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The thesis examines the reconfiguration of concepts of national identity in post-
unification Germany in three broad sections. Section one examines the discourse of
identity of neoconservatives and critical thinkers between the 1960s and 1980s.
Neoconservatives advocated a return to conventional national identity based upon the
patriotic identification with indigenous national traditions. Critical thinkers argued for a
post-national Constitutional Patriotism based upon the critical reflection of national
traditions. Both these approaches are located within the context of conflictual attitudes
towards the concepts of "compensation" and "emancipation" in past and present and
towards the experience of the National Socialist past.
Section two examines the reception of unification within the liberal conservative and
neue Rechte milieu. Liberal conservatives sought to synthesise the technocratic
Westernisation of the post-war FRG with a traditional national concept. Neue Rechte
conservatives rejected "Western" values and perceived in the collapse of Communism
the discrediting of both the "utopia" of radical social alternative and also of the
Kleinutopie of civil society. The post-Cold War constellation signified for these thinkers
the opportunity for a return to pre-1945 traditions of German nationalism and offered an
opportunity to relativise the national socialist past.
Finally, section three offers an analysis of the reconfiguration of national identity which
synthesises the concern for "national" identity with the left-liberal concept of "post-
national" identity. The "Westernisation" of the concept of the German nation perceived
positive antecedents in the bourgeois emancipation movements of the pre-national
nineteenth century. The final chapter elaborates the thesis of a "culture of contrition" for
the national socialist past which formulates a radical, "post-national" identity with
emancipatory aspirations. The thesis perceives in this latter discourse of "broken"
identity an attempt to reconfigure a sense of national "normality" in the present which is
predicated upon the acknowledgement of "abnormality" in the past.
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1. Introduction: Reconfiguring Identity at the "End of History" and "Beyond the Nation
state"?
But we cannot picture to ourselves a world that is essentially different from the present one, and at the
same time better. Other, less reflective ages also thought of themselves as the best, but we arrive at this
conclusion exhausted, as it were, from the pursuit of alternatives we felt had to be better than liberal
democracy. I
Der nationalstaatliche Rahmen fur die Implementierung von Menschenrechten und Demokratie hat,
tiber die Grenzen von Stammen und Dialekten hinweg, eine neue, abstraktere Form der sozialen
Integration moglich gemacht. Wir stehen heute vor der Aufgabe, diesen Prozel3 mit einem weiteren
Abstraktionsschritt fortzusetzen. 2
In the following, I wish to examine the reconfiguration of German national identity within
the broader parameters delineated by the above two positions. Francis Fukuyama perceived
in the collapse of the Soviet Union the exhaustion of the modernist dialectic of social
transformation and progress represented in Hegelian and Marxist concepts of social
transience. We can, for Fukuyama, no longer imagine a future alternative social-historical
form which is better than the present, only worse. For Fukuyama, the pinnacle of human
social form appears represented in the liberal, democratic Free Market society of the United
States. Jiirgen Habermas, on the other hand, remains committed to the ongoing "modernist
project" and the values of universalism, reason and human emancipation.' For Habermas,
whilst the nation-state has been exhausted as a cohesive social form, the modernist project
which created the nation must be continued after its demise into the "post-national
constellation". Habermas seeks to rescue the republican core of the nation-state and the
radical project of the post-war social state upon the supra-national level of Europe and
ultimately a universal cosmopolitan world order. Whilst both these thinkers pursue different
political and philosophical projects, these arguments appear, in their essence, to express two
constitutive perceptions of the present: the exhaustion of both the classical concept of human
social progress and of the classical form of the nation-state.
I Francis Fukuyama, 'The End Of History And The Last Man.' Penguin Books, London. 1992.p.46.
2 Jilrgen Habermas, 'Die postnationale Konstellation.' Suhrkamp. 1998. p. 36.
3 Jilrgen Habermas, 'Die Moderne - ein unvollendetes Projekt. Philosophisch-politische Aufsatze 1977-
1992.' Reclam. Leipzig. 1992.
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Whilst the collapse of the Soviet Union strengthened a conservative social outlook which can
countenance no alternative social form to Free Market society, throughout the 1990s the
traditional nation-state appears compromised as the prime unit of identification in political
culture." In this context, one might perceive, with Eric Hobsbawm, that the present
constellation is characterised by the eclipse of the conventional points of orientation through
which left and right have gained definition since the French Revolution.' Whilst the "party of
progress" has conventionally been defined by its commitment to human emancipation and
alternative social forms, the "party of order" has conventionally orientated itself towards the
nation as the ultimate focus of collective loyalty and social regulation.
More specifically, I wish to examine the development of a post-unification discourse of
identity with recourse to distinct conservative and left-liberal approaches to the German
national past and present which emerged in the 1980s in West Germany, I attempt to pursue
this development by a critical reception of the left-liberal discourse of "critical history" and
Verfassungspatriotismus as media of political "emancipation" and conservative concepts of
Historie and national identity as media of political "compensation". I contend thereby that
whilst during the 1980s these discourses existed in a dichotomous relationship with one
another, during the 1990s they have undergone an uneven and open-ended process of
synthesis. The unification of the two German states clearly exercised a profound impact upon
such discourse and offered a material context for the articulation of the seemingly abstract
debates of the 1980s over national identity. Yet at the same time, these debates themselves
have not evolved in a vacuum and have themselves been transformed, In particular I am
interested in examining the changing role played by reflections of the National Socialist past
as a media of national identity creation for both the "party of progress" and the "party of
order".
1.1 National Identity in flux
Despite the claims of conventional "national identity", both the nation state and "national
consciousness" are neither eternal in character or of fixed meaning throughout history. In
order to assess the characteristics of varieties of national thinking and identity construction
4 c:fthe collection of essays in John Dunn (ed.) 'Contemporary Crisis of the Nation State?' Blackwell.
Oxford. 1995. Paul Kennedy, 'Preparing for the Twenty-First Century.' Harper-Collins. London. 1993.
esp. pp. 122-134.
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one must first recognise that such phenomena evolve within a historically and socially
specific context which is involved in a dynamic process of change. This perspective enables
us to consider the specifics of particular formulations of national consciousness within a
dynamic framework and to recognise that the social and political values expressed in
particular varieties of national discourse can change both substantially and formally over
time.
Sophisticated treatments of the development of nationalist thought and practice since the
early nineteenth century relate the emergence of national identity to the process of nation-
building. Such readings stress the emergence of nation states and nationalism as a part of the
broader process of social, economic and political modernisation in the West charted by the
transformation from agrarian to industrial society. Different authors have stressed the
importance of factors such as the process of socio-economic modernisation", the
development of print capitalism', demographic changes and the universalisation of a distinct
"High Culture'". Common among such treatments of the theme is the realisation that
nationalism is a distinctly modem phenomenon and a reaction to forces of social and
economic modernisation and political transformation rather than a derivation of innate
human need which exists outside of history. Thinkers such as Gellner, Hobsbawm and
Anderson stress the character of the nation as an artifice or an "imagined" community which
must be understood within the context of the great social and cultural transformations which
ushered in the "modem age" in Western society.
Of particular importance in the evolution of national identity is the transformation in the
terms of legitimacy between the state and the civil society which it regulates. John Breuilly
has noted the manner in which nationalist politics emerged as a legitimising discourse for
universalising the economic and political claims of an increasingly powerful "civil society"
against an unrepresentative monarchical state." In the age of the revolutionary nation state,
sovereignty was no longer mediated by the notion of a divine right of the monarchy, but by
5 Eric Hobsbawm, 'The New Century' Little, Brown and Company. London. 2000. p. 98.
6 cfErnest Gellner, 'Encounters with Nationalism'. Blackwell. Oxford. 1994. Also cfthe recent
collection of critical assessments of Gellner's approach in John A. Hall (ed.) 'The State of the Nation.
Ernest Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism.' CUP. Cambridge. 1999.
7 Benedict Anderson, 'Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism.'
Verso. London. 1983.
8 Charles Taylor, 'Nationalism and Modernity'. in Hall. (ed.) op. cit. 1999. pp. 193-4.
9 John Breuilly, 'Nationalism and the State.' MUP. 1993. pp. 367-372.
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the democratic rights of the people." In the wake of the enlightenment and the French
Revolution, traditional perceptions of how to regulate the relationship between the state and
civil society were profoundly undermined by the force of rational, human centred and
democratic principles. II Breuilly considers the development of the social purchase and
aspirations of nationalist politics during the nineteenth century from denoting a political
medium which cohered social elites behind the project of creating a nation state to
representing an ideological tool to cement the legitimacy of the newly created states and
hence bolster the status-quo." Rogers Brubaker distinguishes in this vein between "state-
framed" and "counter-state" nationalism."
Whilst the nationalism which emerged around the late eighteenth early nineteenth century
tended to project a forward-looking challenge to the status-quo, the national identity of
established late nineteenth century nation states aimed to legitimise the often newly created
social order." By the end of the nineteenth century, the earlier universal and progressive
values articulated by national politics had largely been replaced by a focus upon national
particularism and the historical derivation of the present. Such studies recognise the
importance of social and historical context in explaining the role of nationalism at the level
of effective politics. This perspective avoids the seperation of nationalism as an "idea" from
the social structure which it seeks to reflect." For the Marxist historian Miroslav Hroch,
approaches which regard a particular type of nationalism as the prime mover relegate
nationalism to a "state of mind" which is not accessible to historical investigation." Against
this, Hroch understands the relationship between "the nation" and "national consciousness"
10 ibid. p. 374.
II Habermas. op. cit. p. 185. Eric Hobsbawm, 'The Age of Revolution. 1789-1848.' Mentor. New York.
1962, p. 84.
12 Breuilly. 1993. op. cit. p. 380.
13 cfRogers Brubaker, 'Myths and misconceptions in the study of nationalism.' in Hall (ed.) op. cit.
1999. p. 300.
14 cfFrank Furedi, 'Mythical Past - Elusive Future. History and Society in an Anxious Age.' Pluto.
1990. esp. pp. 132-158.
15 cf Smith, 'Theories of Nationalism. ' Dudeworth. 1971. pp. 5-6 for Smith's "methodological"
justification of this seperation and pp. 264-67 ibid for his defence against Gellner's criticism that he
emphasises idealist over structural forces. Smith still remains orientated, it must be stated, to the
importance of the processes of modernisation in assessing nationalism. A similar emphasis upon the
ultimate "primacy" of "ideas" as a motivation for human action also runs through James Joll's
treatment of the origins of the 1914-18 World War, cf James Joll, 'The Origins of the First World War.'
Macmillan. London. 1990. p. 187.
16 Miroslav Hroch, 'Real and constructed: the nature of the nation.' in Hall (ed.) op. cit. 1999. pp. 92-3.
Whilst Hroch concurs with Gellner's emphasis upon the 'social transformations during the transition to
modernity' he is critical of the view that the nation represents a mere "myth" and of "global"
explanations of nationalism as an all-purpose explanation. ibid. p. 104.
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as one of "mutual and complimentary correlation" rather than one of "mutual derivation" and
considers arguments over which is "primary" as ideological or philosophical sophistry. I?
In recent years, arguments which imply nationalism as a state of mind or as a prime mover of
social activity appear to have gained a certain currency. This assumes perhaps its most
common form in the description of "Western" and "Eastern" variants of national sentiment
which are frequently conflated with concepts of "civic" and "ethnic" nationalism." From this
perspective, the schism which runs through East and West is no longer formulated in terms
of the capitalist - communist confrontation but in terms of the civility of indigenous national
traditions. Conceptions of "romantic" and "civic" nationalism play a role in defining the
contemporary political identity of the post-Cold War West. The eclipse of relatively effective
post-war international and domestic social, economic and political arrangements has
stimulated a search for new media of regulating international relations and the terms of
domestic legitimacy. Discussion of varieties of "ethnic" and "civic" nationalism play an
important role in reconfiguring political authority in the post-Cold War age at both a
European and national level.
Many thinkers in the West during the 1990s have been concerned to develop a political and
intellectual model which could help provide a positive definition of concepts such as
"Western civilisation" in the absence of the anticommunist certainties of the post-war period.
In the immediate wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Fukuyama formulated the new
major division in the world as running along the lines of those nations still "caught in
history" and those which had progressed into a "post-historical" condition." Ernest Gellner
sought to define the distinctiveness of the Western nations in the form of a "Consumerist
Unbeliever International" which was perfectly entitled to "gang up with each other" against
threats from Islam or terrorist states and which effectively represented a "world
government"." Whilst the radical social philosopher Jurgen Habermas rejects any notions of
"world government" he perceives in the "states of the First World" the only reliable
representatives of the "Western" emancipatory legacy of enlightenment political traditions."
17 ibid.
18 cf Anthony D. Smith, 'National Identity and the Idea of European Unity.' in Peter Gowan and Perry
Anderson (eds.) 'The Question of Europe'. Verso. London. 1997. p. 324.
19 Fukuyama. 1990. op. cit. pp. 276-8.
20 Gellner. 1994. op. cit. p. 181.
21 Jtlrgen Habermas, 'Die Einbeziehung des Anderen. Studien zur politischen Theorie.' Suhrkamp.
Frankfurt.lM. 1996. p. 215.
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An important sentiment of such reconfigurations of Western civilisation is the notion that the
contemporary West is united in its rejection of traditional ethnic nationalism. For Habermas,
a central, defining experience of the collective Western European states is the one of having
happily overcome nationalism." All of the above arguments seek to reformulate a sense of
what constitutes the political boundaries of the West and how this particular culture is
distinguished from the rest of the globe. What is significant about the above commentaries is
that they attempt to recast divisions between the West and the rest of the globe in terms of
values or ideas of nationalism. The picture which emerges is of a Western world which has
happily made the break with its chauvinistic or ethnic nationalist past in contrast to the parts
of the globe where such forces apparently remain strong.
Within this context it appears useful to remember the importance of the social and historical
forces which shape the expression of nationalism of both ethnic and civic character.
Considering various types of nationalism as the prime mover and locating these within
particular cultural or political boundaries apppears equally capable of reproducing a similar
hierarchy of humanity to that performed by classical ethnic nationalism." Commentators
have emphasised that no such neat distinction between Eastern and Western nationalisms is
tenable" and that the salience of extreme nationalism in the former Eastern Bloc is hugely
overstated." From this perspective, divisions between ethnic Eastern and civic Western
nationalism appear to reflect more the search for new definitions in the West than genuine
understanding of the contemporary world. The reconfiguration of the particularism of "the
West" within a global context is reproduced at the national level. Upon this level too, the
notion of an abandonment of old ethnic nationalism or romantic national traditions in favour
of a pluralist and tolerant civic nationalism plays a central role.
In the case of post-unification German national identity these developments play a
particularly important role. In the post-war German context, discussion of ethnic or romatic
nationalist traditions was understandably dominated by the experience of the National
Socialist regime and the Holocaust. In the post-war Federal Republic, the National Socialist
experience served not only to discredit romantic traditions of national discourse but rather
22 cf Jurgen Habermas, 'Reply to Grimm.' in Gowan and Anderson. (eds.) 1997. op. cit. p. 264.
23 Adam Burgess, 'Divided Europe. The New Domination of the East.' Pluto. London. 1997. p. 195.
24 ibid. pp. 9-12, p. 121.
2S Brubaker. in Hall (ed.) 1999. op. cit. pp. 283-4. Brubaker finds more evidence of similarity between
East and West in the form ofa more general cynicism towards politics and parties.
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more to undermine the articulation of nationalist sentiment per se. Indeed, the post-
unification discussion over national identity has been significantly shaped by the question of
whether the return of the German nation state would signal a return to romantic and
chauvinist traditions of nationalism. In this context, discussion over the distinction between
ethnic and civic nationalism assumes the form of a direct confrontation with the indigenous
past and above all with the National Socialist period. In other words, in order for
contemporary Germany to cultivate a sense of positively endowed national identity, a
fundamental break is necessary with traditional romantic concepts which emphasise ethnicity
as the key to nationality. This break with tradition involves, however, much more than the
distancing from overtly racial definitions of nationality and takes in a wider post-war West
German political confrontation between neoconservative and left-liberal intellectuals and
politicians. It is within this longer-term West German political context that the thesis
examines the reconfiguration of post-unification national identity. Before considering the
post-unification transformation of not only romantic and civic nationalism but more
fundamentally of central tenets of the left-right political divide, it is necessary to discusss the
thinkers and positions examined in the thesis in closer detail.
1.2 Neoconservatives, Left-liberals and Identity
The distinction in the thesis between neoconservatives and left-liberals is orientated towards
the political and historiographical confrontation which polarised discussion of the concept of
national identity during the 1980s. The well-documented Historikerstreit of 1986 involved
more than a dispute over the singularity of the Nazi Holocaust, as important as that was, but
rather more served as a public forum within which conflictual and distinct perceptions of
contemporary West German society clashed. The primary distinction between
neoconservative and left-liberal positions during the 1980s gained definition from a
reflection of two central experiences: on the one hand the political legacy of tradition-
consuming modernist political culture represented in the enlightenment and French
revolution of 1789. On the other hand, in terms of more direct political experience,
neoconservative and left-liberal approaches divided in their general attitudes towards the
counter-culture of the 1960s and the reformism of the social-democratic state. Both of these
factors played a central role in the articulation of distinct neoconservative and left-liberal
interpretations of the political identity of the Federal Republic during the 1980s.
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In tum, it can be stated that the emergence of a heated debate over the concept of national
identity itself was a symptom of changing perceptions of emancipatory politics and the post-
war social state consensus. The concern with national identity only became a substantial
point of public-political debate in the context of the exhaustion of both the confessional and
technocratic conservative streams associated with the Adenauer period of reconstruction and
also the emancipatory energies contained in the 'New Left' and social-liberal reformism.
Perceptions of a Tendenzwende or political U-turn to the right in the wake of the 1960s were
strengthened by the return of a conservative coalition in 1982 which placed the promotion of
a sense of national identity as a political priority." The Historikerstreit was initiated by the
perception among left-liberals that the right was robustly engaged in a rehabilitation of
conventional nationalism and discredited romantic, anti-modernist political traditions.
The neoconservative position which emerged during the Historikerstreit can be summarised
with reference to three main factors. Firstly, neoconservatives understood conventional
national identity as a source of meta-political values which could forge an emotional bond
between the state and citizenry in a reading of the national past. For the historian and former
consultant to Chancellor Kohl, Michael Sturmer, patriotism's social role was that ofa secular
religion which commanded loyalty and authority in meta-political terms." The benefit of
conventional national identity was that it did not rely upon rational, conscious political
debate but rather invoked a pre-political essence which shaped the nation as a community of
fate.
Secondly, for neoconservatives, history and the past played a vital social role in the present.
For the Zurich philosopher Hermann Lubbe, the constant dynamic of social and economic
change in modem society undermines our sense of identity by destroying traditional values."
From the cultivation of historical consciousness, via the promotion of a museum and
preservation culture, Lubbe believes that the present can draw compensation for the
dislocating effect of socio-economic modernisation. Whilst neoconservatives remam
26 cfHolger Czitrich, 'Konservatismus und nationale Identitat in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Der
Konservatismus, seine Theorie und Entwicklung im Spiegel der Diskussionen iiber das
Selbstverstandnis der Bundesrepublik Deutschland seit Mitte der siebziger Jahre.' Peter Lang.
FrankfurtlM. 1989. pp. 63-72.
27 Michael Sturmer, 'Kein Eigentum der Deutschen: die deutsche Frage.' in Werner Weidenfeld (Hg.)
'Die Identitat der Deutschen.' Carl Hanser Verlag. MiinchenlWien. 1983. p. 86.
28 Hermann Lubbe, 'Der Fortschritt und das Museum. Uber den Grund unseres Vergniigens an
historischen Gegenstanden.' The 1981 Bithell Memorial Lecture. Institute of Germanic Studies.
University of London. W.S Maney and Son LTD Leeds. 1982. pp.I-6.
10
positively inclined towards the modernisation of Free Market mechanisms, they take
exception to the process of political modernisation in the sense of democratisation and
claims for equality. Notions of the political benefits of national identity are thus predicated
upon a positive attitude towards the national past. The past serves both as a source of pride
and affirmation and also as a reminder of the rootedness of the present in particular historical
traditions. This is necessarily disrupted by the National Socialist experience which clearly
hinders an uncomplicated assertion of the organic continuity between past and present or the
plea for conventional patriotism.
This brings us to the third aspect which was represented in the contribution of the Berlin
historian Ernst Nolte who sought to shift the causality of National Socialism and the
Holocaust from German history and onto the Bolshevik revolution of October 1917 and
Soviet Union." This corresponded to the common perception articulated by neoconservatives
that an overemphasis upon the National Socialist past had both disrupted the relationship
between state and society and also the emotional bond between past and present. In Nolte's
argument, an anticommunist or totalitarian approach was employed to both confront the
discrediting of the national past and also to bolster the status of the contemporary West
German state as a member of the Free West.
The neoconservative position essentially understood History as a source of ultimate, meta-
political values which were transmitted through national identity. Historicism provides the
ideological basis of nationalism in this perception. This orientation towards a positive past
which invited imitation was necessarily compromised by the National Socialist experience
which led neoconservatives to stress non-German factors and relativise the Holocaust. This
position was confronted by left-liberal intellectuals who likewise addressed similar themes to
their conservative colleagues.
The foremost left-liberal intellectual in the Federal Republic is arguably Jurgen Habermas.
Habermas contested the plea for a return to conventional national identity and argued that
such a concept represented a threat to West Germany's commitment to the West." For
Habermas this commitment to the West implied an orientation towards the tenets of Western
29 Ernst Nolte, 'Vergangenheit, die nicht verge hen will. Eine Rede, die geschrieben, aber nicht gehalten
werden konnte.' In, 'Historikerstreit.' op. cit. p. 45.
30 Haberrnas, 'Eine Art Schadensabwicklung' in, Historikerstreit. 1987. op. cit. p. 75-6.
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political culture deemed antithetical to traditional German nationalism. This led Habermas to
argue the case for a form of Verfassungspatriotismus which adopted and substantially altered
a concept articulated by the liberal conservative Dolf Sternberger in 1978. Both Sternberger
and Habermas argued for a form of social solidarity and loyalty which was based upon pride
in the constitutional arrangements of the Federal Republic. Yet for Sternberger the
commitment to the constitution was complimented by an attachement to the concept of the
German nation." For Habermas, however, the attachement to Verfassungspatriotismus was
inextricably linked with a celebration of the post-national basis of West German democracy.
In Habermas, the concept of Verfassungspatriotismus is derived from republican-democratic
traditions of sovereign will formation in a society of free and equals and a commitment to the
principles of reason and universalism." Habermas represents in many respects a highly
interesting figure in the critical engagement with neoconservatism as he remains as
committed to the modernist project as neconservatives were to attack this tradition. Likewise,
a central aspect of VerJassungspatriotismus is a celebration of the refounding of the Federal
Republic during the 1960s. For Habermas and other left-liberal intellectuals, West Germany
only really substantially broke with national traditions and joined Western political culture
after the democratising impulse of the 1960s counter-culture.
The concept of a progressive refounding of the FRG during the 1960s was based upon a
critical reading of German national history. For the pioneer of the critical-historical social
science appoach, Hans-Ulrich Wehler, the history of the German nation and the collapse into
National Socialist barbarity testified to a Sonderweg to modernity which significantly
deviated from the path of Western democracies." The role of critical history comprised the
investigation of the repression of emancipatory forces in national history and the critique of
authoritarian and antidemocratic continuities in contemporary West German society. The
critique of national history is thus understood as enabling the emancipation from tradition
and as breaking the link between historicism and nationalism.
These approaches combined with a critical reflection of the National Socialist regime which
placed the Third Reich firmly within longer-term national political and ide logical traditions.
31 cf Berger. 1997. op. cit. p. 83.
32 c:f Jurgen Haberrnas, 'Die Moderne - ein unvollendetes Projekt.' in Haberrnas. 1992. op. cit. pp. 32-
55.
33 cfHans-Ulrich Wehler, 'Bismarck und der Imperialismus.' Vandenhoeck und ruprecht. Gottingen,
1969.
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In response to the neoconservative call for drawing a line under the NS past in order to
articulate a more conventional form of national identity, left-liberal thinkers derived moral-
political authority for the concept of post-national democratic Verfassungspatriotismus from
a critical focus upon the Nazi past. From this perspective, the German nation state had been
eternally discredited either as a practical organisatory principle or as an ideological rallying-
call in West Germany. Critical reflection of the National Socialist past was understood, in the
words of the director of the Munich-based Instittute for Contemporary History, Martin
Broszat, one of the best forms of moralisch-politische Gesittung in West German society."
For left-liberal thinkers, remembrance of the National Socialist past thus represented not
only decent respect for the victims but also played a key role in politically civilising West
German society against regressive trends towards a renationalisation of political culture.
Thus during the 1980s one could discern a dichotomy between neoconservative and left-
liberal approaches to the concept of national identity. One commentator speaks of a divide
between "national conservatives" such as Sturmer and "radical modernists" such as
Habermas." Neoconservative thinkers argued for a rehabilitation of conventional patriotism
from which an emotional, supra-rational bond between state and citizenry was expected as
well as a form of compensation afforded by consciousness of the historical derivation of the
present. This approach was predicated upon a playing-down or relativisation of the National
Socialist past and the regime's specific roots in German national political culture. Left-
liberals argued for a form of post-national Verfassungspatriotismus which was based in the
historical departure from the nation state in 1945 and in the intellectual break with
authoritarian traditions in the 1960s. This approach centred upon a critical self-reflection of
the National Socialist past which was understood as a powerful moral-political argument for
a post-national orientation in terms of social organisation and political identity.
Whilst neoconservative and left-liberal positions existed in a conflictual relationship to one
another in terms of the form of identity sought and the conceptualisation of the social use of
history, it would be misleading to imply that they represented homogenous and antithetical
blocs of political opinion. Both orientations displayed inner heterogeneity and also elements
34 Broszat, 'Wern gehort die deutsehe Gesehiehte ?' in Broszat, 'Nach Hitler. Der sehwierige Umgang
mit unserer Gesehiehte.' DTV. Munchen. 1988. p. 310.
35 ef Anton Leist, 'Nation und Patriotismus in Zeiten der Globalisierung.' in, Christine Chwaszcza,
Wolfgang Kersting (Hrsg.) 'Politisehe Philosophie der intemationalen Beziehungen.' Suhrkamp.
Frankfurt. 1M. 1998. p. 402.
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of congruence with one another. Thus the neoconservative stance incorporated liberal-
conservative and deutsch-national currents of right-wing politics. Whilst both currents were
orientated towards a romantically conceived concept of conventional national identity, they
diverged in their assessment of the role of nationalism in contemporary West German
society. Whilst liberal conservative such as Sturmer argued for the renaissance of
conventional national identity as a means of bolstering the social hegemony of the Federal
Republic, deutsch-national thinkers such as Bernhard Willms understood nationalism as a
potential challenge to the Cold War status-quo. For Willms, the case for conventional
national identity involved a challenge to the divided status of Mitteleuropa and raised the
prospect of breaking out of the East-West deadlock and unifying the two German states."
Whilst such positions remained marginal in conservative discourse, both pro and anti-
Western right wing thinkers conceived national identity in anti-modernist, romantic terms
and sought to suppress the critical memory of the National Socialist past.
Left-liberals too cannot be considered a homogeneous coterie of modernist thinkers. There
are important differences in the arguments advanced by left-liberal thinkers even if they
largely shared Habermas political critique of neoconservatism. Left-liberal, post-national
thinkers included right wing social democrats such as Heinrich August Winkler, critical
historians such as Wehler and radical modernists such as Habermas. Habermas argument for
post-national identity came under criticism from left-liberal historians such as Broszat, Lutz
Niethammer and Detlev Peukert who argued from a defence of critical Alltagsgeschichte.
Broszat noted the pro-western attachments of Sturmer and questioned whether he was
deserving of Habermas criticism that his position undermined the bond with the West." Lutz
Niethammer criticised the conceptual premises of the instrumentalisation of history for
simplistic identity constructs and argued the case for an orientation towards subjective
Erfahrungsgeschichte rather than an objectifying national reference point." Against such
identity politics, pro-Alltagsgeschichte historians argued that a critical history from below
approach challenged uncritical assertions of a Stunde Null in 1945 by emphasising the
36 Bernhard Willms, Paul Kleinewefers, 'Erneuerung aus der Mitte. Prag - Wien - Berlin. Diesseits von
Ost und West.' Busse und Seewald GmbH. Herford. 1988. p. 300.
37 cfMartin Broszat, 'Wo sich die Geister scheiden.Die Beschworung der Geschichte taugt nicht als
nationaler Religionsersatz.' in 'Historikerstreit.' 1987. op. cit. p. 193.
38 cf Lutz Niethammer, 'Erinnerungsgebot und Erfahrungsgeschichte. Institutionalisierungen im
kollektiven Gedachtnis.' in Loewy. 1992. op. cit. pp. 21-34.
14
continuities which stretched into the post-war period." Also from a history from below
perspective, Detlev Peukert perceived unintentional apologetics in the critical concept of the
Sonderweg: firstly this notion cast the roots of later barbarism in terms of a "deficit of
modernism" which, however, had now been successfully overcome in the Federal Republic."
For Peukert, talk of a Zivilisationsbruch in 1933-45 down-played the intimate relationship
between modernism and barbarism in the broader process of Western civilisation." For this
group of critical historians, the real issue of the Historikerstreit was not merely the
confrontation between progressive and conservative formulations of identity but rather more
the question of how to structure the necessary Historisierung of National Socialist."
Despite the criticisms from advocates of a critical Alltagsgeschichte or from left-liberal
intellectuals who criticised Habermas' moralisation of history", it must be recognised that
they shared significant common ground particularly in their rejection of historiographic
nationalism and their commitment to emancipatory forms of history writing." Likewise,
whilst is was certainly the case that Sturmer and Habermas shared an orientation to the
Western-integrated Federal Republic, the political visions which filled this concept for right
and left diverged significantly. In the context of West Germany during the 1980s,
perceptions of romantic and civic patriotism were intimately related to distinctive left and
right attitudes towards the legacy of political modernism, attitudes towards the counter-
culture of the I960s, notions of the social use of history and approaches towards the National
Socialist past.
Whilst defintitions of neoconservative and left-liberal approaches to the question of identity
in West Germany contained certain limitations, they nevertheless reflected a broad
orientation along the lines of Hobsbawm's distinction between the parties of order and
progress. Post-unification debate of these themes displays a process of transformation in the
39 Lutz Niethammer, 'Normalisierung im Westen. Einnerungsspuren in die 50er Jahre.' in Diner.
(Hrsg.) 1987. op. cit. pp. 153-184.
40 cf Detlev Peukert, 'AIItag und Barberei. Zur Normalitat des Dritten Reiches.' in Diner. (Hrsg.) ibid.
pp.52-3.
41 ibid. pp. 59-61. This argument in greater detail in Peukert, 'The Weimar Republic. The Crisis of
Classical Modernity.' Penguin. London. 1993.
42 Thus Wolfgang Benz, 'Die Abwehr der Vergangenheit. Ein Problem nur fur Historiker und
Moralisten?' in Diner. (Hrsg.) 1987. op. cit. p 18. also cf Diner in ibid. 'Einleitung des Herausgebers.'
p.8.
43 cfHelmut Fleischer, 'Die Moral der Geschichte. Zum disput uber die Vergangenheit, die nicht
vergehen will.' in 'Historikerstreit.'. 1987. op. cit. p. 124.
44 Thus Berger. 1997. op. cit. p. 80.
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definitions of neoconservative and left-liberal approaches to the question of national identity.
Above all, discussion of post-unification national identity has been dominated by the
suggestion that the collapse of the Cold War has heralded a renaissance of romantic
nationalist traditions and has restored the bond between historicism and nationalism." The
thesis considers this perspective within the context of an examination of substantial changes
in both neoconservative and left-liberal formulations of identity which display an uneven
synthesis between conventional left and right wing conceptions of the relationship between
historical consciousness and national identity.
Firstly, the thesis considers the relative ideological unity between liberal conservative and
deutsch-national formulations of a romantic-inspired national identity as no longer tenable in
important respects. Liberal conservatives such as Sturmer and Hildebrand continue to argue
for a merging of the Westbindung with the national idea. For these thinkers, contemporary
Germany assumes a form of synthesis between the Westernisation and democratisation
pursued under Adenauer and the national sovereignty and foreign-political influence of the
Bismarckreich. Whilst during the period of division, liberal conservatives sought to
"nationalise" the political culture of West German democracy, in the post-unification period,
this approach has assumed the form of an attempt to democratise or Westernise aspects of the
historic German nation state. Whilst these thinkers perceive 1989 as heralding a return to
"normality" this does not entail a return to pre-1945, antidemocratic traditions of German
nationalism. This latter position is adopted by the thinkers of the neue Rechte or "New
Right".
This brand of right wing conservatism assumes the mantle held during the period of division
by deutsch-national conservatives who perceive in the unification of the nation state, the end
of the dominance of "Western" values in Germany and the return to a traditional canon of
romantic-inspired nationalism and the international power-politics of the "autonomous"
nation state. For historians such as Rainer Zitelmann" and Karl-Heinz Weillmann," the
collapse of the Eastern Bloc heralded the death of traditional radical politics and antifascist
approaches to National Socialism in particular. This constellation held for the "New Right"
45 cfBerger. 1997. op. cit. p. 23.
46 ef Rainer Zitelmann, 'Adenauers Gegner. Streiter fiir die Einheit.' Straube. Erlangen-Bonn- Wien.
1991.
47 Karlheinz WeiBmann, 'Der Weg in den Abgrund. Deutschland unter Hitler 1933 - 1945.' Propylaen
Verlag. Berlin. 1995. p. 10.
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the potential for a confrontation with the National Socialist past (or more specifically with
the perceived left-wing bias of interpretation) which not only sought to neutralise the
contemporary political charge of this discredited past but which perceived "positive" aspects
of the regime in its programme of social and economic modernisation. As one commentator
observed, these thinkers are neither drawn towards the Western conservatism associated with
Adenauer, nor with the Prussian power-state created by Bismarck but with the pre-fascist
traditions of the Conservative Revolutionaries who polemicised against liberal democracy
during the inter-war period."
Clearly there remain significant overlaps and differences between liberal conservative and
'New Right' positions. Liberal conservatives concur with New Right thinkers in the
perception that post-war West German left-liberal Volkspiidagogik must be defeated and the
fixation with the National Socialist past and the Sonderweg must be finally dropped." In this
vein, both currents drew confidence from the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and the trend to
identify the GDR as Germany's zweite Diktatur and hence relativise the singularity of the
Third Reich. Also, both streams positively assess the possibilities of a cultivation of the
Mittellage in Central Europe with the increased international authority of the unified state.
Yet despite such common ground, an irresolvable point of contention between liberal
conservatives and New Right thinkers remains perceptions of "Western" values and the
quality of nationalism desired. Whilst liberal conservatives endorse the Westbindung of
Germany and affirm the commitments of the contemporary nation state to the Western
community, New right intellectuals attempted to rehabilitate a more traditional, and anti-
Western, ethnic brand of nationalism which necessarily entailed a direct confrontation with
the legacy of National Socialism. It appears at this point in particular - the defence of
romantic nationalist traditions - that liberal conservatives and New Right thinkers part ways.
Whereas a significant section of liberal conservatism has dropped the embarrassing
commitment to ethnic definitions of nationality and has achieved a certain rapprochement
with left-liberal formulations, New Right thinkers seek to free such interpretations from the
stigma of National Socialism. Whilst during the early 1990s it appeared to many
commentators that the New Right was making significant inroads into political culture, the
course of the decade has seen such positions pushed to the margins of serious discourse. 50
48 Thomas Assheuer, 'Das Deutschlandspiel.' in Die Zeit. Nr.37. 03.09. 1998.
49 cfBerger. in Berger, Donovan, Passmore (eds.) 1999. op. cit. p. 256.
50 ibid. p. 260.
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Left-liberal perspectives of national identity have also undergone significant change in post-
unification society. On the one hand a significant section of left-liberal thinkers have sought
a rapprochement with the German nation and staked a claim for the cultivation of a
democratic nationalist concept of identity which remains critical of the historic German
nation state and yet seeks to foster authority for the new Western nation state. Figures such
as Winkler\ Otto Darin," Wolfgang Mommsen" have significantly altered their anti or post-
national affiliations and argue for a synthesis between "Western" values and the concept of
the "German nation". Such authors seek democratic-nationalist, or civic nationalist
antecedants for the contemporary nation. Interesting in this transformation is not only the
rapprochement with the nation but equally the consensual nature of such discourse which
appeals to both left-liberals and liberal conservatives to construct a democratic national
identity. Liberal-conservative and left-liberal discourses of identity merge in a form of
mutual rapprochement which fuses a "Westernisation" of the concept of the German nation
with a "nationalisation" of Verfassungspatriotismus.
Even more remarkable than the convergence over the need for a democratic, "Westernised"
national political culture appears the rapprochement over the issue of the National Socialist
past. It is in this moment - characterised as a culture of contrition - that the thesis perceives
the most important development of the post-unification discourse of national identity. This
represents far from a new consensus over the historical and political antecedents of National
Socialism which understandably remains contested ground. The element of convergence
takes place at the level of interpretations of the contemporary social value of historical
perceptions of the Third Reich in lending authority to a concept of reconfigured national
identity. The basis of this change lies founded in two importantant trends: on the one hand
with the collapse of the East, totalitarian approaches to National Socialism experienced a
fillip. Yet on the other hand, the course of the 1990s has shown that this has not led to a
rehabilitation of traditional terms of nationalism. On the contrary, a dominant motif of
national identity constructs in post-unification society is that romantic nationalism must not
be allowed to resurface. Above all, it has become clear that post-unification concepts of
51 cfWinkler, 'Seperatismus auf Filzlatschen. Der Marxismus-Lenninismus ist tot, und der Weg nach
Europa fiihrt uber Berlin.' in Die Zeit. Nr. 43. IS. Oktober. 1998.
52 Otto Dann, 'Nation und Nationalismus in Deutschland 1770 - 1990.' Verlag C.H Beck. Munchen.
1993.p. 325.
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national identity have not led to the drawing of a line underneath the National Socialist past
but rather more are predicated upon a critical reflection of this period. Thus, whilst
unification appeared to strengthen the totalitarian reflex, this has not resulted in the
marginalisation of the National Socialist experience in political culture. Rather, serious
interpretations of National Identity across the political spectrum emphasise the need to base
contemporary post-ethnic concepts of national identity within the context of self-critical
reflection of German fascism and the Holocaust in particular. Thus contemporary discussion
of national identity finds itself in a peculiar and unique situation whereby the right appears to
have won the argument for a concept of national identity and yet the left appears to have won
the argument over its political historical points of reference. It is now necessary to consider
the major aims and limitations of the project.
1.3 Aims and Limitations of the Thesis
The main focus of the thesis is formed by an investigation into the development of the type
of "critical" and "post-traditional" concept of national identity articulated in the post-
unification work of the radical social philosopher Jiirgen Habermas. Habermas is selected
above all as he represents the most sophisticated articulation of the broader trends identified
towards a reconfiguration of national identity which explodes the unity between nationalism
and historicism. Habermas appears in many respects as the philosophical expression of the
transformation of left-liberals in post-unification Germany. Whilst Habermas formally
remains critical of the nation as a basis for either social organisation or political identity, his
concept of gebrochene Identitiit represents a sophisticated reformulation of national identity
rather than its transcendence.
For Habermas, the defining characteristic of the contemporary West is described in the
phrase of the "post-national constellation"." This involves two processes of reconfiguration:
Firstly Habermas contends that in the present globalised world the political and economic
authority of national governments are severely weakened. In this context he argues for the
development of a European federation which could create a new, supra-national forum for
the continuation of the "modernist project" and the social state compromise of the post-war
53 cfWolfgang Mommsen, 'Der autoritare Nationalstaat. Verfassung, Gesellschaft und Kultur im
deutschen Kaiserreich.' Fischer. F.lMain. 1992. p. 7.
54 Habermas. 1998. op. cit.
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period. Secondly, Habermas contends that traditional, ethnic-based or romantic nationalism
was fundamentally discredited by the National Socialist experience. Far from signalling the
rehabilitation of such traditions, the eclipse of the Cold War constellation has displayed the
bankruptcy of conventional formulations of national identity based upon a mystification of
the indigenous past into a glorious antecedent. 55 It is within this context that the concepts of
Verfassungspatriotismus and "critical history" have undergone change.
In answer to the post-national constellation, Habermas argues for the transformation of
Constitutional Patriotism into a Weltinnenpolitik. This retains the orientation towards the
universal values of republican democracy which he seeks to realise on the supra-national
level of a European Federation. The universalism derived from a form of solidarity mediated
by the law and constitution appears to Habermas as a useful means of breaking the link
between nationality and citzenship which characterised traditional nationalism. For
Habermas, it is hence the task of Verfassungspatriotismus to adopt the role formerly
performed by nationalism. 56
In this context, Habermas argues that the "national public" created by the emergence of
nation states in the late eighteenth - early nineteenth century should now be transcended onto
the level of a European "Public" which shares a supra-national communicative context
within which the sovereign will of the European "civil society" should find an effective
voice. The concept of Weltinnenpolitik serves as a mechanism for the realisation of a
genuinely cosmopolitan order as it not only ruptures the intimate relationship between
citizenship and nationality, but it also serves as a means whereby particular states may
intervene for "humanitarian" purpose in the affairs of a state which oppresses its people. For
Habermas, cooperation and solidarity between people is mediated at the abstract level of
"universal moral consciousness" which exists above and beyond the national loyalties of the
citizen. From this perspective, Habermas argues that the boundaries between a humanist
universalism at the level of "moral consciousness" and the cultural particularism of laws
bound by nation states must be relativised. The role of law creation is extremely important to
this discourse and Habermas contends that only when "universal moral consciousness" finds
ss Helmut Dubiel, 'Niemand ist frei von der Geschichte. Die nationalsozialistische Herrschaft in den
Debatten des Deutschen Bundestags.' Carl Hanser Verlag. MiinchenlWien. 1999. p. 292.
56 Habermas. 1996. op. cit. p. 143.
20
codification in international law can the basis for a truely cosmopolitan order be established.
57
As during the 1980s, Habermas concept formally eschews the couching of political authority
in a discourse of particularist national identity. Yet as Habermas remained committed to the
Federal Republic during the 1980s and hence fell back upon an - albeit "critical" -
formulation of post-traditional identity for the West German state, so in the 1990s he is
compelled to articulate his emancipatory political vision via a radical concept of gebrochene
nationale Identitiu." Habermas argues that at the end of the twentieth century not only have
radical politics been discredited but that also traditional right wing political and historical
approaches have been equally discredited. Habermas expresses scepticism towards both the
"utopian" philosphy of history associated with Hegel and later Marx as well as the form of
"historicism" developed by Borussian nationalist historians in the nineteenth century and
defended by neoconservatives up to the present. In place of conventional historical-political
approaches to the questions of progress and order Habermas develops a case for the
internalisation of history as Dementi:" For Habermas, both "utopian" and "historicist"
approaches to past and present are mistaken in their optimism and need to be surplanted with
a concept of history that is born from the experience of defeat and catastrophe. History does
play a central role in defining Habermas concept of radical identity and this assumes the
form of an internalisation of the insight that we only learn from the mistakes of the past. In
the National Socialist experience Habermas perceives the historical collapse par example and
hence the concept of "broken identity" is based neither upon the vision of a positive,
alternative social form nor is it derived from an identification with a postively endowed
national past. Thus in response to the discredited couplet of historicsm and nationalism,
Habermas offers the combination of history as Dementi and a self-critical gebrochene
ldentitiit.
The thesis considers Habermas transcendence of the couplets of "nationality and citizenship"
and "historicism and nationalism" into the concepts of the European Public and
Weltinnenpolitik and "broken identity" based upon an appreciation of history as Dementi as a
57 Jurgen Haberrnas, 'Bestialitat und Humanitat, Ein Krieg an der Grenze zwischen Recht und Moral.'
Die Zeit. Nr. 29. April 1999.
58 Thus Haberrnas in a contribution to the debate over the Berlin Holocaustmahnmal, 'Der Zeigefinger.
Die Deutschen.' Die Zeit. Nr. 14.31. Marz, 1999.
59 Haberrnas. 1995. op. cit. pp. 9.18.
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sophisticated response to the problems of defining progress and order at the "End of History"
and "Beyond the nation state". Whilst Habermas remains formally committed to the
continuation of the modernist project and the realisation of emancipatory social forms, his
approach appears undermined by a prioritisation of order above freedom which leads him
back to the confines of "identity politics". The thesis seeks to investigate the manner in
which Habermas argument reflects a more consensual mood among left and right wing
thinkers regarding the interplay between the critique of the National Socialist past and the
articulation of national identity in the present. The motif of "contrition" appears well suited
to summarise these developments in which the expression of remorse for the NS past ceases
to delegitimise the plea for national identity and rather more transforms into its moral-
political centre. The act of contrition involves not only the expression of remorse for past
transgressions but simultaneously implies the willingness to "learn" from past sins and to
"do better" in the future. The fusion of this motif with the concept of national identity
appears to offer a form of remorse which no longer serves as a critique but as an act of
legitimacy creation and a willingness to "do better" which contemplates the abuse of national
sovereignty in the name of realising a "humanitarian" world order. In this radical form of
"post-national identity", the particularism of the Germans appears formed by the experience
of having overcome National Socialism and conventional romantic nationalism.
Furthermore, this discourse of national identity relies heavily upon the power of an emotive
past to confer the moral-political authority of "history" and contemporary political values. It
is from this perspective that the thesis adopts a critical attitude towards national identity
constructs of both romantic and radical provenance.
The limitations of a thesis of this nature are considerable. Firstly I understand the discourse
of national identity as grounded in the specific socio-political and historical context in which
it is generated. Furthermore, I understand national identity as a response to broad perceptions
of breakdown of previous political and social models in times of rapid historical change. It
would explode the confines of a thesis to provide an exhaustive account of these processes
and their independence and relationship with one another. In this sense, the thesis has been
compelled to assert these factors without going into the detail to which any full account must
in truth aspire.
More specifically, in terms of the debate within the German context the thesis is also
restricted. Thus there is no real discussion of the potential to construct identity on the sub-
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national regional or federal level. Similarly, whilst the development of a relative economic
independence on the level of the regions has progressed in post-unification Germany, I do
not perceive these in competition with the concept of an over-arching concept of national
identity. National identity seeks to define the collective values which cohere a society in
terms of its fundamental social and political norms. I do not perceive a conflict between this
project and the "Sinatra doctrine" of relative regional independent economic development."
Also, there is no chapter solely on the experience of the GDR or indeed on the post-
unification reflection of the social problems derived from the West German "annexation?" of
East Germany and the phenomena of Ostalgie among sections of the former East German
population. Limitations of space playa role in this as does the fact that I do not consider such
discourse as a species of "national identity" but rather more a form of sub-national
Trotzidentiuit." It would be against the grain of the thesis to contribute, however
unintentionally, to the post-unification marginalisation of the East German "voice"." It
appears to reflect the marginalisation of the East German "voice" that the only contribution
to the reconfiguration of national identity offered by the GDR is as a wholly negative
counterfoil to West Germany in the form of Germany's zweite Diktatur. It is also clear that
perceptions of a transformation from ethnic to democratic terms of patriotism playa role in
establishing divisions between not only the nations of the West and the rest of the globe but
equally between West and East German citizens." The vision of the "East German skinhead"
has become a popular, and largely unquestioned stereotype in the new Germany which
fosters notions of a distinct culture of "Eastern" and "Western" values. The Dutch journalist
Ian Buruma reported a popular reaction of West German liberals towards their Eastern
compatriots in the notion that "uncivilized" East Germans represented a form of Wildean
"portrait in the attic" of how the Germans used to be." Such divisions would appear to
60 c:fCharlie Jeffries, 'From cooperative Federalism to a "Sinatra Doctrine" of the Lander?' in Charlie
Jeffries (ed.) 'Recasting German Federalism. The legacy of unification.' Pinto. London 1999. pp. 329-
342.
61 Thus Andre Brie, 'Europapolitische Wendepunkte: eine linke Position.' in Axel Lochner (Hrsg.)
'Linke Politik in Deutschland. Beitrage aus der DDR und BRD.' Galgenberg. Hamburg. 1990. p. 73.
62 Formulation of Daniel Hough. PhD student at IGS Birmingham.
63 Thomas A. Baylis, 'East German Leadership after Unification: The Search for Voice.' in Merkl. (ed.)
1999. op. cit.pp. 135-145.
64 Thus one West German commentator articulates what appears to be an equally popular as it is
irrational fear that although similar percentages of East Germans as West declare an allegiance to the
principles of liberal democracy this does "not necessarily mean" that they are as "able as West
Germans to act democratically." cf, Robert Rohrschneider, 'Visions of Democracy.' in Merkl. (ed.)
ibid. p. 77.
65 Ian Buruma, 'Wages of Guilt. Memories of War in Germany and Japan.' Vintage. London. 1995. p.
28.
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represent more products of the course of unification than reflect genuine, age-old
distinctions.
Despite the importance of reflection of the former GDR and of East-West divisions in
unified Germany, the major focus of this research project is the reconfiguration of German
national identity within the political, philosophical and historical parameters of the
neoconservative and left-liberal positions of the 1980s. These approaches are pursued in the
post-unification context in which, so the thesis contends, they find themselves in a process of
mutual reconfiguration and uneven synthesis. More specifically, the thesis is concerned to
examine the post-unification development of Jurgen Habermas and his reformulation of
conventional national identity in the form of gebrochene Identitiit founded in a concept of
history as Dementi in particular. The thesis perceives in the work of this outstanding
intellectual, the most sophisticated formulation of a discourse of identity which reflects both
the exhaustion of conventional left and right wing approaches to past and present.
The thesis examines the changing discourse of identity in three broad sections. Section I
(chapters 2 and 3) examines the discourse of neoconservative and critical concepts of identity
which emerged over the period between 1960s and 1980s. In this section I wish to highlight
the dichotomy between conservative and critical concepts of identity and reflection of the
National Socialist past. Section II (chapters 4 and 5) concentrates upon the post-unification
development of conservative discourse of national identity within the context of perceptions
of the re-nationalisation of German political culture. Finally section III (chapters 6 and 7)
considers the emergence of an uneven synthesis between left-liberal and conservative
approaches to past and present in the process of a reconfiguration of the concept of national
identity via the plea for a "Westernisation" of the German nation and in the terms of a culture
of contrition towards the National Socialist past. Finally in the conclusion (chapter 8) I wish
to tie together the strands of the thesis and problematise the culture of contrition.
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2. Salvaging the Past: Neoconservatism, Compensation and National Identity
In the following chapter I wish to examine the conservative discourse of identity which
emerged in the 1970s - 80s in the wake of the counter-cultural revolt of the 1960s.
Firstly I wish to examine the perception on the right during the 1960s - 1970s that
contemporary West German society was afflicted with a crisis of values. The chapter
examines perceptions of a crisis of values in society and relates these to the call for a
sense of identity against the disruption of emancipatory politics and the value transience
of modem society. This was often formulated as a need for patriotism, the lack of which
was deigned a fundamental weakness of West German society. Finally the chapter
considers the approach to the national socialist past adopted by Nolte in an attempt to
relativise the contemporary political charge of this compromising past.
2.1. A Crisis of Values
It has been observed that the emergence of a forceful discourse of what constitutes
society's "basic values" indicates that these have become far from self-evident and
frequently betrays a profound confusion and state of value crisis in society. I During
periods of relative stability where social interests, values and aspirations are regulated
by and gain definition though functioning political and economic structures, the
question of "identity" appears as a rather academic concern. Up until the 1970s, various
paradigms shaped West German political culture. The cohesive potential of concepts
such as "Western democracy", the "economic miracle", "anticommunism" and "social
reformism" was generated by their congruence with the grain of public expectation and
experiential basis in contemporary material reality.
Taking stock of the state of contemporary society, invariably directly or indirectly
mediated through perceptions of the NS past, was a common characteristic of post-war
governments in West Germany of all political shades. Declaring the "end" of the post-
war period remained a common feature of successive West German governments
throughout the Cold War until the actual end of the post-war period in 1989-90. In 1953
Adenauer perceived a definitive "new start" with the construction of Western style
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parliamentary democracy in 1949.2 Similarly, his successor Ludwig Erhard had
contended Wir sind wieder wer upon the success of the economy in the 1950s and
likewise posited the end of the post-war period upon his assumption of the
chancellorship in 1963.3 Willy Brandt's governmental declaration of 1969 was also
informed with a sense of departure from the post-war years which was based in the
programme of social reform and the contention that the democratisation of West
German society had only really began in earnest with the election of the social-liberal
coalition." Whilst all these declarations corresponded to distinct political perceptions
and programmes, a common factor shared by them is that the perception of socio-
political direction was predicated upon specific political, social and economic
achievements or programmes of government. Adenauer, Erhard and Brandt's
perceptions of the political orientation and social solidarity of West Germany are all
based upon what one may term "hard foci" of political identity; the system of
parliamentary democracy, economic success and a social programme of progressive
state intervention and democratic reform.
The emergence of neoconservatism during the 1970s and the accompanying discourse
over which values should enjoy authority in the political culture of West German
society is often brought into conjunction with the broader flux of established political
values during the 1960s and 1970s. In particular, many commentators locate the
development of a distinct "neoconservative" stream of conservatism during this period
within the context of a broader rethinking of the ideological and political tenets of
conservative thought in the wake of the exhaustion of the "pragmatic" conservatism of
the Adenauerstaat and the challenge emanating from the "new Left" paradigm which
developed during the 1960s. Neoconservatism resulted from the abandoning of the post-
war "technocratic-pragmatic" approach based upon impressive economic growth rates
and the successful organisation of the state and institutions which lead to the
IMartin und Sylvia Greiffenhagen, Ein schwieriges Vaterland. Zur politischen Kultur
Deutschlands. Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, FrankfurtlM. 1981.pp.132-13 7.
2 Helmut Dubiel, Niemand ist frei von der Geschichte. Die nationalsozialistische Herrschaft in
den Debatten des Deutschen Bundestags.Carl Hanser Verlag. MiinchenlWien. 1999. p. 45.
3 ibid. pp. 91-2.
4 cf Regierungserklarung von Bundeskanzler Brandt vor dem Deutschen Bundestag 28. 10. 1969.
in Irmgard Wilharm (ed.) Deutsche Geschichte 1962-1983 - Dokumente in zwei Banden/Bd, I.
Fischer Taschenbuch. Frankfurt/M. 1985. pp. 27-32.
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development of an "ethical-nonnative" conception of conservatism.' The second
constitutive element of this ideological reconstruction was the critical engagement with
the neo-Marxist political movements and social theories which had blossomed during
the late 1960s - early 1970s. The critique of the "emancipatory" politics of the "New
Left" played a central role in politically defining the reconfiguring of conservative
thought during this period. The conservative counter-critique of the 1960s
"emancipatory" political paradigm developed during the 1970s and is often associated
with the notion of a Tendenzwende. The concept of the Tendenzwende derives from a
1974 meeting of the Bayrische Akademie der schonen Kiinste and counted the historian
Golo Mann and the philosopher Hermann Lubbe among its founders. The
Tendenzwende has been understood as a conservative counter-critique to the perceived
political hegemony of the neo-Marxist left." As such, this intellectual "U-Turn" was a
response to the "counter-culture" of the 1960s and, in particular, the discourse of social
emancipation and reform associated with the "New Left". Whilst the actual influence of
the Tendenzwende in shaping West German political culture is open to debate', it
formed an important ideological moment of a broader process of reconstitution of the
right which became synthesised in the emergence of "neoconservatism".
2.1.1 Corrosive Values
In the blossoming of the neo-Marxist paradigm during the late 1960s-70s, many
conservative intellectuals and politicians perceived the rebirth of an ideology which they
had always rejected. Yet whilst many tenets of the romantic inspired critique of the
concepts of reason, universalism and progress play an important role in the conservative
counter-critique of the late 1970s - 80s, neoconservatism does not reject the
technological-industrial growth which characterises modem society. The basic political
5 cf Holger Czitrich, Konservatismus und nationale Identitat in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.
Der Konservatismus, seine Theorie und Entwicklung im Spiegel der Diskussionen tiber das
Selbstverstandnis der Bundesrepublik Deutschland seit Mitte der siebziger Jahre. Peter Lang.
FrankfurtlM. 1989. pp. 63-72.
6 cfHans J. Hahn, The Concept of the Tendenzwende as seen in the Sontheimer - Habermas
Controversy. in Hans J. HahnJEva Kolinsky (eds.) Germany In The Eighties. Modem German
Studies. Association For Modem German Studies. (AMGS) Aston University, Goethe Institute
London. Number 2. October 1986. (ISSN 0268-5930) p. 1-6.
7 Gerhard Hertel, Der Weg zur "Wende". Die Bundesrepublik Deutschlands in der Ara Schmidt.
Bd. I: 1974-1980. S. Roderweg Verlag. Regensburg. 1988. pp.122-128. Hertel argues here that
the Tendenzwende represented more a barometer of political change rather than acting as a
catalyst.
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orientation of this stream of conservatism to liberalise the Free Market and
simultaneously "de-liberalise" the political culture of society has been understood as
indicative of a schizophrenic attitude towards the concept of modernism.
"Neoconservatism" promotes "modernisation" in terms of technological-economic
advance whilst simultaneously striving to roll back the influence of "modernist"
attitudes in the political culture of society." Citing liberal intellectuals as the culprits of
contemporary "cultural crisis", neoconservative intellectuals set about constructing
counter-values around traditional themes such as the nation, religion, historical
consciousness, secondary virtues etc. The common denominator of these ideas is their
perceived ability to operate in a therapeutic, compensatory manner for the disorientating
chaos of the modem age." Thus the apparent modernist paradox of neoconservatism -
unifying "modem" and "anti-modem" elements - results from the concern to cultivate a
set of values capable of legitimising or neutralising the disruptive consequences of
economic liberalisation. Czitrich offers the following understanding of the relationship
between these two elements in the conservative discourse of national identity
In der Bundesrepublik, so ist als These fur die Entwicklung des Konservatismus und fur des sen
spezifische Beitrage des Diskurses uber nation ale Identitat festzustellen, gehen die Konservativen
aller Strornungen davon aus, daf der rein neo-liberale Versuch, der Revitalisierung des
Kapitalismus ohne sinnstiftende Stiitzung gescheitert ist."
Neoconservatism extracts technological-economic processes from the arena of value
creation, on the basis that they are unreliable or redundant foci of social loyalty and
simultaneously detaches the cultural system from the experience of progress. II In this
manner, "antimodernist" cultural-political values can be fostered as a means of
absorbing the socially disruptive effects of economic-technological "modernisation".
The need for "compensation" results from the actual social dislocation engendered by
economic restructuring and from the belief that progress and emancipation are at best
illusory utopias and, at worst, the catalysts of social breakdown. As such,
neoconservatism anticipates the endurance of present material problems into the future
and hence prioritises the cultivation of political values which could potentially absorb or
8 Claus Offe, Die Utopie der Null-Optionen. Modernitat und Modemisierung als politische
Gutekriterien. in, Peter Koslowski, Robert Spaemann, Reinhard Low (Hg.). Modeme oder
Postmodeme ? Zur Signatur des gegenwartigen Zeitalters. Civitas Resultate Band 10. Acta
Humaniora, VCH Verlagsgesellschaft mbH. Weinheim. 1986.pp. 157-9.
9 Martin Greiffenhagen, Von Potsdam nach Bonn. Zehn Kapitel zur politischen Kultur
Deutschlands. Piper Verlag. Miinchen. 1986. p. 73.
10 Czitrich. 1989. op. cit. p. 78.
II Greiffenhagen. 1986. pp. 72. ff.
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neutralise the socially disruptive consequences. The development of neoconservative
thought formed an important influence on the shaping of a discourse of national identity
which after the return of a conservative coalition in 1982 became elevated to a
governmental priority.
Helmut Kohl, like his predecessors, also perceived his election victory as a turning point
in West German history. Interesting in Kohl's perception are the terms in which the
idea of a "new beginning" was articulated. The incoming conservative lead coalition
conventionally presented its policies over the economy, international relations, intemal
security and the welfare state as the better alternative to the social-liberal coalition
which had clearly run into serious difficulties since the mid 1970s. Combined with the
understanding of representing a more competent political-economic programme,
Chancellor Kohl was keen to couch the political mission of the Union in the sacred
terms of a geistig-moralische Wende. This phrase has become as strongly identified with
Kohl's conservative coalition as the slogan mehr Demokratie wagen is with Brandt's
social- liberal administration. The contrast between the two is significant and reflects
not only the contrasting programmatic intent of the two governments but also two
distinct approaches to social cohesion. A central pillar of Brandt's government was the
programme of social reform and democratisation through which, it was contended, the
creation of a more equitable society could be achieved. In Kohl's formulation of the
Wende, however, the emphasis is placed upon the cultivation of a set of values deemed
deficient in the spiritual-moral make-up of West German society. Commenting on the
condition of the Federal Republic at the time of his assumption of power, Kohl
presented the following retrospective diagnosis
Es war nicht nur eine wirtschaftliche und aul3enpolitische, sondem auch eine geistig-moralische
Krise, und diese war das Resultat einer Verunsicherung im Verhaltnis zur Geschichte, zu vielen
grundlegenden ethischen Werten und sozialen Tugenden, zu Staat und Recht - und letzlich auch
einer Verunsicherung im nationalen Selbstverstandnis der Westdeutschen. 12
For Kohl, the spiritual-moral crisis of West German society during the early 1980s arose
primarily as a consequence of alienation from a set of traditional values. From this
perspective, a core corpus of "ethical values" and a historically founded sense of
national identity act as the spiritual adhesive of society and it is the absence of these
12 Helmut Kohl, Ich wollte Deutschlands Einheit. Dargestellt von Kai Dieckmann und RalfGeorg
Reuth. UJlstein Buchverlag GmbH, Berlin Propylaen Verlag. 1996. p. 26.
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essential components of social order which explain the malaise of contemporary West
German society. Whilst he makes reference to the role played by economic instability
and the intensification of the Cold War, Kohl perceives the prime cause of
contemporary social decline in cultural-political terms. The perception of moral crisis
remained a central ideological tenet throughout Kohl's administration. The government
policy declaration of 1987 also emphasised the need to develop a "proper moral
attitude" and social consensus over the country's "basic values" describing the
cultivation of a sense of culture and history as the "national task" for the future. I)
During the 1980s, the project of cultivating moral norms and a sense of historically
conditioned national identity became important features of governmental policy. Both
the nature of the values identified as in crisis and the perceived cause of this malaise
provide insight into the political character of this critique.
The emphasis upon "spiritual-moral" themes emphasises value creation as primarily a
cultural-political phenomenon distinct from the socio-economic sphere. Frequently,
such perceptions were underpinned by scepticism towards the ability of economic or
political moments to secure social consensus in their own right. From this perspective,
the "spiritual-moral" values articulated in a conventional sense of national identity are
understood as an imperative social adhesive in the face of socio-economic dislocation
and the resulting conflict of interests and values in society. The basic question of
national identity as to which shared experiences and values constitute the basis of
contemporary social consensus and collective solidarity immediately suggests that these
are in a state of flux and hence no longer self-evident. The purpose of this concept is to
establish points of social consensus which could serve as a buffer against the experience
of heterogeneity and as such this represents a claim made in favour of a particular set of
political values.
A starting point of this formulation of values, as witnessed in Kohl's Wende, is the
identification of a crisis of values. This perception reflects both concern for the broader
condition of contemporary society and also, more specifically, for the status of
conservatism within the political culture of society. Throughout the West, during the
1960s, established tenets of right wing ideology came under criticism. The experience
13 Helmut Kohl, Preserving Creation, Mastering the Tasks of the Future. Government Policy
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of fascism, world conflict and the Holocaust was invoked by anti-Vietnam protesters,
"third World" liberation movements and the "New Left" in all Western nations during
the counter-culture of the 1960s and reflected the broader discrediting of the superior
claims of the West through the experiences of the first half of the twentieth century." In
West Germany, the critique of conservative positions and ideology was, understandably,
lent a particularly highly charged character by the experience of the fascist past. As one
conservative intellectual deduced to his irritation in 1972
Konservativ gilt in weiten Kreisen als gleichbedeutend mit reaktionar, reastaurativ,
vergangenheitsfixiert und, in letzter Konsequenz, mit antidemokratisch, faschistisch oder doch
"faschistoid"."
The indignation articulated in the above sentiment was indicative of the immense
difficulties which the national socialist past presented the formulation of a traditional
conservative perspective in West Germany. The 1960s radical critique elicited various
responses on the right in a process of ideological reconfiguring of the basic tenets of the
West German conservative approach. Whilst some maintained the correct response lay
in the form of a more open attitude towards reform and the protest culture", others
asserted the need for a return to traditional conservative values in politics and society. I?
During the 1970s, it appeared that the latter tactic, of a more open rehabilitation of
"traditional" values and critique of reformist and progressive politics enjoyed greater
currency. Disturbed by the positive social purchase of concepts associated with Utopie,
Revolution and Planung and the converse decline of traditional values since the 1960s,
conservative intellectuals began to stake a claim for the rehabilitation of the discredited
conservative topics of Tradition, Kontinuitdt, Autoritdt, Organik and Hierarchic."
Conservatives perceived the alleged permissive liberalism of the 1960s as a basic cause
of social heterogeneity and value pluralism during the decades which succeeded it and
1987-1990. Press and Information Office of the Federal Government. 1987.p. 35.
14 Frank Furedi, Mythical Past, Elusive Future. History and Society in an Anxious Age. Pluto.
London. 1992.p. 130.
IS Gerd-Klaus Kaltenbrunner, Vorwort des Herausgebers. in Kaltenbrunner. (Hg.),
Konservatismus in Europa. Unveranderte Sonderauflage des Buches "Rekonstruktion des
Konservatismus" fur die Bundeszentrale fur politische Bildung. Verlag Rombach + CO GmbH,
Freiburg. 1972. p. 13.
16 cfNorbert Blum, Reaktion oder Reform. Wohin geht die CDU? Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag
GmbH. Reinbeck bei Hamburg. 1972. Here, this representative of the "social" wing of the Union
stakes a claim for integrating moderate elements of the reformist and critical culture of the late
1960s into the Christian ethos of the CDU-CSU.
17 Published in the same year, see the volume edited by Kaltenbrunner. op.cit. The tenor of the
majority of contributions in this work sways between eulogies to "traditional" values and a neo-
romantic critique of modernism.
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this perspective shaped the intellectual framework within which attempts to rehabilitate
"traditional" values were formulated. In this vein, former CDU Bundestagsprasident
Karl Carstens offered the following assessment of the disintegrative influence of
progressive politics which continues to afflict the Federal Republic in the late 1980s
Unter dem EinfluB einer philosophischen Denkrichtung wurde in den sechziger und siebziger
Jahren die Forderung nach Emanzipation, nach moglichst weitgehender Beseitigung aller
Bindungen, vor allern jeder Form von Herrschaft, erhoben. Damit einher ging die Negierung
vieler tradierte Werte und Tugenden wie Fleili, Pflichterfullung, Opferbereitschaft,
Zuverlassigkeit, Wahrhaftigkeit, Treue und Tapferkeit."
For Carstens, an entire generation had been corrupted by the "false teachings" of critical
educationalism and was now irrevocably alienated from the redemptive powers of
religious faith and patriotic spirit. 20 As elsewhere in the West during the 1970s and
1980s, the plea for a return to "traditional" values was influenced by the critique of
"emancipatory pedagogy" in schools and higher education which was perceived as
promoting the alienation of the younger generation from established social mores and
institutions. This represents a common belief among conservative commentators that the
real roots of contemporary "moral decline" and social malaise are to be ascribed to the
influence of "treacherous" intellectuals and educationalists. The tactic of criticising
educational reformers for their unwillingness to internalise prescribed traditional values
rather than considering the changing status of such values in a dynamic socio-historical
context confuses cause and effect. In such interpretations, the political critique and
social conflicts of the 1960s did not enter the universities with academics and students
from society, but rather more, the young generation of "new Left" influenced academics
which developed at the time of the expansion of education had disrupted the consensus
of the republic. Thus for Ernst Nolte, the primary root of the "value-crisis" of the early
1970s was to be found in the progressive reform of the universities
So wurden die Universitaten durch feierliche Verfassungsgarantie gerade als die Statten
geschutzt, wo die Linien und die Zusammenstobe der politischen Welt im Forschen und Denken
zu sich selbst Abstand gewinnen sollen, durch eine undurchdachte Reform zur falschen Zeit in
Konzentrate des politischen Aktionismus verwandelt."
18 Thus Gerd-Klaus Kaltenbrunner, Der schwieriger Konservatismus in, Kaltenbrunner. op. cit.
1972. pp. 20-23.
19 Karl Carstens, Zur deutschen Zukunft. v. Hase & Koehler, Mainz. 1989. p. 23.
20 Carstens. ibid. p. 24-5.
21 Ernst Nolte, Deutschland und der Kalte Krieg. (1974). Ernst Klett Verlag. Stuttgart. 1985. p.
549.
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Thus, not only are the universities cast as the ring-leaders of social political disruption,
but as having committed the sin of mixing Wissenschaft and politics. This reading also
flirts with the image of (left wing) academics as the demagogic-ideological "seducers"
of the young, educated bourgeoisie. 22 Yet despite the often asserted criticism of the
merging of Wissenschaft and politics, conservative thinkers seek precisely the influence
which they critically ascribe to "progressive" educationalists, teachers and academics.
Whilst opinions differ over the question of whether the problems of the 1960s - 70s
derived primarily from the "university"," conservative thought is in agreement that the
influence of "progressive" pedagogy had been detrimental to the social-political
coherence of the Federal Republic. Also widely consensual is the notion that this
situation demands the cultivation of a counter paradigm which is largely defined by its
orientation towards "traditional values".
2.1.2 "Traditional" values
An example of the values in question can be found in the nine theses towards a Mu! zur
Erziehung drafted by Mann, Lubbe, fellow philosopher Robert Spaemann and the Baden
Wurttemberg Minister for Culture, Wilhelm Hahn, during an educational congress held
in Bonn in 1978. The critique of the theses is aimed against the reforms of emancipatory
pedagogy and advocates a return to "secondary virtues" in education
Wir wenden uns gegen den Irrtum, die Tugenden des FleiBes, der Disziplin und der Ordnung
seien padagogisch obsolet geworden, wei! sie sich als politisch miBbrauchbar erwiesen haben. In
Wahrheit sind diese Tugenden unter allen politischen Umstlinden notig. Denn ihre Notigkeit ist
nicht systemspezifisch, sondern human begriindet. 24
Despite the surface assertive tone of the "theses" there is an unmistakable defensiveness
evident in this promotion of "traditional" values which indicates the enduring
stigmatisation of core conservative beliefs through the NS experience. Thus, the authors
22 Ernst Nolte. ibid. p. 502. Thus the influence of the Marxist historian Wolfgang Abendroth is
described in terms of his powerful ability to emotionally ignite the critical sentiments of young
students.
23 cf Hermann Labbe. Zwischen Trend und Tradition. Uberfordert uns die Gegenwart ? Edition
Interfrom. Zurich. 1981. p. 70 Labbe contends that it is a fundamental error to cast the
universtities as the primary motor of contemporary political alienation which he understands as a
characteristic of the modem experience as a whole. He still, of course, considers the critical
paradigm of the 1960s-70's, especially in relation to the question of the NS past, a perfidious
influence.
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of the theses seek to counter the compromised legacy of "traditional" values by casting
them as essential, anthropological "Truths". This is an argument frequently advanced in
an attempt to deflect the radical critique of conservative values as irredeemably
compromised by the experience of national socialism. In this reading, the work ethic,
discipline and order are elevated into the realm of absolute Truths which exist
independent of systemic context. Given their enhanced status as anthropological Truths,
the absence of such core values is necessarily cause for profound concern and appears
indicative of an abnormal condition of human affairs. It is also, of course, a condition
for which conservative discourse can offer the optimal antidote."
For the right, the socio-political turmoil of the 1960s and 1970s was evidence of the
consequences of the failure to respect traditional values. Reformist educational policy
was made responsible for a range of social problems including the extremist left wing
terrorism of the RAF during the 1970s. Reactions to the RAF movement of the 1970s
played a significant role in shaping the conservative critique of progressive politics and
the protest movement. As the term "fascist" was used as a criticism of authoritarian
politics, so conservatives began to draw parallels between the radical student movement,
the APO and the RAF and the NSDAP. Drawing parallels between the protest
movement and national socialism upon the basis of their violent radicalism,
conservatives could both reassert the older idea that Weimar was destroyed by
"extremist" forces outside the centre and simultaneously seek to delegitimise the
counter-culture." For conservative commentators the influence of emancipatory
pedagogy and progressive politics had brought the Federal Republic dangerously close
to repeating the "extremism" of the inter-war years. Thus during the 1970s, the
emerging discourse of a crisis of values was given credence by the "civil war"
atmosphere invoked principally from the right over the issue of left wing terrorism. The
undeniable ideological connection of the RAF and various K-Gruppen of the 1970s with
the student protest movement and the "ideas of 1968" could appear to conservatives as
evidence of the socially disruptive consequences of "progressive" and anti-authoritarian
pedagogy.
24 cf Martin und Sylvia Greiffenhagen. 1981. op. cit. pp. 177-180.
25 Thus Kaltenbrunner maintains that conservatism represents the political articulation of such
anthropological "Truths". in Kaltenbrunner. 1972. op. cit. p. 26.
26 cf the parliamentary debates in response to the RAF terrorism of 1970s documented in Dubiel.
1999. op. cit. pp. 139-160.
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Such formulations could also imply an assault upon the reformist, democratic
programme of the social-liberal coalition. In this vein, and with the 1976 elections in
view, Franz Josef StrauB suggested to CSU functionaries behind closed doors at
Sonthofen that their election propaganda should intimate that the SPD and FDP were
"abandoning the state to criminals and political gangsters"." In slightly more diplomatic
language CDU leader Helmut Kohl also questioned the ability of the SPD to defend the
interests of the state and intimated that both dissenting voices within the SPD and the
terrorists of the RAF could be related by their common scepticism towards authority
Leider mussen wir feststellen, daB bestimmte Kreise innerhalb der Sozialdemokratie immer noch
ein gestortes Verhiiltnis zur Ausiibung rechtsstaatlicher Macht haben, die notwendig ist, urn
diesen Staat seine Zukunft zu garantieren."
Given the de facto alliance between CDU and SPD over the issue of combating the
RAF, however, it is perhaps more accurate to perceive the significance of this issue for
both left and right beyond the narrow parameters of party-politics. Reactions to left-
wing terrorism profited the right rather more by providing a dramatic context within
which a witch-hunt against left wing intellectuals could be carried out" and the plea for
"traditional" values could be forcefully articulated. At the height of the deutscher
Herbst in 1977, shortly after the storming of the Landshut aircraft at Mogadishu and the
collective suicides of the RAF cadre in Stammheim, the right wing conservative COU
member of parliament, Alfred Dregger, offered the following understanding of recent
events
Jetzt gilt es, etwas von der sittlichen Kraft wirksam werden zu lassen, die in den Anfangsworten
un serer Verfassung ihren Ausdruck gefunden hat, wo es heiBt: 1m BewuBtsein seiner
Verantwortung vor Gott und den Menschen hat das deutsche Yolk dieses Grundgesetz der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland beschlossen ... Meine Damen und Herren, auf dem Bewuf3tsein der
Verantwortung vor Gott und den Menschen beruht das Gluck, und auf dem Frevel seiner
Milsachtung beruht das Elend der Volker. (Beifall bei der CDU.) Hatten die heutigen Terroristen
etwas weniger von Emanzipation, Konfliktpadagogik und antiautoritarer Erziehung und etwas
27 cited in Marion Denhoff Foe into Friend. The Makers of the New Germany from Konrad
Adenauer to Helmut Schmidt. Weidenfeld and Nicholson. London. 1982. p. 166.
28 cfHelmut Kohl, Vorsitzender der CDU, zu den Ursachen und dem geistig-intellektuellen
Umfeld des Terrorismus. (Debatte uber die Regierungserklarung, 20. 4. 1977.) in Wilharm. op.
cit. p. 146.
29 Notably the reactions against "sympathisers" of the RAF movement intimated a wider left wing
culpability for terrorism as demonstrated by the attacks on Heinrich B611after his appeal to Ulrike
Meinhof, Will Ulrike Gnade oder freies Geleit? cf Stefan Aust, Der RaaderMeinhof Komplex.
Goldmann. Munchen. 1998. pp. 226-7.
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mehr von ihrer ganz person lichen Verantwortung vor Gott und den Menschen erfahren, dann
ware ihnen und uns vieles von dem erspart geblieben, was wir heute beklagen."
Dregger's diagnosis of the problem and his prescription of the cure are both informed
with an understanding of the importance of pre-political values embodied, in this
instance, by religious faith mediated through authoritarian pedagogy. For this
conservative politician, the ascension of the progressive paradigm had corroded the
authority of traditional values and thus led West German society to the brink of civil
war. Whilst Dregger may well be a political maverick and the ease with which he links
reformism with terrorism be particularly defamatory, the connection between
emancipatory politics and social chaos is inherent to the conservative imagination.
A perception common to both the nine theses and Dregger's comments on the RAF
terror is that the contemporary state of social disorientation derives from a lack of
"meta-political" values which claim absolute authority. Thus, the understanding of the
worth of traditional values is founded not only in the quality of the particular elements
themselves but also in the conviction that they represent a superior category of value.
The primary benefit of "traditional values" is that they lay claim to unconditional
loyalty or faith. Thus contemporary social malaise results not merely from the ignorance
of particular "traditional values" but from the critical rejection of unreflected, naive
categories of unconditional faith of either religious or secular provenance. Absolute
values which claim to reflect an essential human or spiritual condition are not open to
rational enquiry or indeed critique and thus enjoy unquestionable legitimacy and
authority. Herein appears to lie the appeal of such formulations for conservative thinkers
interested in cultivating social hegemony and limiting value pluralism in society. An
important element of the appreciation of a crisis of values is contained in the perceived
decline of such unconditional faith and the rise of the culture of "critical rationalism"
associated with the "New Left".
These themes are illuminated by the conservative philosopher Robert Spaemann in a
cultural critique of modem society. For Spaemann, a characteristic of modernist
political culture is the dominance of hypothetical postulates over unconditional faith
which he rightly perceives as undermining the concept of absolute, irrefutable Truth.
30 Cited in Dubiel. 1999. op. cit. p. 155.
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Given the dominance of the hypothetical paradigm, Truth in the classic philosophical
sense of a Wesensaussage no longer exists and the concept of indispensability or
uniqueness (of things or people) merely enjoys the status of one refutable hypothesis
among others
Unbedingte Uberzeugungen sind in einer durch funktionales Denken gekennzeichneten
hypothetischen Zivilisation ein Frerndkorper, unwiderrufliche Bindungen ein Anachronismus.
Die Philosophie der hypothetischen Zivilisation ist der "kritische Rationalismus", der
Falsifizierbarkeit zum Kriterium gehaltvoller Aussagen macht und davon auch moralische
Normen prinzipiell nicht ausnimmt. Auch sie sollen standig daraufhin uberpruft werden, ob sie
dasjenige begiinstigen oder nicht, was man "rationales Problemlosungsverhalten" nennt."
What Spaemann appears to find so distasteful about the alleged a priori of "critical
rationalism" is that it leaves no room for the form of absolute, unconditional faith which
can exert an authoritative, moral claim on its subject which need not be justified by
recourse to rational scrutiny. Particularly disturbing for this philosopher is the fact that
even moral or ethical questions are passed through the filter of critical rationalism which
likewise are then robbed of their ability to command absolute authority. For Spaemann,
the notion that "critical rationalism" serves as a protective buffer against totalitarian rule
is erroneous and he contends that it can in principle serve the legitimisation of despotic
rule via the perception of totalitarian society as a form of long-term social experiment.
The only form of resistance which is genuinely capable of criticising totalitarianism is
the form of unconditional faith which he perceives as eroded through the modernist cult
of rationalism
Echter Widerstand hingegen speist sich immer nur aus dezidierten Gegenilberzeugungen mit
unbedingten Wahrheitsanspriichen. FOr Hypothesen stirbt man nicht."
This appears as the fundamental problem of critical-rational enquiry for Spaemann, that
it does not generate the enthusiasm, conviction and loyalty required in order, if
necessary, to bring about the ultimate sacrifice. Once more, we learn that the only
values capable of commanding such authority are of a meta-political nature and
embodied in religious, moral or artistic terms of unconditional faith." The conservative
understanding of the political necessity of cultivating absolute values reflects the desire
for social cohesion at a time of perceived disorientation and heterogeneity.
31 Robert Spaemann, Ende der Modernitat ? in Koslowski, Spaemann, Low. 1986.op. cit. p. 28.
32 Spaemann. 1986. ibid.
33 Spaemann. 1986. op. cit. p. 36.
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From the perspective of absolute values, evidence of value pluralism is cause enough
for the identification of a crisis of values. Value pluralism, by definition predicated upon
the absence of "absolute" values, is a cause of serious concern for conservative
commentators who perceive this as a threat to social hegemony. Against the background
of economic and social change, value pluralism is understood as a presage of social
disintegration and collapse. Writing in the early 1980s, the conservative historian and
occasional political consultant to Chancellor Kohl, Michael Sturmer, describes the
underlying conservative concerns about value pluralism
In Wahrheit geht es urn die Frage, aus welchen Werten Konsens kommen soli und innerer Friede.
Der Pluralismus der Werte und Interessen, wenn er keinen gemeinsamen Boden mehr findet,
durch Wachstum nicht mehr entscharft, durch Schuldenaufnahme nicht mehr gedampft wird,
treibt fruher oder spater zum sozialen Burgerkrieg, wie am Ende der Weimarer Republik."
Sturmer's perception of the socially disintegrative potential of value pluralism IS
founded in the understanding that economic success represents a precarious and
unreliable focus of social consensus. In this context, social consensus must be achieved
by recourse to alternative foci which are perceived independent of socio-economic
structures. It is within this conceptual framework that conservative commentators
deduce the necessity of national identity as a means of fostering consensus in society.
The conception of a crisis of values is founded in the impression of value transformation
at a time of socio-economic upheaval and as such this discourse relates to more
fundamental attitudes towards the experience of ideological and structural change in
society. In the following, I wish to consider the role of attitudes towards "modem
society" in the cultivation of the conservative discourse of "identity" as a counter to the
alienating consequences of "emancipation".
2.2 Identity versus Emancipation
The perception of social breakdown formed an important context in which attitudes
towards the concept of progress could reflect distinct philosophical and political points
of social orientation. Writing in the early 1970s, the "secretary of post-war
conservatism", Armin Mohler," presented the following understanding of the essential
34 Michael Sturmer, 'Kein Eigentum der Deutschen: die deutsche Frage.' in Werner Weidenfeld
(Hg.) 'Die Identitat der Deutschen.' Carl Hanser Verlag. MiinchenIWien. 1983. p. 84.
35 Dirk von Laak, 'Gesprache in der Sicherheit des Schweigens. Carl Schmitt in der politischen
Geistesgeschichte der fruhen Bundesrepublik.' Akademie Verlag. Berlin. 1993. p. 261. The Swiss
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distinctions between left and right which, in the context of social crisis, were
increasingly compelled to display their true colours
Und neuerdings hat die schon nicht mehr schleichende Selbstauflosung der westlich-liberalen
Gesellschaft eine Situation geschaffen, in der die heiden politischen Grundhaltungen elementar
und nackt zu Tage treten: der Rechte sucht Bindung und Halt, der Linke will Befreiung und
Ungebundenheit; fur die Linken sind der Mensch und die Welt im Prinzip vollkommene Gebilde,
ihre reale Unvollkommenheit eine Schuld der Umstande, die deshalb verandert werden miissen -
der Rechte glaubt nicht an diese Perfektibilitat, fur ihn geht durch Welt und Mensch eine
tragi scher Zwiespalt, der nicht aufgehoben werden kann, aber bestanden werden muB.36
For Mohler, the key to establishing the fundamental differences between left and right
are two distinct approaches to the experience of social change. According to this
reading, the contemporary condition of social disintegration elicits two responses: whilst
the right reacts by stressing the need for rituals, customs, institutions etc. which could
secure social integrity, the left appears as the agent of change driven by the conviction
that that the lot of humanity can be improved by conscious, progressive intervention.
The ascent of the progressive paradigm of the "New Left" in politics and academia
exercised a formative influence upon the development of neoconservative positions
between the 1970s and 80s. The emancipatory motif of the neo-Marxist New Left
invigorated the concept of "social progress" within West German political culture and
provided it with an identifiable political definition. The conservative political historian
Werner Weidenfeld remarks how that during the late 1960s and early 1970s the ideas of
progress, democratisation, rapprochement, social justice and reform reflected the broad
horizons and aspirations which characterised politics and society. 37 In 1969, the
conservative intellectual Arnold Gehlen noted with scorn that the progressive idiom had
even penetrated organised protestantism citing the attempts of the Evangelischer
Kirchendienst (EKD) to reinvigorate itself with the, secular, faiths of enlightenment
social-reformism and socialism." For Mohler, the coincidence of social crisis and the
perceived dominance of the progressive idiom have created the opportunity for a
national Mohler was an important figure in the post-war right-wing West German conservative
spectrum, had volunteered for the Waffen SS during the war, was influential in the CSU under FJ
StrauB and between 1964 - 1985 headed the right wing Carl-Friedrich von Siemens Stiftung.
36Armin Mohler, '1m Schatten des Jakobinismus. Die "Konservativen" und die "Rechte" in
Frankreich.' in Kaltenbrunner. 1972. op. cit. p. 276.
37 Werner Weidenfeld, 'Geschichte und Politik. in, Werner Weidenfeld (Hg.)
GeschichtsbewuBtsein der Deutschen. Materialien zur Spurensuche einer Nation.' Verlag
Wissenschaft und Politik. Berend von Nottbeck. Koln. 1987. pp.24-5.
38 Arnold Gehlen, 'Religion und Ethik.' in Merkur. Deutsche Zeitschrift fur europaisches Denken.
XXIII. Jahrgang. Heft 10. Oktober 1969. p. 912.
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conservative counter-critique. The image of a social dynamism which the left seeks to
accelerate and the right to brake displays a negative reception of the experience of social
change. Mohler's understanding of human interaction with the social environment
appears to derive from the perception of an inherent dichotomy between humanity and
the social relations of human existence. If the world is, by its very nature, imperfect,
then the project of social emancipation becomes an illusion. This betrays a perception of
society as ultimately a pre-political phenomenon whose natural limitations restrict the
scope of human agency. Negative features, such as social inequality can thus be
presented as merely reflecting an essential conditio humanum and cannot therefore be
transcended. Thus, the status-quo, whilst susceptible to minor adjustment, ultimately
represents a naturalist order which cannot, and indeed should not, be radically tampered
with. In this context, the progressive project of social emancipation predicated upon
social transformation is challenged by an understanding of social progress as ultimately
restricted by definitive, natural limitations. In the modem age, this impasse needs to be
bridged via recourse to the cultivation of values and beliefs which may act in a
"compensatory" manner for the experience of disorientating change and the futility of
progressive, social emancipation. In this context, conservative discourse commonly
asserts the cohesive potential of "historical consciousness" against the dynamic,
revolutionary project of historical progress.
A useful example of the understanding of the interplay between progress and historical
consciousness can be found in the writings of the ZUrich philosopher Hermann Lubbe.
For Lubbe, the experience of rapid civilisational change, which characterises modem
society, undermines our established points of orientation and promotes the emotional
alienation of modem civilisation from itself. In a world of rapid change, we are
increasingly losing a sense of familiarity with our broader environment and heritage
which exercises a corrosive effect upon our sense of identity." It is within this context
that Liibbe perceives a popular renaissance of the museum and the cult of the past. Not
only does he perceive a quantitative growth in the number of museums in Switzerland
and West Germany but also notes the broadening of their object of interest from the
39 Hermann Liibbe, 'Der Fortschritt und das Museum. Uber den Grund unseres Vergniigens an
historischen Gegenstanden.' The 1981 Bithell Memorial Lecture. Institute of Germanic Studies.
University of London. W.S Maney and Son LTD Leeds. 1982. pp.1-6. also cf Lubbe. 1981. op.
cit. p. 9.
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more traditional archaeology and art history all the way through to local history and
hairdressing. For Lubbe, the museum represents more than a place of nostalgic
contemplation of the past and serves an essential social function as an institution which
acts in a compensatory manner in the face of rapid social change. The cult of the past,
which he identifies as a definatory feature of modem society, reflects much more than a
nostalgic leisure pursuit and rather more is understood as an expression of unease in the
face of the rapid pace of change which characterises modem, industrial-technological
society. In this reading, contemporary alienation ultimately derives from the inevitable
processes of rapid change which characterise modem social existence.
Lubbe identifies two fundamental responses to the experience of alienation from the
present: Nostalgie and Utopie." The renaissance of both concepts, in the form of a cult
of the past and the blossoming of "alternative" movements is evidence of a widespread
disaffection with the present and the ceaseless process of change. The problem of
contemporary society does not result from our inability to emancipate ourselves from
the limitations of tradition but from the political disorientation engendered by the
decline of the status of tradition in shaping the political culture of society." The
destruction of the concept of tradition is considered particularly disturbing as traditions
provide a sense of continuity and orientation through past, present and future. Refuge
from the ceaseless process of change can only be provided by "nostalgia" which offers
the psychischer Ruhepunkt afforded by a sense of entlastende Vorgestrigkeit" The
increasing status of the museum represents, for Lubbe, the more fundamental attempt to
rescue elements of recognisable familiarity and identity which may serve as a buffer
against the ravages of social and technological progress
Jenseits ungewisser Grenzen unterliegen wir unter Bedingungen eines sich beschleunigenden
sozialen Wandels der Gefahr einer temporalen Identitatsdiffusion. Das historische Bewul3tsein
halt die fremdgewordene Vergangenheit als eigene Vergangenheit aneignungsfahig
beziehungsweise als Vergangenheit anderer anderen zuschreibungsfahig, Es konfrontiert uns mit
dieser Vergangenheit im Museum. Die bundelnde Formel fur diese Struktur lautet: Durch die
progressive Musealisierung kompensieren wir die belastenden Erfahrungen eines
anderungstempobedingten kulturellen Vertrautheitsschwundes."
40 Lubbe. 1981. op. cit. p. 12.
41 Lubbe, ibid. p. 14.
42 Lubbe. 1981. op. cit. p. 13.
43 Lubbe. 1982. op. cit. p. 18.
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Thus, for this conservative philosopher, historical consciousness, as represented in the
cult of the past and the museum, serves an important social function as a buffer to the
ravages of progress and social change. In this perspective, the past is positively
evaluated against the present and future in an attempt to stem the self-alienation of
culture which accompanies the increased tempo of change in the present. As the social
project of attaining a future "utopia" is regarded as a part of the problem and as the
present finds itself in an endless process of alienating change, then the past appears here
as the only refuge. Underlying Lubbes concept of the modem experience is an
understanding of the historical subject in inherently passive terms. In this reading,
"modernism" and all its negative side-effects appear as an existential condition which
extends beyond human intervention. Humanity is cast in a reactive role to the seemingly
anonymous forces of change from which only flight into the cultural and historical
certainties of the past can offer refuge. Thus for Lubbe, the only rational behaviour left
to those living in the present is the construction of a positive present (in tum cultivated
from historical consciousness) that may serve as a "positive past" to future generations.
Conflicting perceptions of the role of historical consciousness in fostering a sense of
identity in the present formed a central point of contention during the Historikerstreit of
1986. Although, on a surface level, the Historikerstreit resulted from the contentious, if
not novel, interpretation of national socialism as inspired by the experience of Marxism
and the Soviet Union, this was inextricably linked to a discourse of contemporary West
German society. The ultimate philosophical and political bone of contention between
latter day "enlighteners" and "government historians?" was characterised by the
argument over the desired orientation of the Federal Republic towards "progressive" or
"traditional" political principles in the 1980s. Hence attitudes towards the concept and
status of "progress" formed an extremely important subtext of the historical fracas of the
mid 1980s. During the Historikerstreit Sturmer summarised the conservative perception
of the relationship between interpretations of the past and value creation in the present
as follows
44 cf Jiirgen Habermas, 'Eine Art Schadensabwicklung. Die apologetischen Tendenzen in der
deutschen Geschichtsschreibung.' in 'Historikerstreit.' op. cit. pp. 62-76 and Klaus Hildebrandt,
'Das Zeitalter der Tyrannen. Geschichte und Politik: Die Verwalter der Aufklarung, das Risiko
der Wissenschaft und die Geborgenheit der Weltanschauung. Eine Entgegnung auf Jurgen
Habermas.' in ibid. pp. 84-92.
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Orientierungsverlust und Identitatssuche sind Geschwister. Wer aber meint, daf alles dies auf
Politik keine Wirkung habe, der ignoriert, daf in geschichstlosem Land die Zukunft gewinnt,
wer die Erinnerung filllt, die Begriffe pragt und die Vergangenheit deutet."
Similar to Lubbe, Sturmer identifies a blossoming of history, museums and a general
interest in the past. For Sturmer, this signals both the return to "normal" cultural
traditions and also the search for orientation in a present which can no longer orientate
itself towards a positive vision of the future." The perception of social crisis in the
present and scepticism towards the project of future progress redirects social and
intellectuals energies onto the past as a source of value creation. Mastery of
contemporary malaise is predicated, in this reading, upon the successful cultivation of
identity whose authority is grounded in "history". Criticising both the "progressive
strangulation" of history by the left and its "technocratic underestimation" by the right,
Sturmer argued for a conception of historical consciousness which could foster social
consensus in the present by providing intellectual coherence to the concept of national
identity. This understanding of the role of national identity founded in history appears
paradigmatic of the broader change in attitudes towards the progressive idiom in
political culture between the 1970s and 1980s.
2.2.1 Pessimism towards the Future
Over the course of 1970s - 1980s, under the impression of the RAF terror wave and
problems of the social-liberal coalition, the generally positive reception of the
progressive idiom within both revolutionary and reformist currents underwent a critical
re-examination. Thus whilst the ascendancy of the critical-progressive position
associated with the counter-cultural rebellion formed a focus of the neoconservative
critique, perceptions of its steady decline since the late 1970s played an equally
important role in shaping the conservative discourse of national identity. From this
perspective, the widely identified "cult of the past" across West German society was
often interpreted as signalling the decline of the progressive idiom and hence providing
an opportune moment for the return to a more traditional orientation in society and
4S Michael Sturmer, 'Geschichte in geschichtslosem Land.' Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. 25.
April 1986. in, Historikerstreit. ibid. p. 36.
46 ibid.
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politics. Writing three years prior to the Historikerstreit, Michael Sturmer had already
observed with satisfaction
Der spate Fortschrittsglaube, aus dem 19. Jahrhundert tauschend unbeschadigt in die
sozialliberale Ara gerettet, ist gegangen wie gekornmen."
The political consequences of the decline of "progressive politics" assumed diffuse
forms and influenced a variety of political opinion beyond the neoconservative right.
Hence the perceived defeat of the "ideas of 1968" also impacted upon radical thinkers
and influenced the development of postmodern and Green thought and politics. These
two aspects of "environmentalism" and "postmodemism" form important political and
intellectual currents which are considered in more detail in subsequent chapters.
Although these discourses draw different social and intellectual conclusions than
conservatism, all three streams operate from an understanding of the destructive or
deceptive quality of human progress. A common assertion of both Green and
neoconservative thought is that progress in human affairs is circumscribed by natural
limits. Whilst the Greens (founded in 1980) absorbed broad sections of the counter-
culture and their environmental position was cast in an "anticapitalist" hue, the
underlying perception of human limitation and the critique of human progress is one
basically shared by conservatism. As such, these social movements run a risk which
conservative thinkers happily enter: the danger of relapsing into "natural" or pre-
modern, and therefore pre-emancipation models of thought,"
An instance of the proximity between these positions, over the issue of human progress,
is displayed in Spaemann's interpretation of the crisis of modernism. Spaemann
contends that the progressive human domination of nature has finally reached its limits
and that we must assume these to be definitive. For Spaemann, dwindling resources
have generated the feeling that we are now living off the "capital" rather than the
"interest" which leads him to the following observation
Dieses Gefiihl lost den traditionellen Zusammenhang des Fortschrittgedankens mit so etwas wie
Hoffnung auf. Der Pro- Kopf- Verbrauch der Industrielander an Energie und Rohstoffen ist
parasitar, denn es ware mit den Uberlebensbedingungen der Menschheit unvereinbar, wenn aile
Menschen dieses Niveau erreichen wilrden. Damit ist die Marx'sche Utopie der endgultigen
Beseitigung des Gerechtigkeitsproblems durch Entwicklung von Uberfluf definitiv tOt.49
47 Sturmer in Weidenfeld. 1983.op. cit. p.86.
48 cf Offe in Koslowski, Spaemann, Low. 1986. op. cit. p. 161.
49 Spaemann. op. cit. p. 31.
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In this reading, the notion of progressive emancipation from inequality is not only
rejected as illusory but is considered an existential threat to the future survival of
humanity. Thus, the project of a revolutionary transformation of the present into an
emancipated future, associated with both Marxist and enlightenment thought, has been
overcome by the definitive constraints placed upon human agency by nature. Significant
in Spaemann's interpretation is not so much the standard conservative critique of
progress but rather more the manner in which this anti-modernist reading is so easily
blended with the "alternative", even "emancipatory" language of environmentalism.
During the 1980s, the perceived decline of progressive politics inspired conservative
intellectuals and politicians with the confidence to argue for the rehabilitation of a
particularist concept of collective identity as the backbone of social consensus." A
characteristic of this discourse is the notion that the closure of avenues of future
emancipation has reopened the past as a source of orientation and identity creation in
the present.
2.2.2 A Positive Past
Historical consciousness is important in the development of the conservative concept of
collective identity as it prioritises the supposed rootedness of contemporary collective in
tradition over its transcendence and transformation into an emancipated, and uncertain,
future. Under the concept of Gemeinschaftbewuj3tsein Werner Weidenfeld understands
the primary social function of collective identity as the neutralisation of conflicting
interests which result from the experience of change and dynamism in modem society.
For Weidenfeld, like most conservative commentators, the root cause of contemporary
disorientation is to be found in the rapid pace of social, cultural and technological
change in modem society. Whilst pre-modem society enjoyed the certainties of fixed
identities, the high level of mobility, pluralism and differentiation of the modem world
acts to corrode all certainties and robs the concept of identity any hope of permanent
status. This condition describes the "pathology" of modem man which consists in the
perpetually unsatisfied need for orientation. The most effective means of fulfilling the
modem need for orientation is offered in the concept of collective identity which, if
so Spaemann. op. cit. p. 39.
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successful, can neutralise potentially disruptive conflicting social interests and
aspirations
Der Ausgleich unerfiillbarer, widerstreitender Anspruche, die Integration unterschiedlicher
Interessen, die Regelung von politischen Konflikten - dies alles ist oftmals nicht aus sich selbst
heraus begrundbar, sondem man benotigt als Kriterium den Bezug auf eine gemeinsame
Lebensgrundlage. Das Gemeinschaftsbewubtsein wird damit zu einem wesentlichen Fundament
politi scher Problemlosung, Dieses Gemeinschaftsbewuf3tsein spiegeJt nicht zuletzt unser
Verhaltnis zur Vergangenheit wider. Geschichte leistet dam it einen zentralen Beitrag zur
0·· 51nentierung.
Important in this understanding IS the connection drawn between conflicting or
unattainable claims and interests and the cultivation of historical consciousness. This
response to social aspirations and claims appears characterised by the underlying
assumption that the conflict arising from the inability of modern society to realise such
claims is inevitable not because of any fundamental flaw in the socio-economic order
but because inequality remains an inevitable experience of human existence. Thus the
concept of a gemeinsame Lebensgrundlage does not seek to resolve various social
conflicts but rather more to neutralise them and defuse their potentially disruptive
political charge.
The problem facing such an approach, however, lies founded in the fact that conflicts
arising from social disparities can rarely be justified on rational grounds or in their own
terms as this would logically imply action which aimed to act upon the social order in
order to address the problem. It is through the construction of an alternative set of
values that can potentially compensate the experience of conflicting interests that
conservative discourse promotes the notion of collective identity. Thus the cultivation of
a sense of higher, collective loyalty as a means of legitimising the existing social order.
The perceived inability to resolve serious social problems in the present or foreseeable
future, leads to the retreat into the past as a potential instance of collective experience.
Thus one conservative commentator presents the primary value of historically founded
identity thus
Vergegenwartigung der Vergangenheit, Geschichtsarbeit, wenn man so will, dient der
Selbstvergewisserung deshalb, weil sie und sofem sie es fertigbringt, kollektive Identitat trotz
aller Verschiedenheiten, trotz aller Interessenzusammenstolie, trotz all des Schlimmen, das die
SI Werner Weidenfeld, 'Geschichte und Politik.' in, Weidenfeld (Hg.) 1987. op. cit. p. 26.
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Angehorigen einer Gruppe, einer Nation, eines Volkes einander und anderen angetan haben,
hervortreten zu lassen. 52
The option for the past is appealing to the conservative imagination, in this context, as it
can be instrumentalised to evoke the sense of a solidaristic community of equals which
is so patently absent in the present. This reading suggests that the contemporary
experience of inequality and conflicting interests can be neutralised by a concept of
"equality" defined by the shared fate of national historical continuity. In essence, von
Bredow's argument rests upon the assumption that the reference to collective identity
may act in a compensatory manner for any actual social, political, economic differences,
interests and conflicts in the present. There appears a distinct air of fatalism inherent in
this reading which implies that society is a form of pre-political community of fate
which precedes and shapes the contemporary subject and succeeds it into the future. As
such, it is impossible to "escape" from one's (predefined) "History" or "Identity" which
appears to exist independent of historical context (either in the past or future) and thus
appears beyond the grasp of the contemporary historical agent. Von Bredow states that
the concept of national identity would be misguided to attempt a total homogenisation
of society which is not realisable." Heterogeneity is accepted, however, only to the
extent which is considered bearable for the cohesion of society, beyond which point,
pluralism becomes a threat to social stability and must be reigned in under the concept
of collective identity. In this sense, national identity appears as the "bottom line" of
social cohesion.
This reading is characterised by a basically positive evaluation of the past which can
justify the continuation of particular traditions etc. in the present. Whilst past iniquities
are acknowledged by von Bredow, they are considered subsumed under the positive
historical continuity of collective identity. That the past is viewed in a positive light is a
basic premise of conservative discourse of identity during this period. This results from
the appreciation of a sense of continuity in German history which is based upon the
handing down through tradition of a recognisable set of orientational norms and values
between the generations from past into future." In this sense, one may only speak of
S2 Wilfried von Bredow, 'Geschichte als Element der deutschen Identitat.' in Werner Weidenfeld
(Hg.) 1983. op. cit. p.l 02.
S3 ibid.
S4 Weidenfeld. 1987. p. , Lubbe, 1981. pp.14-25.
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"identity" within the context of historical continuity. Rudolf Vierhaus describes this
connection thus
Es ist also nach Einheitlichkeit, nach Elementen und Entwicklungen zu fragen, die
Einheitlichkeit gestiftet haben, nach Kontinuitat, also nach Zusamrnenhangen und Traditionen, in
denen die Deutschen noch heute stehen oder doch zu stehen meinen, auf die sie sich, zu Recht
oder Unrecht, berufen; auch nach solchen, die sie verges sen haben und aus denen sie austeigen
mochten.55
This notion of identity is thus based upon a fundamentally positive perception of the
past as a basis for contemporary political identification and social orientation. Although
Vierhaus acknowledges that not all these continuities can be considered "positive"
instances of national pride, the total experience of shared historical continuity acts as a
higher bond which fosters a sense of particularist, national collectivity. Whilst
"negative" past experiences need to be "explained", this is an academic enterprise which
is primarily motivated by the desire to strengthen the legitimacy of the concept of
national identity. For Vierhaus, the main task of politics and political pedagogy is the
cultivation of identificatory elements of the German past in contemporary historical
consciousness in order to resolve the "difficult" relationship with national traditions." In
place of dynamic change, the conservative approach emphasises the concept of
recognisable, and, optimally, positive continuity in historical development as a basis of
political authority. 57 The construction of a sense of identity based upon the impression
of a form of continuity in history prioritises the investigation of whence society has
evolved from as opposed where to it can develop to and thus places a premium on the
past in evaluating contemporary society. From this perspective, contemporary social
relations are essentially the result of the past" and draw upon "historical consciousness"
and the attention to tradition as a source of contemporary orientation. The authority of
such claims ultimately rests upon the perception of positive continuities between past
and present which continue to shape the present and implied future. "Historical
consciousness" thus appears as the intellectual synthesis of those elements of the past
which appear useful to the present. 59 The necessary transmission of traditional values
through generations is afforded by a concept of historical consciousness which thus
SS RudolfVierhaus, 'Historische Entwicklungslinien deutscher Identitat.' in, 'Die Frage nach der
deutschen Identitat.' Schriftenreihe der Bundeszentrale fur politische Bildung. Band 221. Druck-
und Verlags-Gesellschaft mbH. Darmstadt. 1985. p. 12.
S6 ibid.
S7 von Bredow. in Weidenfeld. (ed.) 1983. op. cit. p. 106-7.
S8 Bernard Willms. 1988. op. cit. p. 101.
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understands how to combine elements of the past with the concerns of the present and
fears of the future."
In this discourse of "identity" and "historical consciousness" attitudes towards the
concept of progress in human affairs played a key role in shaping commentators'
political evaluation of contemporary society. In prioritising the rootedness of society
within a historical continuity of traditions, the conservative approach displays a political
orientation towards social stasis over social transformation. The stability of
contemporary society should be cultivated by the solidarity induced by collective,
historical experience over the discourse of social emancipation into a transformed
future. Identity represents more than the mere reference to history but places a claim of
loyalty upon the subject based upon its supposed status as a concept which transcends
sectional social interests. The concept of whole needs to command the social authority
to act as a superior category of solidarity in the face of change and as a media of the
type of unconditional faith championed by neoconservative thinkers. Thus, in short, in
order for the continuities suggested to contribute to social cohesion they need to engage
the hearts and minds of the citizens of the Federal Republic. For conservative thinkers,
no other value of the modern age has as successfully resolved these questions of
legitimacy than the concept of patriotism which is intellectually cohered by "historical
consciousness". From the concept of patriotism, conservative thinkers hope to find a
"higher authority" of the abstract collective, national community which overrides
"fractional" interests in society and can offer a common point of consensus. Inherent in
the conservative discourse of national identity during the 1980s was the identification of
a basic inability of the Federal Republic to generate this necessary sense of collective
loyalty without recourse to a concept of the "nation". In this sense, the concept of the
"German nation" formed the ideological-political focus of the neoconservative approach
to both contemporary West German society and also German history. Before moving on
to examine responses to the discrediting of the national past and concept of German
nation through the experience of national socialism, it is useful to consider the concepts
of "nation" which neoconservative thinkers advocated for the FRG during the 1980s.
2.3. The Need for Patriotism
59 Greifenhagen. 1986. op. cit. p. 79.
60 Weidenfeld. 1987. op. cit. p. 29. Jeismann in Weidenfeld. p. 35-9.
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The conservative discourse of national identity formed the intellectual forum in which
the concerns towards social hegemony considered thus far were politically articulated.
Conventional patriotism proved rather unconventional in German political-historical
debate during the 1980s and provoked radical contradiction from left-liberal circles. In
contrast to formulations of social loyalty founded upon economic prosperity, Western
democracy or Verfassungspatriotismus, neoconservative discourse championed the
"nation" as the a priori focus of collective identity. That is not to say, of course, that
intellectuals and politicians refrained from couching formulations of pride and identity
in the above mentioned concepts which remained central tenets of West German
political culture and conservative discourse. Yet a wide range of diverse conservative
commentaries on the subject of national identity during the 1980s considered the
"German nation" a superior media of identity to that afforded by the Federal Republic
alone. In the enduring problems with the concept of the "nation" in the post-fascist,
divided context of the German states right wing thinkers perceived a dangerous latent
weakness of the Federal Republic and most would probably agree with the diagnosis
made by Carstens in 1989
Zu den Mangeln der deutschen Demokratie im ausgehenden 20. Jahrhunderts rechne ich weiter
die Schwache der Bindungen an Nation und Vaterland.61
Interesting in this perception is that the absence of conventional national identity is
presented as a deficit of democratic society and thus the critical perception of a
dichotomy between the German nation and democracy is inverted by Carstens. For
Carstens, modem democracy is weakened by the absence of the "nation". In this
discourse, the concept of the "nation" is considered a higher form of authority and
legitimacy in ideological terms than the institutions of the post-war West German state.
Evidence of economic difficulties and alienation from the political institutions of the
FRG helped sharpen the perception that the need for identity could best be fulfilled by
the national idiom. Two currents of thought have been identified in the neoconservative
discourse of national identity of the 1980s in the form of deutsch-national and liberal-
konservativ approaches to the national idea." Whereas, deutsch-national positions
perceive in national identity the intellectual justification for the transcendence of the
Federal Republic in the practical political reconstruction of the nation state, more
61 Carstens. 1989. op. cit. p. 27.
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liberal-konservativ streams understand the primary benefit of national identity in the
stabilisation of West German society. Yet, whilst these two currents operate from
differing perceptions of the pragmatic political application of the national idea, the
ideological lines between these two streams are blurred as both approaches share
basically the same political conception of the essence of the nation. A characteristic of
the neoconservative national discourse of the period is the conceptualisation of the
nation in the neo-romantic terms of a Kulturnation based in the pre-political,
particularist categories of shared language, historical descent and culture. In the
neoconservative rehabilitation of particular tenets of classical romantic conceptions of
the nation we may perceive the appeal of a national concept which was both directed
against the progressive political approach and which also could be asserted despite the
experience of national fragmentation.
Whilst deutsch-national currents may appear to take the romantic discourse of
nationality more literally, this tradition also shares an important intellectual framework
with more liberal-konservativ conceptions of the essence of the nation. For the right
wing conservative intellectual Bernhard Willms, the Napoleonic epoch which first
generated a discourse of the "German Nation" bears resemblance to the period of Cold
War division. Above all, the experiences of national fragmentation, foreign military
occupation and cultural domination provide the point of interface between the early
nineteenth century idea of the nation and national discourse in divided Germany during
the Cold War. For Willms, the nation is principally constituted by the ethnic concept of
Volk which has developed and retained its particularism through history, language and
culture." In this reading, the concept of the nation is released from its historically
specific context of development at the end of the eighteenth - early nineteenth century
and appears as the transcendental, organic a priori of collective human existence in past,
present and future. Willms traces the development of the idea of the nation to its origins
at the end of the eighteenth century and rightly contends that the nation gradually
replaced confessional and dynastic loyalties and became the central point of reference
for the individual. Yet Willms does not have in mind the democratic-revolutionary
concept of nation of 1789 but rather more orientates his political approach towards the
62 Czitrich. 1989. op. cit. pp. 74-88.
63 Bernhard Willms / Paul Kleinewefers, 'Erneuerung aus der Mitte. Prag - Wien - Berlin.
Diesseits von Ost und West.' Busse und Seewald GmbH. Herford. 1988. p. 300.
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"German" concept of nation. Whilst the revolutionary genesis of the nation state in
France championed the principles of "Freedom - Equality - Fraternity", Willms
contends that the German concept of the nation was driven by the principles of unity
and freedom. These two principles ensure that the (German) concept of the nation has
an important role to play in transcending the Cold War order in the present and it is in
this point that the value of nationalism in Willms reading comes to fruition.
Whilst this author concurs with mainstream conservative thought that it would be a fatal
mistake to throw the baby of national consciousness out with the bathwater of
belligerent national imperialism," the national idea is a principle which demands
concrete political action in the present. For Willms, this essentially implies the
reunification of the German nation and the (re)construction of the Central European
Mitteleuropa between the Cold War Superpowers in the present. In this reading, the
essence of national identity is only fulfilled when historical consciousness ceases to be
an object of intellectual, historical or sentimental study and transforms into an
inspirateur of political action in the present." These observations bring Willms and
Kleinewefers to the following conclusion
Insofem die Nationen vor allern historisches Schicksal sind, verlangt die Idee der Nation die
Identitat mit der eigenen Geschichte. Insofem die Idee der Nation von der Freiheit ausgeht,
verlangt sie auch hier Identitat, was bedeutet: Freiheit des einzelnen ist nur wirklich in einem
freien - selbstbetimmten - Ganzen. Die Nation als Idee verlangt also die Einheitlichkeit des
Bezugssystems und das ist fur die Deutschen das ganze Deutschland im konkreten regionalen
Aufbau und vor allem: in Unhabhangigkeit. Mitteleuropa-Politik bedeutet, daB die Dynamik
dieser zweifachen Identitat der Idee der Nation gel tend gemacht werden muBte: Die
Ubereinstimmung vor allem des Freiheitsanspruches des einzelnen mit der Freiheit seiner
Nation."
In the above excerpt we may discern an important distinctions between deutsch-national
and liberal-konservativ conceptions of the nation and its political function. For these
authors, the historical roots of the national idea in the concept of freedom demands
identity and it is in this moment where the national idea is elevated into the realm of
concrete political action. As the individual's fate is presented as synonymous with the
fate of the nation, the realisation of individual freedom is predicated upon the freedom
64 Willms / Kleinewerfers. 1988. ibid. p. 94.
65 ibid. pp. 85-7, 99-100,
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of the nation which, in the Cold War context, demands the transcendence of the division
of Central Europe and Germany. Thus, in contrast to the argument forwarded by Lubbe
et al that historical consciousness may serve as a form of "compensation" in the Federal
Republic, for Willms and Kleinewerfers the loss of sovereignty cannot be offset by the
promotion of museum culture
Wirkliche Geschichtsbewuf3theit macht sich politisch geltend. Es ist der Sinn dieser Erinnerung
an unsere pragende Ideen, zu aktiver Politik aufzufordern."
The authors make a distinction between blofJer Restauration and the lebendige
Aktualisierung der unentrinnbaren geschichtlichen Priigung. Thus the actualisation of
"Central Europe" appears as a pre-determined act of historical fate which requires the
input of the "historically conscious" politician in order to achieve the future realisation
of this specifically German historical legacy. Thus for this current of conservative
national discourse, the development of "national consciousness" is a means of
challenging the status quo and correcting the founding "myth" of the Federal Republic
that the loss of national sovereignty in 1945 represented a liberation for the Germans."
It is interesting to compare the ideas expounded by Willms and Kleinewefers with more
mainstream conservative discourse on national identity. For more liberal-konservativ
thinkers, the cultivation of the national idea is understood as a means of securing rather
than transforming the status quo and it is within this respect that the idea of national
identity is developed. The cultivation of a conventional sense of national identity during
the 1980s necessarily implied a concept of national consciousness which had been
abstracted from the concrete political form of the nation state. This exercise reflected
the paradox created by the adherence to the nation as the most effective focus of
collective identity and the enduring facticity of national division. Thus in Sturmer's
words
In der Wirklichkeit des geteilten Deutschland mussen die Deutschen ihre Identitat finden, die im
Nationalstaat nicht mehr zu begrunden ist, ohne die Nation aber auch nicht."
In this sense, one conservative commentator remarks how that as the formal call for the
actual reunification of the two German states became an increasingly abstract,
67 ibid. p. 100.
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unrealistic political aim, the importance of the concept of national identity increased."
Hence this appears as a definition of nation which exists in and is sustained by the realm
of "consciousness" rather than the tangible structures of political reality. This definition
of nation was articulated by Kohl in the 1987 Policy Statement as follows
The German nation continues to exist, sustained by the consciousness of Germans in East and
West. It derives its strength from the common history and culture and from the responsibilities
that the Germans share for the future."
Despite the recurrent oaths sworn by conservatives on the aim of the Basic Law to strive
for the reunification of the German states, the practical realisation of national unity
hardly appears to have been a motivational political concern of the Kohl administration
until the very last. In contrast to post-unification explanations by Kohl which imply
reunification as a major tenet of his political programme", as late as 1988 the former
Chancellor believed that he would not live to see reunification of the two German
states." Yet no other West German government placed so much political energy into
publicly promoting the concept of national identity as Kohl's conservative coalition.
The answer to this apparent contradiction is to be found in the concern for social
consensus which we have considered thus far. Conservatives identify a crisis of values
within society which threatens social hegemony. This condition and the challenge from
"emancipatory" politics is met with the notion of identity based upon the historical
continuity of the nation. It is the combination of this approach to the challenge of social
heterogeneity with the specific conditions of post-war Germany that shaped West
German conservative discourse on the nation.
Whilst some conservatives deduced from this dichotomy the necessity of the
reunification of the German nation, most conservative thinkers perceived the strength of
the national idiom in securing the existing order by fostering a sense of identity. In this
vein, Karl Rohe presents the case for cultivating national identity as a form of necessary
political and ideological ballast for West German democracy achieved by its insertion
into German national traditions. The present dichotomy between the concept of the
70 Gunter C. Behrmann, 'Yolk, Verfassung, Staat, Kultur, Geschichte und Nation. Das
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German nation and the facticity of the Federal Republic undermines, for Rohe, the
legitimacy of the West German state. Rohe describes the problem as follows
Die im intemationalen VergleichsmaBstab extrem schwach ausgebildete Fahigkeit der
bundesrepublikanischen Gesellschaft, Konzepte, Werte und Malistabe an die nachstfolgende
Generation zu vermitteln, die zwar einerseits kulturelle Innovationen begunstigt, andererseits
aber zu einer bedenklichen Fragmentierung der politischen Kultur in der Zeit fuhrt, hat eine ihrer
entscheidenden Ursachen zwar nicht in der Teilung Deutschlands, wohl aber in der fehlenden
Einbettung der bundesrepublikansichen politischen Kultur in eine iibergreifende nationale
Tradition, die dieser erst Halt, Selbstachtung und Verankerung zu geben vermag.
"Verfassungspatriotismus" in einer "post-national en Demokratie" ist wohl doch nur so etwas wie
ein Schonwetterkonzept."
Rohe's analysis draws together many familiar elements into the plea for a sense of
collective identity based in the continuity of national traditions. Rohe proceeds from the
observation that the Federal Republic is marked by an, internationally anomalous,
inability to establish a continuity of norms and values through successive generations
which has fragmented the political culture of West Germany. Thus he begins with the
perception of value crisis in society which ultimately derives from the perceived
alienation of the Federal Republic from the consensual influence of national traditions
and historical continuity. Writing a year after the Historikerstreit, Rohe is keen to
counterpoise the stability engendered by a sense of long term, national continuity in
history to the "fait-weather" concept of Constitutional Patriotism advocated by "post-
national" thinkers. The implication of this line of thought is that the social body requires
deeper roots than those offered by post-national readings if periods of social turbulence
are to be overcome. This common line of argumentation resolves the perceived
dichotomy between "democracy" and the "nation" by subsuming the former under the
historical continuity of the latter.
A frequently asserted objection to Constitutional Patriotism is that it lacks the capacity
to engender the emotional loyalty of its citizens which proves an essential bond
particularly in times of crisis." In this sense, in a contribution to the Historikerstreit, the
historian Hagen Schulze criticised the "critical" opposition between national identity
and Constitutional Patriotism as a dangerous game. Drawing a parallel with the Weimar
73 David Marsh. 'Germany and Europe. The Crisis of Unity.' Mandarin. London. 1994. p. 26.
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Republic, Schulze warned of the dangers of having nothing to counter the powerful
emotional appeal of the extreme nationalists." For this thinker, mainstream political
culture should foster the emotional bond of the nation in order to prevent the
"usurpation" of the powerful force of nationalism by the extreme right. The implicit
assumption of this reading is that the legal codification of liberal democracy represents a
somewhat insipid focus of social loyalty which requires the particular sense of
attachment which only the nation can inspire. In this manner, Schulze unites a historical
perspective on the collapse of the Weimar republic with a critique of contemporary
"post-national" discourse in the Federal Republic. In the capacity of the national idiom
to stimulate an emotional bond between citizenry and state, conservative thinkers
perceive a powerful argument for the rehabilitation of national identity in the Federal
Republic. A typical line of argument implies that whilst constitutional arrangements
may well be a fine thing in modem, Western democratic society, the social cohesion
afforded by the heart outweighs that of the head
Eine vom deutschen Nationalgedanken abgekoppelte Bundesrepublik Deutschland allein in
einem "Verfassungspatriotismus" verankern zu wollen, unterschatzt die mit der Nationalbildung
verbundene, tiefe Einbindung in Emotionalschichten. Ein so1cher Befund ist nicht mit dem
Etikett "irrational" in Altertumsschubladen abzulagern, er rnuf ernst genommen werden.t'
The conservative discourse of national identity places a premium upon emotion over
reason as a higher media of collective consciousness. For neoconservative thought the
neo-romantic approach appeared to offer the political-philosophical basis for a concept
of nation which remained intact beyond political-territorial division, which could
counter the progressive paradigm of the New Left and "critical history" and which could
satisfy the need for meta-political values of unconditional faith. In this concept of the
"nation", conservative thought perceives the socially cohesive potential of an idea
which claims a "higher authority" than that represented by "mundane", economic,
political or social concerns. A cogent expression of this sentiment is provided by
Sturmer who offers the following case for the cultivation of conventional patriotism in
the Federal Republic
1st der Staat organisiert wie eine grode AOK, machtige Burokratie uber betreuter Unrnundigkeit?
Oder bedarf er, da er Opfer fordert, der sittlichen Begrundung? Kann er sich darauf beschranken,
76 Hagen Schulze, 'Fragen, die wir stell en mussen, Keine historische Haftung ohne nationale
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Legitimitat durch geregeltes Verfahren herzustellen, oder bedarf er jener hoheren Sinnstifiung,
die nach der Religion bisher allein Nation und Patriotismus zu leisten imstande waren?
Nirgendwo gilt so stark wie im geteilten Deutschland der Einwand, daf der Patriotismus in zwei
Kriegen und den Greueln des Volkermords starb. Nirgenwo aber hat auch der Verlust der
Geschichte und die Teilung des Landes eine so tiefe Unsicherheit hinterlassen."
The theme which occupies Sturmer here is the question of how the state can cultivate
the social legitimacy required in order for it to exercise its political authority without
contradiction. The values which are capable of sanctioning the state's social authority
must represent a claim for a higher authority than legal process or the bureaucratic
rationality of the health service. In the modern age, this requirement has only ever been
met by the secular faith of patriotic nationalism. Yet, due to the experience of national
socialism this naturally remains a highly discredited concept in the German context. The
dilemma facing conservatives is thus formed by the impasse resulting from the clash
between the desire for social hegemony and consensus on the one hand and the insight
that the only media capable of achieving this were morally and politically compromised
by the experience of the NS past on the other. This is considered doubly problematic
because the resulting "loss of history" and division of the nation has left behind an
unparalleled state of social unease and disorientation. In this reading, the loss of the cure
also forms part of the original problem. If a successful concept of conventional national
identity were to be developed during the 1980s, then the legacy of national socialism
needed to be addressed and its compromising effect upon the articulation of
"conventional" national sentiment relieved.
2.4. Confronting the Past
During the 1980s, conservatives pursued a more confrontational approach to the
national socialist past which sought to redress the "damage" done to the national
concept during the 1960s counter culture. This was ostensibly characterised by a
rehabilitation of themes which had shaped political culture during the 1950s. In the
post-war years, conservatives emphasised a culture of amnesia towards the national
socialist past and a concentration upon the tasks of the Wiederaufbau. Kiesinger
expressed the common sentiment in 1954 when he stated
78 Michael Sturmer, 'Kein Eigentum der Deutschen: die deutsche Frage.' in Werner Weidenfeld
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Aber eine wichtige Aufgabe dieses Parlaments ist es auch, diese Wunden mit heilen zu helfen
und nicht bei jedem Anlafl die kaum vernarbten Wunden wieder aufzureiflen. Wir haben in den
letzten Jahren viel tiber die europaische Integration gesprochen, und sie ist wahrhaftig notig,
wenn wir mit dem Leben davonkommen wollen. Aber es gibt auch eine innerdeutsche
Integration. Wir dienen Europa nicht und wir dienen diesem Volke nicht, wenn wir nicht alles
daransetzen, diesen Integrationsprozefl voranzutreiben uns aus diesem immer noch gespaltenen
und blutenden, unsicheren und verwirrten Volk endlich wieder ein gesundes Volk zu machen."
As Dubiel comments, this is essentially the form of kommunikatives Schweigen which
Hermann Lubbe favourably compared during the 1980s to the critical engagement with
the NS past on the part of the student movement. 80 This approach to the past found
expression in the solidarity with POW'S,8l the "honour" of the German soldiers" and the
reintegration of former Nazi civil servants under the 131 Law83 with reference to the
need for "experts" in the reconstruction. In this vein, one commentator remarks that the
development of the Bundeswehr into the late 1960s was characterised by a general
paradigm of "restoration" in which the intemalleadership's bureaucratic emphasis upon
the formal constitutional regulation of the Bundeswehr served as a substitute for the
cultivation and consolidation of the more substantial concept of the armed forces as
Burger in Uniform." Frei perceives in this combination of amnesia and solidarity with
the Wehrmacht officers and men a form of secondary confirmation of the
Volksgemeinschaft" This approach found historiographical congruence in the writings
of Ritter who contended that national socialism was primarily a problem of the fanatical
"masses" which since the "demagogy" of the Grofsdeutsch liberals of 1848 had asserted
an ever increasing influence in political culture and denigrated the "classic age" of the
great statesmen." During the 1960s this approach was challenged by both the New Left
79 cited in Dubiel. 1999. op. cit. p. 64.
80 Hermann Lubbe, 'Es ist nichts verges sen, aber einiges ausgeheilt. Der Nationalsozialismus im
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student activists and also young left-liberal academics whom we shall consider in the
subsequent chapter. It was largely in response to this counter-culture that conservatives
in the 1980s attempted to recover ground lost to the left.
Werner Conze notes the transformation of perceptions towards the historical Reich in
the late 1960s and early 1970s. Comparing the I50th anniversary of Bismarck's birthday
on 1 April 1965 with the centenary commemoration of the Kaiserproklamation in
Versailles on 18 January 1971, Conze remarks that although in both celebrations the
symbol of the, now divided, nation state played a central role, attitudes towards
Bismarck differed starkly. In 1965, Erhardt could claim that Bismarck should not be
cast as the historical enemy of democracy and that through the act of honouring
Bismarck West Germany was affirming its commitment to a positively endowed
national history. Heinemann's commentary from 1971 was reluctant to include
Bismarck and concentrated upon the Schwarz-Rot-Gold democratic social forces
defeated by Bismarck in 1866-7 and who again emerged in the drafting of the peace
resolution of 1917 and the formation of the Weimar Coalition of 1919.87 The
transformation described by Conze reflected the change in perceptions of the German
past in accord with a changing contemporary political paradigm and in particular
perceptions of "democracy". Michael Sturmer noted that during the 1960s, the New
Left's interest in "radical democratic" politics and critique of the SPD lead to a
historical interest in the Riitebewegung of the immediate post 1918 years and the
interpretation that the coalition forged between MSPD and OHL sowed the seeds of
later collapse." This connection between shifts in the political culture of the present and
interpretations of the past centres, in conservative discourse, upon the critique of the
progressive paradigm of the New Left in the 1960s-70s. Conze locates the shifting
paradigm of the past within the expansion of the universities and the development of
social-historical science which superseded more traditional historiographical approaches
and fused sociology, politics and history into a "critical" approach. Conze is particularly
Franz Schnabel, 'Das Problem Bismarck' (1949) in, Heinrich Lutz (Hg.) 'Franz Schnabel.
Abhandlungen und Vortrage 1914 - 1965.' Herder. Freiburg im Breisgau. 1970. p. 205. ibid. p.
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critical of the "emancipatory" conceptions contained in the neo-Marxist paradigm of the
early 1970s
Gesteigert wurde aber auch der politische Antrieb bis zur Forderung, daB die Frage nach dem
Warum "padagogisch" gewendet wurde. Der Historiker soUte nicht nur fragend analysieren,
sondem mahnen, daB es keine politische Ruckfalle geben diirfe. Die Geschichte als
"Gesellschaftsgeschichte" sollte dazu dienen, den Sinn fur "emanzipatorisch" begriffene
historische Prozesse der Vergangenheit und Zukunft zu wecken."
It is precisely this emancipatory thrust of critical history which conservative thinkers
object to most strongly. For Conze, the critical notion of a reactionary German
Sonderweg to modernity had permeated the education system and weakened the sense of
national identity particularly among the young." Whilst during the 1950s, the question
of continuity largely focused upon the relationship between the Reich and national
socialism, under the influence of the "emancipatory" paradigm, the critique of the West
German present was powerfully fused with the critical appreciation of the German past.
Under the influence of the greater public-political and legal engagement with the
Holocaust during the 1960s, questions as to the treatment of the recent NS past in the
immediate post-war years and embarrassing scandals of personal continuity between NS
and FRG created serious problems of legitimacy for the FRG.
In this context, Hermann Lubbe identified the popularity of the Verdriigungsthese since
the 1960s with an increasing critical distance from the Federal Republic and its social
institutions. For Lubbe, the thesis of a suppressed social memory of national socialism is
a straw-man constructed by radicals in the present who instrumentalise the NS past as a
means of undermining contemporary society and arguing for the revolutionary
overthrow of the capitalist SchoJ3, aus dem das kroch" Adding that this is the version
fed to students across a variety of academic disciplines, Lubbe draws out the connection
between contemporary social critique and critical engagement with the NS past. For
Lubbe, the period of the kommunikatives Schweigen during the 1950s represented an
essential condition of social consensus which was disrupted by the radical theories and
student protest movement of the 1960s which, in tum, he understands as a symptom of
the more general alienation induced by modem society. Sturmer also links the critical
89 Conze. 1979. op. cit. p. 60.
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engagement with the NS past with a radical questioning of the legitimacy of the West
German present observing
Je mehr das Grauen der Vergangenheit einer von ihm verschonten Generation femriickt, je mehr
sozialwissenschaftliche Abstraktion die Realitiat des Nationalsozialismus auflost bis zu dem
Punkt, da alles zu Kontinuitat zusammenschieJ3t und umfassender Faschismusverdacht wuchert,
desto nachdriicklicher gerat die Bundesrepublik unter einem Rechtfertigungszwang, der nicht
Bestand, als das Schrecken noch die Erinnerung besetzt hielt."
The perceived relationship between contemporary political analysis and historical
interpretation articulated in the paradigm of "critical social history" led many
conservative thinkers to cast this neue Orthodoxie as a form of Treitschke revidivius"
and contended that it played a similar role for the contemporary New Left as traditional
Historicism had for the national liberal bourgeoisie of the Kaiserreich. Such objection to
the "politicisation" of historical "science" formed a common theme of conservative
thought which, however, revealed more an aversion towards the premises and
conclusions of critical history than the actual practice itself. Conservative arguments for
a sense of national identity and a salvaging of the national past also clearly operated
from an understanding of the political value of historical interpretation.
In the conservative discourse of Vergangenheitsbewiiltigung of the 1980s we can
discern the central role played by the concept of anticommunism in dealing with the
negative German past and the attempt to salvage the discredited nation. Also evident
was the attempt to solidarise with the soldiers of the Ostfront who in the last days of the
war had fought the encroaching Red Army in Eastern Prussia." Whilst this approach
was reminiscent of the conservative discourse of the 1950's which urged solidarity with
an "honorable" Wehrmacht, it nevertheless constituted more than a simple return to
immediate post-war approaches to the past. Neoconservative thinkers were compelled to
address the critical insights of the progressive paradigm in theories of both
contemporary politics and historical analysis. In this sense, the anticommunism of the
1980s represented a synthesis of some of the themes which we have considered thus far,
comprising principally: a) the attempt to cultivate a contemporary sense of political
92 Sturmer. 1985. op. cit. p. 17.
93 Nipperdey. 1979. op. cit. p. 389.
94 Thus the general drift of Andreas Hillgruber's suggestion that contemporary sympathies should
lie with the Wehrmacht soldiers who "defended" the German population of the Eastern territories
against the Racheorgien of the encroaching Red Army. cf 'Historikerstreit.' 1987. op. cit. pp.
232-242.
61
orientation within the context of the Cold War, b) breaking the asserted link between the
German nation, capitalism and National Socialism and c) articulating a critique of
modernist political culture. These themes are particularly well represented in the work
of perhaps the most controversial figure of the Historikerstreit, the Berlin historian
Ernst Nolte.
2.4.1 Relativising the Past
Whilst Nolte expends little energy in developing a concept of "national identity" or in
establishing a set of positive "German traditions", his approach and academic output is
central to the broader conservative discourse of identity during this period. Since the
early 1970s, Nolte has devoted his intellectual energies to explaining the rise of fascism
in Europe during the inter-war period. Although he does not explicitly address the
phenomenon of identity creation, his thesis on European and in particular German
fascism has been extremely influential in studies of the period and sparked the explosive
controversy of the Historikerstreit. The chief characteristic of Nolte's approach is the
rejection of the thesis of various shades of Marxist and Marxist-influenced thought that
fascism and capitalism were inextricably linked. In place of this critical approach he
contends that the principal causal factor was formed by the ideological and political
interplay between Marxism and fascism. From the comparison with the inter-war Soviet
Union, Nolte sought to relativise the specific German national context of National
Socialism under the broader concept of "totalitarianism". Nolte's main objection to the
NS past which refuses to "pass away", is its disruptive effects upon contemporary West
German political culture. In comparison with the study of other historical epochs, the
engagement with the National Socialist past has purposefully retained a high political
charge and thus has not passed into a theme of "objective" historical study. For Nolte,
the NS past continues to hang above FRG society not as a "model" from the past but as
a "nightmare" which impedes the cultivation of the past for contemporary identificatory
purpose. In the endurance of this past, Nolte also perceives the attempts of successor's
of the survivors to retain a sense of "privileged status" in the present. It is worth
repeating Nolte's main contentious argument of the Historikerstreit in full
Vollbrachten die Nationalsozialisten, vollbrachte Hitler eine "asiatische" Tat vielleicht nur
deshalb, weil sie sich und ihresgleichen als potentielle oder wirkliche Opfer einer "asiatischen"
Tat betrachteten ? War nicht der "Archipel GULag" urspriinglicher als Auschwitz? War nicht
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der "Klassenmord" der Bolschewiki das logische und faktische Prius des "Rassenmordes" der
Nationalsozialisten ? Sind Hitlers geheimste Handlungen nicht gerade auch dadurch zu erklaren,
daf er den "Rattenkafig" nicht vergessen hatte ? Riihrte Auschwitz vielleicht in seinen
Urspriingen aus einer Vergangenheit her, die nicht vergehen wollte ?95
Hence, for Nolte, the racial genocide perpetrated by the SS can be understood as a
reaction to the "class genocide" of the Red Terror and Stalin's Cheka, symbolised in the,
mythical, "rats cage" of Lubjanka. Thus, beyond his declared intention of considering
various forms of "mass murder" in the interests of historical objectivity or Wissenschaft,
Nolte's thesis contains an inherently political revaluation of the genocide of European
Jews which places the ultimate historical-political responsibility onto the Soviet Union.
Thus he not only "compares" the political violence of both regimes but ascribes
historical causality to the Soviet Union in explaining the development of radical
German fascism and its programme of racial genocide. Anticipating critique of his
position, Nolte complains that the political climate of the Federal Republic unfairly
considers such attempts at relating the "whole picture" as evidence of anticommunism
born from contemporary Cold War considerations." Nolte's approach was indeed
criticised as contemporary anticommunism and whilst this certainly appears a valid
observation, his approach is as much directed against the domestic, "New Left" radical
critique of West Germany as against the contemporary Soviet Union.
Nolte's contention that fascism was essentially a reaction to the Marxist and socialist
movements of the late nineteenth-early twentieth century was a theme which he had
worked upon for some years before the Historikerstreit. In a critique of the antifascist
theory of the "New Left" during the early 1970s Nolte formulated his basic position as
follows
Wenige Satze sind wahrend der kurzen Bliitezeit der Neuen Linken haufiger zitiert worden als
die These, die Max Horkheimer 1939 aufstellte: Wer nicht vom KapitaJismus reden wolle, solie
auch vom Faschismus schweigen. Mit dem gleichen Recht konnte man sagen, wer nicht vom
Marxismus sprechen wolle, verfehle den Begriff des Faschismus schon im Ansatz."
Nolte derives the post 1918 radical fascist movements from the threat to the bourgeoisie
from the radical left and traces Marxism back to the enlightenment and genesis of
95 Ernst Nolte, 'Vergangenheit, die nicht vergehen will. Eine Rede, die geschrieben, aber nicht
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modernism at the end of the eighteenth century." For Nolte, Marxism represented the
loose synthesis of older ideas which essentially centred upon the opposition between
rich and poor and the objection to inequality. In the diffuse strands of enlightenment
egalitarian thought Nolte perceives the genesis of the concept of "class war" as this
discourse provided the poor with a voice for the first time." On a philosophical level,
Nolte perceives the persistence of the "modernist", "rational" and "universal" moments
of the enlightenment in the discourse and movements of socialism in the early twentieth
century, and indeed in the New Left of the 1960s.100Nolte's rejection of the Marxist
argument that the anarchy of the Free Market can be transcended by planning in order to
satisfy need and want is based in the familiar conservative contention that the supposed
anarchy of the market is merely a reflection of the natural, unplannable nature of human
need. A central thread running through Nolte's critical engagement with socialist
thought is the association of the negative human emotions of hatred and the will to
destruction with Marxist politics, philosophy and practice. This is an important
component of Nolte's analysis as it lays the basis for his claim that radical fascism later
emerged as the bourgeois reaction to the "class genocide" of the Soviet regime. Thus we
learn that the "central thought" of Marxism is that of "extermination" and its "central
will" is described as the identification with the historical process and its exterminatory
tendency.'?'
Having established the inherently destructive implications of Marxist philosophy, Nolte
contends that the essential political link in the causal chain between Marxism and
fascism was formed by the experience of the First World War and the maturation of
Marxism through the mediation of Leninism developed in the October Revolution. The
world conflict of 1914-18 split the socialist movement between "reformist" and
"revolutionary" Marxists, the latter who were to succeed in Russia. Nolte is sensitive to
the national peculiarities of the economically and socially backward imperial Russian
state which demanded a "development dictatorship" and which, at the latest after the
Kronstadt uprising and the defeat of the Left Opposition, resulted in defusing the inner
explosive force of Marxism. Thus, for Nolte
98 Nolte. ibid. p. 117.
99 Ernst Nolte. 1985. op. cit. pp. 39-40.
100 Nolte. 1985. op. cit. pp. 573-574.
101 Nolte. 1973. op. cit. p. 118.
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Das ResuItat ist bekannt: Eine Entwicklungsdiktatur, deren Ziel zunachst ein ganz
unMarxistisches "Einholen" war, trat mit dem vollen Anspruch einer Sozialreligion auf. Die
Vernichtung des schwachen russischen Burgertums wurde fur die kommunistischen Parteien in
Europa zum Paradigma und fur das europaische Burgertum zu einem Trauma."?
Thus, in this reading, the basic philosophical orientation of Marxism towards the
destruction of the bourgeoisie was radicalised by the experience of the First World War
and politically implemented in a backward state necessitating the ruthless
implementation of a developmental programme which assumed the air of a fanatical
social religion. The resulting traumatisation of the European bourgeoisie is considered a
foundational motivation of the development of radical fascism in Italy and Germany
during the inter-war years. It is this constellation of forces which Nolte invokes in order
to understand the development of National Socialism and, ultimately, the genocide of
European Jews. For Nolte, such developments necessarily stimulated a reaction on the
part of the bourgeoisie and the Russian revolution, of course, elicited anti-Marxist
sentiment in all the Western nations who, in the midst of war, were quick to dispatch
armed forces in an attempt to crush the revolutionary regime. Yet this response was of a
diffuse nature and Nolte is interested in understanding fascism as the specific response
to the Bolshevik revolution which sought to counter the radicalism of the Bolsheviks
with a "revolution" from the right. Thus, according to Nolte
Eben dies ist der Faschismus: nlimlich ein Antimarxismus, der den Gegner durch die Ausbildung
einer radikal entgegengesetzten und doch benachbarten Ideologie und die Anwendung von
nahezu identischen und doch charakteristisch umgepragten Methoden zu vemichten trachtet, stets
aber im undurchbrechbaren Rahmen nationaler Selbstbehauptung und Autonomic.'?'
In this, Nolte operates from the understanding of National Socialism as a revolutionary
movement and hence rejects the left interpretation of the NSDAP as essentially
representing a counter-revolutionary force. The revolutionary status of national
socialism is witnessed, for Nolte in the development of a fanatical ideology and the
application of radical, brutal methods of realising the aims of this ideology. In this
interpretation Hitler radically countered revolutionary Marxism with an equally
revolutionary and quasi-religious fascist ideology. This understanding rejects the "myth
of the good revolution" along the lines of 1789 and 1917104 and suggests the image of
102 Nolte. ibid. p. 121.
103 Nolte.l973.op. cit. p. 122.
104 cfKarl-Dietrich Bracher, 'The Role of Hitler: Perspectives ofInterpretation.' in Walter
Laqueur, 'Fascism. A Reader's Guide. Analyses, Interpretations, Bibliography.' Wildwood
House. Hants. 1988. p. 219.
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Hitler as a form of "German Lenin"!" In this manner, national socialism is detached
from the causal context of a national-historical Sonderweg and the political activity of
national elites in the Weimar Republic, and is associated with the radical left. In this
reading the modernist understanding of the historical and potentially future
emancipatory capacity of revolutionary social progress, revived by the New Left during
the late 1960s-1970s, is not only rejected as an illusion but is retrospectively identified
as part of the original problem.
Nolte argues for an "empirical" concept of revolution which refers to a deep alteration
of society which is, however, free from the moral or political considerations ascribed to
the "normative" revolution associated in progressive thought with 1789 and 1917.
Rainer Zitelmann accepts Nolte's line of argument and expands his conceptualisation of
revolution with the notion of the "fundamental revolution" inaugurated by the process
of social modernisation and industrialisation.l'" For Zitelmann, Hitler stood beyond the
categories of left and right and sought to draw from the extremes of both currents in
order to provide an authoritarian solution to domestic class war and at the same time
modernise German society and industry. He was, thus a reactionary exponent of social
revolution, the kernel of which was "modernist"."? In such readings, the concept of
modernity is stripped of its progressive, emancipatory political associations and related
to the process of industrial-technological modernisation. In this light, neoconservatives
often appear to reveal as much about their own concept of modernism as Hitler's and
that of the NS state. In this discourse of the past, one may note the fusion of
contemporary political conceptions and historical interpretation which is frequently
identified as a perfidious characteristic of the New Left. The social programme of
pursuing technological-industrial modernisation whilst at the same time compensating
the resulting socio-political alienation with recourse to "anti-modernist" or pre-
emancipatory values describes as much contemporary neoconservative social theory as
National Socialist ideology. Whilst this does not lead serious thinkers to identify with
the NS programme, the basic agreement that emancipatory politics should be de-
coupled from technological-industrial modernisation and the notion that in this manner
105 Rainer Ziteimann, 'Hitler. Selbstverstandnis eines Revolutionars.' Berg Hamburg/Leamington
SpalNew York. 1987. p. 3.
106 ibid. p. 10-11.
107 ibid. p. 459.
66
Hitler "modernised" German society often gives the impression that neoconservatives
seek to evaluate the objectively "positive" aspects of the regime against its obvious
political "negatives". The notion of Hitler as a revolutionary moderniser is employed
also to assert its relatedness to Marxism and also its distance from "conventional"
conservative streams who, for Zitelmann, offered the most effective resistance to
Hitler.!" Inherent in Zitelmann's argument is a positive evaluation of Hitler's social-
industrial modernisation programme against the KPD's, Stalinist version, of political
emancipation and social transformation. We shall return to these idea in more detail in
chapter five.
Ambiguous sympathies are also evident in Nolte's understanding of the emergence of
radical fascism as a form of radical self-preservation instinct of occidental culture. Nolte
understands the radicalism of the NSDAP as the inverse reaction to the radicalism of
the communist movement and contends that few observers of German society during the
1930s would have doubted that the KPD represented the more radical of the two parties.
For the German bourgeoisie, communist victory would have resulted in the potential
physical destruction of the German middle-classes, large agrarians and (bourgeois)
Jewish population. The growth of radical German fascism also resulted from the fact
that these classes were stronger than their equivalents in Imperial Russia and yet not
strong enough to ensure "normal relations" in German society. It is thus not surprising
that given these conditions, a powerful and radical German fascism was able to assume
power in crisis-ridden liberal German democracy as a form of bourgeois "self-defence"
movement. Writing after the Historikerstreit Nolte thus defended his argument as
follows
Die historische Betrachtung lliBt daher Raum fur das Auffinden von Fehlem und Versagen; sie
darf nicht dahin gelangen, die Tatsache zu leugnen, daB die Selbstverteidigung jener Klassen
auch radikale Formen annehmen muBte und daB selbst diese radikalen Formen nicht einfach im
historischen Unrecht waren, sofern man nicht behaupten will, daB die westliche Welt sich seit 70
Jahren in einer Fehlentwicklung befindet.!"
Nolte's line of argument is interesting and highly contentious. Despite his earlier
protestations that he is not interested in cultivating contemporary Cold War
108 ibid. p. 460.
109 Ernst Nolte, 'Die epoche des Faschismus - Voraussetzungen und Auswirkungen.' in Thomas
M. Gauly (Hg.) 'Die Last der Geschichte. Kontroversen zur deutschen Identitat.' Verlag
Wissenschaft und Politik. Berend von Nottbeck. Koln. 1988. p. 79.
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anticommunism, as the above extract displays, his line of thought clearly implies a form
of anticommunist continuity in the West since the Bolshevik revolution of October
1917. The retrospective historical justification for the emergence of radical German
fascism is predicated upon the continuity of "self-defence" against the communist threat
which, seventy years later, continued to play a central role in defining the political
culture of the Federal Republic. Although Nolte on no account seeks to justify the
political activity of national socialism, his defence of German fascism's "historical
justification" implies that this movement represented an, albeit radical, form of
occidental self-preservation. Thus adherents of the West in the present must, for Nolte,
recognise the historical legitimacy of national socialism even if they reject its racialist
ideology and belligerent imperialism. This line of argument contradicts Nolte's central
thesis and his contention that fascist parties represented the armed wing of the
bourgeoisie during a period of social-economic crisis ironically undermines his attempt
to sever the relationship between capitalism and fascism.
In explaining the Nazi policy of genocide, Nolte again turns to the "model" of the Soviet
Union and the "ideologues" Lenin and Stalin who sought to identify the human agents
of the ills of the world. In place of the bourgeoisie, Hitler identified the Jews as the root
of the ills of modem society and thus countered the "class genocide" of the Bolsheviks
with the racial genocide of the SS. Whilst acknowledging the singularity of the Nazis
"transcendental-biological" programme of racial genocide, the Shoah was als
Massenvernichtung die Kopie eines iilteren Originals.'!" Thus Nolte returns to his
original, provocative contention of the Historikerstreit that the Soviet "Red Terror"
transformed for the Nazis from Schreckbild into the Vorbild of mass extermination. In
the final section of this article, Nolte turns his attention to the Historikerstreit and the
issue of the value of the NS past in the contemporary political culture of the Federal
Republic. Nolte perceives two distinct camps in the historians' dispute which divides
between those interested in the furtherance of academic knowledge and those who
promote a set of moral values. I II It contains little surprise that Nolte considers himself,
and fellow conservative thinkers, as agents of Wissenschaft and his critical detractors as
essentially moralists camouflaging their intent in the name of intellectual endeavour.
For Nolte, the critical attitude towards the historic German nation state and the
110 Nolte.1988. ibid.
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contended antecedents of national socialism in German history are essentially instances
of moral engagement which is antithetical to scientific investigation
Wissenschaft ist vor allem durch Distanz charakterisiert. Das bringt sie in einen Gegensatz zum
unmittelbar moralischen Impuls des Leidens, der Trauer und der Anklage.!"
The "pseudo-moralism" evident in the approach of critical thinkers and historians is
thus anathema to the objective historical scientist who should seek to identify the
connections between phenomena and hence relativise that which lays claim to absolutes.
With such absolutes, Nolte essentially has in mind approaches which seek to understand
historical phenomena in their totality and, in particular, the critique of capitalism in
favour of socialism.'!' Nolte's reasonable objections to the role of "moralism" in the
study of historical is undercut by his falsification of the arguments of critical thinkers
which reveals his underlying motive. During the Historikerstreit, critical objections to
Nolte were primarily concerned with illuminating the specific German historical-
political antecedents of national socialism and investigating the relationship between the
crisis of German capitalism during the inter-war years and the rise of radical fascism.
Thus whilst his explanation of the events of the inter-war years rests upon the notion
that they represented the "epoch of fascism" and hence a phenomenon which extended
beyond the territorial boundaries of the German nation state, he argues in such a way
that suggests that this broader European context of fascism somehow relativises the
historically specific socio-political context which generated national socialism
Wenn damit die verbreitete Auffassung zuruckgewiesen wird, das aufserordentlichste Verbrechen
des Jahrhunderts sei auf "die Deutschen" zuruckzufuhren, dann ist das Motiv nicht ein
"nationalpolitisches Bedurfnis", sondem die schlichte Einsicht, daB es sich urn ein ideologisches
Verbrechen handelte und daf eine Nation in der groflen Mehrzahl ihrer Angehorigen viel zu
durchschnittlich ist, als daf sie ideologische Verbrechen begehen oder auch nur bejahen
konnte.!"
Nolte's argument, repeated here again from the Historikerstreit, that it is illegitimate to
condemn "the Germans" for the crimes of national socialism in the manner of theories
of collective guilt!" appears, at first glance, a sober and rational point of order in a
heated debate. Yet, his approach is, again, somewhat disingenuous as he confuses the
III Nolte. 1988. ibid. p. 85.
112 Nolte. 1988. ibid. p. 81.
113 ibid. p. 82.
114 ibid. p. 83.
115 cfNolte in 'Historikerstreit', op. cit. p. 41 his (in my view legitimate) objection that those who
hold "the Germans" responsible for national socialism employ the same ideological-political
constructs as did the Nazis themselves.
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critical indictment of the German state and its social, political and economic elites with
the metaphysical charge that the "Germans" as a people were responsible. Critical
thinkers, more than most, proved sensitive to avoiding irrational categories of thought
based upon the notion of "national character". Furthermore, the reason he presents for
rejecting such an approach reveals an underlying elitism in his own political
conceptions as he appears to suggest that the mediocrity of the masses prevented them
from understanding the call of an ideologically founded national mission let alone
enabling them the ability to translate such a theoretical position into practical political
reality.
In the arguments of Ernst Nolte we find the synthesis of many of the neoconservative
objections to the critical historical "emancipatory" paradigm of the New Left. Thus
Nolte rejects the association between capitalism and fascism and also rejects the
rootedness of national socialism in German historical political culture. In identifying the
revolutionary Marxist movement of the inter-war period and the Soviet Union as the
catalysts for the development of radical fascism in the West, Nolte successfully shifts
the focus of critical attention from inter-war German society and the crisis of capitalism
onto an ideological enemy who endures into the present.
Characteristic of the ideas forwarded during the Historikerstreit is that they found ready
supporters and detractors in the realm of politics and perhaps this is nowhere so evident
than in the public political engagement of chancellor Kohl during the 1980s. The return
of a conservative coalition in 1982, under the banner of a geistig-moralische Wende,
provided an opportunity to translate the discourse of tradition, history and identity into
political practice. Whilst Kohl was keen to stress the importance of West Germany's
Westbindung into Western Europe and the Atlantic Alliance, he also played a leading
role in the attempt to defuse the political charge of the NS past and cultivate a sense of
historical consciousness. In this sense, one may perceive in Kohl, the political
representative of the liberal-konservativ stream of conservative intellectual discourse on
the nation and identity. Nevertheless, this approach necessarily entailed a more
confrontational engagement with the NS past which proved highly controversial.
The Chancellor's 1984 state visit to Israel provided an early example of this. Whilst
Kohl declared the necessity of remembering the horrors of the death camps as a part of
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German history, his approach suggested that these events should be 'historicised' and in
a sense effectively laid to rest. His visit provoked controversy for two main reasons:
Firstly the contentious inclusion in his team of the right wing publicist and president of
the Deutschland Stiftung Kurt Ziesel who as a young man had been a convinced Nazi.
Secondly, Kohl's contention that those generations which had not consciously
experienced National Socialism as adults, and he perceived his own as the first, enjoyed
a Gnade der spiiten Geburt implicitly suggested that it was high time to draw a line
under this compromising period of German history. Thus, whilst Kohl, unlike many
conservatives, appeared ready to admit the NS past into the annals of German history,
this was predicated upon the belief that it was a past which had now been historicised
and as such its political charge had been defused. Writing twelve years after his trip to
Israel and discussion with members of the Knesset, Kohl complains that his intentions
have often been maliciously misinterpreted. Yet his explanation still rests upon an
appreciation of the good grace of fortune and the accident of birth. For Kohl this
simultaneously absolves successor generations from guilt, if not a metaphysically
founded "responsibility", and interestingly also denies them the moral right to condemn
the generation of perpetrators. 116 An interesting tone, which led to outrage among the
opposition during his report of the visit in the Bundestag, is discernible in Kohl's
understanding of the inescapable duty of contemporary Germans to assume such
responsibility
aber es ist wie in der eigenen Familie: ob man mit all dem einverstanden ist, was die, die vor
einem waren, getan haben oder nieht, man kann sieh nieht lossagen ... Man tragt das Blut der
Familie, die Erbanlagen in sieh. 117
Kohl's understanding of contemporary Germans' responsibility to remember the
national socialist past operates from a pseudo-organic, biological concept of nationality.
This does not, of course, testify to any neo-fascistic tendencies of Chancellor Kohl but
rather more displays the degree to which conventional conservative concepts of the
nation were politically compromised by the experience of national socialism. Kohl's
numerous public interventions and the ensuing political controversies resulted from the
necessary confrontation with this legacy and the attempt to neutralise its contemporary
political charge. The fortieth anniversary of the German capitulation of the 8 May also
provided a commemorative context for addressing the Nazi past. Commenting on the
116 ef Helmut Kohl, 'Ich wollte Deutschlands Einheit.' 1996. op. cit. p.240.
117 efDubiel. 1999. op. cit. p. 203.
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historical significance of the 8 May in February 1985, Kohl offered an understanding of
the German capitulation which relativised the liberationary quality of the collapse of the
NS dictatorship stating that whilst the 8 May was a day of liberation, it did not bring
liberation for all.118 Kohl thus paid lip-service to the concept of 'liberation' whilst
simultaneously qualifying this by reference to the fate of the Vertriebenen and the
occupation of Eastern territories by the Red Army. Kohl's recourse to anti-communism
effected a relativisation of the NS past via comparison with the Soviet Union. This
perception was strengthened by his decision to commemorate the end of the war with
President Reagan at the military cemetery in Bitburg on the 5. May which appeared to
suggest that contemporary Cold War anticommunism could be employed to both bolster
the contemporary status of the FRG as a reliable partner of the Free West and
simultaneously relativise the NS past. Thus Kohl insisted that Reagan lay a wreath at the
cemetery, which contained the graves of 47 members of the WafJen-SS, in an act of
rapprochement between two former adversaries now united in the fight against
Communism. In the light of criticism from the US Congress and Jewish organisations,
Chancellor Kohl threatened with the fall of his government and, in the event of
cancellation, foresaw a "serious psychological effect" on the friendly sentiments of the
German people towards the US and the Reagan administration.'!" The relativisation
enterprise appeared to enjoy the paternalistic endorsement of the US government as
Reagan had claimed in discussions with journalists prior to his visit that those young
men buried in the cemetery were victims of National Socialism just as surely as the
victims in the concentration camps. 120
Kohl's interpretation of the end of the war in Europe was subjected to indirect
contradiction three days later by Federal President Richard von Weizsacker on 8 May.
In a firm departure from the familiar conservative understanding of the German
capitulation, von Weizsacker interpreted this day as an unqualified liberation from the
National Socialist regime. Von Weizsacker's insistence on an unhierarchical
remembrance of the victims of National Socialism including groups which had
118 efNorbert Seitz, 'Die kalte Revision. Zur Aktualitat der 8.-Mai-Rede Weizsackers.lin, Neue
Gesellsehaft-Frankfurter Hefte. Mai 1995/5. p. 389.
119 ef Jeffrey Herf, 'Divided Memory. The Nazi past in the two Gerrnanys.' Harvard University
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 1997.pg 352.
120 ef, 'Remarks of President Reagan to Regional Editors' , White House, April 18. 1985. in
Geoffrey H. Hartman (ed.) 'Bitburg in moral and political perspective.' Indiana University Press.
Bloomington. 1986.p. 240.
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previously been marginalised such as Sinti and Romany Gypsies, homosexuals and the
mentally ill as well as his commemoration of organised working class and communist
resistance also marked his speech as a watershed in West German official
commemoration of the end of the war.!" Von Weizsacker's speech was admired by left-
liberal commentators.!" The hostility displayed towards von Weizsacker from within
his own party, however, would indicate that his approach represented an anomaly of
conservative Geschichtspolitik during the 1980s which was more typically represented
by the attempt to establish contemporary West German 'normality' via a relativisation
of the damaging legacy of the NS past. This impression was reinforced by the
Historikerstreit which sought to claim academic and political legitimacy for the project
of neutralising the past and rehabilitating national traditions under the motif of
anticommunism.
The employment of "totalitarian" theory during the 1980s could have suggested a return
to the early paradigm of the Federal Republic during the 1950s. Yet, the discourse
which emerged during the late 1970s - 1980s was clearly distinct. Above all, this
discourse was shaped by the response to both the New Left counter-culture student
rebellion and the emergence of a group of left-liberal young academics in the
universities. Whilst the former perceived continuities between the National Socialist
regime and the contemporary West German establishment, the latter traced the historical
antecedents of radical German fascism to the Sonderweg of the German nation state
formation in the nineteenth century. Furthermore, in comparison to the 1950s, the
anticommunist discourse of the FRG during the 1980s was articulated in a period which
had witnessed the breakdown of economic or confessional expressions of identity. The
combination of contemporary value crisis and the waning of the progressive political
idiom after the 1970s inspired neoconservatives to cultivate a concept of conventional
national identity which after the Wende of 1982 was elevated into a governmental
priority. Above all, this concept of national identity was predicated upon separating the
historic "German nation" from the phenomenon of German fascism and, in present
political culture, relativising the crimes of national socialism via recourse to Cold War
121 cf 'Speech by Richard von Weizsacker, President of the Federal Republic of Germany, in the
Bundestag during the Ceremony Commemorating the 40th. Anniversary of the End of the War in
Europe and of National Socialist Tyranny' ,May 8, 1985. in Hartmann 1986. p. 263.
122 cf Jilrgen Habermas, 'Defusing the Past: A Politico-Cultural Tract.' in Hartrnann.1986. p.49.
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anticommunism. The primary motivation of this enterprise was the desire to recapture
the national past as a source of potential collective pride in the present and as a counter
to the emancipatory paradigm of transforming the present into a liberated future.
Despite arguable success in shifting the political culture of the republic to the right and
forcing the issue of national identity and the "German nation", the legacy of national
socialism and the facticity of contemporary division remained formidable obstacles to
this project. As the Historikerstreit displayed, the question of the "German nation" and
the NS experience remained extremely contentious themes and were challenged by the
"post-national", left-liberal discourse of VerJassungspatriotismus and critical history.
Before progressing to an investigation of the impact of reunification upon both these
discourses, it is, of course, necessary to consider the "New Left", critical paradigm
which developed during the 1960s and formed the basis of the post-national
VerJassungspatriotismus argued by left-liberal thinkers during the identity debates of
the 1980s.
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3. The Emancipation from the Past: Critical History and Verjassungspatriotismus
In the following chapter I wish to exam me the left-liberal discourse of
Verfassungspatriotismus which emerged in the 1980s as a counter to the plea for a
return to conventional national identity on the right. Here, I wish to consider perceptions
of a "refounding" of the Federal Republic in the 1960s, the development of the
Sonderweg thesis, reflections of the social state as vehicle of emancipatory politics and
finally the concept of "post-traditional" identity.
3.1 The "Refounding" of the Federal Republic
Die Bildung eines deutschen Nationalstaates war, wie die Dinge im 19. lahrhundert lagen,
unverrneidbar. Aber das Reich von 1871 ist an den Deutschen selbst gescheitert. Angesichts der
Rolle, die Deutschland bei der Entstehung der beiden Weltkriege gespielt hat, kann Europa und
soli ten auch die Deutschen ein neues Deutsches Reich, einen souveranen Nationalstaat, nicht
mehr wollen. Das ist die Logik der Geschichte, und die ist nach Bismarcks Wort genauer als die
preul3ische Oberrechenkammer.'
Heinrich August Winkler's above contribution to the Historikerstreit in 1986 expressed
a recurring sentiment of left-liberal opinion in the Federal Republic. Particularly
characteristic is the causal role played by a critical perception of the historical German
nation in establishing the rejection of the contemporary conservative plea for a return to
conventional national identity. Also characteristic appears the quiet confidence in the
continued facticity of national division, if not the metaphysical content of the notion of
the "logic of history". Winkler's concept of contemporary West German society is
informed with a critical appreciation of German national history from which a
fundamental antagonism between the concepts of the "German nation" and "Western
democracy" is derived. This sense of dichotomy between the concepts of the "German
nation" and "Western democracy" runs through critical and left-liberal discourse during
this period and was forcefully articulated in response to the provocation of the
"Historians' dispute" during the mid-1980s. In this discourse, the concepts of "German
nation" and "Western democracy" feature as antagonistic phenomena, the flourishing of
the one only at the expense of the other.
IHeinrich August Winkler, Auf ewig in Hitlers Schatten? Zum Streit tiber das Geschichtsbild der
Deutschen. (1986) in Historikerstreit. 1995. op. cit. p. 263.
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Critical and left-liberal intellectuals perceived in the neoconservative discourse of
national identity an attack on the philosophical-political foundations of the Federal
Republic. This perception revealed both a broader orientation towards the epoch of
political modernism and in experiential political terms, towards the social state of the
1960s. The social historian and former director of the Munich Institute for
Contemporary History, Martin Broszat, understood in the national revisionism of the
right a threat to the Federal Republic's political-cultural integration into the Western
community. For Broszat, the tum to the West in the post-war period was predicated
upon the abandonment of national-political continuities in German history and thus the
call for a rehabilitation of national traditions is considered with deep suspicion
Es geht urn den zeitweiligen deutschen Sonderweg in der Neuzeit, damit aber auch urn die
Staatsidee der Bundesrepublik, die darin grtmdet, daB mit diesem Weststaat und seiner
Westintegration nicht nur erfolgreiche Allianzen und Kooperationsverhaltnisse entwickelt
wurden, sondem nach dem Irrweg deutsch-national en SonderbewuBtseins wieder eine
Ruckbindung an die universalistischen Prinzipien des westIichen freiheitlichen Rechtsstaates
stattfand. Gerade unter diesem Aspekt macht die amtliche Forderung des Interesses fur nationale
Geschichte auch manchen zwiespaltigen Eindruck.!
Broszat's critique of the call for "traditional" values is informed with an appreciation of
the conflictual content of the concepts of German nation and Western democracy. For
this thinker, "Western values" are primarily derived from the progressive political
emancipation movements of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. In the
Federal Republic, this reattachment was predicated upon the collapse of the German
nation and the intellectual break with its cultural-political traditions. From this
perspective, attempts to argue the "normality" of the German nation and the Mittel/age
challenge the conviction that Germany may never again "go it alone" in international
affairs.' For Habermas, the form of deutsch-national eingefiirbte Natophilosophie
propagated by right wing advocates of Westbindung also represented a serious threat to
the Federal Republic's openness to the political culture of the West.4 The fundamental
distinction between liberal-conservative and left-liberal perspectives of "Western
integration" was summarised as follows by Habermas in 1987
2 Martin Broszat, Wem gehort die deutsche Geschichte? (1986) in Broszat. 1988. op. cit. p. 309.
3 Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Entsorgung der deutschen Vergangenheit? Ein polemischer Essay zum
"Historikerstreit". Verlag C.H. Beck. Mtinchen. 1988. pp. 174-189.
4 Jurgen Habermas, Eine Art Schadensabwicklung. Die apologetischen Tendenzen in der
deutschen Zeitgeschichtsschreibung. (1986) in Historikerstreit. 1995. op. cit. p. 75.
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Gewi13, auf beiden Seiten wird die Orientierung der Bundesrepublik nach Westen emphatisch
verteidigt; aber die eine Seite laGt sich eher von einem machtpolitischen Konzept der
Westbindung leiten und denkt in erster Linie an das militarische Bundnis und an die
AuBenpolitik, wahrend die andere Seite die Bindung an die Aufklarungskultur des Westens
betont. S
Habermas thus offers a substantial reading of the Westbindung which supersedes the
formal question of the legal, military, economic and political alliances with Western
Europe and the US. Whilst Habermas offers a radically different concept of
contemporary West German political culture, this remains a political vision which is
orientated towards bolstering the status-quo. For Habermas, the attachment of the FRG
to "Western political culture" represented its insertion into the progressive philosophical
and political culture associated with the late eighteenth century bourgeois emancipation
movements. The tum to the West was predicated not only upon the historical departure
from the German nation but importantly upon the political-intellectual break with
German national traditions during the cultural revolt of the 1960s. The notion of a
second, ideational, Westbindung of political culture during the 1960s rests upon an
appreciation of the cultural-political changes inaugurated during this period and in
particular the critical engagement with the national past. We may note that it is precisely
this period and intellectual milieu which conservatives cite as the root of contemporary
social problems. Broszat offers the following description of the final synthesis of the
formal and substantial moments of the post-war Westbindung which was achieved first
in the 1960s
Tatsachlich ist diese ideelle Legitimation der Bundesrepublik, die Begrundung von Weststaat und
Westintegration als epochale Ruckwendung zur vomationalstaatlichen politische-kulturellen
westeuropaischen Gemeinsamkeit, nach den Verirrungen deutscher Sonderwegsideologie seit der
Romantik, wahrend der Adenauerzeit kaum schon bewuBtseinsbildend artikuliert worden. Das
geschah in starkerem MaJ3eerst seit den spaten sechziger Jahren, als man nicht nur auf den Erfolg
des Wirtschaftswunders, sondern nach dem gelungenen Machtwechsel auch auf eine erfolgreiche
Demokratiestabilitat zuruckblicken konnte, und es au13erdem galt, das seiner selbst sicherer
gewordene Staatswesen Bundesrepublik gegen den utopischen Systemveranderungswillen der
neuen Linken zu verteidigen."
This left-liberal formulation of the legitimacy of the Federal Republic is predicated
upon the conscious political-cultural break with national traditions which, for Broszat,
S Jiirgen Habermas, Geschichtsbewu13tsein und posttraditionelle Identitat. Die Westorientierung
der Bundesrepublik. (1987) in, Habermas, Die Modeme - ein unvollendetes Projekt.
Philosophisch-politische Aufsatze 1977 - 1992. Reclam. Leipzig. 1992. p. 160.
6 Broszat. 1988. op. cit. p. 288-9.
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was only fully realised after the successful transition of governmental power to the
social-liberal coalition at the end of the 1960s. Broszat, like Habermas, is clearly
ambivalent about the student protest movement and yet welcomes the liberating impact
of the revolt upon post-war German political culture. Left-liberal thinkers clearly have a
qualitatively different Federal Republic than neoconservatives in mind when defining
the substantial content of the concept of "Western democracy". The programme of the
social-liberal coalition of domestic democratisation and reform and of foreign-political
rapprochement via Ostpolitik clearly represented a change of political paradigm in West
Germany. The waning of the legitimacy of the CDU's hard-line anticommunist policy,
in the face of the gradual thaw in relations between the US and Soviet Union, finally
culminating in the recognition of the GDR in the Grundlagenvertrag of 1972 appeared
to testify to the practical irrelevance of the "national question". Yet for left-liberal
thinkers the transference of governmental power in 1969 represented more than a
change of governmental paradigm. For Habermas, the post war social state succeeded
where the other twentieth century "utopias" of Soviet communism and fascism failed
because it alone could internalise the progressive legacy of the nineteenth century
bourgeois emancipation movements and the model of the democratic constitutional
state.' This is a legacy which, for critical thinkers, reached its apogee in the election of
Heinemann to the office of Federal President and the social-liberal coalition under
Brandt. Habermas perceives the greatest service of Brandt's social-liberal coalition in
the concessions it made to the democratising demands of the student activists." Whilst
Habermas remained critical of radical student elements, perceiving evidence of
Linksfaschismus in Frankfurt in 1967,9 with hindsight he ascribes to the anti-
authoritarian revolt liberationary, democratising influence
Diese Jahre zwischen 1960 und 1967 sind die Inkubationszeit, in der kulturelles, in der geistige
Impulse, nicht institutionalisierte 6ffentliche Meinungen ein politisches Gewicht gewonnen
haben. Die Studentenbewgung war dann die von niemandem vorausgesehene Explosion von ein,
zwei Jahren - eine Revolte, auf die, eigentlich bis heute, die von Rancune und Ressentiment
gespeiste Konterevolution gefolgt ist."
7 Jurgen Habermas, Die Krise des Wohlfahrtsstaates und die Erschopfung utopischer Energien.
(1984) in Habermas. 1992. op. cit. p. 111-112.
8 Habermas. 1990. op. cit. p. 26.
9 Frank Wolf, Eberhard Windaus (Hg.), Studentenbewgung 1967-9. Protokolle und Materialien.
Peter Stem. FrankfurtlM. 1977. pp. 120-121.
10 Jurgen Habermas. 1990. op. cit. p. 22.
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For critical thinkers, the political catalyst for this liberation of an emancipatory political
culture primarily derived from the critical engagement with the national socialist past. It
is this critical engagement, which stimulated both a critical attitude towards the German
national past and West German present, which also stimulated (and continues to
stimulate) hostility from the right. Thus the critical engagement with the national
socialist past forms an essential role in stimulating the break with "German" political
culture and the tum to the West. The perception of a democratic "refounding" of the
Federal Republic during the 1960s provides the experiential political basis for the
construction of a progressive "identity" during the 1980s. This perception contrasts,
however, with the critical perception of West German democracy generated by the neue
Linke which legitimised arguments for social change of both radical and reformist
provenance via reference to the continuity of German authoritarian traditions. Before
returning to the question of post-national Verfassungspatriotismus, it is necessary to
consider the development of critical perceptions of the relationship between the
engagement with the national socialist past and the construction of contemporary West
German democracy.
During the 1960s West German political culture experienced, as elsewhere in the West,
the turmoil of the student protest movement. During this period the claims to democracy
of the anticommunist West were challenged by the post-war generation. Writing a
decade after the events of 1968, and the attempt on his life, the radical student leader
Rudi Dutschke observed the following on the broader historical context which bore the
emergence of the "New Left" during the 1960s
Bei unserem Einstieg in die Geschichte begann das herrschende System an ideologischer
Glaubwurdigkeit in der Sache der Demokratie und Freiheit zu verlieren. Die amerikanische
Armee warf Bombenteppiche auf Vietnam und sprach von der Verteidigung der Freiheit; die
Herrschenden in Amerika, bei uns in der BRD, West-Berlin usw. sprachen von Demokratie,
Forschung und Lehre, meinten aber die alten Vorrechte und die Herrschaft fiber uns.!'
The perception expressed by Dutschke of the questionable democratic credentials of the
West German political system, parties and ideologies was, in its time, strengthened by
the authoritarian manner with which the authorities responded to the phenomenon of the
student protest movement. The post-Godesberg SPD played an inadvertently formative
role in the emergence of the APO via its purging from the party of left-wing elements,
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most importantly the SDS in 1961, in the wake of the 1959 Conference and formal tum
to the concept of the Volkspartei," The APO formed a melting pot of socially critical
movements and ideas which, after the dissolution of the SOS in 1970, influenced the
political culture of 1970s in such phenomena as the feminist and ecology movements,
radical social-liberal reformers, revolutionary K-Gruppen, the anarcho-terrorism of the
RAF, the Spontis and Autonomen scene and the peace movement. 13 The broader revolt
against the restauration of the post-war reconstruction was lent explosive moral-political
force in the Federal Republic in the perception of enduring anti-democratic continuities
between national socialist and West German state. The impression of enduring
authoritarian attitudes fuelled the perception that post-war developments had signalled
more of a "restauration" than a new beginning in German society." In contemporary
West German democracy the philosopher Karl Jaspers perceived a system which
essentially sustained older continuities of the Untertan" and hindered the development
of a democratic political culture of citoyen," Charting a potential social development
from Parteioligarchie - autoritdrer Staat - Diktatur - Krieg, Jaspers perceives the
danger of a relapse into the authoritarian traditions which had resulted in two world
wars and the Nazi dictatorship." Jaspers' contemporary critique is focused upon the
discussion over internal security in the Notstandsgesetze (finally passed in May 1968)
and the lack of any effective political opposition to the "party oligarchy" of the Federal
Republic (a perception reinforced after the formation of the Grand Coalition in 1966). In
these two aspects, Jaspers focuses upon themes central to the broader anti-authoritarian
revolt of the 1960s. Jaspers' perception of continuity between NS and FRG Germany at
the level of the judiciary, military, police, professional classes and indeed of political
culture lends his critique a power moral-political compulsion and legitimacy.
Das Fortwirken der alten Nationalsozialisten ist ein Grundgebrechen der inneren Verfassung der
Bundesrepublik. Aile verdammen sie Hitler, aile behaupten, nicht eigentlich Nationalsozialisten
11 in Gretchen Dutschke-Klotz, Jurgen Miermeister, Jurgen Treulieb (Hg.) Rudi Dutschke.
Wurzeln und Spuren eines Aufbruchs. Rowohlt. Reinbeck bei Hamburg. 1983. p. 152
12 The Marxist historian Wolfgang Abendroth was expelled from the party in 1959 after his
critique of the Godesberg resolution as an accommodation to the existing system along with the
Konkret faction which since 1957 had been highly critical of the SPD's Deutschlandpolitik and
rearmament policy. c:fChristiane Bachmeier, Thomas Fischer, Alexander Ewald, Sabine Norton,
Mythen Knacken. 40 Jahre Westdeutsche Linke. Alexander Hom Verlag. Darmstadt. 1989. pp.
84-5.
13 c:fLangguth. 1983. op. cit. pp.234-262.
14 Kurt Sontheimer Die verunsicherte Republik. 1979. ibid. p. 77.
IS Karl Jaspers, Wohin treibt die Bundesrepublik? Piper. Munchen, 1966. p. 146.
16 Jaspers. 1966. op. cit. p. 178.
17 Jaspers. ibid. pp. 128-174.
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gewesen zu sein. Die Amerikaner sagten 1945 spottisch: In ganz Deutschland ist kein
Nationalsozialist zu finden. Wie kleinlaut waren sie 1945! Sie rechtfertigten sich, sie seien
mif3braucht worden. Wie beschieden und vorsichtig noch 1948! Seitdem wurden sie mit der
Macht der Wirtschaft und der neuen Geltung des Staates in der Welt immer selbstbewut3ter als
Mittlenker einer scheinbar wieder aufruckenden Grofimacht."
Jaspers' perception of the endurance of anti-democratic elites reflected a perception
current among critical sections of West German society. The emphasis during the
Adenauer years on "inner-German integration", the rehabilitation of "experts" in the
process of reconstruction and the dubious past of several political figures became a
source of explosive political controversy during the 1960s. The formation of a Grand
Coalition under the Chancellorship of the former NSDAP member Kiesinger, appeared
to confirm critical perceptions of anti-democratic continuities and SPD complicity."
This widespread perception that the present authorities largely comprised the generation
responsible for the National Socialist regime lent student protest moral-political
authority and served to radicalise rebellious opinion. Thus in the words of the young
Gudrun Ensslin in the wake of the death of Benno Ohnesorg on the 2 June 1967: Dies ist
die Generation von Auschwitz - mit denen kann man nicht argumentieren", Perceptions
of system continuity found perhaps their most destructive expression in the RAF's
declaration of "urban guerrilla warfare" on the "pre-fascist" West German state."
In the context of perceived continuity of both right wing authoritarianism and SPD
complicity, models of radical, anti-capitalist democracy loosely based upon the
Riitebewegung of 1918-19, which had rejected both the Soviet and Social Democratic
positions of the period, became an important historical-political orientation for the
SDS.22 In this context, inter-war, non-orthodox Marxist analyses of fascism underwent a
18 Jaspers. 1966. op. cit. p. 183-4.
19 A perception which, for Kiesinger, resulted in a slap in the face from the student Beate
Klarsfeld who had travelled from Paris in order to bring home the chancellor's NS past to young
Germans in particular. For this exercise ofa more direct form ofVergangenheitspolitik she
received a sentence of twelve months without bail. c:fWalter von Goldendach, Hans-Rudiger
Minow. 1994. op. cit. p. 318.
20 Stefan Aust, Der Baader Meinhof Komplex. Goldmann. Miinchen. 1990. p. 60.
21 c:fformulation of the notion of the "urban guerrilla" from 1971 in Rote Armee Fraktion.
Konzept Stadtguerilla. in Redaktion Diskurs. (Hg.) 1991. op. cit. pp. 264-269. Here a distinction
is made between the reformist social democratic government which had absorbed the protest
potential of the APO and was essentially buying time until the return of "fascist" rule in a CDU-
CSU government which would then destroy the left.
22 c:fGerd Langguth, Protestbewegung. Entwicklung - Niedergang - Renaissance. Die Neue
Linke seit 1968. Berend von Nottbeck. Koln. 1983. p. 39-40.
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certain rehabilitation particularly in academic circles." Rejecting both conservative
"totalitarian" explanations of German fascism and East German vulgar Marxist
approach, the new left was theoretically influenced by radical non-Stalinist emigres and
in particular the Frankfurt School. Adorno and Horkheimer's understanding of the
total ising tendencies of capitalism and its production of mass culture" could resonate
with the baby boomer generation born into the unique age of consumer capitalism.
Wilhem Reich's analysis of authoritarian structures in the bourgeois family also offered
an understanding of fascism as a psychological aspect which, however, was contained
within a broad socio-political analysis of National Socialism and capitalism." In
distinction to both communist and social democratic currents of the left, the new left
was marked by a social and political alienation from the working class. In this context,
the emigre Herbert Marcuse gained influence among this milieu and, in contrast to
Adorno and Habermas, celebrated the students as a new revolutionary class of
liberators. For Marcuse, pre-empting later theories of proletarian "embourgeoisement",
the revolutionary potential of the working class as die bestimmte Negation des
Bestehenden had been exhausted. The working class was, for Marcuse, now a social
group which had supported the US war in South-East Asia, the police and state against
counter-culture radicals and had elected Nixon into office."
This perspective denied the radical student movement a genuine social basis in the
working class which could have lent their demands political weight. Dieter Ruch
suggests that, although the student protest movement could actually record few direct
institutional gains, it exercised an important effect upon the longer-term political culture
of the Federal Republic in terms of repealing rigid anticommunism of the post-war
years, the strengthening of grass-roots participation models and heightening critical
23 Thus the volume edited by Abendroth, originally published in 1967, contains the work of
"unorthodox" Marxist theoreticians from this period which, in addition to Rosenberg, featured
contributions from Otto Bauer, August Thalheimer and Herbert Marcuse. c:f Abendroth. 1972.
op. cit.
24 Max Horkheimer, Theodor W. Adorno Dialektik der Aufklarung Philosophische Fragmente.
Fischer. FrankfurtlM. 1998. pp. 128-176.
25 Wilhelm Reich, Massenpsychologie des Faschismus in Reinhard Kuhnl (Hg.) Texte zur
Faschismus-diskussion. Positionen und Konroversen. Rowohlt. Reinbeck bei Hamburg. 1979. pp.
30-50.
26 c:fHerbert Marcuse's lecture to students at the University of Frankfurt, 28. June 1974,
Bemiihungen zum Verhaltnis von Theorie und Praxis. in Redaktion diskurs (Hg.) Kuss den
Boden der Freiheit. Texte der Neuen Linken. Aurora Verlagsauslieferung. Edition ID-Archiv im
international en Institut fur Sozialgeschichte. Amsterdam. 1991. pp. 172-176.
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awareness of the discrepancy between democratic ideals and political practice." For
critical thinkers of the 1980s, the greatest impact of the student protest movement was
its radicalising effect on political culture which, for Habermas, reached its highest
expression in the election of the first social democratic Chancellor since Hermann
MUller in 1930.28 The narrow election victory of the social liberal coalition was
presented by Brandt in terms of a democratisation of West German society. The social-
liberal coalition proposed a raft of reforms in society, politics and economy, which were
famously formulated in Brandt's phrase of mehr Demokratie wagen. Brandt's
governmental declaration was characterised by the powerful evocation of a democratic
new beginning and suggested that the process of genuine democratisation of West
German society could only now begin in earnest
Meine Damen und Herren, in den letzten Jahren haben mane he in diesem Land befurchtet, die
zweite deutsehe Demokratie werde den Weg der ersten gehen. Ieh habe dies nie geglaubt. Ieh
glaube dies heute weniger denn je. Nein: Wir stehen nieht am Ende unserer Demokratie, wir
fangen erst richtig an."
Although Brandt belonged to the older political generation, his assumption of the office
of Chancellor evoked a symbolism of progressive departure derived, to a large extent,
from his particular biography as a resistance fighter expatriated by the Nazi authorities.
In comparison to the compromised figures of Globke, Kiesinger, Carstens and the like,
Brandt appeared to politically symbolise the break with undemocratic political and
personal continuities and the overdue ascension to power of the "Other Germany".
Brandt combined a sense of departure from unsavoury continuities and the dawn of a
new democratic era with a plea for integration into and loyalty to the "new" state from
the younger generation." In this, Brandt combines perhaps the two major phenomena of
the 1960s, which seriously undermined the authority and social legitimacy of the West
German state in the perception of continuity between NS and FRG Germany, and the
related radical critique articulated by the counter-culture. Brandt implies sympathy with
the critique of compromised, authoritarian elites and combines this with an attempt to
reconstitute the social legitimacy of the state in terms of its democratic credentials and
break with traditions. Brandt is attributed a major role in effectively stemming the tide
27 Dieter Rueh, Protestbewegungen. in, Wolfgang Benz (Hg.) Die Gesehiehte der Bundesrepublik
Deutschlands. Band 3. Fischer Tasehenbuch Verlag. FrankfurtlM. 1989. p. 320.
28 Habermas. 1990. op. cit. p. 26.
29 Regierungserklarung von Bundeskanzler Brandt vor dem deutsehen Bundestag. 28. 10. 1969.
in Irmgard Wilharm (Hg.) Deutsche Geschiehte 1962 - 1983. p. 27.
30 Brandt. 1969. ibid.
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of youthful protest of the APO which had emerged over the decade, and the dissolution
of the SDS in 1970 and the rise in SPD membership among the under 30s between 1969
and 1973 lends credence to this perception." Clear from Brandt's address is his concern
to repair the broken bond between state and critical social groups. Different from other
conventional propositions, Brandt's claim to legitimacy and authority is predicated upon
an open sense of more democracy. The notion of a new "social-democracy" was not
exhausted by the formal inclusion of the younger generation and the programme of
social reform, as important as these were, but also implied a change in the substantive
concept of democracy itself, which also reflected the changes in West German political
discourse over this period. Brandt's concept of "daring more democracy" complemented
the series of progressive state interventions in society and the economy and advocated a
more open or "republican" understanding of the relationship between state and society
Die Regierung kann in der Demokratie nur erfolgreich wirken, wenn sie getragen wird vom
demokratischen Engagement der Burger. Wir haben so wenig Bedarf an blinder Zustimmung,
wie unser Yolk Bedarf hat an gespreizter Wiirde und hoheitsvoller Distanz. Wir suchen keine
Bewunderer; wir brauchen Menschen, die kritisch mitdenken, mitentscheiden und
mitverantworten.. Wir sind keine Erwahlten; wir sind Gewahlter, Deshalb suchen wir das
Gesprach mit allen, die sich urn diese Demokratie muhen."
Once more, a contrast is evoked between established governmental practice and the new
beginning, which seeks to bridge the chasm between state and society via the media of a
more open concept of modem democracy predicated upon the active engagement of the
citizenry in the political process. This is hence a reading which seeks to absorb political
critique and perceives this process more as testimony to a healthy democratic culture
rather than the state of emergency so frequently evoked by conservative commentaries
of this period. The themes raised by Brandt in his 1969 governmental address are
components of a concept of socio-political reform which keyed into a longer-term
discourse in which the critique of contemporary West Germany was fused with the
critical engagement with the NS past. As early as 1972, the RadikalenerlaJ3 appeared to
contradict the notion of a "critical" democracy and this impression was strengthened by
the witch-hunts against the left during the 1970s over the engagement with the left-wing
terrorism of the Baader-Meinhof group. Brandt's concept of open, critical democracy
drew heavy criticism during the 1970s from both CDU-CSU and indeed own party in
form of Schmidt's subtle attack on the responsibility of "intellectuals" for fostering a
31 Norton. (Mitverf.) 1989. p. 94.
84
critical climate in which RAF could develop and engender broad sympathies among the
young, counter-culture milieu." Whilst the APO was largely absorbed by the social-
liberal coalition and this reformist programme itself ran into serious problems in the
1970s, the enduring influence of this period appears to have been the transformation in
perceptions of the national socialist past. It is primarily this development which left
wing intellectuals celebrated when casting a nostalgic eye over the 1960s. Before
progressing to a consideration of the role of critical perceptions of the German past in
the post-national identity of Constitutional Patriotism in the 1980s, it is necessary to
consider the development of critical history in the 1960s.
3.2 The Sonderweg Thesis and Emancipation
During the 1960s, established historical positions on NS and Imperial Germany came
under attack within academic history and gave way to more critical considerations of
indigenous history. Perspectives of National Socialism within the broader course of
German history formed a fulcrum of paradigm change. Both Marxist and non-Marxist
thinkers had addressed the question of the role of National Socialism in the longer term
continuity of German history prior to the 1960s. The Hungarian Marxist Georg Lukacs
published The Destruction of Reason in 1953, which built on his earlier notion of Hitler
as the political manifestation of Nietzsche's philosophical standpoint and extrapolated a
continuity of a German Sonderweg of anti-enlightenment, irrationalist philosophy
throughout the Imperial period. For Lukacs, Hitler represented the "demagogic
synthesis" of irrational German philosophy which was fused with the techniques of
American advertising." In 1945, AlP Taylor had perceived in National Socialism "the
course of German history" which he related to longer term developmental tendencies in
modern German history." The US radio-journalist and former Berlin correspondant
William L. Shirer observed in his treatment of National Socialism published in 1959
that Hitler and the Third Reich in fact represented the "logical continuation of German
history"." Such positions from non-German thinkers represented the "myths" against
32 Brandt. 1969. ibid. p. 32.
33 Schmidt. Sten Ber. 1977
34 Lukacs, The Destruction of Reason. Merlin. London. 1980. p. 76.
3S AJP Taylor. op. cit. 1965. p. 263.
36 William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich.A History of Nazi Germany. Book
Club Associates - Seeker & Warburg. London. 1971. p. 90.
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which Gerhard Ritter polemicised in his defence of Bismarck." The comfortable
severance of the history of the Kaiserreich, and in particular Bismarck, from the later
NS dictatorship articulated by established post-war historians in the West was
challenged above all by fellow German historians who began to develop on conceptions
of continuity in German history which, however, were not motivated by simplistic
arguments of "German character" or notions of "collective guilt" often discernible in
non-German treatments."
The controversy unleashed in the wake of the publication of Fritz Fischer's research on
the origins of the First World War in the Historische Zeitschrift in 1959 centred on a
continuity of economic, political and military interests of elite groups developed in
Wilhelmine Germany." For Fischer, the outbreak of war in 1914 corresponded to a set
of annexionist interests represented in the highest echelons of the military and state
which existed in a longer continuity reaching back to the 1890s and the declaration of
Weltpolitik, the construction of a Naval Fleet and the belligerent interventions of
William II. For some important establishment historians such as Ritter, Fischer had
reopened the question of German War Guilt which had occupied Weimar
historiography, which had acquitted Imperial Germany of any particular responsibility
for the First World War.40 Thus Ritter perceived Fischer's work as a rewarming of the
Versailles Kriegsschuldthese and rejected the contention that the German military
sought to fulfil longer term plans for continental hegemony between 1914-18.41 What
was perhaps so explosive about Fischer's thesis, and what upset conservatives such as
Ritter, was that, if correct, this destroyed post-war totalitarian readings of National
Socialism which posited Hitler and the clique around him as solely responsible for the
37 c:f Ritter. 1948. op. cit.
38 c:fTaylor's ideas on "German character" as "barbarians" and "civilisers" or Wilhelm II as
personification of Germany. Taylor. 1965. op. cit. 157.
39 c:f Fritz Fischer, Deutsche Kriegsziele, Revolutionierung und Seperatfrieden im Osten 1914-
1918. in, Historische Zeitschrift. Herausgegeben von Theodor Schieder und Walter Kienast. R.
Oldenbourg VIg. Miinchen. Band 188. Heft 2. Oktober 1959. pp. 249-310. also Fritz Fischer,
Kontinuitat des Irrtums. Zum Problem der deutschen Kriegszielpolitik im ersten Weltkrieg. in
Historische Zeitschrift. Band 191. Heft. I August 1960. pp. 83-100.
40 c:f Holger H. Herwig, Clio Deceived. Patriotic Self-Censorship in Germany After the Great
War. in Keith Wilson (ed.) Forging The Collective Memory. Government Historians through
Two World Wars.Berghahn. Oxford. 1996. p. 114.
41 Gerhard Ritter, Der Anteil der Miltars an der Kriegskatastrophe von 1914. in, Historische
Zeitschrift. Band 193. Heft 1. August 1961. pp. 72-91. and Ritter, Eine neue Kriegsschuldthese?
Zu Fritz Fischers Buch "Griffnach der Weltmacht", in HZ. Band 194. Heft 3. Juni 1962. pp. 646-
668.
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military campaign of the Third Reich. The thesis that the global conflict of 1914-18 had
been willingly pursued by various elites in Imperial Germany in the pursuit of
continental, and ultimately global, power exploded readings of National Socialism as a
historical accident. Ritter's campaign against Fischer was not restricted to academic
exchanges. Ritter's, together with Karl Dietrich Erdmann's, advice that a planned
lecture tour of Fischer's in the US would constitute a "national tragedy" if permitted
urged foreign minister Schroder to rescind Goethe Institute funds for the tour, which
was only finally permitted upon the insistence of a dozen American scholars."
The suggestion of longer term continuities which reached way back into the Imperial
period seriously undermined the legitimacy of the German nation as defended by the
more traditional "historicism" of historians such as Ritter, who clearly remained
intellectually and emotionally attached to the German Reich," This traditional approach
gave way during the 1960s to a more critical paradigm of historical investigation which
rejected the "totalitarian" explanation of fascism and communism and focused attention
instead upon the relationship between capitalism and fascism as first articulated by
inter-war Marxist interpretations." This conception of a critical social history was often
fused with a distinct perspective on contemporary society which was characterised by a
faith in the capacity of a rational direction of the dynamic process of social change. This
positive evaluation of the possibility to progress in our comprehension of both past and
present was a constituent component of the "critical-historical social science" which
developed in the Federal Republic in the 1960s. The veteran social historian Jiirgen
Kocka provides the following retrospective understanding of the relationship between
historical paradigm and perception of the present in an edition dedicated to the 65th
birthday of one of the most significant figures in the development of "critical social
history" Hans-Ulrich Wehler
Es war eine besondere intellektuelle Atmosphare, die das ermoglichte: eine allgemeine Stimmung
der Kritik an hergebrachten Traditionen, das Vertrauen in die Machbarkeit von Reform und
42 c:fHerwig. in Wilson. 1996. op. cit. p. 114.
43 Thus, Ritter, in his critque of Fischer in the Historische Zeitschrift, refers to unseres Reich and
unsere Militar displaying an attachement to and identification with imperial Germany which was
anathema to the later "critical" school of younger historians. c:f Ritter. 1961. op. cit. p. 91. and
1962. op. cit. p. 646.
44 Frei. 1997. op. cit. p. 406.
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Verbesserung, und das alles vor dem Hintergrund einer institutionellen Expansion im
Universitatssystem, die besonders fur die Jiingeren neue Moglichkeiten eroffnete."
this captures the political climate in which critical social history developed which was
shaped by a diffuse faith in the possibility of social reform and or social transformation.
This perception of change in the present was reflected in examinations of the German
past with reference to the dynamism of social development. Writing in the early 1960s,
Hans Mommsen characterised the notion that historical movements are essentially
driven by longer-term processes of social change as "constitutive" of the new generation
of social historians." this concept of critical history invoked a neo-Marxist appreciation
of history as Mommsen explained
Ahnlich wie in der Marxistischen Geschichtsphilosophie, sofern die dialektisch, nicht im Sinne
eines positivistischen Entwicklungsautomatismus, aufgefaBt wird, der die okonornischen
Faktoren absolut setzt, erscheinen hier die innerhalb der Gesellschaft und zwischen den
gesellschaftlichen Systemen autbrechenden Spannungen und Konflikte als die eigentlichen
Triebkrafte der Geschichte."
Whilst Mommsen clearly distances critical social history from vulgar Marxist economic
determinism, the notion that Marxism represented a "philosophy of history" betrayed a
theoretical misunderstanding which found historiographical expression in the thesis of
the German Sonderweg to modernity. Both Marx and Engels had argued against any
concept of a universal "philosophy of history" as contradictory to the principles of
historical specificity developed in historical materialism." Whilst Marx and Engels
emphasise the importance of studying social development within its historical
specificity, critical historians held a normative concept of modem capitalist democracy.
Yet whilst Mommsen and Wehler invoked a neo-Marxist concept of history which
concentrated upon the transience of social relations and the role of class conflict as a
dynamo of history, this openness was restricted by normative concept of "modernist"
45 Jurgen Kocka, Annahrung und neue Distanz. Historiker und SozialwissenschaftIer seit den
fiinfziger Jahren. in, Manfred Hettling und Paul Nolte (Hg.) Nation und Gesellschaft in
Deutschland. Historische Essays. C.H. Beck. Munchen, 1996. p. 16.
46 Hans Mommsen, Sozialgeschichte. in Hans-Ulrich Wehler (Hg.) Moderne Deutsche
Sozialgeschichte. Neue Wissenschaftliche Bibliothek. Kiepenhauer und Witsch. Koln.Berlin.
1968. p. 33.
47 ibid. p. 30.
48 c:f Marx' Brief an die Redaktion der Otetschestwenje Sapinski in Karl Marx Friedrich Engels
Werke Band 19. Dietz. Berlin. 1962. pp.III-112 and Friedrich Engels Anti-Duhring Herr Eugon
Duhring's Revolution in Science. Lawrence and Wishart. London. 1969.pp. 10-25,47-50.
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political culture." As Wehler commented retrospectively In the wake of the
Historikerstreit
Die Kritik am Kaiserreich seit den 1960er Jahren hat in seiner obrigkeitsstaatlichen und
vorparlamentarichen Struktur, in seiner gesellschaftspolitischen Status-Quo Verteidigung und
repressiven Durchsetzung von Klassenegoismen eine "konfliktverscharfende Belastung" der
Gesamtpolitik, insbesondere ein nur schwer uberwindbares Hindemis "liberaler Demokratisierung in
Deutschland" gesehen. Dem lag die (selbstredend normativ besetzte) Zielvorstellung zugrunde, daB
ein parlarnentarisch-dernokratisches Gemeinwesen dank der Flexibilitat seiner Institutionen am
ehesten der Bewaltigung seiner inneren und auf3eren Probleme, auch der Korrektur der eigenen
Fehler, gewachsen ist - am ehesten auf Dauer die lebensnotwendige politische Lernfahigkeit
besitzt."
This normative perception of modern social development was reflected in critical
attitudes towards both the German Imperial past and the West German present of the
social state. Central to Wehler's thesis of the Sonderweg is the belief that, in the age of
late capitalism characterised by the development of monopolies and cartels, the state
must intervene in an organisatory capacity." This must be accompanied, for Wehler, by
a process of socio-political modernisation which enables the development of
emancipatory and democratising forces in society." This is a perception based upon an
appreciation of both the democratising tendencies of capitalism in the late eighteenth -
early nineteenth century as well as the post-war social state. The essential Sonderweg of
the Kaiserreich was formed by the apparent incongruity of industrial-economic
modernisation which was cohered by an anti-modernist, reactionary political
framework." For Wehler, the coincidence of an arch-conservative political culture with
a broader process of socio-economic change formed a developmental paradox which
contained inherently destructive potential
49 This despite Wehler's formal recognition of the principle of historical specificity in
understanding social development for historical materialism. c:fHans Ulrich Wehler,
Modemisierungstheorie und Geschichte. Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht. 1975. p. 55. Although
Wehler's critique of Marx "model" of "Base and Superstructure" reveals a dichotomy which
appears to have more in common with Wehler's own approach to the Sonderweg than Marx'
historical materialism. c:f the much more subtle appreciation of the interdependance of the two in
Franz Jakubowski, Ideology and Superstructure in Historical Materialism. Pluto. London. 1990.
50 Wehler. 1988. op. cit. p. 186.
51 Wehler. 1979. op. cit. p. 141, 1969. op. cit. p. 19.
52 Wehler. 1979. op. cit. p. 161.
53 Schutz argues that this founding asynchronicity rendered the Kaiserreich incapable of reform
and argues its collapse in terms of this deficit of democracy. Rudiger Schutz Monarchischer
Konstitutionalismus und parIamentarisches System Zum Problem der
Parlamentarisierungsbestrebungen in der Endphase des deutschen Kaiserreichs. in Heinrich
Bodensieck (Hg.) Preulsen, Deutschland und der Westen. Annahrungen und Beziehungen seit
1789. Muster Schmitt Vlg. Gottingen. 1980. pp. 103-5.
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1m Grunde aber stand die Politik dieses Regimes auf langere Sicht insofem einem unlosbaren
Problem gegeniiber, als Modemisierung ohne grundlegende Veranderung der Sozialstruktur und
der ihr zugehorigen Machtverhaltnisse, ohne soziale und politische Emanzipation nicht rnoglich
ist, wenn der innere und iiul3ere Friede erhalten werden soll."
The apparent asynchronicity of socio-economic and political modernisation fuelled an
unresolvable conflict in Imperial society which inevitably exploded in 1914-18119 into
international military aggression and domestic civil war, before undermining the
Weimar Republic and ultimately ending in the NS regime of 1933-45.55 Wehler
perceived in the Prussian Establishment's Revolution von oben the construction of a
"bonapartist dictatorship" along similar lines to the usurpation of executive power by
Louis Bonaparte between 1848 and 1851 and described in Marx's 18 Brumaire of Louis
Napoleon. In this model the usurpation of political power by the leader of the executive
who commanded the loyalty of the military and enjoyed certain plebiscitary acclamation
was compensated for by the defence and development of the bourgeois social order
against the real or apparent threat of revolution. 56 Wehler applies this model onto the
founding constellation of 1871 with the modification that in the German context this
was a "bonapartist" dictatorship which was primarily employed to secure the political
dominance of pre-industrial elites rather than the political interests of the industrial
bourgeoisie. 57 In this constellation, critical historians observed that the German liberal
bourgeoisie had been essentially convinced to abstain from the political arena in return
for the prosperity generated by industrial-economic modernisation and security from the
nascent, social democratic working class. 58 This apparent political quietism of the
German national bourgeoisie was likened with pre-unification traditions of the Prussian
reformers Stein and von Hardenberg who responded not only to the influence of the
French occupation but equally to the widespread fear of social revolt from below by a
policy of Revolution von oben," For Sauer this testified to a continuity of cohering the
domestic population around foreign wars as advocated by the Prussian military
strategists von Clausewitz during the Befreiungskreige of 1813 and continued by
Bismarck over the wars of unification which effectively quashed liberal oppositionsts
54 Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Krisenherde des Kaiserreichs 1871 - 1918. Studien zur deutschen Sozial-
und Verfassungsgeschichte. Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht. Gottingen. 1979. p. 161.
55 Wehler. 1988. p. 55.
56 Wehler. 1979. op. cit. p. 409.
57 Wehler. ibid. p. 410.
58 Wehler. I969.op. cit p. 456-458. Wolfgang Sauer, Das Problem des deutschen Nationalstaates.
(1962) in Wehler. (Hg.) 1966.op. cit. p. 409.
59 Sauer. ibid. p. 420.
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during the l860s as well as invalidating the Habsburg claim over the German lands." In
this sense, left-liberal commentators often condemned the failings of the liberal
bourgeoisie in nineteenth century Germany which had failed to perform its "historical
mission" in realising modern, capitalist, liberal democracy and internalised the
romantic, antimodernist nationalism of the aristocratic elite."
For Wehler, the role of ideology was central in cohering a society riven with social
tension. In this respect, the development of colonial policy under Bismarck in 1883-4
and the later Wilhelmine Weltpolitik was primarily derived from endogenous socio-
economic and political forces rather than exogenous, traditional foreign-policy
interests." Alongside economic benefits which were regarded as a counter-measure to
the problems of recession, overseas expansion is perceived as having performed an
important internal function in Bismarckian Germany
Sie (Ausdehnung nach Ubersee) gewann aber auch innenpolitisch eine spezielle Integrations- und
Ablenkungsfunktion in der Fortsetzung der preullisch-deutschen "Revolution von oben", Sie bot
dem Reichskanzler eine Chance, die allmahlich emporgewachsene, zum Teil dann aber auch
kunstlich angeregte Kolonialbewegung zu innen- und wahlpolitischen Zwecken auszunutzen,
neue Ziele am femen Horizont abzustecken und die von ihnen ausgehende integrierende Wirkung
zur Verdeckung schwerer sozialer und politischer Spannungen in Innem des Kaiserreichs, damit
aber auch zur Starkung seiner bonapartistisch-diktatorischen Machtstellung, zur Steigerung der
schwindenden Popularitat und des angeschlagenen Prestiges der Reichsregierung zu verwerten:
erfolgreicher Imperialismus sollte seine Herrschaft emeut legitimieren."
For Wehler, the cultivation of an imperialist national myth, which during the
Wilhelmine era was fused with a racial component, resulted from the necessity of
cultivating a sense of legitimacy for an essentially anti-modernist, pre-industrial
political regime. In the words of another critical historian, Bismarck noted that national
sentiment and patriotism could be employed as a form of social "cement" with which an
essentially traditional, conservative socio-political framework could be refounded
against the transfonnatory pressures from forces of social and political emancipation."
Whilst post-war conservative historians had associated the collapse of the Empire with
60 Sauer. ibid. pp. 421-5. Wehler. 1969. op. cit. p. 457.
61 Hans Heigert, Deutschlands falsche Traume, oder: Die verfiihrte Nation. BiichergebiJde
Gutenberg. FrankfurtJM. 1969. pp. 7-8.
62 Wehler. 1979. p. 141-143.
63 Wehler. 1969. p.454.
64 Otto Pflanze, Bismarck - ein konservativer Revolutionar? in Dieter Langewiesche (Hg.) Das
deutsche Kaiserreich 1867171 bis 1919. Bilanz einer Epoche. Verlag Ploetz. FreiburgIWiirzburg.
1984. p. 30.
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the phenomenon of mass, politicised nationalism and related this to the legacy of
Grofideutschland liberals and the influence of totalitarian "demagogues", the critical
school linked the predominance of reactionary nationalist sentiment to the social elite's
inability to contemplate democracy. Wehler draws upon the concept of the inter-war
historian Eckhard Kehr who perceived a Primal der Innenpolitik as the motivation for
the construction of a large naval fleet, begun in 1897. Kehr's concept of a "primacy of
domestic policy" is based upon an appreciation of the role which the fleet and the
nationalist public agitation of the Navy League (founded in 1898) played in fostering a
social and political identification with a Weltpolitik which, alongside economic benefits,
was regarded as an ideal ideological weapon to counter the growth and legitimacy of
social democracy." In this vein, Kehr perceived the motivation behind the second Navy
Bill in 1900 as originating less from the need for a large fleet and rather more from a
consideration of its usefulness as a form of social Ablenkungspolitik after the defeat of
the anti-socialist motivated Zuchthausvorlage in 1899.66
The thesis of asynchronicity in the socio-economic and political moments of Germany's
development as a modem capitalist nation derives from the conviction that the socio-
economic and political moments of societal modernisation must be developed in relative
tandem. This perspective operates from the normative evaluation of Western
parliamentary democracy as the political system which corresponds most clearly to the
"objective" interests of the modem bourgeoisie. As this approach appears to deny the
possibility of a coincidence of bourgeois "interests" and authoritarian systems of rule,"
critical historians concluded that the Kaiserreich essentially represented a "bonapartist"
regime in which the bourgeoisie relinquished its own political emancipation under a
class of aristocratic, pre-industrial elites in as the price of preventing the emancipation
of the working class.t'The major political continuity spanning the period of the German
nation state is defined by the endurance of these pre-industrial elites into the inter-war
period and the ascension of fascism. This insight forms the basis of not only Wehler's
understanding of the eventual collapse of Imperial Germany in the chaos of the First
65 in Wehler (Hg.) 1968. op. cit. p. 393.
66 ibid. p. 398.
67c:fDavid Blackboum and GeoffEley, The Peculiarities of German History. Bourgeois Society
and Politics in Nineteenth Century Germany, Oxford. New York. 1991. pp. 75-97
68 Wehler. 1969. op. cit. p. 459.
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World War and the revolutionary uprising of 1918-1919, but also of the later
developments of German history
Die fatalen Auswirkungen dieser Politik, durch die die politische Kontrolle vorindustrielle
Ftihrungsschichten bis in die Zeit der Hochindustrialisierung erhalten wurde, trat dann endgtiltig
zwischen 1914 und 1929 zutage, als ihre Strukturen zerbrachen. Bis dahin hatte sie die
Grundlagen dafiir mitgeschaffen, daB sich in Deutschland als einzigem hochindustrialisierten
Land der Faschismus in seiner radikalsten Spielart durchsetzen konnte: die Blockierung der
Emanzipation breiter Gesellschaftsschichten schlug in die "Revolte der declasses" der
Industrialisierung urn."
Wehler's concept of modernisation is revealed in the implied paradox constructed
between pre-industrial political rule and socio-economic modernisation which is then
repeated in the couplet of highly advanced industrial nation and radical fascist state. The
roots of the fascist state are clearly identified with the persistence of pre-industrial elites
who had consistently repressed the broader process of social and political emancipation.
The inherent unwillingness and inability of the Kaiserreich 's political class to provide a
democratic resolution of the tensions and conflicts created by the forces of socio-
economic modernisation resulted in the tendency to find authoritarian political solutions
to the problems created by change. It is this political continuity of Imperial Germany
which helped create the broader conditions within which a fascist dictatorship could be
constructed in the 1930s. From this perspective, the historical parallels between the
"bonapartist dictatorship" constructed by Bismarck in the wake of military conquest, the
declaration of Weltpolitik in 1890s and the "national revolution" of 1933 which aimed at
imperial expansion reveal a wholly anti-democratic continuity of German national
culture which derived from a fundamental developmental schism between the socio-
economic and political forces of modernisation.
Contained within the critical historical conception of the Sonderweg was, from the start,
an evaluation of the potential of society to progress. Permeating Wehler's analysis is the
theoretical orientation towards the concept of progress in human affairs articulated in
the belief that both past and present should be viewed through the political perspective
of a better, improved future society organised in accordance with rational principles."
The basis of drawing instruction from the past is formed by the perception that the
problems of socio-economic modernisation and political democratisation which
69 Wehler. 1979. op. cit. p. 143.
70 Wehler 1969. op. cit. p. 14.
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unloaded such conflict during late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries continued to
form the basic context of social existence in the present. More specifically, his
continuity is formed by the dynamic social context or formed by the development of
organised capitalism characterised by the concentration of domestic production in
monopolies and cartels and increased international competition for markets. Of
particular political importance in this process is the role played by the state in
cultivating the political and economic conditions within which organised capitalism
may thrive. For critical historians, the history of Imperial Germany displays the
disastrous consequences which ensue when these processes of socio-economic
modernisation are codified by a reactionary, anti-modernist political system. Thus for
Wehler writing in the late 1960s
1m Hinblick auf die politische Ordnung des Interventionsstaats wird wahrend dieser Entwicklung
tendenziell die grol3e Alternative zwischen autoritaren (z.B. bonapartistischen, letztlich dann
auch faschistischen) Systemen einerseits und sozialstaatlichen Massendemokratien andererseits
aufgeworfen. In Deutschland, wo tiber diese Alternativen mit fatalen Foigen entschieden worden
ist, bleiben die Lasten der Fehlentwicklungen im 19. Jahrhundert bis in unsere Gegenwart
spurbar."
This essentially constitutes the Sonderweg of German development for Wehler. Whilst
other states in Western Europe complimented the process of industrialisation and
urbanisation with a process of parliamentarism and democratisation of society, in the
German nation these dynamic social developments were constrained within an entirely
anti-democratic and reactionary political system. Thus whilst the post-war mass social-
state democracies of the West developed from the bourgeois emancipation movements
of the nineteenth century, nineteenth century German history offered quite antithetical
traditions of state intervention in economy and society. Wehler operates from a much
longer perspective of historical and social development which enables him to assert the
continued relevance of these older themes in the present. Behind this lies the memory of
the Third Reich as an example of the profound potential consequences of finding
authoritarian answers to these problems. The Sonderweg thesis was controversial and
contested by both German and non-German historians. Critics of the Sonderweg thesis
have contended that in the late Wilhelmine period the potential for democratic reform
was greater than imagined by critical historians. The long-standing liberal conservative
critic of "critical social history", Thomas Nipperdey, observed that the potential for
71 Wehler. ibid. p. 19.
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democratic reform contained in the Koalition im Werden, comprising left-liberals, the
Catholic Zentrum party and Social Democracy, was much greater than assumed by
critical historians." Others have displayed that the bourgeoisie was able to stamp its
mark on Imperial society which, by the tum of the century, had internalised the legal,
economic and social characteristic of "bourgeois society"." Geoff Eley in particular has
displayed the distinctly bourgeois self-interests which fuelled the Radical Nationalist
groups of the Wilhelmine period and related these to a longer term process of the
reconfiguration of the right between the 1890s and 1930s.74 Eley observed that the
normative concepts of critical historians blinds them to the possibility that capitalism is
a dynamic social form which has developed in a variety of social arrangements from
late feudal absolutism, nineteenth century bourgeois democracy, authoritarian-fascist
regimes through to the post-war social state." As Wehler states above, the post-war
mass democratic social state forms the basis of critical normative concepts of
democracy and social modernisation in both past and present. This was a project which
since the 1960s has been politically articulated in the work of Jurgen Habermas.
3.3. Radical Democracy and Emancipation
Since the 1960s, Habermas has argued for a "correction" of the modernist disjuncture
encapsulated in the Sonderweg thesis by the realisation of emancipatory social
impulses." In the development of the post-war social-welfare state, Habermas perceives
the most progressive reflection of the legacy of nineteenth century bourgeois liberal and
social democratic emancipation movements and ideas. Thus despite his emancipatory
ambitions, Habermas' social philosophy is firmly welded to the status quo of post-war
liberal, Western democracy. For Habermas, the profound upheavals and change which
ensued from the global conflict of 1914-18, the 1917 revolution in Russia and the
72 Thomas Nipperdey, Gesellschaft, Kultur, Theorie. Gesammelte Aufsatze zur neueren
Geschichte. Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht. 1976. p. 387.
73 Blackbourn, Eley. op. cit. p.75
74 c:fGeoffEley Reshaping the Right. Radical Nationalism and Political Change after Bismarck.
New Yale University Press. New HavenILondon. 1980. p. 205. and also Eley, From Unification
to Nazism. Reinterpreting the German Past. Unwin Hyman. Cambridge (US) 1990. esp. pp. 231-
253 and 254-282.
7S Eley. 1980. op. cit. p. 164.
76 In the context of the university reform debates Habermas argued for a relative autonomy of the
university from the interests of industry and state in order that it may realise its true independance
from both in society. Jurgen Habermas, Universitat in der Demokratie - Demokratisierung der
Universitiit in, Merkur. XXI Jahrgang. Heft 5. Mai 1967. p. 423-4.
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successive inter-war economic collapse formed the genesis of the three dominant
utopias of the twentieth century which he perceives in Soviet communism, the
authoritarian-corporatist models of fascist Italy, Falange Spain and Germany and the
post-war social democratic reformism of the Western mass democracies." Whilst Soviet
communism sought to transcend and fascist regimes to eradicate bourgeois democratic
culture, the project of the post-war reformist state staked a claim to the legacy of the
nineteenth century bourgeois emancipation movements contained in the concept of the
democratic, constitutional state." The political identity of the post-war social state was
founded upon the belief that the state could and should progressively intervene in both
society and economy in order to increase the material prosperity and security as well as
political rights of as broad a layer of society as possible. The success or failure of this
project thus essentially rested upon the ability of the interventionist state to secure a
"peaceful coexistence" between capitalism and democracy." On the one hand the state
intervened in the economic processes in order to tame and promote growth after the
catastrophic experiences of the inter-war years collapse, and acted as an arbitrator
between private industry and the trade unions. On the other hand, the social state sought
to realise the "utopia" of the "work society" which neutralised the socially explosive
conflicts derived from a society organised along principles of wage labour by a
phenomenal expansion of democratisation, participation and rights for the majority of
the population.
Yet as Habermas acknowledged in the early 1980s, this "utopia" of the social state
society and the emancipatory discourse which accompanied it had largely been
exhausted." The problems of legitimacy experienced by the social state since the 1970s
derive from an inner contradiction between aims and means of achieving its project of
regulating the economy and intervening in social relations. For Habermas, the former
created problems because of the inability of the state to guarantee employment and
welfare structures due to the influence of relatively autonomous economic instances and
the latter was problematic because of its underlying legalist interpretation. Whilst the
reformist state aimed to cultivate an egalitarian structured social world, which also
77 Habermas, Die Krise des Wohlfahrtstaats und die Erschopfung utopische Energien.( 1984) in
Habermas. 1992. op. cit. p. 111-12.
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leaves room for individual self-realisation, this aim is undermined by the method of the
legal-administrative translation of political programmes which results in ever-thickening
layers of legal and para-state bureaucracy." These considerations are related to a
legitimacy problem of "late capitalism" which Habermas had identified only four years
after Brandt's assumption of the chancellorship." Legitimacy crises essentially arise for
Habermas when the socio-cultural system of society lacks the flexibility to adapt to the
transformatory dynamic stimulated by the ceaseless process of socio-economic change.
In the past, this disjuncture had been resolved by both fascist regimes, which repressed
progress in the political cultural sphere and held the population in line by a tactic of
permanent mobilisation, or conservative-authoritarian welfare systems, which sought to
minimise the active political participation of the people by encouraging a form
"privatisation" of the people into private citizens, employees and family members. For
Habermas, such systems, however, prove less compatible with developed capitalism
than the constitution of modern, mass, parliamentary democracy because dynamism in
the socio-cultural sphere produces aspirations which authoritarian societies cannot
fulfil. 83
Yet the flexibility of the socio-cultural sphere is limited in the era of "organised
capitalism" too, particularly by the powerful, semi-autonomous forces of economic
interests and administrative bureaucracy. The technocratic approach of the social state
towards reform fails to secure legitimacy because Sinn cannot be simply
bureaucratically administrated in tandem with social change." At the same time as the
level of legitimacy required by the state increases, due to its increased role in social-
economic organisation, however, the less possible it is to reach for traditional bourgeois
values such as effort, meritocracy, exchange values etc as they have increasingly been
destroyed by the dynamic of "organised capitalism". The ensuing motivation crisis and
legitimacy crisis results from the increasing inability of a rigid socio-cultural system to
adopt to the accelerated pace of social dynamism and the increasing gap thus produced
between popular experience of society and the dominant system of social norms." A
more flexible system, however, and one which Habermas underlines, would take as its
81 Habennas. 1984. p. 116-17.
82 Habennas, Was heiBt heute Krise? Legitimationsprobleme im Spatkapitalismus. in
Merkur.XXVII Jahrgang. Heft 4/5. AprillMay. 1973.
83 Habennas. ibid. p. 359.
84 ibid. p. 357 and 1992. op. cit. p. 117.
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starting point the level of progress achieved in the socio-cultural realm particularly
through the media of science, modem art and universal moral values." Upon each of
these levels of socio-cultural transmission irreversible changes and progressions have
occurred, with which a material concept of democracy must engage. National Socialism
provides the most horrific example of the potential political reactionary consequences
when the political system attempts to repress and degrade the level of socio-cultural
progress achieved in science, art and moral values."
In considering the question of how developments of the level of universal moral
consciousness can be fused with the broader process of social norm creation, Habermas
returns to the classical, republican concepts of democracy and in particular the process
of law creation. The process of social modernisation stimulates ever newer demands,
claims and values in society which undermine and challenge the legitimacy of dominant
norms established in tradition. Habermas states that the principle of formal law derives
from this conflict and allows for the liberation of the normative content of laws from the
dogma of tradition thus enabling them to be set intentionally by the collective will of the
people." Whilst legal norms are, on the one hand, separated from the corpus of
privatised moral norms, they require the active participation, and legitimacy, of the
individual subject in the process of their creation - this process is thus based upon the
democratic principle of intersubjectivity. The legitimacy of formal law is bound with the
authority of a particular state over a particular area, yet, when raised to level of a
general principle, no such boundaries exist for the morality of individual citizens."
Since principle morality is ultimately sanctioned only by the instance of conscience, its
claim for universal validity contains an inherent conflict with the form of public
morality which is bound to a particular state: thus there arises the latent and manifest
conflict between the universal values derived from a humanist outlook and the
particular loyalties placed upon the citizen of a particular state." The only resolution of
this conflict is the collapsing of the dichotomy between internal and external morality
and a relativisation of the areas regulated by law and morality." Habermas advocates
8S ibid. p. 359.
86 ibid. p. 362.
87 ibid. p. 362.
88 ibid. p. 363.
89 ibid.
90 ibid
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this action in the belief that in this manner the progressive developments wrought in the
socio-cultural sphere can attain normative status in society as a whole and this, when
formulated via the enunciated principles of communicative ethics, can contribute to the
democratisation of late capitalist society. In this manner Habermas seeks to rescue the
universal, democratic spirit of early capitalism which was undermined and eroded by
the development of "organised capitalism"
Der Konkurrenzkapitalismus hat zum erstenmal streng universalistishcen Wertsystemen
bindende Kraft gegeben, weil der Tauschverkehr seIber universalistisch geregelt werden mul3te
und weil im iibrigen der Aquivalenttausch eine im Biirgertum wirksame Basisideologie anbot.
Nun bricht im organisierten Kapitalismus die Grundlage deieses Legitimationsmodells
zusammen, wahrend zugleich neue und vermehrte Legitimationsfordergungen entstehen.
Sowenig jedoch das System der Wissenschaft intentional hinter einen erreichten Stand
kumulativen Wissens zuruckfallen kann, so wenig kann auch das Moralsystem, wenn erst einmal
praktische Diskurse zugelassen worden sind, einen kollektiv erreichten Stand des moralischen
Bewul3tseins einfach vergessen machen."
Thus Habermas' concept of legitimacy creation is based upon a radical restructuring of
modem capitalist society in accordance with the progress attained at the level of
morality. Habermas contends that the increasing gap between experience and norm
promoted by progression on all levels of social relations has produced two main
currents identifiable in youth counter-culture: on the one hand the "retreatist" current of
drop-out culture, drug culture, hippies, phenomena of motivational decline, etc. On the
other hand, Habermas has grounds for optimism in the existence of an "activist" current
comprising the student movement, the school pupils and apprentice revolts, pacifists and
women's liberation." In this earlier consideration of the question of legitimacy we
encounter themes which Habermas has worked on from the 1960s to the present.
The distinct concept of "identity" does not really feature in Habermas' work until the
later specific advocacy of "post-traditional identity" in the critique of conventional
national identity during the late 1980s. Whilst he rejects the discourse of identity
creation as ultimately representing a flight from genuine socio-political problems and
their mystification, Habermas' concept of solidarity relates to similar problems of
legitimacy creation and cultural hegemony. Neoconservatives invoke "cultural"
arguments in order to mystify and divert potentially transformatory energies away from
92 ibid. p. 364.
93 ibid.
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the social problems stimulated by economic-technological modernisation." Habermas,
on the other hand, seeks to assert the normative capacity of this emancipatory culture
against bureaucratic or economic interests which conservatives attempt to preserve in
the dogma of tradition. Thus it is not the project of legitimacy creation per se to which
Habermas objects, but the form of solidarity which is cultivated in society and how this
reflects, or not, the relationship between economic, bureaucratic and cultural areas. In
tum, underlying this perception is the historical-philosophical position which seeks to
secure a balance between socio-economic and political cultural moments of
modernisation via the mediation of rational discourse. The neoconservative evocation of
tradition aims to provide cultural compensation for the social dislocation and value
heterogeneity characteristic of modem Free Market society and to stigmatise critical
dissent. Habermas, on the other hand, seeks to cultivate precisely these critical counter-
cultural moments and, upon the level of "universal moral consciousness", restructure
social relations in accordance with their progressive dynamic. He thus appears to
attempt the inverse operation from that performed by neoconservatism and to assert
progressive, socio-cultural currents against the power of bureaucracy and economic
interests. We shall return to the specific critique of tradition shortly, before we do so it
is useful to consider Habermas' concept of solidarity and its role in progressively
restructuring society.
Habermas perceives the emergence of three main currents in response to the decline of
the social state project in its political and ideational terms: neoconservatism, right wing
social democracy and the new social movements." Neoconservative currents, which
achieved particular resonance in the US and Britain of the 1980s, focus upon a
liberalisation of the free market and the roll-back of the state's economic regulatory
capacity combined with a simultaneous political de-liberalisation of society. This finds
political expression in the persuit of a cultural policy which comdemns critical dissent
as treachery and from which cultural compensation for the socio-economic dislocation
which can no longer be absorbed by the intermediary force of the social state is sought.
Alongside this, Habermas perceives the changes in social democracy and the dominance
of an approach which seeks to stabilise the status quo and rediscover the balance
between the development of the social-welfare state and the modernisation of the
94 Habennas. 1992. op. cit. p. 100.
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market economy." The chances of this approach are negatively assessed with reference
to the declining power of the trade unions and the demographic and sociological change
in the social state's traditional working class electoral constituency. For Habermas, both
the sociological-political and socio-economic basis of this culture and expression of
solidarity have been eroded, rendering a renegotiation of solidarity from the basis of the
workplace highly unlikely." It is the third form of response in the development of the
post-1960s "new social movements", concerned with feminism, ecology, pacifism,
regionalism, grass-roots and local initiatives etc, which Habermas finds most positive.
The new social movements offer a critique of both traditional conservative and social
reformist approaches in that they polemicise against the economic-technological growth
defended by the right and the bureaucratic legislation associated with reformism. These
groups suggest that society is threatened by both commodification and bureaucratisation
alike, both "money" and "power" are made culpable." In the contemporary climate it is
thus not only capitalism which requires taming and regulation but the interventionist
state itself, and this perspective offers new and positive potential developments of social
change. This attitude is reflected in the organisational structures of these groups which
emphasise the importance of self-regulation and increasing the autonomy of cultural
sub-systems. It is at this level that Habermas seeks to continue the modernist project,
and in the new social movements he perceives the inheritors of the radical-democratic
form of the social-state project jettisoned by right wing social democrats." The collapse
of the social state "utopia" of work society thus does not imply, as both
neoconservatives and postmodemists claim, the termination of "utopia" but rather more
the exhaustion of one form and the opening up of new possibilities other than a
metaphysical "return to tradition". lOO Thus whilst the social state sought to rescue the
legacy of nineteenth century bourgeois emancipation in "work" society, the next stage
of synthesis is continued at the sub-level of autonomous groups, movements and
discourses which form the "communication society" of the late twentieth century.'?'
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Through the concept of solidarity, Habennas hopes to bridge the gap between the
contextual, autonomous level at which these discourses and movements unfold and the
generalising level of universal social values. This link is essential if the "autonomous
public" is to acquire socially nonnative force against the powerful sectional interests of
economic or bureaucratic instances. This restructuring of the social state project on a
higher level thus involves for Habennas the mobilisation of the orientational resource of
"solidarity" against the other orientational forces of economy and bureaucracy.!" This
constellation recalls the nonnative ideal of bourgeois democracy in the perception that
political will is formulated and articulated through the interaction between
"communicatively structured" social moments on the one hand, and state and economy
on the other.'?' Yet as the state is not a neutral facilitator of these processes of social
norm creation but itself an interested party, Habennas contends that the articulation of
progressive socio-cultural programmes now assumes the fonn of self-organised interest
groups which assert their interests and seek loyalty and agreement for their aims, and
that this process of communication and rational discourse forms the inter-subjective web
of an "autonomous public". Habennas perceives three main areas of orientation in
modem Western societies: political elites who realise their will through the state
apparatus; the diverse, anonymous groups which regulate the productive and
communication structures of society; and a third area consisting of elusive streams of
communication which shape political culture and determine the "cultural hegemony", or
Zeitgeist, of society. Although the relationship between these areas is impossible to
quantify, it appears to Habennas that until now the second arena of this developmental
triumvirate has enjoyed predominance
Wie immer die empirische Antwort ausfallt, jedenfalls laBt sich unser praktisches Problem jetzt
anschaulicher fassen: jedes Projekt, das die Gewiehte zugunsten solidariseher
Steuerungsleistungen versehieben mochte, muG die untere Arena gegeniiber den beiden anderen
oberen mobilisieren.'?'
This third area of orientation in modem capitalist society does not derive from "power"
or "money" but rather from "values" which are cultivated, for Habennas, primarily from
regionalist, feminist, pacifist, ecological discourse etc. Their development in the
microsphere of daily communication produces a higher (and autonomous) level of
intersubjectivity - these are autonomous publics engaging in an ever-developing
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dialogue around values. It is the task of these autonomous publics, via a combination of
power and "intelligent self restraint", to make the self-governing systems of state and
economy sensitive to their intentional progress made via recourse to this process of
radical-democratic will formation. For Habermas, this would only be realisable when
the political parties were removed from the process of legitimacy creation
Vermutlich kann das nur gelingen, wenn die politischen Partieien eine ihrer Funktionen ersatzlos,
d. h. ohne einem funktionalen Aquivalent bloB Platz zu machen, aufgeben: die der Erzeugung
von Massenloyalitat.'?'
This appears as a radical-democratic model which empowers the cultural system against
political and economic interests. For Habermas, a more genuine form of legitimacy
creation would be one which possessed the flexibility to adapt to challenges and
changes from the cultural sphere, and which would grant these democratising impulses
both parity with and autonomy from economic or political interests. As such it appears
reminiscent of his earlier concept of a democratisation and politicalisation of the
campus in the university reform debates of the 1960s. Since this period, Habermas'
critical discourse has focused upon the democratic and democratising potential of the
counter-culture and its radical progeny in the 1970s and 80s. Whilst the social state
project required the solidarity engendered by work which was strengthened in a now
declining working class sub culture, the post-social state society is also dependant upon
the cultivation of loyalty. Habermas radical resolution of this legitimacy problem
assumes the form of empowering the intersubjective web of the "autonomous" public
and thereby enabling the reformulation of solidarity in terms set neither by the state,
employers nor politicians, but the alternative subculture itself.
Only within this form can the "utopian content" of "communication society" be realised.
In contrast to conventional, and for Habermas misplaced, modernist formulations of
progress, the utopia of communication society does not proclaim a total vision of
society, but merely creates the normative structures through which the participants
themselves are able to consider the concrete possibilities of improving life in
accordance with their needs and from their own initiative'" Also, we may add, unlike
previous social transformations which had invoked the principles of universal values,
the emancipatory capacity of human reason and the potential of progress through social
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transformation, this is an approach which argues for a revolution of consciousness over
a social revolution. Through effecting a paradigm change at the level of legal and social
norms, Habermas hoped to realise a more democratic restructuring of the relationship
between socio-economic and political-cultural streams of modernisation. In the New
Social movements of the 1970s, Habermas perceives a form of modern "civil society"
which had inherited the radical core of the social state programme. Whilst Habermas
appears to perceive in the new social movements the inheritors of the radical core of the
social state project and therein the historical agency of social change, his priority is in
the cultivation of "solidarity" in society. It is this turn which founds his concept of
"identity" and Verfassungspatriotismus developed in the 1980s.
3.4 Post-Traditional Patriotism
In the critical engagement with neoconservatism in the 1980s, Habermas' concept of a
"progressive" or "enlightened" concept of social solidarity was developed into a
discourse of VerJassungspatriotismus founded in a critical appreciation of indigenous
history. This form of "post-traditional" identity was primarily concerned with
developing critical consciousness of German national history and the anti-modernist
Sonderweg in particular. This critical appreciation of the deviance of the historical
German nation was invoked as source of inverse pride in the Federal Republic which,
albeit culturally only since the 1960s, had successfully integrated itself into the Western
political culture shunned by the nation state. In the national argumentation of the right,
Habermas perceived a fundamental attack upon the post-national foundations of West
Germany's political-cultural Westbindung and an attempt to mobilise the experience of
defeat of both "1968" and the social state for particularist, metaphysical values which
sought to establish the legitimacy of the state in terms not dissimilar to the classic
Sonderweg. It thus represented the most virulent and, after 1982, most politically
influential critique of Habermas position of pursuing the "modernist project" in the
present. The discourse of Verfassungspatriotismus and critical, "post-traditional"
identity became over the 1980s the media through which this project was articulated,
and concentrated in particular upon the dichotomy between the concepts of nation and
democracy in modem German history.
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In the critical discourse of Verfassungspatriotismus in the 1980s, Habermas expanded
his earlier themes and his pro-modernist radical democratic concepts. Although one
recognises the concepts of universal moralism, enlightenment culture, communicative
reason mobilising "cultural solidarity" in society etc, they are brought in the 1980s into
a new relationship with the Federal Republic. Whilst during the 1960s and 1970s this
progressive discourse was invoked in the project of a radical reform of West German
society, in the identity debates of the 1980s this discourse retained its radical
pretensions towards social change, yet in the context of combating the national
argumentation of the right was employed as a sophisticated legitimisation of the Federal
Republic.
At the heart of Historikerstreit, for Habermas, lay the conflict between two distinct
approaches to the contemporary social use of history and tradition in the Federal
Republic.!" Habermas' positive orientation to modernist culture provides the
philosophical-political standpoint from which he both rejects the attempted
rehabilitation of the national idiom discredited by National Socialism, and instead
advocates a "modernist" approach to resolving the identity question which is related to
his earlier concept of cultivating phenomena of "cultural modernism" as a focus of
social solidarity. In the neoconservative argumentation of the right Habermas perceived
an attempt to regress the progress made in the political and cultural development of the
Federal Republic, and as such he views this approach through the intellectual filter of
critical history. Habermas' critique of neoconservative cultural politics reveals his
appreciation of the affinity between this current of conservative thinking and the older,
inherently anti-democratic traditions of German conservatism in the pre-1945 period. In
a speech given upon receipt of the Adorno Preis of 1980 in Frankfurt, Habermas offered
the following political assessment of the neoconservative approach
Oer Neokonservatismus verschiebt namlich die unbequemen Folgelasten einer mehr oder
weniger erfolgreichen kapitalistischen Modemisierung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft auf die
kultureJle Modeme. Weil er die Zusammenhange zwischen den willkommenen Prozessen der
gesellschaftlichen Modemisierung einerseits, der catonisch beklagten Motivationskrise
andererseits ausblendet; weil er die sozialstrukturellen Ursachen fur veranderte
Arbeitseinstellungen, Konsumgewohnheiten, Anspruchsniveaus und Freizeitorientierungen
nicht aufdeckt, kann er, was nun als Hedonismus, mangelnde Identifikations- und
Foigebereitschaft, als Narzif3mus, Rilckzug von Status- und Leistungskonkurrenz erscheint,
unmittelbar einer Kultur zuschieben, die in diese Prozesse doch nur auf eine hochst vermittelte
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Weise eingreift. Die Stelle der nichtanalysierten Ursachen miissen dann jene Intellektuellen
einnehmen, die sich dem Projekt der Modeme immer noch verpflichtet fuhlen.!"
Necoconservative discourse thus for Habermas corresponds to the schizophrenic attitude
towards modernism which characterised the Sonderweg as represented in critical
history. We can note how it is precisely the phenomena of "cultural modernism" which
neoconservatives seek to repress which Habermas seeks to empower in society. This
displays the inverted parallels between critical and neoconservative discourse which
relate to the two distinct approaches to modernism which characterises these positions:
the object of conservative suspicion and ire - "cultural modernism" - represents
precisely the social phenomena of modernisation which Habermas seeks to mobilise
against the economic and bureaucratic interests which conservatives seek to legitimise.
Neoconservatism too operates from an understanding of the schism which exists in
Western societies between cultural and economic and bureaucratic instances of
modernisation. Yet right wing thought seeks to repress the radical elements of cultural
modernism whilst simultaneously instrumentalising cultural arguments in the discourse
of the nation in an attempt to compensate for the socially and politically disruptive
consequences of rapid economic modernisation and the hypertrophic growth of
bureaucracy. For neoconservatives, "modernism" has terminated, and cultural crisis
derives essentially from subversive intellectuals and movements still committed to the
transformatory modernist dialectic. The intellectual-political vacuum created by the
termination of the modernist project is to be filled by recourse to myths of either
religious or secular nature which form the basis of an identity which seeks primarily to
cultivate legitimacy for the status quo.
History and the concept of tradition are the primary values from which neoconservatives
hope to provide intellectual and political authority for the discourse of national identity.
The conservative understanding of the social use of history relates to older right-wing
traditions of "historicism" which seek to present a glorious past as the key and guide to
present and future development. The conservative appreciation of "tradition" is that it
may cultivate the sense of positive social solidarity required to master difficult times in
the present and is thus predicated upon an overwhelmingly positive attitude towards the
national past. Habermas related the current wave of "neohistoricism" to the conservative
107 Habermas in Historikerstreit. 1987. op. cit. p. 71.
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intellectual milieu of the Weimar Republic which likewise sought to counterpoise a
positive "national" past against contemporary ineffectual democracy
Die Neokonservativen sehen ihre Aufgabe einerseits in der Mobilisierung der Vergangenheiten,
zu denen man sich zustimmend verhalten kann, andererseits in der moralischen Neutralisierung
anderer Vergangenheiten, die nur Kritik und Ablehnung herausfordem konnten. Walter Benjamin
hat die "Einfiihlung in den Sieger" ein Kennzeichnen des Historizismus genannt. Das ist es, was
uns Neokonservativen heute empfehlen.'??
This appears an accurate assessment of the main thrust of neoconservative fetishisation
of history which attempts to cultivate a sense of collective social loyalty via the naive
identification with a glorious, victorious past at the expense of neutralising other, far
from glorious traditions of history. As such, contemporary neoconservatism appears to
exist in a continuity with traditional right wing discourse on past and present which
characterised the Sozialimperialismus of the Second Empire and the right wing
discourse of the inter-war years which attacked Weimar democracy as an "ungerman"
Western import.'!" Hans Mommsen likewise perceived parallels between the inter-war
period and the rise of national conservative currents since the late 1970s and related this
to a creeping legitimacy crisis of the parliamentary system whose progressive, post-war
dynamic was exhausted and was in fact, increasingly unable to address the primary
political interests of the population. As in the Weimar Republic, history had become a
"battleground" upon which claims for political consensus and legitimacy are fought
OUt.111
Habermas' concept of "post-traditional identity" represented a critique of the national
argumentation of the right and also formed the intellectual forum in which a
"modernist" concept of social solidarity was developed which, albeit in radically
different form, also centred upon the question of the contemporary social use of
historical traditions. For Haberrnas, the concept of "post-traditional" identity
represented the attempt to develop the universal potential of occidental modernism in
the present and to liberate this tradition from the "birth marks" of historicism and
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Marxism.112 In reassessing the legacy of the emancipatory movements and ideas of the
late eighteenth century, Habermas highlights the transformatory potential of the critique
of tradition which lay at the heart of the revolutionary consciousness which developed
during this period
Das Revoltionsbewul3tsein ist die Geburtsstatte einer neuen Mentalitat, die gepragt wird durch
ein neues Zeitbewulltsein, einen neuen Begriff der politischen Praxis und eine neue
Legitimationsvorstellung. Spezifisch modem ist das historische Bewul3tsein, das mit dem
Traditionalismus naturwiichsiger Kontinuitaten bricht; das Verstandnis von politischer Praxis,
welches im lei chen von Selbstbestimmung und Selbstverwirklichung steht; und das Verstrauen
auf den vemiinftigen Diskurs, an dem sich jede politische Herrschaft legitimieren SOIl."3
It is essentially this "new mentality" which Habermas seeks to expand and develop in
the altered conditions of contemporary society. In this context, Habermas notes that the
nascent ideology of nationalism was itself, during this period, a "post-traditional"
concept which sought a revolutionary political, intellectual and social break with the
traditions and continuity of the ancien regime. 114In distinction to French revolutionaries
or later Marxism which drew inspiration from the emancipatory culture of the
enlightenment when combined with social revolution, Habermas' concentration upon
the mentality of 1789 suggests the image that he seeks above all to achieve a "revolution
in the mind" rather than a social revolution.!" Habermas hopes to pursue the
revolutionary project of modernism on a non- or post-revolutionary level as a catalyst
for the further democratisation of society. This reassessment leads Habermas to
conclude that of all the legal, political and ideological ideas of 1789, only the concepts
of the democratic state and human rights have retained their exemplary value for the
present. Yet, in the present these values are under threat from the every day experiences
of poverty, inequality, abuse of human rights, repression etc. and with an ever
increasing tempo. Furthermore, neoconservative and postmodern critiques of modernist
political culture appear in the ascendancy and to correspond to a broader social mood in
the West often described by the concept of the "end of the post-war period" and related
to the collapse of the social state reform programme and the emancipatory politics of the
1960s.116 It is this climate of a termination of "utopia" and specifically this modernist
consciousness of the emancipatory potential of reason and social critique which inspires
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neoconservatives to call for a return to the certainties of a glorious past. It is in the
engagement with this discourse of national identity that Habermas recreates the
"modernist consciousness" of 1789 and advocates the notion of "post-conventional"
identity.
In characterising "neohistoricism" Habermas contends that conservatives are motivated
by a basic faith or Urvertrauen in the past which allows for the continuation of
historical traditions in the present. This basic trust in the validity of the past legitimises
the handing down of traditions in a continuity from one generation to the next and the
present merely continues that which has gone before. Habermas does not criticise the
continuation of tradition - clearly he is indebted to emancipatory traditions in modem
history - but the unquestioned, naive assimilation of tradition. The essential question for
Habermas is whether or not particular values are worth continuing in the present and
this can only be ascertained by a process of critical self-reflection of both past and
present which demands rational justification for the continuation of particular traditions.
In the German context, the catalyst of this process of critique is formed by the
experience of National Socialism and Habermas suggests that the form of Urvertrauen
in the past which resonates through neoconservative discourse was irrevocably
destroyed in the gas chambers of Auschwitz.'!' After the experience of National
Socialism and the fact that the Holocaust was perpetrated without impinging upon the
Alltag of the majority of Germans, the only possible form of conscious historical
existence is allowed by extreme suspicion towards unquestioned traditions and
indigenous continuities which assert their normative legitimacy in their unquestioned
status.
This forms for Habermas an essential distinction between the revolutionary
consciousness around the tum of the eighteenth-nineteenth century and the
contemporary version of the "new mentality" which he seeks to asset in the FRG.
Whilst the emergence of the nation state and the break with the past traditions and
continuities with the ancien regime was understood as an act of historical progress
which behoved a responsibility for the future on the historical subject, after the
experiences of the twentieth century this consciousness of temporal responsibility has
117 Grenzen des Neohistorizismus.1990. p. 150.
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been expanded into the past.!" After Auschwitz it is no longer possible to adopt the
naive assimilation of national traditions, which must instead be passed through the filter
of critical self-reflection. Whilst the present generation cannot "compensate" for the
crimes of National Socialism, it is obliged to maintain the "weak force of memory" as
an instance of solidarity with those innocent martyrs murdered under the NS regime and
as an expression of the necessary critical distance to indigenous traditions which have
formed the concept of identity. Whilst we cannot choose our traditions, we can exercise
conscious choice in the manner with which we deal with them, thus
Aber unsere Identitat ist nicht nur etwas Vorgefundenes, sondem eben auch gleichzeitig unser
eigenes Projekt. Wir konnen uns unsere Traditionen nicht aussuchen, aber wir konnen wissen,
daB es an uns liegt, wie wir sie fortsetzen .. .Jede Traditionsfortsetzung ist selektiv, und genau
diese Selektivitat muO durch den Filter der Kritik, einer willentlichen Aneignung der Geschichte,
wenn Sie wollen: des Siindenbewul3tseins, hindurch.""
We can thus appreciate the intimate relationship between the critical perspective of the
indigenous national past and the continuation of the modernist project in the present.
The critique of the German past and the NS past above all is not only an expression of
decent moral repugnance towards the crimes committed by an older generation of
Germans, but is also the definatory moment in restructuring the approach to traditions
per se. Through the moral shock of National Socialism, Habermas hopes to rediscover
the critical self-reflective approach to tradition which formed such an important
component of the "revolutionary consciousness" which bore the modem epoch. Yet,
unlike the democratic-nationalist or later Marxist formulation of progressive
emancipation from past into future, the contemporary continuation of the revolutionary
mentality is disciplined by the critical instance of the Sundenbewufitsein which, after
Auschwitz, has replaced the now anachronistic notion of a heroic Siegergeschichte. In
diametrical opposition to the conservative fetishisation and celebration of national
historical continuities, critical thinkers perceived the willingness and ability of West
Germans to face up to the painful memory of a past which must never be allowed to
"pass away" or be "normalised" as a form of litmus test for the moral-political
substance of West German democracy. In this sense, Wehler inverted the
neoconservative concept of contemporary political sovereignty based in a celebrated
past as follows
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Die Mundigkeit, die reflektierte Identitat des Burgers der Bundesrepublik wird sich auch kunftig
daran erweisen, wie selbstkritisch, wie frei von Arroganz und Verdrangungsgelusten er mit der
schweren Burde unserer Vergangenheit umzugehen bereit ist. Daran wird sich seine innere
Freiheit und Souveranitat erweisen.!"
Thus for Wehler, the critical engagement with the NS past exists In a reciprocal
relationship with the articulation of contemporary democracy - again, one can perceive
the inversion of the conservative appreciation of the relationship between "negative"
past and "national" present. Like Habermas, Wehler, Mommsen and others, the
historian Martin Broszat also perceived in the Historikerstreit the public-political arena
in which antagonistic interpretations of West German political culture were played out.
He too expressed serious misgivings about the intentions of those who, since 1983, with
vehemence had argued for a homogenising national history in the post-national,
pluralist, democracy of West Germany.!" Like Habermas and Wehler, Broszat sharply
criticised those currents who sought a return to the naive historicism of the nineteenth
century in the debates over national identity and offered a similar interpretation of the
relationship between critical engagement with the NS past and the cultivation of
democratic consciousness in the present
Wer uns den selbstkritischen Umgang mit der eigenen Geschichte alteren und jungeren Datums
ausreden will, beraubt uns eines der besten Elemente politischer Gesittung, das in der
Bundesrepublik entstanden ist. Besonders fatal ist die haufige Verkennung, die aufgrund der
Nazi-Zeit notwendig gewordene Feinfilhligkeit gegenilber der eigenen Geschichte sei ein
kultureller und politischer Nachteil, verglichen mit anderen Nationen, und als gelte es, deren oft
robusteres historisches SelbstbewuBtsein, das sich politische meist als schadlich erwiesen hat, zu
kopieren. Die deutsche Geschichte gehort nicht denen, die aus Geschichtsbewul3tsein eine neue
ordnungspolitische Funktion machen wollen, sondem denen, die die Auswirkungen staatlicher
Aktivitaten auf dem Gebiet der Geschichtsforschung mit Sensibilitat wahrzunehmen in der Lage
sind.!"
Broszat's concept of politische Gesittung succinctly expresses the attitude of left-liberal
thinkers towards value of a self-critical, reflective approach to the national past. The
study of history does form a central aspect of contemporary value creation for these
thinkers, yet one which is diametrically opposed to the practice of naive assimilation of
tradition and uncritical identification with the past. It is the necessary critical distance
and self-reflection behoved to post-fascist society after the shock of National Socialism
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which forms the progressive and democratic content of the engagement with the past.
Far from representing an inherent weakness of the Federal Republic, as invariably
claimed by conservative thinkers on the subject, this self-critical impetus derived from
the Zivilisationsbrucn of National Socialism represents the best form of ensuring
politically civilised behaviour in the present. Broszat stresses that history is ill-served as
an ordnungspolitische Funktion, and with this he clearly has the discourse of national
identity in mind pursued by conservative intellectuals and politicians since the return of
the conservative coalition in 1982/3. Yet this naturally begs the question as to how the
concepts of politische Gesittung and ordnungpolitische Funktion distinguish themselves
in practical political discourse. In many ways this point forms the crux of post-
unification arguments for the cultivation of a culture of contrition for the NS period as a
source of value creation and progressive identity formation, and we shall return to this
theme in detail in chapter five. In the pre-unification period, however, Broszat's
politische Gesittung, Habermas' Sundenbewufitsein or Wehler's selbstkritische
Kontrolle'P all functioned in an antithetical capacity to the concept of conventional
national identity. In this critical discourse, the memory of the national socialist past
served primarily to de-legitimise the argument for a return to traditional values and a
political-historical orientation towards the German nation state which had terminated,
for critical thinkers, in Auschwitz.
The rejection of the discourse of national identity did not imply, as indicated, a rejection
of the project of identity creation per se. The discrediting of traditional concepts of
national consciousness and the physical division of the nation state after National
Socialism also formed the foundation stone of the left-liberal concept of post-national
identity. Both the facticity of division and the anti-Western, anti-democratic traditions
associated with the historical German nation state were invoked to support a "post-
national" reading of West German democracy in the terms of a progressive
Westbindung into West European political traditions which preceded the creation of a
unitary nation state in Germany. In this sense, the liberal historian Wolfgang Mommsen
drew a parallel between the contemporary division of the German states and the pre-
national, democratic traditions of the early nineteenth century. Mommsen concedes the
importance of "history" as a source of orientation in contemporary society and yet he
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highlights rather the pre-national culture of Germany over the pomp and military
ceremony of the Kaiserreich which he thoroughly rejects. As with many liberal
treatments of the identity question, Mommsen considers the period of the unitary nation
state as an anomaly of German history, the normality of which is far better represented
by the absence of a unitary nation state. Thus, writing in 1983, Mommsen commented
Wenn nicht alles tauscht, so ist die Geschichte der deutschen Frage heute in ihre Norrnallage
zuruckgekehrt, in der sie sich tiber Jahrhunderte hinweg befand, namlich der Existenz einer
deutschen Kultumation in der Mitte Europas, die in mehrere deutsche Staatsnationen gespalten
ist. Alles spricht dafiir, daB die Phase des konsolidierten national en Gesamtstaates von 1871-
1933 eine Episode in der deutschen Geschichte gewesen ist und daf wir wieder, freilich auf
hoherer Ebene, den Zustand erreicht haben, der in Deutschland nach 1815 bestand, narnlich einer
Mehrheit deutscher Staaten mit gemeinsamer kultumationaler Zugehorigkeit.!"
Thus, whilst Mommsen adheres to a sense of "national culture", this is distinct from the
concept of the nation state. Upon first glance this appears as a left-liberal inversion of
the liberal-conservative approach of subsuming the Federal Republic within longer term
national traditions. There are two essential distinctions to made between these two
approaches: firstly, Mommsen rejects the period of the nation state which is so
important for conservatives as antidemocratic and concentrates rather upon pre-national
cultural and intellectual traditions.!" Secondly, Mommsen's "cultural nation" is far
removed from neo-romantic versions and rather more ought to reflect those historical,
pre-national, democratic intellectual traditions which he considers were adopted by the
contemporary, post-national, democratic state.!" The strong attachment to Europe in
post-war West Germany allowed, according to Mommsen, the liberation from such anti-
democratic national traditions and provided a firm basis for the construction of a
democratic state.!" Given the acceptance of Austria and more recently of the GDR,
Mommsen contends that national-plurality indicates more of a "normal condition" than
the unitary nation and also offers a much stronger basis for the FRG's attachment to
democratic Western political culture. Thus whilst there appear certain parallels between
this approach and that of liberal conservatives - the use of history, the concept of the
Kulturnation - there also remain fundamental differences - the affirmation of West
Germany's "post-national" status as a condition of historical "normality" and most
importantly the impression of an inherent dichotomy between the concept of the
124 Mommsen. 1983 p. 76.
125. Mommmsen 1978. pp. 12-17.
126 Mommsen. 1983. p. 78-9.
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German nation state and modern, Western, democratic political culture. In this sense,
Mommsen states that the historical-political description of the Federal Republic as a
democratic system can only be asserted against elements of indigenous national
history.!"
Whilst this was expressed before the Historikerstreit and at the beginning of Kohl's
conservative administration, it remained an important point of orientation throughout
the decade and was frequently invoked against the national discourse of the Right.
Indeed, in the attachment of West Germany into this Western European democratic
tradition, Habermas perceived a source of progressive pride in the Federal Republic. It
is worth repeating Habermas' oft quoted formulation of progressive patriotism at the
height of the Historikerstreit
Die vorbehaltlose Offnung der Bundesrepublik gegeniiber der politischen Kultur des Westens ist
die grof3e inteIIektueIIe Leistung unserer Nachkriegszeit, auf die gerade meine Generation stolz
sein konnte, . .Der einzige Patriotism us, der uns dem Westen nicht entfremdet, ist ein
Verfassungspatriotismus. Eine in Uberzeugungen verankerte Bindung an universalistische
Verfassungsprinzipien hat sich leider in der Kulturnation der Deutschen erst nach- und durch
Auschwitz bilden konnen. Wer uns mit einer Floskel wie "Schuldbesessenheit" (Sturmer und
Oppenheimer) die Schamrote uber dieses Faktum austreiben will, wer die Deutschen zu einer
konventionellen Form ihrer national en Identitat zuruckrufen will, zerstort die einzig verHil31iche
Basis unserer Bindung an den Westen. 129
The above excerpt neatly draws together the various strands of Habermas concept of
"post-traditional" identity as a focus of social solidarity. This concept of Constitutional
Patriotism invokes two legacies: firstly the universalist and democratic traditions of
eighteenth-nineteenth century Western Europe and secondly the "refounding" of the
Federal Republic in the 1960s. Inbetween these two progressive traditions lies the NS
regime which acts as a critical fulcrum of this concept of Constitutional Patriotism.
National Socialism represented for Habermas and other critical thinkers the reactionary
apogee of the form of anti-Western and antidemocratic values which critical history
described in the Sonderweg of the German nation state and which were antithetical to
the progressive traditions of modernist culture. The collapse of this tradition with the
defeat of National Socialism and the construction of a modern democratic, Western state
thus represented a unique turn, or caesura, in modem German history represented by the
127 Mommsen. 1978. p. 22.
128 Mommsen. 1987. in Mommsen 1990. op. cit. p. 146.
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inclusion into this Western enlightenment culture. As we have seen elsewhere,
Haberrnas perceives this process of Westernisation in stages and after the economic and
political inclusion into the Western community and the construction of a constitutional
party democracy, West Germany was culturally included into this community only after
the experience of the radical counter-culture during the 1960s. The critical engagement
with the NS past formed a central component of the anti-authoritarian revolt and
inspired varied democratic and radical discourses in which Haberrnas participated. The
importance of this period lay founded in the fact that first during the 1960s was an open
confrontation with the parental generation and a decisive political-cultural break with
the legacy of the German nation possible, one important result of which was the
emergence of "critical history", developed by many of the left-liberal historians who
participated in the Historikerstreit. In this sense, the political-cultural tum to the West is
regarded as a moment of pride for the generation of critical thinkers who contributed to
the democratisation of the FRG during the 1960s. Thus both the collapse of 1945 and
the "refounding" of 1968 legitimise Habermas' claim that Western democracy could
only ever gain a foothold in German society after the experience of Auschwitz.
This is a perspective internalised in the concept of critical, post-traditional identity and
from this standpoint, the attempt of neoconservative intellectuals to relativise or
"normalise" the NS period in order to salvage a sense of national authority represents
not only contrafactual historical dilettantism, but more importantly undermines the
attachment of the Federal Republic to the democratic, cosmopolitan political and
cultural traditions of Western Europe and the United States. In this sense Habermas
contended that the relativisation approach of the right attacked the foundations of the
moral-political consciousness of the Federal Republic.':" Despite such threats, left-
liberal intellectuals perceived cause for cautious optimism after the Historikerstreit.
Particularly among the younger generation it was noted that the period of the "German
nation" held little resonance in post-national West German democracy.!" Habermas
perceived broader forces at play and world-historical change in both the internal
composition of Western societies and in the global East-West relations gave him ground
for optimism.
129 Habermas in Historikerstreit. 1987. op. cit. p. 75-6.
130 Habermas. 1992. op. cit. 254-5.
131 c:fHans Mommsen in Diner. 1987. op. cit. p. 88.
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With the prescience which one can expect of this far-sighted intellectual, Habermas
outlines in the 1980s many of the themes which, during the 1990s, have come to
dominate political discourse in the West. Whilst the evolution of Constitutional
Patriotism in the Federal Republic clearly resulted from the specifics of German
historical development, Habermas contended that all Western nations were on the way
to becoming "post-national" societies. The phenomena of European integration, supra-
national military alliances, global economic interdependence, economic migration,
ethnic diversity, development of communications networks, human rights abuses,
famine, solidarity with national liberation movements etc led Habermas to conclude that
there was now no alternative to universal values.l" In such phenomena and the East-
West atomic stalemate, Habermas perceived the potential of pursuing the modernist
project and for the first time overcoming the Naturzustand between the nations. Whilst
the classic universal values of the democratic bourgeois state existed in a dichotomous
relationship caught, as it were, between the particular loyalties demanded by the state
from the citoyen and the cosmopolitan solidarity with humanity, the post-national trend
of Western societies represented an opportunity for realising the true universalisation of
values around themes such as human rights, tolerance, pluralism, difference etc.
Particularly in the politics of multiculturalism he perceives the chance to develop the
cosmopolitanism of the modernist project in the present age. Whilst he welcomes the
breakdown of traditional, particularist loyalties and models of large scale action such as
Marxism, he also perceives the potential dangers emanating from the celebration of
diversity, the coincidental, the private, sub-cultures etc. in that such trends away from
the large scale could lead to a flight from the level of collectivity required to resolve
social and global problems. In this sense, Verfassungspatriotismus based upon the
universalisation of democracy and human rights should draw in the "last remnants" of
solidarity in order to prevent a total atomisation of society.!"
132 Habermas. 1990. op. cit. p. 152.
133ibid. p. 16.
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4. Westbindung and Nation
In the following chapter I wish to examine liberal-conservative discourse of national
identity which emerged in the wake of the unification of the two German states. Section
one examines perceptions of the collapse of the GDR as a "victory" of the Federal
Republic's policy of Westbindung. Section two then considers arguments put forward by
conservatives in the reconstruction of a "conventional" sense of identity. Section three
examines attempts to reconstruct a conventional national identity with reference to the
Kaiserreich.
4.1 The Victory of the Westbindung?
The decision to unify Germany through Article 23 of the Basic Law, upon which basis
the Saarland was finally integrated into the FRG in 1957, officially codified German
unity as the accession of the GDR to the FRG. The fact that the West German Basic
Law was considered by far the best constitution in German history and that the
conservative "Alliance for Germany" partner of Kohl attained 48.14% of the vote in the
first free elections to the Volkskammer on the 18.03.1990 (against the SPD's 21.8%)
displayed the popular legitimacy of this route to German unity. Advocates of Article 23
could cite the widespread support for the FRG model which among citizens of the
former GDR was a popular symbol of aspirations to greater freedom and prosperity. I
The appeal of integration into West Germany was underlined by the lack of support in
the East for the notion of a reform of the GDR along democratic lines which would,
however, retain an orientation towards socialist principles as expressed in the plea of
intellectuals Fur unser Land? In the West, the generally more cautious approach to
reunification by the SPD, typified in Lafontaine's suggestion that national unity
represented a temporary stage in the broader process of the creation of a "United States
of Europe" contrasted with Kohl's promise of bluhende Landschaften in a united nation
I cf Interview with Wolfgang Schauble (then Minister of Interior) and Markus Meckel (then vice
president of the "GDR-SPD") concerning unity via Article 23 or 146 in, 'Der Spiegel.' Nr.I21 44.
Jahrgang. I9.Mlirz 1990. pA8-57.
2 In the failure of such alternative GDR concepts and the desire to join the West ,Claus OfTe
speaks of 1989 as an "exit" revolution. cf Claus OfTe, 'Wohlstand, Nation" Republik. Aspekte
des deutschen Sonderwegs vom Sozialismus zum Kapitalismus.' in Hans Joas, Martin Kohli (Hg)
'Der Zusammenbruch der DDR.' Suhrkamp. F.IM. p. 293.
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enabled the ruling coalition to profile itself as the engineers of German unity.' The
assertion that the CDU represented the guardians of the project of German unity in the
present was supported by a reading of post-war history which cast the CDU as the
historic defenders of German unity throughout the Cold War. This approach evoked the
impression of a conservative, anti-Communist continuity which culminated in the
transcendence of the post-war division. For Kohl, the events of 1989 displayed not only
the superiority of West German society and economy but also represented the historical
vindication of the policies of the CDU since Adenauer. Kohl constructs a continuity
between the declared aim of the first Chancellor of the FRG to advance the cause of
German unity within the context of binding the FRG to the West.4 This reading of
reunification as a part of the heritage and conscious political aim of the CDU, together
with the inference of SPD unreliability in the national question, presents the CDU as
both the contemporary and historical "guardian" of national unity. This is a perception
which has become popular in conservative commentaries of division and unification
throughout the 1990s. Upon the commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the end of
the war in Europe, Bavarian Prime Minister and CSU chairman Edmund Stoiber
likewise stressed the "far-sightedness" of the Western integration policy of the FRG
during the 1950s
Es dauerte fur den Westen Deutschlands die angesichts des total en Zusammenbruchs nur kurze
Spanne von zehn Jahren, nach der die Bundesrepublik Deutschland wieder souveran, Mitglied
der NATO und wenig spater Griindungsmitglied der EWG wurde. Die transatlantische
Partnerschaft mit den USA war hierfilr die Grundlage. Sie sicherte dem Westen Europas 50 Jahre
Frieden. Diese Adenauersche AuBenpolitik war die historisch richtige Antwort auf den 8. Mai ...
3 cf Renate Fritsch-Boumazel, 'Europe and German Unification.' Berg Publishers, New
York/Oxford. 1992.pp.193-4 and 219. Mary Fulbrook, 'Germany 1918-1990. The Divided
Nation.' Fontana Press, An imprint of HarperCollins Publishers, London, 199I.p.338, Harold
James, 'Yom Historikerstreit zum Historikerschweigen. Die Wiedergeburt des Nationalstaates.'
Wolf Jobst Siedler GmbH, Berlin. 1993.p.45. Offe perceives in this the basis of an elite level
nationalism employed to create mass acceptance for the process of economic restructuring of the
GDR. op. cit. p. 285. Evans and James likewise perceive the main thrust to unity drived from
economic factors. cf Evans. 1997. op. cit. p. 218. James offers a more pessimistic view of the
possibilities of economic nationalism and argues instead for a strong institutional sense of identity
in order that the "obsession" with economic affairs not be "imposed" on Europe. James. 1994. p.
246.
4 Thus on the eve of reunification Kohl reiterated Adenauer's belief that German and European
unification were "two sides of the same coin" in, 'Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestags.'
Stenographische Berichte. 11. Wahlperiode 173/178. Band.151. 1989. 'Bericht zur Lage der
Nation im geteilten Deutschland.' 173 Sitzung. Mittwoch den 8. November.1989. pg 13018 also
cf Helmut Kohl, 'lch wollte Deutschlands Einheit.' Dargestellt von Kai Dieckmann und Ralf
Georg Reuth. Ullstein Buchverlag GmbH, Berlin Propylaen Verlag. I996.pg 10-11.
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Die Entscheidung fur die Westbindung und fur Europa war mit die Voraussetzung fur die
Zustimmung aller Nachbam zur deutschen Einigung 1990.5
From this perspective, the Westbindung after 1945 is retrospectively claimed as a
historical antecedent to the eventual transcendence of the post war order and German
reunification in 1989-90. This is a reading which tends to underplay the role of the Cold
War in facilitating the "friendly" relations between the Western allies and the Federal
Republic. The notion that Adenauer's policy of Western integration was the "correct
answer" to the capitulation of the 8 May and that, in turn, this laid the foundations for
eventual unification relativises the influence of the Cold War constellation in both
creating the two divided states and also precipitating their unification in 1989-90. Whilst
Adenauer undoubtedly presented the case for reunification in terms of integration into
Western Europe and the Atlantic Alliance, it is problematic to infer that German unity
was the vision which drove his political engagement and to invoke him as the "father"
of German unity as common among mainstream conservative politicians.
Perhaps the most famous attack by Schumacher on Adenauer came during the
parliamentary discussion over German membership of the International Ruhr Authority
in November 1949 which the SPD rejected as a forsaking of sovereignty. Whilst
Adenauer soberly reflected that Germany possessed no such sovereignty rights at all due
to the unconditional surrender and Occupation Statute of the Allied High
Commissioners, Schumacher famously criticised him as a craven Bundeskanzler der
Alliierten? Marion Gratin Denhoff also recollects Adenauer's indifference to the
concept of unity noting that as the Berlin Wall was constructed in August 1961 it took
the Chancellor a full nine days before he visited West Berlin preferring instead to
embark on his planned election tour of Bavaria as if nothing had happened.' Adenauer's
prioritisation of integration into the West reflected the facticity of US and Soviet
hegemony in the post-war years. The directive to the military commander in chief of the
US occupation forces from April 1945 stated quite clearly that no political activities
5 'Rede des Bayerischen Ministerprasidenten Dr. Edmund Stoiber bei der Feierstunde anlalllich
des 50. Jahrestages des Kriegsendes vom 8. Mai 1945 in Aschaffenburg.' Bayerische
Staatskanzlei:Rede des Ministerprasidenten vom 8.5.1995, http://www. bayem. del Politik/
Reden/ 1995-05-08. html, p.4.
6 cf Habel, Kistler. 1987.p.17 -19.
7 According to Donhoff, during this election tour, Adenauer also missed few opportunites to
criticise the Mayor of Berlin Brandt which, under the circumstances, caused a great deal of
indignation, cf Marion Donhoff, 'From Foe to Friend. The Makers of the New Germany from
Konrad Adenauer to Helmut Schmidt.' Weidenfeld and Nicolson. London. 1982.p.77.
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shall be countenanced, unless authorised by you? The SMAD operated from a similar
basis and although the newly refounded KPD under the exiled Moscow leaders quickly
assumed a prominent role politically cohering the zone, Soviet commanders left little
ambiguity towards where power lay." Adenauer himself was removed from the office of
Lord Mayor of Cologne by the British authorities on October 6 1945 in censure of his
rehiring of former Nazis and underrepresentation of "anti-fascist" parties in the city
administration and following indignation at his first public speech in which he appeared
to deny any German culpability for the disaster and concentrated upon the German
people as the real victims." Relations with the occupying forces only changed under the
aegis of the emerging Cold War and the desire of each Superpower that "their" German
zones be integrated into the broader East - West international and domestic political
constellation. Both the "Westernisation" of the FRG, which liberal conservatives
perceive as the "service" of Adenauer and the "Sovietisation" of the GDR after 1947
and the creation of the West economic zones and the dropping of the notion of a
"German" route to socialism, II were ultimately products of supra-German forces. As
Brigitte Seebacher-Brandt questions, would Kurt Schumacher have been in a position to
suggest any alternative to the US if he had assumed the chancellorship in 1949 instead
of Adenauer?"
Notions of a continuity of the Adenauerian Westbindung also underplay the changes
brought about during the 1960s and the Ostpolitik of the social-liberal coalition which,
in tum, also reflected developments between the Cold War Superpowers and the onset
of a period of detente between East and West. The vociferous opposition of Barzel's
CDU and CSU against any recognition of the GDR and their inability to bend with
changing global constellation reflected the more general inflexibility of the right and its
reluctance to break out of the immediate post-war authoritarian and anti-Communist
position of the Hallstein Doctrine." Interestingly, casting a post-unification
retrospective eye over the debates around Ostpolitik Kohl appears to present this
8 Pu1zer. 1995. op. cit. p. 23.
9 cfNonnan M. Naimek, 'The Russians in Germany. A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation,
1945-1949.' Harvard University Press. Massachusetts. US. 1997. pp. 11-16.
10 cfHerf. 1997. op. cit. p. 213.
II cf Wolfgang Leonhard, 'Die Revolution entlliBt ihre Kinder.' Ullstein. Darmstadt, 1962. pp.
377-380.
12 Seebacher-Brandt. 1992. p. 37.
13 Sontheimer. 1979. op. cit. p. 25
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development as a CDU inspired tum. Kohl refrains from invoking the SPD names most
closely associated with Ostpolitk, Brandt, Scheel, Bahr and rather more associates this
with Erhard and Grand Coalition Chancellor Kiesinger." The only acknowledgement of
CDU intransigence over the issue is on the refusal to accept the demand forwarded by
sections of the SPD over the Grundlagen treaty of 1972 for a recognition of a separate
GDR citizenship and the retention of the principle of jus sanguinis - an objection which
seen in the context of 1989-90 could be presented as a wise foresight. In contrast to
CDU interpretations of Adenauer as the "father" of later unification, Seebacher-Brandt
considers the SPD under Brandt as the only post-war party to truly represent a pragmatic
national interest. For Seebacher-Brandt, the high-point of an otherwise "embarrassing"
history was the Ostpolitik of the social-liberal coalition which according to his widow,
managed to combine co-operation with the foreign policy interests of the US with a
more independent, assertive line on German-German relations which was articulated in
the language of common nationality."
Sadly, for Seebacher-Brandt, this national reference point increasingly dissipated and by
the 1980s the politics of both SPD and CDU-CSU were characterised by a tacit
acceptance of the German-German status quo. Despite the annual rhetorical lip-service
to the "aim" of the Basic Law in the Bericht zur Lage der Nation Seebacher-Brandt
contends that Die deutsche Einheit galt als ein Ziel ohne Realitiusgehatt." Chancellor
Kohl himself appears to have concurred with such sentiment when he, on a diplomatic
trip to Moscow in 1988, confessed to the then political editor of the Financial Times
David Marsh that he would never see German unification." Similarly the official
reception of Honecker in Bonn in 1987 with full military honours added legitimacy to
the independent, if co-operative, status of the two German states.
Attempts to reconstruct a concept of the Westbindung whose primary aim was the
fulfilment of the aim of unity inscribed into the preamble of the Basic Law reflect
contemporary concerns to cultivate a sense of continuity and "normality" for the
unification of the two states over 1989-90. The de-facto discontinuity represented by
14 Kohl. 1996. p. 19.
IS Brandt. ibid. p. 34
16 ibid. p. 38.
17 David Marsh. 1995. p. 25. Kohl later re-interpreted this as the belief that he would never see
unification as German Chancellor.
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unification is recast, in such readings, as a continuity of Adenauer's Westbindung and in
this manner, the transcendence of German division formally codified in the preamble of
the Basic Law is reinterpreted as a feature of pragmatic West German political
engagement. In essence, this approach casts the particularist West German claim to
national legitimacy which emerged during the events of 1989 back into the history of
the rival German states. In this sense, Brigitte Seebacher-Brandt contends Die Suche
nach dem Selbstverstiindnis des geeinten Deutschlands ist eine Suche auch nach der
deutsch-deutschen Vergangenheit." Although Seebacher-Brandt contests the
interpretation of Adenauer as the father of German unity and instead emphasises Willy
Brandt as the most successful "national" West German politician she appears to concur
with CDU authors in her suggestion that this history is to be written from a West
German perspective on the basis of its legitimacy as a free democratic society in
contrast to the "illegitimate" society of East Germany." From this perspective, the
"Westernisation" of former East German society should be complimented with a
"Westernisation" of post-war German-German history - a claim which is likewise
legitimised by reference to the democratic superiority of the FRG.
It is interesting, and given such sentiment perhaps hardly surprising, to observe that the
much sought after Westernisation of the GDR has become for a significant section of
the former East German population a focus of resentment in post-unification society.
Contrary to some West German perceptions that this testifies to an ingrained lack of
initiative" or to the resentments of former beneficiaries of the regime" this must rather
more be understood within the context of the failure of the terms on which unification
was presented to materialise. Only two years after unification a commentary in Der
Spiegel noted
Nun rachen sich die vielen Ulgen, mit denen die Einheit schongeredet, der Wahler getauscht, die
Macht erhalten wurde; bluhende Landschaften, keine Steuererhohungen, Markwirtschaft- am
zweiten Jahrestag der deutschen Einheit sind diese Versprechungen im Volke nichts mehr wert."
18 Brigitte Seebacher-Brandt, 'Die Deutsch-deutschen Beziehungen: Eine Geschichte von
Verlegenheiten.' in Jesse, Mitter. op. cit. 1992. p. 16.
19 ibid. p. 17.
20 Schauble, in Langguth. 1997. op. cit. p. 284.
21 Michael Mertes, 'Germany's Social and Political Culture: Change Through Consensus?' In
Michael Mertes, Steven Muller, Heinrich August Winkler (eds.) 'In Search Of Germany.' New
Brunswick Transaction. London. 1996. p. 4.
22 'Der Spiegel.' 05.10. 1992. p. 42.
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In the course of unification, the East German economy lost its trading markets in the
East with the dissolution of the Rat for gegenseitige Wirtschaftshilfe in June 1991, lost
around 67% of its obsolete capital stocks and was subjected to a process of mass
privatisation and subsequent disproportionate unemployment." Unemployment has
continued to remain disproportionately high in the former East and the official figures
released for 1997 revealed Sachsen-Anhalt, Mecklenburg- Vorpommem, Thuringia,
Brandenburg and Saxony assuming the top five places." Such phenomena clearly
undermine the proclaimed inclusion of the East German population into the prosperous
West German community and it is little surprise that surveys of the East German
population have revealed that e.g. in Mecklenburg Vorpommem according to estimates
of the Landesjugendamt around 80% of youth consider themselves to be second class
citizens" Whilst unification was popularly understood and presented as an opportunity
to partake in the economic and liberal successes of post-war West Germany, 1989-90
also clearly signalled the transcendence of not only the GDR but also the post-war FRG.
Whilst the East German region was obviously more seriously effected by the process of
economic unification, in the West too during the 1990s, as elsewhere in the West, the
tenets of the postwar social state have been subjected to reform. The Federal Republic
extended substantially more democratic choice to its citizens than the GDR, offered
greater room for opposition and through its relative material prosperity also offered a
higher standard of living. The collapse of the GDR and the end of the Cold War,
however, also raised the question of how far on could still speak of "West Germany" in
the post-Cold War order. Writing shortly after unification, the historian Amulf Baring
expressed this sense of transience in an articulation of nostalgia for post-war West
Germany
Wir haben die alte Bundesrepublik, solange sie lebte, nie fur sehr gemiitlieh gehalten, sondem fur
sehr umkampft und krisengesehiittelt. Aber im Riickblick erscheint sie dennoch als eine
idyllisehe Phase unserer Geschichte."
Baring's retrospective attachment to the Federal Republic reveals a common sentiment
among West German, and indeed East German opinion, which reflects a sense of unease
23 ef Gerline Sinn, Hans-Werner Sinn, 'Kaltstart. Volkwirtschaftliehe Aspekte der deutschen
Vereingung.' DTV. 1993.p. 55
24 ef 'Jahresbericht der Bundesregierung zum Stand der Deutschen Einheit 1998.'
Arbeitslosenquoten 1997. at httpllwww.bundesregierung.de.
25 ef 'Der Spiegel.' 07. 12. 1992. p. 26.
26 Arnulf Baring, 'Deutschland, was nun ? Ein Gesprach mit Dirk Rumberg und Wolf Jobst
Siedler.' Wolf Jobst Siedler Verlag GmbH. Berlin.1991.p.15.
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at the passing of the certainties of the post-war order. During the euphoria of 1989-90,
West German politicians could cite the clear illegitimacy of the GDR state in the eyes of
the citizenry as a form of backhanded compliment for the FRG. Yet during the 1990s,
the question of state legitimacy has become a central concern of the political class. In
this sense, perceptions of the crisis of legitimacy of the GDR state mirror anxieties of
the West German political class in the face of heterogeneity and potential social
disharmony.
4.1.1 The Victory of the Nation?
It is within this context that the liberal conservative reading of unification as the result
of Adenauer's Westbindung is supplemented by an approach which understands the
FRG not only as the more economically and politically successful state of the Free West
but also as the custodian of "national values". For conservatives of all shades,
unification represented an opportunity to translate the academic debates over the
concept and legitimacy of the "German nation" into concrete political practice.
Reconsidering these debates some time after unification, Kohl could perceive a
historical vindication of his controversial national position during the 1980s which
suggests that the CDU took national values into a form of "custody" during the Cold
War which may now be unproblematically "de-thawed" in united Germany
Mich beunruhigte, daB man in vielen politischen Kreisen in der Bundesrepublik immer weiter
von dem Gedanken abruckte, daB die Einheit der Nation trotz staatlicher Teilung fortbestand.
Hier wurde einfach nicht zur Kenntnis genom men, daB das NationalbewuBtsein kein beliebiger
Wert ist, den man nach Laune akzeptieren oder von sich weisen kann. Solange sich die
Deutschen gegenuber anderen Nationen als Deutsche verstanden, war ihre Nation eine Tatsache.
Die Menschen, die in beiden Teilstaaten lebten, gehorten unstreitig zum deutschen Yolk, auch
wenn sie als Deutsche in verschiedenartigen Gesellschaftsforrnen lebten. Sie waren nach wie vor
deutscher Nationalitat, auch wenn die Gemeinsamkeiten, die ein Yolk als Einheit verbinden,
durch die Trennung geschwacht waren. Diesen ErosionsprozeB galt es aufzuhalten und im
Gegenzug das Zusamrnengehorigkeitsgefuhl der Deutschen zu starken. Dazu gehorte es nach
unserem Verstandnis, nach dem Verstandnis des Grundgesetzes, festzuhalten am Ziel der
staatlichen Einheit, an der Wiederherstellung der Identitat von Nation und Staat."
In this excerpt is becomes clear that for Kohl the media of synthesising Westbindung
and national unity is a concept of "national consciousness" which was preserved by the
27 Helmut Kohl. 1996. p.22.
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CDU and bridged the division of the two German states in an abstract community of
national "belonging". Interesting is Kohl's understanding of national consciousness
which is presented here as a naturalised concept and is ascribed a transhistorical value.
In this reading, national consciousness appears as a pre-political phenomenon which
exists independent of state composition and appears to override subjective
consciousness. As such this appears as a faithful representation of neo-romantic notions
of the Kulturnation cohered by common language, culture and history. Kohl clearly
perceives in unification the historical vindication of the national orientation of
conservative politicians and intellectuals during the 1980s who managed, despite the
criticism of West German intellectuals, to "keep alive" the sense of national
consciousness which apparently united the two divided German states upon the level of
an abstract, ephemeral identification with the "German nation". Yet with unification the
abstract became the concrete and the value of national consciousness changed from
representing a discourse which was primarily employed to cohere the West German
status quo around a core of "traditional" values to a political sentiment which had
overcome the post-war division. In this context there has been a perceptible shift in the
relationship between Westbindung and "German nation". Whilst during the 1980s
liberal conservatives sought to integrate the legacy of the German nation into West
German political culture, since unification this period itself has become a "legacy"
which is, for liberal conservatives, to be inserted into the political culture of the nation.
Thus in a speech upon the opening of the Haus der Geschichte der Bundesrepublik in
Bonn in 1994, Kohl articulated the following understanding of the need for an
integration of the positive post-war experience of the Western integrated Rechtsstaat
into the newly unified German nation arguing
Dieses Haus hier in Bonn, einer Stadt, der die Bundesrepublik Deutschland und wir aile so viel
verdanken, dieses Haus der Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschlands errinert an eine
Vergangenheit, die in unsere Zukunft eingehen muG.28
Kohl clearly still desires a more traditional orientation towards the national past yet his
approach is characterised by a neutralisation of the NS past and the contention that a
democratic tradition of the nation existed before, during and beyond the NS dictatorship
and was maintained in the FRG. Whilst the FRG was the most successful and
democratic period of recent German history, the problem which liberal conservative
28 Presse und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung. Nr.59. Bonn, den 17 Juni 1994.
'Vergangenheit, die in die Zukunft eingehen mull.' p. 559.
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interpretations face is revealed in Kohl's statement. The fact remains that the period of
post-war Westbindung and the FRG is celebrated as a legacy already suggests that this
is a period which has in fact passed into history. In this context the relationship between
"legacy" and political culture has been inverted since the period of division and it now
appears that the FRG provides a positive experience (which in this reading of the
Westbindung retained its "national" orientation") which must be cultivated in the unified
nation state.
The image that the Federal Republic had fulfilled its historical mission as the curator of
the nation and national consciousness which had now succeeded the West German state
is evident in the following triumphal interpretation of unification by the political
historian Hans-Peter Schwarz. Schwarz accepts that the hour of the FRG's hiatus also
represented the hour of its demise yet this appears as cause for celebration rather than
mourning and invokes the image of the FRG as the historical "guardian" of the national
idea throughout the period of (artificial) division
Erst durch den Beitritt der DDR am 3. Oktober erhalt die Bundesrepublik alles, was ihr bisher
fehlte: das ganze deutsche Staatsvolk und klare Grenzen, die im Inland gleicherweise akzeptiert
sind wie von den Nachbam. Der dunnblutigen, wenn auch wohlmeinenden Professorenfiktion des
Verfassungspatriotismus bedarf es nun nicht mehr. Staatsvolk, Staatsgebiet und Staatsgewalt
fallen wider zusammen. Vielleicht entdecken die Deutschen sogar emeut, was ein Staat ist.
Erstmals in der neueren deutschen Geschichte konnen sich nun aile Schichten und aile Regionen
Deutschlands mit Staat, Geschichte, Volk und Verfassung ruhig und selbstbweuBt identifizieren.
Ein Land hat nach langen Irrwegen zu sich selbst gefunden."
For Schwarz, unification represented both a fulfilment and simultaneous transcendence
of the FRG but this was not a higher synthesis into the new and unknown but is
perceived as the "return" to a supposedly "normal" historical condition. The assertion of
a "return to normality" remains a central aspect of conservative interpretations of
reunification. In this reading of recent German history, the post war division is rendered
not only a provisional arrangement, which in itself is a highly dubious point, but the
successful FRG is depicted as an incomplete social entity and as such the post-war
division of the nation is transformed into the actual Sonderweg of German history.
According to this reading, only in the moment of its transcendence did West Germany
become a wholly legitimate social body as it could once more regard itself as a
29 Hans-Peter Schwarz.1990.p.159.
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sovereign, unitary nation state." This appears as another way of naturalising
reunification by means of denying both German states any real historical legitimacy and
celebrating national unity as the return to an "essential", natural condition. The same
evidently applies for the perceived dominance of the critical ideological paradigm of the
post war FRG which aimed to substitute the discredited concepts of traditional
nationalism with a "constitutional patriotism" informed with a "post-national",
democratic spirit. As such, this interpretation rejects the "artificial" republican concepts
of social solidarity represented by notions of "Constitutional Patriotism" and welcomes
their transcendence upon the returned "natural condition" of national community.
Whilst Schwarz may regard the post war FRG with a much cooler retrospective eye than
many, his contention that Germany has rediscovered its "true" status as a nation state
and as such has returned to the historically legitimate German continuity remains a
popular interpretation of the events of 1989. In this reading, the FRG appears as the well
meaning, yet temporary, executive of the legacy of the historical German nation state.
This interpretation thus perceives a specific German element to the world historical
"victory of the West" which heralds the long awaited "return" of the nation state to
German society after a period of apparent misguided development and historical
abnormality. In this sense, Schwarz reflects conservative awareness of the limitations of
casting unification as a "Westernisation" process and continuity with the post-war
Westbindung. Whilst the collapse of the Eastern Bloc fuelled a sense of Cold War
triumphalism, German unification represented more of the swansong of the post-war
Western order which was cohered by the politics of anticommunism. For conservatives,
the answer to the question of what follows lies with the understanding of unification as a
return to national normality which reflects a longer-term continuity. Thus for Schwarz,
unification has displayed that Die deutsche Geschichte geht weiter als die Geschichte
der Bundesrepublik Deutschland?'
4.2. "Hard Times" and National Identity
Whilst the victory over the socialist alternative lent the West a sense of superiority, the
evaporation of the Communist opponent also placed a question mark over the terms in
which Western society had legitimised itself as a Western democracy for over forty
30 Marsh notes this paradox at the end of the period of German division thus, The nation could
become whole again only once it had ceased to think and behave as a nation. Marsh.1995.p.23.
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years. Commenting upon the state of the innere Einigung, five years after unification,
Kohl's lieutenant and chairman of the CDU-CSU parliamentary faction, Wolfgang
Schauble, noted the paradoxical situation of the West after the victory over communism
Es ist schon merkwiirdig: Da hat die Idee der Freiheit und der Demokratie einen grandiosen Sieg
tiber die Unfreiheit und Diktatur errungen, und ausgerechnet die Staaten des freien Westens, die
tiber Jahrzehnte Hort von Freiheit und Demokratie waren, stehen jetzt, da der real existierende
Sozialismus im Orkus der Geschichte verschwunden ist, in einer Krise ihres
Selbstverstandnisses."
Conservative politicians and intellectuals celebrated the triumph over the socialist
alternative and attempted to locate the return of the nation within the longer term trends
of Westbindung and the "shared values" of the "Free West". It soon became quite clear,
however, that the collapse of the Eastern Bloc had not only transcended the post-war
arrangements in Eastern European states but had also exercised an equally corrosive
impact upon the values and self-perception of the West. As Schauble notes, during the
Cold War, the concept of "antitotalitarianism" and the threat of mutual atomic
annihilation had acted as a form of social and political cement in the West. With the
disappearance of the "totalitarian" enemy, however, the established self definition of the
"Free West" has also evaporated leaving behind a political vacuum which demands the
development of values more in tune with contemporary socio-political reality. For
conservative thinkers the only value capable of fostering both a sense of unity between
East and West and cultivating authority for the state is to be found in the concept of
national identity founded in historical consciousness.
Kohl expressed his evaluation of the social role of the concept of the nation in an
interview with TIME magazine in summer 1990 which coupled the declaration of the
continued Western commitments of the new Germany internationally with a coded plea
for a return to conventional patriotic sentiment domestically. Synthesising the concepts
of Westbindung and the German nation, Kohl contended "the Fatherland is Germany,
the future is Europe"." As such, unification appears as both the historical vindication of
the Westbindung policy of Adenauer and also of the German nation beyond the
experience of National Socialism and post-war division. Yet if indeed the future is
31 Schwarz.1990. ibid. p. 152.
32 Wolfgang Schauble, 'Nationale Identitat und innere Einheit.' in Langguth. 1997. p. 283.
33 TIME. June 25. 1990. 'Germany Towards Unity. Interview with Helmut Kohl.' Henry
MullerlKartsen Prager. p. 30.
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Europe, we need to ask after the appeal of a national concept which had been
compromised by the NS experience and rendered highly abstract through the period of
division. Clearly, for Kohl, the association made between Adenauer's Westbindung and
unification of the two German states aims to cultivate a more democratic concept of the
German nation which combined longer term "positive" national traditions with the post-
war experience of membership of the "Free West". This represents the technocratic
form of Westbindung criticised by Habermas during the 1980s which primarily
understands the achievements of the FRG in terms of economic and social institutions
and the construction of the democratic Rechtsstaat but which, however, stops short of
the form of democratic-republican political consciousness advocated by critical
thinkers. In terms of the political substance of German identity, liberal conservatives
accentuate the cohesive potential of "national" values. Kohl's understanding of the
social role of the national idiom, or the concept of "Fatherland" corresponds more
closely with the familiar tenets of conservative discourse of identity since the late 1970s
- 1980s. For Kohl, the concept of patriotism is clearly linked with a perception of
positive national historical continuities and exists in a compensatory relationship to the
process of socio-economic modernisation. As in his address to the Bundestag upon the
assumption of office in 1982, so eight years later, the primary problem of the Germans
appears to be one of lacking moral fortitude
We have economic, material problems, but all of them can be solved. At issue is the moral
strength of our people. Have we lost some of that during the years of affluence and prosperity? I
don't think so. But a layer of butter and kiwi and shrimps has covered our moral strength. It will
reappear when we remove that layer. The term idealism was born here - it was the contribution of
German philosophers, and it was abused terribly in this century. There was a backlash, and now
we have to achieve a sort of'balance."
It is in this context of strengthening the moral fibre of the German people that Kohl
emphasises the importance of a sense of Fatherland in the new Germany, The material,
economic problems to which he refers, and which promote the trends of social
dissolution which he seeks to counter, are relegated in this reading to secondary,
resolvable, problems. The crux of the matter for Kohl is the ability of the German nation
to develop a sense of moral community and solidarity which could weather the storms
caused by socio-economic modernisation. This argument tends to undercut the
unconvincing relegation of economic factors to secondary issue and implies that
34 Kohl. ibid. p. 33.
129
national identity gains primary definition through its ability to absorb the potentially
disruptive effects of socio-economic modernisation. It is in this context that the concept
of the German nation reveals its true virtue for conservatives which is not primarily
derived from the description of the territorial status of the unified German state but
rather more from its capacity to foster a sense of common value-consensus which could
compensate for the anticipated "removal" of the layers of "butter, kiwi and shrimp". In
this understanding, "idealistic" faith must be revived as a form of compensation for the
removal of the symbols of West German self-indulgence born from relative prosperity.
The solution to such implied West German "pampered decadence" lies, for Kohl, in a
revitalisation of idealist traditions which could provide the emotional and intellectual
sustenance required to survive periods of material hardship. The connection between
anticipated material austerity and the rehabilitation of "idealist" traditions indicates that
Kohl is above all concerned with the rehabilitation of a form of patriotic faith which
stands above the actual experience of social existence and engenders social solidarity
and loyalty in the face of social, economic or political disparities between groups of the
population. Kohl's understanding of the historically fortuitous constellation at the "End
of History" for redressing the "imbalance" between idealist and materialist interests, in
favour of the former, reflects a more deep seated unease towards the viability of the
post-war domestic and international order after the demise of the Cold War order. From
this perspective, the recourse to a discourse of national identity results more from a
reflection of contemporary processes of social change than a "natural" reversion to
transhistorical continuities constituted by "national values". As such it exists in a
continuity with pre-unification West German conservative understanding of the
"compensatory" function of historical consciousness.
Returning to his familiar theme, the conservative philosopher Hermann Lubbe restated
the relationship between the technological dynamism of modern society and the need for
a cultivation of historical consciousness. Referring to the historians dispute of the mid
1980s, Lubbe draws out the main point of conflict between his concept of "historical
cultural science" and the "critical history" argued by left wing intellectuals as the
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dichotomy between Kompensation and Aufkliirung." For Lubbe this represents a false
dichotomy and he perceives the remit of history in a combination of both these aspects.
Lubbe operates from a different conception of both these categories and for him the
"enlightenment" function of history lies in explaining the past in its own terms which
can then be conserved in the present that it might serve as a source of "compensation"
for the process of rapid civilizational change. In this sense, he seeks to derive
Selbstverstiindnis from Herkunftsverstiindnis." Repeating his earlier position, Lubbe
offers the following conception of the social use of historical consciousness
Evolutionsbedingt fremd gewordene Vergangenheiten aneignungsfahig und zuschreibungsfahig
zu maehen - : das ist es, was das historisehe BewuBtsein leistet. Nur so lassen sich eigcne
Geschiehten und die Gesehichten anderer erzahlen und laBt sich damit aussagbar halten, wer wir
sind, wer die anderen sind und wer wir in unserem weehselseitigen Beziehungen sind.
Identitatsvergegenwartigung ist eine kulturelle Notigkeit unter Bedingungen besehleunigten
Identitatswandels, Selbsthistorisierung wird durch die Erfahrung evolutionsbedingter
Entfremdung von Gegenwart und Vergangenheit erzwungen. Nichts wird uns rascher fremd als
das Veraltete. Das historische BewuBtsein, das sich seiner annimmt, hebt damit nicht sein
Veraltetsein auf, sondern halt es als das verstandene Veraltete gegenwartig."
The essential dilemma which Lubbe's concept of "historical cultural science" seeks to
address is the fact that in modern society the dynamic process of technological-
industrial progress destroys traditions and established values which an ever increasing
acceleration. Whilst Lubbe does not revert to traditional anti-industrial romantic
conservatism and welcomes these processes as an "evolution", they nevertheless
corrode our sense of identity in the present as this is largely based in a sense of heritage
and historical derivation. The function of historical consciousness is not to halt the
process of technological-industrial social evolution but rather more to conserve the past
in order that it may serve as a focus of orientation or compensation in the face of this
dynamism. Although this basic position is one which Lubbe has argued for some time,
the process of German unification and the transcendence of the established post-war
order, together with trends towards "globalisation" of the economy and the development
of "information society" over old industrial society clearly provided a very real context
in which these ideas could be posed anew.
3S ef Hermann Lubbe, 'Im Zug der Zeit. Verkurzter Aufenthalt in der Gegenwart.' Springer
Verlag. Heidelberg/Berlin. 1992. p. 297-8.
36 ibid. p. 300.
37 ibid. 223.
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In this vein, Schauble frames his plea for the cultivation of a conventional sense of
national identity based upon a sense of historical consciousness with reference to the
experience of change in the present and two major destabilising trends of modem
Western society in particular: Firstly the increasing difficulty of maintaining the
material prosperity which was a hallmark of the West and secondly trends towards the
development of an Ego-Gesellschaft which prioritises individual needs and desires over
commitment to the social body as a whole. The erosion of the traditional social bonds
engendered by the family, secure employment, religious observance, Trade Union
loyalties, parish communities etc. represents a threat to the social integrity of modem
society for Schauble." The root of the problem for Schauble lies founded in the
increasing difficulty of handing down traditions of common, consensual, values in a
society characterised by accelerating social mobility, value pluralism and heterogeneity.
For Schauble, geographical mobility in a "globalised" world economy has led to an
erosion of the bonds of Heimat, social mobility has broken the continuity of shared
experience between parents and their children who often ascend (or descend) in the
social scale and the decline of the traditional family unit and rising divorce rates have
corroded traditional family values. Finally, political mobility has broken up traditional
party loyalties in favour of a form of political opportunism which motivates electoral
support for particular parties on a case by case basis which weakens their
gemeinschaftsstabilisierende Funktion. 39
The problem which exercises Schauble is the corrosive effect of recent socio-political
and economic changes upon the authority of the traditional canon of conservative
values. For Schauble, repeating the arguments of the 1980', this testifies to a real danger
of social heterogeneity and ultimately decomposition which can only be checked by the
solidarity and loyalty cultivated by the concept of nation. The particular value of the
national concept in unified Germany is viewed in terms of its capacity to establish
common bonds between East and West Germans which could overcome the historical
experience of division and, more importantly, the socially dislocating trends of the
present. Schauble suggests that although state and economic union has progressed
relatively successfully, there remains a serious division on the level of "mentality" and
the different norms, values and psychological characteristics of East and West Germans.
38 Schauble. 1997. op. cit. p. 285.
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The terms in which Schauble perceives these differences are revealing in their inherent
contradiction. Whilst, in the former East, Schauble perceives an enduring lack of
Eigeninitiative, in the West he perceives an unhealthy preoccupation with individual
material prosperity and security which weakens the commitment to communal values.
Whilst the supposed endurance of "collective" modes of thought in the GDR is
considered an obstacle to the development of a form of "entrepreneurial spirit", the
West is criticised for its lack of any sense of social bonds and its hedonistic
individualism. Schauble perceives the roots of contemporary division in primarily
psychological terms of a problem of misplaced mentality. The only possible answer to
such division appears separated from material disparities and economic restructuring
and is understood in the potential of the national idiom to cultivate a sense of social
solidarity above and beyond the concerns with personal fate or material gain
Die innere Einheit zu vollenden, die Deutschen in Ost und West auch mental zusamrnenzufuhren,
wird uns nur in dem Malle gelingen, in dem wir uns zugleich von Egoismus, Tragheit und
Kleinmutigkeit freimachen, unsere Chancen erkennen, uns einen inneren Ruck geben. Es wird
uns nicht oder nur sehr viel schwerer gelingen, wenn wir uns nicht wieder auf die Grundlagen
unserer national en Gemeinschaft besinnen, diese Grundlagen neu mit Leben erfilllen. Der
schwierige Prozef des Zusammenwachsens von Ost und West braucht politisch, gesellschaftlich,
kulturell den nationalen Rahmen. Wie anders sollten wir den Menschen erklaren, dal3 sie auch
einmal Opfer zu bringen haben, Belastungen und Einschrankungen hinehmen mussen, wenn
nicht unter Hinweis auf nationale Solidaritat und Zusammengehorigkeit?"
The primary source of values which can claim absolute authority is to be found for
conservative thinkers in the resource of historical consciousness and the myths of
transhistorical national continuities and "national" values. This is, of course, an old
problem for conservative thought due to the discrediting effect of National Socialism
upon conventional concepts of patriotism and national solidarity. Yet in the post-
unification, post-Cold War climate, many on the right perceived a unique opportunity
for the reclaiming of German national history and a process of "normalisation" of
aspects of the national past so that they may legitimately appear as the source of
continuity with contemporary Germany. The conservative veteran of the
Historikerstreit, Michael Sturmer, expressed, with a sense of optimism, a plea for a
change of paradigm in historical investigation of national history and its political
evaluation
39 ibid. pp. 285-6.
40 Schauble. 1997. p. 294-95.
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Deutschland hat mit der Wiedervereinigung eine zweite Chance erhalten. Die Geschichte braucht
nicht mehr nur beklagt zu werden, sie bleibt, in Teilen jedenfalls, zu reparieren. Auch kann sich
jetzt zeigen, welche Lehren aus der Geschichte gezogen worden sind. Die Welt ist im Wandel,
und noch ist kein Ende des Dramas zu erwarten, nicht einmal eine Pause. Man wird die zweite
Chance nutzen mussen, urn den verantwortlichen Umgang mit der Macht zu lemen, und dies im
schwierigsten Moment, den die Geschichte zu vergeben hat. Das wird ein Begriff des Politischen
erfordem, der nicht bei Wachstum beginnt und bei Lebensqualitat endet, sondem erkennen laBt,
"wofur und wogegen das Land im Entscheidungsfall steht" (Joachim Fest)."
Stunner regards the conditions for the cultivation of the historiography which he
defended during the historians' debate as ripe. The world historical re-encounter of
Germany with global power necessitates a change in the conception of the nation. The
tenets of post-war West Germany, symbolised by economic prosperity and an increased
quality of life, are deemed inadequate in the face of the tasks imposed by the zweite
Chance. Likewise German history should no longer be "lamented" in the style of the
critical school but "repaired" in order that it might forge a concept of the political which
can "stand above" the material disparities which ultimately fuel social heterogeneity. In
the above we may perceive the connection in the conservative imagination between the
return of Germany as a semi-hegemonial European power and the domestic project of
reconstructing traditional categories of national identity. Stunner is an advocate of the
continued Westbindung of Germany and its finn integration into the European and
Atlantic alliance yet this perception is joined with an appreciation of the new
international importance of unified Germany in world politics. This sense of the return
of Germany to the high table of the world powers is perceived by Stunner in terms of a
"second chance" to unfold German power, thus invoking an image of historical
continuity of German power politics on the international stage, which, however, is now
to be achieved in partnership with the other Western powers and principally the United
States. In this sense Stunner, like Kohl and Genscher or fellow liberal conservative
political scientist Werner Weidenfeld rejects both the critical interpretation that the
return of Germany as a world player will explode the Western foundations of the
Federal Republic and also the more deutsch-national reading which would welcome the
distancing from the Western alliance and the (re) cultivation of the "German East". In
terms of domestic politics, however, one can perceive the return of more traditional
paradigms of social solidarity which enjoy superior cohesive potential than the concerns
41 Michael Sturmer, 'Die Grenzen der Macht. Begegnung der Deutschen mit der Geschichte.'
Siedler. Berlin. 1994. p. 274.
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with material prosperity, economic growth and "quality of life". Sturmer's scepticism
towards the capacity of society to generate social loyalty in terms of its ability to
promote as broad a prosperity among the population as possible has clearly not been
modified by the "victory" of Free Market society. The perception that 1989 heralded not
only a second chance in international relations but also an opportunity to roll back
critical perceptions of the nation leads conservatives to address two problems. Firstly:
the conservative fetishisation of history and the hopes for contemporary social solidarity
invested in historical consciousness necessitates the reconstruction of "positive"
continuities of the German nation past and present. Secondly, this leads to the related
problem of redressing the national socialist experience and in particular relativising its
politically de-legitimising force upon traditional conservative corpus of values. These
are two aspects evident in conservative interpretations of the return of the German
Mittel/age and the forces of Geopolitik which I now wish to consider.
4.3 The Continuities of Geopolitik ?
Whilst Sturmer clearly rejects the notion of a rehabilitation of German hegemony in
Central and Eastern Europe along the traditional lines of a Sonderweg between East and
West, his enthusiasm for Germany's "second chance" is based upon a celebration of
Germany's return to global politics. Sturmer offers an interpretation of transcendence of
the post-war international constellation which suggests that "History" has placed the
new Germany back into its old continuity as the leading power in Central and Eastern
Europe. Whilst Sturmer recognises that, in contrast to nineteenth and early twentieth
century, any new German power-politics must be legitimised by the alliance with the
West and more importantly the United States, he perceives nevertheless a historical
continuity based in the potential semi-hegemonial role of the nation in Europe.
Returning to the relationship between past, present and future, Sturmer perceives the
continued presence of older, longer term forces of historical continuity shaping present
and future
Wie aber soli der Gedanke an die Vergangenheit den in die Zukunft schweifenden Blick lenken
oder belehren? Geschiche verlauft nicht linear, und sie wiederholt sich nicht. Aber sie wird auch
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nicht jeden Tag neu erfunden. In den "forces profundes" liegt auch das Material der Geschichte,
die sich erst noeh vollziehen soll."
This rather esoteric concept of the motor force of history acts as a code for the historical
continuity of the German Mittellage and the forces of Geopolitik. The collapse of the
Eastern Bloc has reopened longer term historical continuities of the German nation state
in the centre of Europe albeit that the "second chance" has been provided to a Germany
which is now a fully integrated member of the Western community and alliance
system." Thus whilst there is no continuity of the German Sonderweg, there is a
continuity of Germany as the shaping force of Mittelleuropa. Alone of all the Western
powers, Germany can claim a national interest in the cultivation of economic and
political stability in the former East.44 The implications of this world historical tum for
domestic politics indicate, for Sturmer, that the post-war "critical" historical rejection of
the German nation past and present via reference to the NS experience is no longer
tenable. Thus the altered constellation of Central Europe has necessitated a rethinking of
Germany in terms of global and domestic politics which is not compatible with the
retention of the critical, "post-national" discourse of the left against which he argued
during the 1980s
Nur soviel ist gewil3: Gewicht, Grobe, Geschiehte und Geographie des Landes gestatten den
Deutschen nicht mehr die alte Verbindung von moralischer Emporung und politi seher
Enthaltsamkeit. Die Macht, die die Deutschen vor sich selbst versteckten, erfordert Gestaltung,
ihre Grenzen mussen bestimmt, ihre tragische Natur mul3 gemeistert werden."
From this perspective, the re-acquaintance of Germany with power appears rather more
as a compulsion of geography and history than a question of subjective political or
economic factors. From this perspective, "moral indignation" and "political abstinence"
appear not just as outdated concepts in the new global constellation but as an obstacle to
the fulfilment of the pathos laden "historical mission" of the new-old nation. It is within
this context that the return of the Mittellage is linked with a revision of domestic
political concepts and the "reparation" of history in particular. These two factors are
frequently combined in conservative imagination with a form of identification with the
Kaiserreich. In this sense, Arnulf Baring perceives the return of Germany to the
constellation of 1871 albeit in the framework of Adenauer's West German state." For
42 ibid. p. 10.
43 ibid. p. 244-6.
44 Sturmer. ibid. p. 272-3
45 ibid .. 271.
46 Baring. 1990. op. cit. p. 83.
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Baring, the return of Germany the major force of Central Europe reflects a historical-
geopolitical continuity as wir sind eine geborene Miuelmacht," Baring's concept of a
synthesis between the democratic Western state of Adenauer and semi-hegemoniaI
nation under Bismarck reflects a common perception of liberal conservative
conceptualisations of unified Germany. In this sense, contemporary Germany draws
upon the democratic, Western traditions of the Adenauerian Westbindung which itself
is, as we have seen, often cast as the "custodian" of the "honourable" German nation
reaching back to 1871. unification of the German states has, however, clearly
reactivated a German power policy in Central and Eastern Europe which evokes
memory of past German nation. Given the racialist crusade for Lebensraum under
National Socialism and the belligerent Wilhelmine Weltpolitik, this is clearly a
problematic source of historical continuities between past and present. For this reason,
liberal conservatives are often led back to the Bismarckian state of 1871 which appears
as a period in which a unitary nation state could unfold a semi-hegemonial position in
Central Europe whilst simultaneously respecting the balance of power.
Yet this is rarely expressed, in liberal conservative discourse, as a plea for a return to the
political traditions embodied by the symbol of "Prussia". Often, this is a "national
heritage" which is presented through the filter of post-war technocratic concept of the
Westbindung and the history of the Kaiserreich is subjected to a process of
"democratisation". In this context is was interesting to observe how moves to found a
Bismarck Stiftung with federal money in his last place of rest in Friedrichruhe near
Hamburg were legitimised by the concern to promote "democratic consciousness" in
society. Bismarck is recalled as a significant figure in national history who inaugurated
die ersten Schritte in Richtung auf eine auf allgemeinen und gleichen Wahlen beruhende
demokratische Verfassung" Whilst it is of course true that under Bismarck the
franchise was expanded and social insurance legislation was introduced it appears
disingenuous to conclude evidence of a democratic political culture from this. In a
similar vein, Sturmer offered the following perception of Imperial Germany as a counter
to the critique of the German nation argued by "critical history" and in congruence with
his concept of the need to "repair" German history
47 Amulf Baring. 'Wir sind eine geborene Mittelmacht.' Civis mit Sonde. Vierteljahresschrift fur
eine offene und solidarische Gesellschaft 1 (1996) pp. 52-61.
48 Der Tagesspiegel. 08.02.96
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DaB das Kaiserreich im Kriege unterging, so wie es im Krieg entstanden war, hat zwar viele
Historiker zu tiefsinningen Betrachtungen ermutigt, war ihm aber keineswegs zwingend
vorgeschrieben. Vieles harte auch anders kommen konnen, das Kaiserreich war, aufs Ganze
gesehen, sicherlich sozialer als die meisten Staaten seiner Zeit, und kaum weniger liberal und
demokratisch als die groBen Nachbarstaaten. Und dennoch, die Rede von der "guten alten Zeit"
ist den Deutschen nie leicht von den Lippen gekommen, wenn sie auf das Kaiserreich schauten,
noch weniger allerdings im Blick auf andere Zeiten ihrer Geschichte."
In the above excerpt, Sturmer touches upon several essential themes which are worth
considering further. He rejects the critical analysis of the Kaiserreich which perceives
its destruction as inherently linked to the wider system of social organisation. Against
this interpretation he contends that the Second Empire could easily have taken an
alternative developmental path and states that, in comparison with its neighbours, this
society was essentially "normal" and, on the whole, a more socially advanced state. This
enables Sturmer to reject the notion of a German Sonderweg and its responsibility for
1914-18 and perhaps more importantly 1933-45. Sturmer seems to believe that received
interpretations are in need of revision as they deny contemporary Germans the ability to
contemplate "the good old days". This latter point is of central importance to Sturmer's
conception of the social role of history for which the history of the Kaiserreich should
clearly play an important role.
Sturmer's approach is characterised by the interface between national and "Western"
values which, however, is synthesised into a national frame of reference. He is
obviously concerned with illuminating historical, German continuities in an attempt to
confer identity onto the present and this project is not limited to the epoch of the nation
state but extends way back to the Holy Roman Empire and the German middle ages. In
fact, Sturmer maintains that from all the various periods of history, the Holy Roman
Empire remains the most formative influence upon German society up to the present
day. This particular, "German" historical continuity is, however, perceived in the form
of federalism, welfarism, the legally codified, constitutional Rechtsstaat and the
question of its international hegemonial status." In this vein, Sturmer imbues formal
elements of post war, "Western", political culture with the particularist authority of a
"German" historical continuity. Historical continuities which pre date the nation state
are also perceived by the historian Klaus Hildebrandt who detects a German "reform
49 Michael Sturmer, 'Das ruhelose Reich.' Berliner Morgenpost.J4.01.96
so cf Stilrmer.1994 especially. pp.58-80.
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model" during the epoch of feudal absolutism which synthesised church and state into
the fiirsorglicher Gedanke uber Wohlfahrt und Erziehung der Untertanen." This
enables Hildebrandt to contend that the question of whether or not Germany latched
onto the Enlightenment in the eighteenth century when explaining the
peculiarity/normality of German historical development as essentially irrelevant. The
German "reform model" is thus perceived as having rendered the question of revolution
in German social development superficial. These are aspects which are perceived as
being continued in the Kaiserreich, particularly in the form Bismarck's social and
welfare policy between 1883 and 1889 which also serve as the basis for the perception
of him as the founding father of the modem welfare state. 52 Sturmer also perceives a
similar continuity in the form of the social consensus created between labour, industry
and the state during the Second Empire, noting that Wilhelm II refused to agree to
Bismarck's advice of carrying out a coup against parliament and the Empire's
Reichsfeinde in 1890.53
These perception invoke the impression that liberal conservative thinkers seek to
"Germanise" particular democratic traditions most normally associated with the post-
war West and in this manner effect a certain "democratisation" of German nation
traditions. This corresponds to the technocratic understanding of Western democracy
which is distinct from critical concept derived from enlightenment and republican
traditions. Thus this concept of a "democratised" or "liberal" Kaiserreich can exists
uncontradicted within an essential anti-modernist intellectual framework which
prioritises "tradition" in terms of political outlook and "compensation" in terms of
historical consciousness. Whilst such interpretations are keen to stress the "normal"
political character of the Kaiserreich, its collapse into the chaos of war and revolution
necessitates considerations of the reasons for its destruction. In a manner reminiscent of
the post-war works of Ritter and Schnabel, Sturmer and Hildebrandt locate the
catastrophies of the twentieth century within the context of a tradition-consuming
"modernist" culture and the political inclusion of the "masses" during the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Whilst both thinkers emphasise the legitimacy
of the national unification programme of Bismarck they appear to want to freeze history,
51 Hildebrandt.1995.p. 859
S2 Hildebrandt.1995.p. 875. Haffner.1990. p. 58
53 Stilrmer.1994. op. cit. p. 98.
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at the latest, at the point of his departure in 1890. Sturmer formalises this conception in
the contention that 1914 marked the close of the "bourgeois century" and the rise of the
age of crises, dictatorships and concentration camps, which is alternately referred to as
the "mass" or "totalitarian" age, which are frequently conflated. Such interpretations
adopt a traditional strand of conservative, anti-modernist thought in identifying the
process of social transformation and progress as the destroyers of culture and "classical"
politics in the nineteenth century.
Fortschrittsglaube und Absturzangst aber hatten dieselben Ursachen: Entgrenzung aller Tradition,
der Kultur, des Staates und des europaischen Gleichgewichts."
Progress and decline are regarded as inseparable from one another in a pseudo-
Nietzschean proposition of the inevitable end of the European, bourgeois age in the
nihilistic self-destruction of 1914-18. This is an interpretation which confuses the
discrediting of the robust Victorian faith in progress and Western civilisation, which
resulted from the aftermath of the First World War, for evidence of the inherent nihilism
of progress as an intellectual and social project. It also serves as a reminder of the
contemporary importance and potential of cultivating culture and tradition (or
contemplating the "good old days") at a time when the social purchase of the concept of
progress as been profoundly weakened. This understanding is based upon the
conservative misinterpretation of the relationship between social hegemony and the
status of tradition and perceives the decline of specific traditions and forms of cultural
representation as the source of moral and social decay rather than evidence of the
inability of established conceptions and arrangements to adopt to the dynamic of social
change. Whilst the critical interpretation views the suppression of modernity by pre-
industrial elites as the essential developmental contradiction of the Kaiserreich, in the
conservative imagination, the destruction of the first unitary nation state resulted rather
more from an "overload" of modernity and the decline of "classical" politics. This is an
element which is also evident in the work of Hildebrandt, who regards the destruction of
the Kaiserreich as essentially rooted in the inability of the Wilhelmine elite to contain
the forces of modernity
Das prosperierende Wachstum seiner expandierenden Wirtschaft, das den teilweise sturmischen
Wandel einer mobilen Gesellschaft forderte und erforderte, stand nicht selten in storendem
54 Sturmer. ibid. 1994. p. 105
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Gegensatz zu jenem politichen Erfordemis der Ruhe, das zumindest sein Grunder Otto von Bismarck
dem neuen Mitglied der europaischen Staatengesellschaft mit verpflichtender Strenge auferlegte."
Hildebrandt perceives Bismarck's ability to keep the lid on social change and mobility
as a central element of his political talent and as essential for the balance of the Second
Empire. A marked characteristic of Hildebrandt's analysis is the concentration upon the
centrality of the "great statesman" Bismarck who appears as Germany's last capable
national leader before Adenauer. Hildebrandt echoes the insights of Franz Schnabel at
several key moments including the perception that the liberal movement's GroJ3deutsch
traditions upset the careful balance which Bismarck had constructed and pushed for
expansionism from the last decade of the nineteenth century which witnessed the
genesis of Weltpolitik. In a tradition which stretches beyond Schnabel and back to
Chancellor BUlow's denunciation of the German social democrats as "German
jacobins", Hildebrandt maintains that the liberal and democratic forces who sought
domestic reform also sought international expansion and that they would have been an
even greater danger for Europe if they actually had attained power. 56 Once more, this is
an interpretation which is at odds with the critical perception of the weakness of liberal
and progressive forces in the Kaiserreich who were held at bay or "duped" by the
manipulative policy of Sozialimperialismus. Instead we are presented with an
interpretation of the negative effects of modernisation and progressive forces and the
incompetence of the Wilhelmine political elite. The period between 1871 and 1890
forms the central focus of interpretations of the historic "normality" and legitimacy of
the German nation state. This is particularly evident in interpretations of the
international hegemonial position of the historic German nation state and its foreign
policy. The period of relative stability in European affairs during the "saturated" reign
of Bismarck appears as the only legitimate period in which Germany occupied a semi-
hegemonial position on the continent and did not seem to directly threaten existing
international arrangements. This period is held up against the later policies of
Weltpolitik and Lebensraum as a positive instance of an internationally responsible,
autonomous, German nation state.
Consideration of Bismarck's foreign political rapprochement, however, contrasts starkly
with the domestic repression and authoritarianism of the period and requires a more
55 Hildebrandt.1995.p. 851.
56 ibid.p. 865, 881
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illustrious legitimisation. This relationship is regarded within the theoretical framework
of Geopolitik which, in another inversion of critical theory, subordinates all factors to a
primacy of foreign policy." Indeed, in such interpretations, the eventual destruction of
the Kaiserreich is regarded as essentially being determined by its international situation,
the so called Mittel/age, and its foreign policy over and above domestic or economic
factors. 58 In many respects the theory of Geopolitik can be regarded as the counterpiece
to the Sonderweg thesis. Sturmer provides the following explanation of Bismarck's
political understanding of the relationship between foreign and domestic policy
Berlin berechenbar machen fiir das ubrige Europa, Deutschland ertraglich machen fur das
Gleichgewicht, in diesem Zweck verbanden sich Bismarcks friedliche Auf3enpolitik mit seiner
friedlosen Innenpolitik."
Here, Sturmer formulates a classical geopolitical conceptualisation of the influence of
international hegemony and foreign political pressures upon domestic political freedom.
Whilst these are undoubtedly very important elements of the Kaiserreich, geopolitical
theories seek an absolute primacy over other developmental aspects and imbue
historically specific developments with the legitimising and eternalising aura of
"natural" phenomena. Thus commentators speak of the Biirde der Geographie or the
Diktat der geographischen Lage which demanded that the military played an important
role in society due to Germany's international vulnerability." In this manner, the social
authoritarianism of the Second Empire becomes a historically legitimate, natural
compulsion which, in fact, served to preserve the domestic balance of forces in
Germany and the European peace internationally.
Geopolitical concepts play an important role in perceptions of the German relationship
to international power, past and present and thus serve as an intellectual framework for
perceptions of historical continuity. Wehler perceives the roots of current assertions of
the similarities and continuities between the international situation of reunified
Germany and the Kaiserreich in the former's renewed potential as a semi-hegernonial
world power." The hegemonial potential of the reunified nation-state appears to
Sturmer as an unavoidable, German, continuity which is intrinsically linked to the rather
esoteric concept of the historical forces profundes. Hildebrandt presents the following,
57 Hildebrandt. 1994. p. 389.
58 Hildebrandt.1995.p. 896, Haffner.1990. p. 53.
59 Stiirrner.1994.p. 100.
60 Hildebrandt.1995. p. 860, Schulze in Diner (ed) 1987.op. cit. p. 90.
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more concrete, summation of the historical relationship of the German nation state to
global hegemony
Der VerI auf des Ersten Weltkriegs demonstrierte, daB das Deutsche Reich offensichtlich zu machtig
war, urn sich in die Balance Europas einzufiigen. Es war aber auch nicht stark und im Hinblick auf
die Wilhelminische Elite nicht fahig genug, Europa als Hegemonialmacht zu fiihren. Diese
Feststellung beschreibt ein deutsches Dilemma, das sich seit dem 19. Jahrhundert bis heute
beobachten liif3t.62
Hildebrandt addresses an important aspect and the concept of the nineteenth and
twentieth century "German dilemma" serves as an explanation of one of the
fundamental continuities existing between the Kaiserreich and National Socialist
Germany. The legitimacy of the development of a German global potential is not
questioned in and of itself as in the critical reception, but is rather more presented as an
example of European normality which was perverted by the unavoidable pressures of
the Mittel/age and the lack of a competent successor to Bismarck in the age of the
masses. This is also a continuity which stretches into contemporary situation and
pertains a particular relevance in connection with present discussions over the role of
Germany particularly in Eastern Europe. A fundamental distinction between the present
hegemonial potential and the situation of the Kaiserreich is the fact that reunified
Germany is fully integrated into the Western politico-economic framework and military
alliance. Nevertheless, the re-emergence of a sovereign, German nation state and the
development of its international hegemony automatically revives memory of events
between 1914-18 and 1939-45.
Geopolitics imply that the disruptive behaviour of the historic nation state essentially
resulted from a combination of the compulsions emanating from the peculiar German
Mittel/age on the continent which forced (and now forces anew) Germany into a
hegemonial role as well as the erosion of "tradition" in the face of rapid urbanisation,
industrialisation and Vermassung of political culture. The critical reading's normative
assertion that capitalist modernisation normally promotes democratic institutions and
beliefs, leads it to perceive the post war FRG as the only socially and foreign politically
"normal" period of German history. This concept could attain a certain degree of
consensus during the period of division where it appeared that the "post national" West
61 Wehler: 'Angst vor der Macht?.' 1995.pg. 312.
62 Hildebrandt. 1995.p.886.
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German state's heilsame Primal der Innenpolilik63would prove as permanent as it had
successful. Yet the "unfreezing" of international relations, and importantly of those
between the Western allied nations, has reopened the question of what shape domestic
and global hegemonic "normality" should take. Whilst liberal conservative
interpretations rarely question the importance of Germany's integration into the West,
the technocratic appreciation of he Westbindung allows for the "democratisation" of
certain "national" traditions and for the cultivation of a Western yet independent minded
German foreign policy. The liberal conservative discussion of the relationship between
the Westbindung and renewed German Mittel/age reflects similar tension between
concepts of Western state and German nation in the discourse of identity creation Whilst
liberal conservatives stress the Western democratic and social institutions of unified
Germany and the allegiance to the Western community and NATO alliance in tenns of
foreign politics, the conservative desire to reconstruct a conventional sense of national
identity reflects the eclipse of the domestic and international constellation of division.
Whilst liberal conservative discourse is characterised by an affirmation of post-war
Westernisation and of the contemporary Western foreign-political commitments there
are limits placed upon how far evoking post-war "western values" can foster the form of
identity desired by conservatives. The transcendence of the post-war order - most
graphically illustrated in the altered foreign-political role of Germany - combined with a
natural political affinity towards the national concept prompted conservatives of all
shades to perceive in 1989-90 a return to the "normality" of the nation state. Liberal
conservative and New Right currents of conservatism as less separated in their
perception of the welcome return of the nation state and more in terms of the political
quality of the nation desired. Technocratic conceptions of liberal conservatives reduce
democracy to post-war political, social and legal institutions. From this perspective, the
achievements of the FRG as understood in terms of economic success and the strategic
and political interests in the Western alliance which were intellectually cohered by Cold
War anticommunism. Whereas the progressive concept of Westbindung advocated by
left liberals derives political meaning from the identification with "Western
enlightenment culture" and traditions of republicanism, liberal conservative concepts of
the Westbindung were primarily mediated though the politics of anticommunism. The
63 Habennas.1995.p. 169
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dissolution of the Cold War presented serious problems of self-definition for the FRG as
for all Western societies. Yet, in Germany, the process of unification was perceived as
the answer to the potential ideological vacuum created by the erosion of Cold War
intellectual-political structures and as a means of politically uniting East and West. Yet,
in liberal conservative perceptions, this appears much more as a "Western" nation
whose legacy only the FRG had managed to preserve during the period of division and
which now could be materially fulfilled with the reopening of longer term, Pan-German
historical continuities. Yet this is obviously a problematic concept due to the
compromised nature of much of German national history.
The only period which conservatives feel confident in celebrating appears as the
Kaiserreich and even here this is divided into the early phase under Bismarck which is
separated from the period of Wilhelm II. Liberal conservative celebrations of Bismarck
appear less founded in the desire to rehabilitate the politically ambiguous symbol of
"Prussia" but are rather more concerned with presenting this period of national history
in terms of a forerunner of the modem democratic and welfare state domestically and as
the "honest broker" in international affairs. In this move, the technocratic concepts of
democracy re-combined with affinity towards the nation to construct a positive national
past. The "democratic" nature of the Kaiserreich is reduced to the existence of formal
democratic institutions and this perspective ignores or suppresses the primary roles
played by monarch, military and bureaucracy in shaping the political culture of the
Second Empire. This technocratic appreciation of Imperial German democracy enables
such thinkers to cast the Kaiserreich as the forerunner of the modem, post-war
democratic, welfarist state. Implicit in such readings is the impression that key
components of contemporary democracy enjoy particular German national antecedents
in contrast to left-liberal perception that democracy only overcame the nation in the
post-war period and only substantially after the 1960s. Sturmer and Hildebrandt appear
to subject the concept of democracy to a process of "Germanisation" and the history of
the first unitary nation to a process of "democratisation". This reflects the desire to
construct a positive national past which could form the basis of contemporary concept
of conventional national history.
Yet this remains a highly problematic project and any celebration of German national
traditions is compelled to address the discrediting legacy of National Socialism. Liberal
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conservative approaches to the past attempt more than anything to neutralise the NS past
and its destructive influence upon concept of national continuity. For Sturmer and
Hildebrandt and others the Kaiserreich was destroyed not by the inner disjuncture of
this society but rather more by the twin related processes of "modernity" constituted by
rapid urban and industrial modernisation and the politicisation of the "masses" all of
which acted to erode traditional culture and hence sever society from its orientational
roots. This approach reflects both the desire to explain the collapse of Wilhelmine and
Weimar Germany with recourse to forces external to political elite - "modernity" or
Geopolitik and the rise of "mass society" and totalitarian parties. In this scheme
National Socialism is cast as the "usurper" of the "honourable" German nation
symbolised in figures such as Bismarck, von Stauffenberg, Goerdeler and later
Adenauer. The interpretation of the destructive effects of a modernisation which is not
contained by the framework of tradition contains a relevant aside to the present and the
case for conventional national identity founded in the patriotic affinity with "tradition".
The notion that the national socialists "usurped" this tradition aims to disassociate
fascism with continuities of the German nation and hence free up national history for
contemporary identificatory purpose. The priority of tendencies towards
"dernocratising" national history or "Germani sing" democratic traditions is the
construction of a positive national past. The need to such obfuscation testifies to the
compromised history of the nation and the problematic nature of appealing to the
national past in the project of cultivating conventional national identity. It also testifies
to a certain pragmatism of liberal conservative thinkers with respect to the national past
and this also explains the basis of the relative convergence between liberal conservatives
and left-liberals in the project of seeking a positive national past which we shall
examine in chapters six and seven.
Before examining left-liberal formulations of unification and identity and in order to
understand the basis of the liberal conservative convergence with established tenets of
critical discourse, it is necessary to consider another conservative current of post-
unification society: the so-called New Right. Whereas liberal conservatives pay formal
respects to the Westbindung of the nation and generally seek to defuse the political
charge if National Socialism by neutralising the past, New Right currents adopt a much
more confrontational approach towards the NS past which corresponds to their desire
too rehabilitate a particular form of German nation in the present. Often playing with
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ideas associated with the Conservative Revolutionaries of the inter-war period, New
Right thinkers seek to defuse the NS past in order to rehabilitate a critique of liberalism
which enjoyed currency among the pre-fascist Weimar right. This is clearly a tradition
which was profoundly discredited by National Socialism. New Right approaches to this
legacy assume two basic forms; firstly an attempt is made to "normalise" aspects of
National Socialism in particular on the level of economic and social policy which is
often understood as an authoritarian forerunner to the FRG. Secondly, National
Socialism is understood as a phenomenon of "totalitarianism" and, following the
approach of Ernst Nolte, as the historical "answer" to communism. For New Right
thinkers, the collapse of communism has not weakened the validity of the totalitarian
approach to the NS past but rather more strengthened it. From this perspective, the roots
of both communist and fascist ideology is to be found in the belief in "utopia" and some
model of social progress beyond liberal democracy. The collapse of the Cold War
testified for the right in general to the bankruptcy of "utopian" belief and for the New
Right this implied a return to the certainties of tradition over emancipation after the
internalisation of the "lesson" of the twentieth century that "utopia" leads to
dictatorship. In this manner historical interpretation and contemporary political activity
are combined in the aggressive campaign of relativising National Socialism through the
comparison with Communism as witnessed in the Aufruf gegen das Vergessen
proclaimed on 8 May 1995 in order to open the way for a return to more nationalist
traditions in political culture. An examination of the project of the New Right will help
clarify both its similarities and differences with liberal conservative currents on an
ideological level.
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5. The "New Right" and the End of Emancipation
In the following chapter I wish to examine the work of New Right thinkers. I wish to
examine the concept of national identity offered by these thinkers, their approach to the
legacy of National Socialism, modernist political culture and finally perceptions that at
the "End of History" Germany can return to a "traditional" orientation in political
culture.
5.1. The Renaissance of ethnic-nationalism?
Whilst conservatives of all political shades celebrated the "return" of the nation state in
1989-90, for New Right thinkers this testified primarily to the historical validity of a
nationalist outlook. The principle task now facing the new Germany for these thinkers is
the construction of a traditional sense of patriotism which could ideologically reflect the
transcendence of the post-war domestic and foreign-political order. In this sense, the co-
editors of the SelbstbewujJte Nation Ulrich Schacht and Heimo Schwilk contend
Mit dem Einbruch von 1989 ist, tiber die irreparable Sprengung des Nachkriegs-Status-quo, der
einer zeitabhangigen Symbiose von Selbstverfehlung und Fremdbestimmung geschuldet war,
diese Normalitat Geschichtsgrund geworden, von dem auszugehen ist. Das heil3t: Die
Aufuebeung der deutschen Teilung und europaischen Spaltung durch den historischen Prozel3
seIber, der immer auch ein geschichtsgerichtliches Revisionsverfahren gegen die Status-quo-
Verwalter war, verlangt ihre geistige Anerkennung. Ohne SelbstbewuBtsein geht das nicht. I
Revealing in the above is the perception that the period of German division was
primarily a phenomenon of Selbstverfehlung and Fremdbestimmung which, however,
since unification of the nation has been transcended by a, metaphysically conceived,
agency of "History" itself which had always been "on the side" of national thinkers even
during the "abnormality" of national division. This socio-political transformation of the
German situation demands a political-intellectual recognition which, for the right, is
best expressed through the cultivation of a healthy nationalism or Selbstbewufitsein
grounded in particularist values mediated through the continuities of national history.'
Alfred Mechtersheimer understands the emergence of national sentiment in the former
Eastern Bloc as a product of the release from the ideological bonds of Marxism and
I Schwilk, Schacht (Hg.) 1994. op. cit. p. 12.
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presents this as a reversion to innate human orientational needs. From this perspective
the "anti-national" component of socialism formed one of the main reasons for its
collapse.' In this sense, the renaissance of nationalism signifies a return to a condition of
socio-anthropological "normality" which was disrupted by the Bolshevik revolution.
From this perspective, it is not necessary to explain the emergence of nationalist or
ethnic sentiment and loyalty claims in the former East as they essentially constitute
"natural" phenomena of human social existence. In considering his own society,
however, Mechtersheimer's thesis of the natural status of national sentiment appears
refuted by his complaint that the national renaissance remains absent from the political
culture of unified Germany.
In the former East Germany the appeal to national identity was restricted primarily not
by any "ideological" objections but rather more by the fact that this was a claim to be
shared with the prosperous rival society of the West. In the former West Germany,
however, the main problem with the national concept derived from the experience of
National Socialism. In character with New Right thinkers, Mechtersheimer, however,
perceives the post-war problems with the national concept as deriving primarily from
the left and its insistence on the recanting of national identity in favour of an
internalisation of the values of the West. Thus whilst Mechtersheimer cites the collapse
of the "Marxist" ideology of the Eastern Bloc as a primary reason for the pseudo-
psychological, cathartic recourse to national loyalties and ethnic identity, it is perhaps
more valid to perceive the focus of his critical attention in the contemporary post-Cold
War West. In contrast to the "rediscovery" of ethnic and national ties in the former
Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc, Mechtersheimer laments the endurance of a
"pathological" mistrust of the national idiom in unified Germany which bridges the left-
right divide thus
Der anti-nationale Konsens ist nicht wirklich aufgebrochen. Die poJitische Klasse und die
uberwiegende Mehrheit der Meinungsfuhrer begreifen den Nationalismus als eine Gefahr, die
bekampft werden mul3, und nicht als eine Herausforderung zur politischen Gestaltung. 1st es bei
der Linken der intemationalistische Traum, so sind viele Konservative und Rechte durch den
Antikommunismus des Kalten-Krieges zu West-intemationalisten geworden. Als staatstragend
2 ibid. p. 17.
3 Alfred Mechtersheimer, 'Friedensmacht Deutschland. Pladoyer fur einen neuen Patriotismus.'
Ullstein. Berlin. 1993. p. 106-7.
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gelten bis heute Positionen wie die von Michael Sturmer, die vor "nationalistischen Tendenzen
im linken und rechten Spektrum" warnen."
The above displays the distinction between New Right currents and liberal
conservatives such as Sturmer as well as liberal-left positions. That Mechtersheimer can
criticise Sturmer for his apparently "anti-national" position appears, to those familiar
with this historian's work, somewhat bizarre. What Mechtersheimer objects to is the
idea of synthesis between Westbindung and nation employed by conservatives such as
Sturmer and politicians such as Kohl. For Mechtersheimer, the "renaissance" of the
nation implies the relativisation of the Western orientation of the Federal Republic in
favour of a form of neutralist, nationalist pacifism internationally and the return to pre-
1945 concepts of nationalism rather than their modification (or "watering down") in the
domestic political culture of Germany. Whilst Mechtersheimer largely concurs with
liberal conservative interpretations of the need to foster a sense of legitimacy and
authority for the state and to cultivate a basic value consensus via recourse to a concept
of national identity,' the two depart in the form of patriotism desired. Whilst Sturmer
tempers his national reading with a technocratic concept of Western values,
Mechtersheimer perceives this as evidence of an "anti-national" consensus which gives
rise to the impression that he seeks a "purer" expression of German identity and national
interests untainted by the West. In this respect, Mechtersheimer's conception of a
renaissance of the nation implies a "return" to intellectual continuities which pre-date
the post-war Westbindung and as such this is an interpretation which casts a question
mark over the legitimacy of the post-war Federal Republic.
Whilst this is an interpretation of the events of 1989-90 which is broadly congruent with
liberal conservative attitudes towards the "return" of the nation, right wing
conservatives imply that not only the GDR constituted an "illegitimate" state but that
the legitimacy of the FRG was also fundamentally questionable because of its "post-
national" status. Celebrating the imminent collapse of the post war division, the then
leader of the CDU-CSU parliamentary faction, Alfred Dregger, denied the existence of
an Eastern "Communist" and Western "capitalist" Germany in favour of one
"indivisible German nation". For Dregger, the defeat of the Eastern challenge to the
Western nation state seventy years after the Bolshevik revolution, delivered the final
4 Mechtersheimer. 1993. op. cit. p. 112.
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historical proof that the nation state is stronger than "artificial social systems"." Implicit
in such readings is the belief that the nation state represents the "normal" or "natural"
form of modem social organisation which was radically overthrown by the Bolshevik
revolution of 1917. This is an interesting interpretation as it seems to deny both the
GDR and the FRG any genuine historical legitimacy and invokes the notion that the
genuine Sonderweg of German history was formed by the period of division between
1945 and 1989. The implication of Dregger's approach is that "the nation" has not only
defeated the critique of Marxism but that the return to the "indivisible" German nation
could or should also assert itself against the FRG's "fixation" with the West and
"Western values". Whilst Dregger admits that after two attempts to break the hegemony
of Western powers, Germany had to concede the strategic necessity of a form of
Westbindung.' in terms of political culture, Dregger perceived in unification the
possibility of cultivating a more conventional form of national patriotism. Thus, in
terms of political culture, the collapse of the East also implies the relativisation of the
Federal Republic's Western orientation and the rehabilitation of specifically "German"
national traditions.
One aspect of this rehabilitation which illuminates the dissonance with more liberal
conservative currents is the evaluation of Adenauer's position on the Western
integration of the Federal Republic. For Rainer Zitelmann, the constellation of 1989-90
necessitates a more sober assessment of Adenauer's commitment to the nation than that
offered by Kohl. Zitelmann emphasises Adenauer's prioritisation of Western integration
over national unity in contrast to the positive examples of "national" politicians of the
1950s from across the political spectrum comprising figures such as Kurt Schumacher,
Jakob Kaiser, Thomas Dehler and the former editor of the FAZ Paul Sethe." Criticising
the liberal conservative interpretation of Adenauer's Westbindung as a conscious policy
of attaining unification, Zitelmann highlights the engagement for national unity among
these political figures of the early FRG. For Zitelmann, the illumination of West
German "national" political thinkers in the 1950s is a means of asking contemporary
question such as was the forty years of "division and dictatorship" totally unavoidable -
5 ef Alfred Meehtersheimer, 'Nation und Intemationalismus. Uber nationales Selbstbewu13tsein
als Bedingung des Friedens.' in Schwilk/Schacht, 1994. op. cit. p. 362.
6 Stenographische Berichte vom 8. November. 1989. op. cit. p.13026-7.
7 ibid.
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a question, he adds, which could become of extreme interest for former citizens of the
GDR.9 Zitelman explains his principle concern with establishing the historical
possibility of unification in the early years as follows
Die oftmals ubliche aufdringlich-volkspadagogische "Zeigefinger-Geschichtsschreibung", die
den Leser im Kleide angeblich eindeutiger wissenschaftlicher Befunde daruber belehrt, daB der
damals beschrittene Kurs der Westintegration der bestmogliche und einzig denkbare gewesen sei,
ist dem Autor zuwider. Der unter bundesdeutschen Historikem und Politikwissenschaftlem lange
verbreitete Glaubenssatz, das Eintreten fiir den deutschen Nationalstaat sei "ruckwartsgewandt",
weil die deutsche Geschichte in der "Zweistaatlichkeit" einen fiir aile Zeiten zu bewahrenden
idealen Endzustand erreicht habe, war ohnehin schon immer unhistorisch. Diese These braucht
heute naturlich nicht mehr widerlegt zu worden."
Characteristic of the New Right is the condemnation of the Volkspiidagogik of left-
liberal historians which, however, betrays a desire to attain precisely the political-
pedagogical influence which they ostensibly decry in the name of academic objectivity.
Above all it is the anti-national hue of left-liberal discourse which Zitelmann finds so
distressing. Whilst Zitelmann appears justified in criticising liberal conservative
readings of Adenauer as the "father" of unity, his contention that unity was a historical
possibility during the 1950s appears to correspond more to his contemporary agenda of
"normalising" the national idiom than reflecting historical events. Zitelmann's major
bone of contention is the perceived endurance of the anti-national critique of "post-
national" left-liberal discourse since the 1960s. It is at the door of ex '68er lefties that
Zitelmann lays the blame for the apparent suppression of national discourse in unified
Germany.
The perception of an "anti-national" consensus in unified Germany is understood by
New Right thinkers as testimony to the iron-like grip in which veterans of the New Left
hold contemporary political culture. According to Rainer Zitelmann, former '68er
figures have long since completed the Marsch durch die Institutionen urged by
Dutschke after the dissolution of the SDS in 1970 and have arrived in seats of power in
the media, Trade Unions, political parties, organised religion and the universities albeit
with the sacrifice of the ideals which once held the power to enthuse broad sections of
8 cf Rainer Zitelmann, 'Adenauers Gegner. Streiter fiir die Einheit.' Straube. Erlangen-Bonn-
Wien. 1991.
9 Zitelmann. ibid. pp. 25-6.
10 Zitelmann. ibid. p. 23.
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society. II It is this cultural hegemony of the old West German left which is cited as the
chief obstacle to the cultivation of a more traditional sense of patriotism and national
Selbstbewufitsein. The primary ideological weapon of the Left remains the national
socialist past which is instrumentalised in order to morally underpin the "anti-national"
and pro-Western consensus of contemporary political culture. This is an approach
which, if anything, is perceived as having been strengthened since unification and the
collapse of the socialist alternative. Mechtersheimer perceives in the left's apparent anti-
national approach in post-unification society an expression of profound frustration at the
collapse of the radical alternative project
Die Nationen wurden von der Revolution nicht gefressen, sondem die polnische, ungarische,
kroatische oder auch die deutsche Nation haben den hundertjahrigen Kampf gegen die
Revolution gewonnen. Der antinationale Affekt linker Intellektueller ist deshalb so stark, weil
ihnen das geistige Instrumentarium fehlt, urn die elementare Bedeutung von Yolk und Nation zu
erkennen. Da bleibt nur ohnmachtige Wut fiber eine totgesagte Kraft, die mitgeholfen hat, das mit
so groBen Hoffnungen beladene sozialistische Modell aus der Geschichte zu verweisen."
Thus the anti-national "affect" of the left reveals both its own conceptual inability to
acknowledge the "elementary" significance of the relationship between Volk and Nation
and also its own disorientation and depression in the face of the moral implosion of
Marxism and radical social alternatives. Once more, we may note that for
Mechtersheimer the collapse of bureaucratic socialism did not primarily testify to the
stagnation of Stalinist society but is presented in terms of an ideological victory of the
"nation" and nationalist loyalties. It appears peculiar that a value which is celebrated as
the superior, essential form of orientation in human affairs should also be considered
constrained by intellectual currents which derive from its vanquished opponent. This
power of the old left is explained by New Right thinkers in terms of their "moral"
instrumentalisation of the NS past. These are themes elaborated by Zitelmann who
examines ways in which the broken Selbstbewufltsein of the German nation could be
reinvigorated. Zitelmann acknowledges that knowledge of the crimes committed in the
name of Germany under National Socialism and the experience of forty years of state
division represent serious problems for the cultivation of a traditionalist sense of
Selbstbewufitsein. Yet both factors do not fully explain the problems of national identity
encountered in contemporary Germany for this thinker. For Zitelmann, more important
II Rainer Zitelmann, 'Position und Begriff. Uber eine neue demokratische Rechte.' in Schacht,
Schwilk. (Hg.) 1994. op. cit. p. 178.
12 Mechtersheimer in Schacht, Schwilk. 1994. ibid. p.347
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than the national socialist dictatorship and the period of division IS the perfidious
influence of the left
Allerdings geniigt dies nicht als Erklarung, denn mit dem Abstand zur NS-Zeit steigen
Selbstzweifel und Selbsthall, die bei der Linken vor allen Ausdruck eines entauschten
Missionseifers sind. Die Entauschung dariiber, daB sich die Mehrheit der Deutschen weigerte, das
"verkehrte" BewuBtsein zu iiberwinden und sich im sozialistischen Sinne missionieren zu lassen,
fuhrte zu Frustration, Entauschung und schlieBlich zu einem HaB gegen das eigene Yolk, dem
man zur Strafe ftir Uneinsichtigkeit nun gerne "Auslanderfeindlichkeit", Antisemtismus und
Faschismus unterstellt."
Zitelmann's understanding of the reasons for contemporary Germany's "broken self-
confidence" reveal the central approach and concerns of the New Right. Whilst lip-
service is paid to the effects of the experience of National Socialism these are
subordinated under the, for him, much more serious problems derived from national
division and above all the critique of the left. The critique of the left itself is denied any
legitimacy as a necessary reflection of the NS regime and instead is understood in terms
of resentment at the refusal of the Germans to allow themselves to be converted to
socialism by left wing "missionaries". The biggest crime of the left appears here as the
hatred of the own Volk testifying once more, for the right, to the left's inability to
comprehend the relationship between Volk and Nation. Such concepts of national
community, which are frequently complimented with complaints of "mass
immigration", clearly bear powerful historical and political connotations and in the
context of the Far Right activity in the early 1990s attained a particularly provocative
nature. New Right thinkers invert the relationship between a nationalist or anti-
immigration tone in mainstream political culture and the blossoming of the Far Right
and contend that the lack of a confident sense of national identity between Volk and
Nation forms a central reason for the rise of extreme right wing groups. From this
perspective, it is the left-wing "demonisation" of nationalism and the German Volk in
particular which sows the seeds of Far Right radicalism and which represents, for this
stream, the more socially destructive force. In this sense, Mechtersheimer perceived the
potential for social instability if the "anti-national" attitude of the political elite does not
change
Die bisherige Politk der Selbstverleugnung nationaler Interessen wird, so scheint es, in der
deutschen Bevolkerung kunftig keine Akzeptanz mehr finden. Dann wird ein Nationalismus der
13 Zitelmann in Schacht, Schwilk. 1994. ibid. p. 174-5.
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Massen mit einem Antinationalismus der Eliten kollidieren, mit schweren Belastungen fur die
Stabilitat des Landes und seine Beziehungen zu den Nachbarn."
From this standpoint, the phenomenon of the Far Right, which assumed such a central
place in political and media culture during the early 1990s, represents a criminal
expression or "perversion" of essentially legitimate ideas. For New Right thinkers, the
most worrying aspect of the outbreak of Far Right activity appears that it constitutes a
spontaneous phenomenon of the "masses" which is not regulated by the elite. For these
thinkers, the correct political response to this development would be the cultivation of
national sentiment at an elite level which could both dam the rise of the Far Right and
foster a sense of national legitimacy for Germany's domestic and international relations.
Typical of such representations is the apologia for extremist nationalism which is
coupled with criticism of the anti-racist campaigns which emerged as a response to the
rise of the Far Right. For Zitelmann it appears that the campaigns against
Ausldnderfeindlichkeit are less about combating racist tendencies in contemporary
Germany and more about providing the left with a second wind after the collapse of
socialism and the unification of the nation."
The proximity between the ideas propagated by the New Right and Far Right groups'
violently criminal expression of similar sentiment lies at the heart of perceptions of anti-
nationalist - anti-racist campaigns as evidence of a pathological hatred of the self, or
indigenous Volk. In a contemporary application of totalitarian approaches to fascism and
communism, the extremism of the nationalist right is brought into a complimentary
relationship with the "extremism" of the anti-nationalist left. Whilst the extremism of
the Far Right articulates hatred of an "alien" Volk, the anti-nationalist "extremism" of
the left is regarded as an expression of hatred towards the indigenous German Volk. For
one of the co-editors of the controversial volume Die SelbstbewuJ3te Nation, Ulrich
Schacht, such "hatred of the self' forms an inverted echo of precisely the ideological
traditions which it seeks to criticise leading him to the following conclusion
Denn das unbarmherzige Verurteilen der eigenen Nation und ihrer Angehorigen, einschlieBlich
der Nochnichtgeborenen sowie aller Verblichenen zwischen Heinrich dem IV., Friedrich dem
GroBen und Wilhelm II., ist leider nichts anderes als ein grauenhaftes Echo der Unbarmherzigkeit
gegenUber anderen Nationen zuvor. Und der totale rhetorisch-diskursive Vemichtungswille
gegenuber allen konstitutiven Tatsachen und Aspekten der eigenen nationalen Identitat, ihren
14 Mechtersheimer. in Schacht,Schwilk. 1994. op. cit. p. 363.
IS Zitelmann. ibid. p. 176-7.
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historischen Voraussetzungen wie gesellschaftlichen, ordnungspolitischen und mentalen
Ausformungen und Konsequenzen ist - in seinem blindwutigen Antriebsmotiv - identisch mit
dem totalen Vemichtungswillen NS-Deutschlands gegenuber dem judischen Volk.16
Thus the circle of convergence is completed and the critique of nationalism and racism,
with reference to the historical experience of National Socialism, is transformed into a
variation of the extremist chauvinism which made the Holocaust possible, this time,
however, directed against the indigenous Volk. In this context, Schacht contends that the
left's Germanophobia casts them as the executors of Hitler's last testament and his
contention that if the war were lost then the German Volk deserved to perish." Indeed,
as from this standpoint, the destruction of conventional national identity is identified as
a condition for the rise of the Far Right, the suggestion is implicit that the anti-national
left not only mirrors the right but is furthermore a causal factor in its ascendancy. As
such, this is an approach which reproduces Ernst Nolte's thesis of the "causal nexus"
between communism and fascism in the contemporary context of the old '68ers and the
Far Right. More important for the New Right project of reconstucting a nationalist
outlook, however, is the ability of this thesis to relativise the contemporary political
charge of the national socialist past. Since the collapse of communism, this a
perspective to which right wing thinkers have returned.
5.1.1 A Change of Paradigm?
During the Historikerstreit one gained the impression that Nolte's position has been
positively refuted by his academic colleagues and rejected as a particularly crass species
of anticommunism intent upon whitewashing German national history and bolstering the
democratic identity of the contemporary state. 18 Returning to some of these themes since
the collapse of the Berlin Wall and German unification, Nolte believes his thesis of the
Weltbiirgerkrieg vindicated by events. For Nolte it is now incontestable that the central
historical continuity of the twentieth century was formed by the antagonism between
capitalism and communism. Whilst anticommunism can no longer be employed to
bolster the present via reference to the enemy counter-society of the East, Nolte states
16 Schacht. ibid. p. 63.
17 ibid.
18 A perception which was enhanced by the Bitburg farce of 1985. cf Habermas in Hartmann.
1986. op. cit. p. 51
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the continued relevance of viewing the history of the twentieth century, and the epoch of
fascism in particular, through the intellectual framework of totalitarian theory
Auch das Dritte Reich des Nationalsozialismus muf in diesen wichtigsten der historischen
Zusammenhange des Jahrhunderts eingeordnet werden, und deshalb sollte die
Totalitarismustheorie auf historisch-genetische Weise zum Verstandnis der Epoche des
Faschismus als des europaischen Burgerkiregs und des kalten Krieges als das nur marginal zu
kriegerischer Zuspitzung gelangten "Weltburgerkriegs" fortentwickelt werden. 19
Thus Nolte's justification for the development of totalitarian theory after the demise of
communism is based upon his primary concern to understand the epoch of fascism
which, for him, can only be understood as the radical, occidental response to
bolshevism. Whilst there is little new in Nolte's position in the 1990s, the world
historical context in which it is articulated is of course radically different - this is a form
of totalitarian theory which no longer has a clearly defined opponent in the present.
Thus it appears that the legitimatory function of Nolte's approach for contemporary
society is absent. Yet upon closer consideration, this contemporary legitimatory
function of totalitarian theory has changed rather than been eradicated totally.
Congruent with more mainstream conservative interpretations, New Right thinkers
perceive the answer to the political vacuum created by the collapse of anticommunism
as ideally represented in the national idiom and conventional patriotism. Given the
problems of the German nation past this is an approach which remains highly
problematic and arguably even more pressing in the absence of the Ersatz political
identity of anticommunism. In this context, Nolte's totalitarian approach could achieve
this legitmatory function in its ability to relativise the political legacy of National
Socialism in post-unification Germany and thus contribute to the rehabilitation of a
more conventional sense of patriotism. From this perspective, we may discern that the
collapse of anticommunism represents both victory and problem for conservative
thought: problematic because of the loss of political and intellectual coherence provided
by the struggle against Communism and beneficial because it appears to signal the
defeat of the radical discourse which had subjected the national argumentation of the
right to a vigorous critique.
19 Ernst Nolte, 'Weltbiirgerkrieg 1917-1989 ?.' in Eckhard Jesse (Hg.) 'Totalitarismus im 20,
Jahrhundert, Eine Bilanz der intemationalen Forschung.· Bundeszentrale fur politische Bildung.
Bonn. 1996. p. 367,
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A common perception on the right was that after the collapse of communism, the
traditional left-wing association between capitalism and fascism or nationalism and
fascism or indeed conservatism and fascism was no longer tenable. In this vein, Brigitte
Seebacher-Brandt contended that fifty years after its declaration, Max Horkheimer's
dictum Wer aber vom Kapitalismus nicht reden will soil auch vom Faschismus
schweigen" had finally been made redundant by the collapse of the "antifascist state" of
the GDR.2! This is a constellation which Seebacher-Brandt clearly perceives as more
significant for the former West and the antifascist paradigm of the FRG left. Seebacher-
Brandt is keen to stress the "normality" of concepts such as the "love of the Fatherland"
or Mort pour la patrie which unified Germany should cultivate. Seebacher-Brandt is
concerned with the corrosive effect which post-war anti-national currents exercise upon
the expression of such patriotic sentiment in unified Germany. The climate would,
however, seem ripe for the cultivation of a clean tradition of national patriotism which
Seebacher-Brandt sees represented in the Jreiheitliches Nein of the SPD and the
resistance of Carl Goerdeler, Stauffenberg and the Kreisauer Kreis which were all
motivated by the common love of the Fatherland." It is this legacy of national
patriotism which the author sees as being carried over into the post-war West German
state in the form of "national" politicians such as Schumacher, Kaiser and the later
Willy Brandt thus distancing the concept of patriotism from the Nazi regime and
associating it with "national" politicians of the early FRG. This author perceives both
the electoral failures of the SPD and the "antifascist" stigmatisation of patriotism as
emanating from the influence of the neue Linke23 whose legitimacy, however, she
clearly perceives as spent with the collapse of the East and the unification of the nation
allowing a return to the "normality" of patriotic love of one's nation. This sense that the
events of 1989 hailed the beginning of the end of the supposed political cultural
dominance of the new left is also evident in Hartmut Lange's suggestion that the end of
socialism implied the termination of the political association between conservatism and
fascism, bemoaned by Kaltenbrunner in 197224
Fazit: Die Deutsehen haben 49 Jahre naeh dem Ende des 2. Weltkriegs allen Grund, die
politisehe Asymmetrie ihrer Gesellsehaft, die das linke Spektrum bis in die Meinungsfuhrerschaft
20 ef Max Horkheimer, 'Die Juden und Europa' (1939) in Griffin (ed.) 1995. p. 273.
21 Brigitte Seebacher-Brandt. 'Norm und Normalitat. Uber die Liebe zum eigenen Land.' in
Schacht. Sehwilk. 1994. (Hg.) op. cit. p. 47.
22 Seebaeher-Brandt. ibid.p.53
23 ibid. 1992. p. 53
24 cf Kaltenbrunner. Chapter Two. p. 8
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heinein protegiert, das rechte Spektrum durch Faschismusverdacht bis zur Unerheblichkeit
niederhalt, endlich aufzukiindigen. 25
For Lange, the collapse of Communism and unification of the two German states should
effect a transformation of the perceived left-wing bias of West German political culture.
Both Seebacher-Brandt and Lange express a common sentiment of right wing thinkers
that the collapse of the Cold War and unification of Germany would-should lead to the
loosening of the shackles imposed upon the expression of conventional patriotic
sentiment. As Lange displays, this reflects perceptions of the stigmatisation of
traditionally conservative values which, however, in the post-1989 world context would
appear due for revision.
Such interpretations of the altered left-right constellation in the present are
complimented by a plea to revise the West German historical paradigm of the National
Socialist past. If a coherent and socially effective sense of patriotism is to be developed
then this is predicated upon establishing an artificial dichotomy between "conventional"
or "honourable" patriotism and the bio-racist ultra-nationalism of the NS state. It is
within the context of such a rehabilitation of conventional patriotism that Nolte's
totalitarian approach appears useful to New Right thinkers as it relocates the focus of
critical attention away from occidental culture and the conventional right to the
Bolshevik revolution and the revolutionary left. In this vein, for the New Right historian
Karlheinz WeiJ3mann, the primary impetus for the revision of historical approaches to
the Third Reich does not emanate from new research but primarily from the altered
political constellation after the collapse of communism
Das Ende der Nachkriegszeit verandert seit 1989 den Blick auf die Vergangenheit. Der
Untergang der kommunistischen Ideologie - die "Zwillinge" (Francois Furet) der
nationalsozialistischen - und die Vereinigung der Bundesrepublik und der OOR - deren getrennte
Existenz das Ergebnis der militarischen NiederJage des "Dritten Reiches" war -, fuhren
zwangslaufig dazu, daB die Entwicklung zwischen 1933 und 1945 unter neuen
Geschichtspunkten bedacht wird. Das heiBt nicht, daB sie nur noch von antiquarischem Interesse
ware oder ihre grundsatzliche moralische Beurteilung revidiert werden miiJ3te, aber die Frage
nach Bruch und Kontinuitat in der deutschen Geschichte ist neu zu stellen, und die NS-Zeit wird
25 Hartmut Lange, 'Existenz und Modeme. Uber Selbsterkenntnis als Solidaritat.' in Schacht,
Schwilk. (Hg.) 1994. op. cit. p. 442.
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fur die Legitimation der Berliner Republik anderes bedeuten, als sie fur die Legitimation der
Bonner Republik bedeutet hat."
The above represents a concise summary of New Right approaches to the NS past in the
light of the collapse of communism and the unification of the post-war German states.
For WeiBmann, the collapse of the totalitarian "twin" of National Socialism in 1989 and
the discrediting of the socialist alternative exercises a transformatory influence upon
perceptions of continuity and change in the twentieth century and most specifically with
regards to the NS dictatorship. This is a perception which clearly exists in a mutual
relationship with perceptions that the demise of the GDR also heralds the end of anti-
fascist approaches to the (West) German present. Although WeiBmann, like other New
Right thinkers, is ever keen to substantiate radical revision of historiographical
approaches to National Socialism with reference to advances in objective Wissenschaft,
it is clear that the primary stimulus of change derives from the collapse of the socialist
alternative which is understood as a victory of the totalitarian approach over
antifascism. It is interesting to note the lines along which this author perceives such
change: whilst he states that the NS period has not been reduced to "antiquarian"
interest or that its basic moral evaluation need not be revised one can not resist the
impression that WeiBmann actually desires a movement in this direction. WeiBmann
emphasises the "positive" aspects of the regime alongside "negative" elements (an
approach we shall consider shortly) and confuses the destruction wrought upon
Germany by the Allies with that perpetrated by the Nazis against the Jews (to which a
total of 10 from 500 pages is dedicated) in an undifferentiated manner leading one critic
to perceive in WeiBmann's approach a manifestation of kompositorischer
Revtsionismus." Above all, WeiBmann perceives a change in perceptions of continuity
and change of 1933 within the intellectual framework provided by the collapse of
communism. A fundamental aspect of such change is the perception that the moral
discrediting of communism will exercise a revisionist effect upon the historical-political
engagement with the NS past. This appears, as such, an attempt to develop Nolte's
totalitarian approach to the history of National Socialism after the defeat of the
26 Karlheinz WeiBmann, 'Der Weg in den Abgrund. Deutschland unter Hitler 1933 - 1945.'
Propylaen Verlag. Berlin. 1995. p. 10.
27 Gotz Aly, 'Macht - Geist - Wahn. Kontinuitaten deutschen Denkens.' Argon Verlag. Berlin.
1997. p. 199. The clear political intent of We iBmann's revision of the Third Reich proved highly
controversial and resulted in Propylaen withdrawing the book and re-contracting the historian
Hans Mommsen to write the volume dealing with National Socialism in 1996. cf Aly, ibid. pp.
196-7.
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"Asiatic" threat to occidental culture. The change in historical paradigm presaged by
WeiBmann comprises the insight that the defeat of the socialist alternative in the present
has had the concomitant effect of discrediting antifascist approaches to the NS past
which will consequently occupy a different role in the legitimacy of the Berlin Republic
than it did in that of the post-war FRG.
New Right thinkers have developed Nolte's approach on a variety of levels and with
differing results. In the work of Rainer Zitelmann we find an interesting development of
Nolte's approach which bridges the problems of communist-less totalitarianism by
recourse to a more familiar critique of modernism. In Zitelmann's approach, totalitarian
theory once stripped of its contemporary anticommunist component is reduced to an
antimodernist fundament which focuses upon the disastrous consequences of "political
modernism" and the "fanatical" belief in an "ideology". Applied to the NS experience
this is expressed in Zitelmann's older concern to remove National Socialism from its
conservative antecedents and political context and to relocate to the provenance of the
revolutionary left, presenting Hitler as a "German Lenin"." At the same time, Zitelmann
and other like-minded academics have staked a claim for interpreting National
Socialism as a species of "totalitarian modernism" and have stressed the apparent socio-
economic modernising tendencies of National Socialism. Leaning on earlier theories of
the modernising effects of National Socialism such as David Schoenbaum' s 1965
work", New Right thinkers cast the national socialist regime as a foretaste and more
significantly catalyst of the social modernisation which was to unfold in the post-war
Federal Republic. Unlike Schoenbaum, however, a characteristic of New Right
approaches to this question is that they perceive these as consciously pursued
modernising tendencies which testify to the genuine (rather than purely propagandistic)
social aims of the Volksgemeinschaft. 30
5.2. Historisierung and Modernisation
28 ef Zitelmann. 1988. op. cit.
29 David Schoenbaum, 'Hitler's Social Revolution. Class and Status in Nazi Germany 1933-
1939.' WW Norton & Company. New York. 1980.
30 For Schoenbaum, the Nazis failed to "square the circle" of a formal belief in "equal
opportunity" of the (racially "acceptable") community and the heirachy of the Fuhrerprinzip, op.
cit. p. 235.
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Zitelmann's plea for the Historisierung of National Socialism formally addresses the
concept proposed by Martin Broszat in 198531 and yet substantially represents a quite
contrary historical enterprise than that envisaged by the former director of the Munich
Institut for Zeitgeschichte. Broszat was primarily interested in breaking with the
tendency to examine the NS regime within historical isolation and in examining the
layers of socio-economic continuity and discontinuity which both pre and post-dated the
regime. This was not a plea to return to the earlier Sonderweg thesis of 1960s critical
social history which tended to present the Kaiserreich and Weimar as "prehistory" to
the Third Reich and he welcomes the fact that both these epochs are now widely
perceived in their own historical right." What Broszat is concerned with is the
continuity of socio-economic developmental processes which precede and succeed the
NS regime and the extent to which National Socialism sought to address problems
already latent in German society and which continued into the early Federal Republic.
Thus whilst the historically false answer which NS ideology represented for the
fundamental problems of the age is not in question for Broszat, we do need to re-
examine the misdirected motives, pressures for change and attempts to resolve these
problems which existed on a sub-level to NS ideology and which display a longer term
continuity reaching back to the First World War. Of particular interest in this respect are
questions such as the circumstances of the Mittelstand and their response to the turmoil
of Weimar and also the development of welfarist ideas envisaged by Ley's DAF which
likewise cut through a longer historical framework. Broszat is keen to state that this
process of a "normalisation" of the history of the NS regime should in no way be
understood as relativising the moral-political condemnation of its ultimate ideological
world view or its historical form. Broszat summarises the intentions of Historisierung as
follows
Die "Normalisierung" unseres GesehiehtsbewuBtseins kann auf die Dauer die NS-Zeit nicht
aussparen, kann nieht nur urn sie herum erfolgen. Auch die Pauschaldistanzierung von der NS-
Vergangenheit ist noeh eine Form der Verdrangung von Tabuisierung. Sie kann, je langer desto
mehr, gar den Eindruek eines kompensatorisehen Alibis fur den restaurierten Historismus auf den
wieder "heilen" Gebieten machen, die vor oder hinter der nationalsozialistischen Vergangenheit
liegen. Auflosung dieser Blockade zugunsten einer moralischen Sensibilierung der Historie
31 Martin Broszat, 'Pladoyer fUr eine Historisierung des Nationalsozialismus.' in Broszat. 1988.
op. cit. pp. 266- 281.
32 ibid. p. 273.
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iiberhaupt, gerade aufgrund des Erfahrung des Nationalsozialismus - das ist der Sinn dieses
Pladoyers fur seine Historisierung."
Thus it is clear that Broszat certainly did not seek a form of apologia for the NS regime
or indeed seek to establish "positive" aspects of the system but rather more this is an
approach which compliments a critical perspective on the past both before and after
period 1933-45. It is clear from the above that Broszat's plea for a Historisierung
reflects a desire to consider the NS regime within a much broader socio-historical
context and to avert the dangers of either considering 1933-45 in a form of quarantine
which releases other epochs from their association or of the reduction of the concept of
the NS-Gewaltherrschaft to a stale moral mantra. Broszat does not object to the moral
import of historical analysis but rather more seeks to reinvigorate the relationship
between historical knowledge and moral-political sensibilities.
The form of Historiserung desired by New Right thinkers differs significantly from
Broszat's to whom the 1992 volume Die Schatten der Vergangenheit is dedicated."
Whilst many of the contributors appear to pursue the lines of historical investigation
suggested by Broszat, his ideas features rather more as a springboard for a quite
different enterprise. This is particularly clear when one considers the interpretation of
the moral-political aspects of historical investigation of National Socialism. Whereas
Broszat sought to reinvigorate this relationship in a "historicising" analyses of National
Socialism, New Right thinkers are of the distinct impression that such "moralising" has
no place in historical investigation. In terms of moral-political perspective Broszat and
Zitelmann actually stand at opposite ends of the spectrum and one cannot avoid the
impression that for New Right thinkers the project of Historisierung is a means of
relativising the moral-political stigma of the NS regime by, on the one hand, identifying
its "positive" aspects and, on the other, associating "negative" elements with
"totalitarianism" which, in turn, is understood as a historical derivative of the radical
left. This is an impression contained in the definition of Historiserung penned by Uwe
Backes, Eckhard Jesse and Zitelmann in which we learn that the tendency of the older
generation to perceive in the Third Reich not only "negatives" but also many "positives"
has been previously all too hastily interpreted as evidence of a failed de-nazification
process or as a warning of the virulence of Far Right sentiment in the FRG. This
33 ibid. p. 281.
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phenomenon, which was documented in various opinion surveys commissioned by the
allies in the immediate post-war years appears to have experienced a form of
retrospective justification in the light of recent research
Wie die neuere Forschung belegt, zeichnete sich das NS-System gerade durch einen spezifischen
Dualismus aus, der dessen Stabilitat bis weit in den Zweiten Weltkrieg hinein garantierte:
Wahrend eine Minderheit von "rassisch" Ausgegrenzten, politisch Oppositionellen und anderen
Randgruppen verfolgt, gedemutigt und letzlich "ausgernerzt" wurde, nahm das Regime auf
soziale Belange der Arbeiterschaft in hohem MaBe Rucksicht."
Together with the brutal expulsion and persecution of those "minority" elements of the
Volksgemeinschaft deemed unacceptable, the solidarity of the NS regime is understood
as having been effectively achieved by the development of a social-welfare system
which proved in many respects more modem than that developed in Weimar. Of central
importance in this analysis is that such modernisation programmes were pursued as
conscious social-political aims of the Volksgemeinschaft and that this formed a central
tenet of regime loyalty." The perception of "dualism" in the NS system between
modem and anti-modem moments is employed by New Right thinkers to establish
"positive" aspects of the regime in a manner which challenges the perceived left-wing
orthodoxy of West German political historiography." A central feature of attempts at
Historisierung of National Socialism is a revision of received interpretations of the
relationship between working class and NS regime.
Jurgen Falter's contribution to Zitelmann's Historisierung volume rejects the thesis that
the middle classes displayed a high preponderance to vote NSDAP from whose allure
the working class proved largely immune." For Falter the roots of the "middle class
thesis" derive in part from the dominance of Marxist intellectual traditions on the one
hand and from well intentioned but counter-productive pedagogic intentions on the
other." Elsewhere, Falter has developed this notion with statistical research into the
34 Uwe Backes, Eckhard Jesse, Rainer Zitelmann (Hg.), 'Die Schatten der Vergangenheit.
Impulse zur Historisierung des Nationalsozialismus.' Ullstein. Frankfurt/M. 1992.
35 Uwe Backes, Eckhard Jesse, Rainer Zitelmann, 'Was heil3t: "Historisierung" des
Nationalsozialismus?' in Backes, Jesse, Zitelmann. 1992. ibid. p. 41.
36 ibid. p. 42.
37 Hans Mommsen perceives the concern to develop a counter-position to the presumed
hegemony of left-wing historiography as the defining concern of New Right thinkers, cf. Hans
Mommsen, 'Noch einmal: Nationalsozialismus und Modernisierung.' in, Geschichte und
Gesellschaft. 21 Heft 3. Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht. Gottingen, p. 392.
38 Jurgen Falter, "'Anflilligkeit" der Angestellten - "Immunitat" der Arbeiter? Mythen fiber die
Wahler der NSDAP.' in Backe, Jesse, Zitelmann. 1992. op. cit. pp. 265-290.
39 ibid. p. 265.
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Nazi electorate and concluded that whilst the highest represented group was in fact
drawn from the Protestant middle classes, working class Nazi voters represented a
considerable sub-group which indicates that the NSDAP can no longer be regarded as a
"middle class party" and rather more must be considered as Germany's first successful
Volkspanei." A similar conclusion is also drawn by GUnter Mai who has examined the
role of the Nazi factory cell organisation NSBO and the DAF which he perceives as
evidence of both the conscious aim and practical ability of the NSDAP to break through
the traditional class structures of the nineteenth century and appeal to a broad range of
social interests in developing into the model of the Volkspartei:" For Mai, the
development of the NSBO testified to the existence of a "left wing" of the NSDAP
which consciously strove for the achievement of particular "socialist" aims albeit in a
conservative political framework." Mai perceives in the NSBO more a trade union than
fascist organ and notes that curbing of the factory cell organisations by the DAF, itself
under the aegis of the Labour Ministry, reflected a desire in the party hierarchy to reign
in more radical elements who sought not only the geistige Gleichheit proffered by
Robert Ley but rather more material equality for the workers." Conan Fischer and
Detlev Muhlberger have also questioned "established" perspectives of the relationship
between working class and NSDAP in his research into the working class membership
of the SA particularly among the young unemployed.t' For Fischer and Muhlerberger
the significant working class membership of the SA, although middle and higher ranks
were almost exclusively drawn from middle class W.W.! and Freikorps veterans,
indicates the necessary revision of the view that the Stormtroopers were primarily a
manifestation of lower middle class militancy.
The above research into the sociological composition of the NS electoral and party
constituency is understood as having consequences for our political understanding of
National Socialism and most particularly the relationship between the ideological aims
40 Falter. in Backes, Jesse, Zitelmann. ibid. p. 283. Also cf Jurgen Falter, 'How Likely Were
Workers To Vote For The NSDAPT in, Conan Fischer (ed.) 'The Rise of National Socialism and
the Working Classes in Weimar Germany.' Berghahn. Oxford. 1996. p. 40-1.
41 GUnter Mai, 'Arbeiterschaft zwischen Sozialismus, Nationalismus und Nationalsozialismus.
Wider gangige Stereotypen.' in Backes, Jesse, Zitelmann. 1992. p. 196 and also, 'National
Socialist Factory Cell Organisation and The German Labour Front. National Socialist Labour
Policy and Organisations.' in Fischer (ed.) 1996. ibid. p. 120
42 Mai. in Backes, Jesse, Zitelmann. ibid. p. 202.in Fischer (ed.) ibid. p. 130.
43 Mai. in Fischer. ibid. pp. 127-8.
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of the NSOAP and NS state and their translation into pragmatic political practice. Falter,
Mai and Fischer all state that they are not suggesting that the middle-class thesis of
National Socialism should be replaced by a "working class thesis"." Rather more these
authors argue for taking the claims of the Volksgemeinschaft more seriously than as a
mere ideological foil for the pursuit of class interests and stress the unique ability of the
NSOAP to attract support across the traditional class structure. In tum this reflects a
perception that class based analysis to National Socialism is less fruitful than has been
previously assumed and that the unique, and for some "modernising", feature of
National Socialism was not only its intent but its ability to transcend class society in the
Volksgemeinschaft:" Research into working class electoral support for the NSOAP
during the late Weimar period is complimented by conceptions of the OAF, and in
particular the organ Kraft durch Freude, as a media of working class interests and
central in fostering regime-loyalty."
It is important to emphasise that the body of research briefly summarised above does
not correspond to a homogenous coterie of New Right intellectuals intent on relativising
national socialist experience. Interesting for our project, however, is the congruence
between such approaches and the more ideologically motivated New Right project of
Historisierung which indeed seeks to effect a relativisation of the moral-political
consequences of National Socialism. This appears to comprise two basic drives: firstly a
degree of "normalisation" of National Socialism is implied by the reference to its
modernising tendencies and role as "bridge" between the rigid class structures of the
late nineteenth century to the meritocracy of post-war West Germany. In this sense,
WeiBmann perceives the events in German society post 1933 as testifying to the process
of modernisation common to all modem industrial states albeit in a "new" form of
"social revolution" and speaks of the existence of both Wirtschaftswunder and
Sozialstaat during the 1930s.48 It is this element which appears to ground the novelty of
New Right approach which casts NS "social policy" as evidence of the NS state's
conscious policy of social modernisation.
44 Conan Fischer and Detlev Muhlberger, 'The Pattern of the SA's Social Appeal.' in Fischer
(ed.) ibid. p. 109.
45 Fischer. (ed.) ibid. p. 242.
46 ibid. p. 243.
47 Thus Mai in Fischer. (ed.) ibid. pp. 130-31 and in Backes, Jesse, Zitelmann. (Hg.) 1992. op. cit.
p.209.
48 Weil3mann. 1995. op. cit. p. 176.
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The question of the relationship between the working class and National Socialism has
formed a central tenet of approaches to the third Reich and has contained obvious
importance for Marxist approaches to fascism since. The observation that fascism was
capable of mobilising mass support has, despite criticisms of the antifascist approach,
been a problem which Marxist thinkers have addressed. Clara Zetkin noted with concern
the ability of fascism to formally adopt a revolutionary image as early as 192349 as did
Arthur Rosenberg" and Georg Lukacs'l.This was also a factor understood by right wing
conservatives such as the renegade Nazi Hermann Rauschning who in a retrospective on
the Conservative Revolution explained the need to resolve the "problem" of the
"masses" via recourse to mass means in justifying his active political support for the
NSDAP.52 Common in all of the above disparate perspectives is the understanding that
the appeal to mass, revolutionary or anti-bourgeois politics essentially constitutes an
ideological attempt to gain popular sympathies and mass support for a project which
sought to destroy the political organisation of the working class and break the bond of
socialism of either reformist or revolutionary provenance.
Acknowledgement of the ability of fascism to attract mass support and draw upon
workers is thus in itself no new revelation. Distinctions between various Marxist and
non Marxist approaches is of course apparent when one draws political conclusions
from such sociological observations. Orthodox Stalinists perceived in National
Socialism the "agents" of the bourgeoisie and the most reactionary elements of finance
and monopoly capitalism", Non orthodox Marxists such as August Thalheimer and
Leon Trotsky offered a more sophisticated interpretation of fascism which addressed the
autonomous character of National Socialism and its aggression towards the bourgeoisie
and its parties with recourse to a version of Marx's Bonapartist theory", Whilst in the
post-war GDR the former Agententheorie was continued in the official GDR antifascist
theory, the latter found resonance in the FRG in the 1960s in the neue Linke, non
49 'Extract from a resolution of the Third Enlarged Executive of the Communist International
Plenum on Fascism' (23. June 1923). in Griffin. 1995. op. cit. p. 260.
so Arthur Rosenberg, 'Der Faschismus als Massenbewgung. Sein Aufstieg und seine Zersetzung.'
(1934) in Abendroth. 1972. op. cit. esp. pp. 118-127.
SI George Lukacs. 1980. op. cit. 82-85.
52 Hermann Rauschning, 'Make and Break with the Nazis: Letters on a Conservative Revolution.'
Seeker and Warburg. London .. 1941.pp. 181-2.
53 cfGriffin. 1995. op.cit. pp.260-263.
54 cf August Thalheimer. in Abendroth op cit. 1972.
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Stalinist milieu which was more open to non orthodox Marxist interpretations of
fascism. Whilst the various interpretations and approaches to fascism were conflictual
and reflected the fault lines of the labour movement, common ground was found in the
perception that fascism was a means of salvaging capitalist society in a period of
profound crisis and of intensifying the economic exploitation and political suppression
of the working class. It is this anticapitalist core of antifascism to which right wing
thinkers have always objected and, since 1989 in particular, have believed exhausted
with the demise of the socialist alternative and moral implosion of Marxism. Recent
research which has supported the thesis of a greater working class participation in
National Socialism than previously assumed is not in itself new or necessarily
contradictory to antifascist approaches. The novel element in the thinking of the New
Right is the perception that this reflected a genuine attempt of the NSDAP and NS state
to respond to the social needs of the working class which is a quite different enterprise
and one which has been convincingly refuted by critics.
It is undeniable that the notion of the Volksgemeinschaft and the creation of the DAF,
KdF, NSV or initiatives such as the Winter aid schemes (WHW) were intended to foster
the notion of a welfarist concern for the needs of the people and that this was often
justified in terms of overcoming the "class politics" associated with not only the
tumultuous Weimar years but also with the elitist structures of the Imperial epoch. It is
quite something different, however, to take National Socialism at its word as New Right
thinkers appear to do. Such initiatives of the regime, along with claims to have achieved
a genuinly meritocratic or consumer society, rather more fuelled aspirations and claims
which, however, it was incapable of realising." Furthermore there was little new in the
social policy of the Third Reich which, as in the instance of the Winterhilfswerk (WHW)
and Nationalsozialistische Volkswohlfahrt (NSV) assumed the form of usurping
functions previously performed by charities or confessional groups and overlaying them
with the new, and hardly modem, volkisch, bio-racist ideology." Furthermore, it is clear
ss Thus Norbert Frei, 'Wie modem war der Nationalsozialismus?' in Gesehiehte und Gesellsehaft.
19 (1993) Heft 3. Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht. Gottingen, p. 384.
56 For the example of the WHW cf 'Opferritual und Volksgemeinschaftsdiskurs am Beispiel des
Winterhilfswerks.' in Manfred Behrens (Mitverf.) 'Projekt Ideologie-Theorie.' Das Argument:
Argument Sonderband, AS62. Argument Verlag. Berlin (West) 1980. pp. 199 - 226. For the
development of the NSV ef Eckhard Hansen, 'Wohlfahrtspolitik im NS-Staat: Motivationen,
Konflikte und Machtstrukturen im "Sozialismus der Tat" des Dritten Reiches.' Mara Verlag.
Augsburg. 1991. esp. pp. 69- 79.
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that NS social policy was not motivated by the needs of the individual or meeting the
social needs of the workers, as Zitelmann suggests, but was rather more an attempt to
compensate for the intensification of the labour process in a form of carrot and stick
approach to labour relations. 57 Furthermore, as Mommsen has observed, not only do
such interpretations confuse the DAF's plans with reality but also ignore the fact that
social and welfarist policy as well as industrial productivity were only financeable
through the exploitation of slave labour and the draining of the economies of the
occupied territories. 58 Mommsen has also convincingly destroyed the New Right's
modernisation argument on its own technocratic terms emphasising the inefficiency of
the regime derived not least from its hypertrophic bureaucratisation." Inefficiency was
also a characteristic result of the prioritisation of certain ideological concerns leading, in
the instance of armaments production, not only to the diversion of essential military
resources in the genocidal campaign in the East but also to the inefficient expenditure
on the development of the Vergeltungsraketen instead of the more vital production of
new fighter planes."
This brings us to another fundamental criticism of "modernisation" theory - the fact that
Zitelmann and his colleagues separate the social policy of the Third Reich from the
racial hygienist conceptions which ideologically cohered the concept of the
Volksgemeinschaft. NS social policy was not only understood as a means of achieving a
balance to compensate for the intensification of labour exploitation and the removal of
all rights but more fundamentally corresponded to the conviction that the "national
stock" needed to be enhanced (if the population were to be rendered ultimately fit for
war) which also, of course, entailed the "eradication" of elements deemed weak, defect
or otherwise damaging to the racial health of the nation." The notion of a "dualism" in
the behaviour of the NS state is predicated upon the artificial separation of NS social
policy from the bio-racist, hygienist ideas which cohered population, health and welfare
57 This is an impression strengthened from the SD report on internal security for 1938 in which
the KdF is explicitly referred to as a form of necessary "balance" to even out the instensification
of the labour process. cf'Meldungen aus dem Reich.' 1938. pp 204-5.
58 Mommsen. 1995. op. cit. p. 398.
59 cf Hans Mommsen, 'Nationalsozialismus als vorgetauschte Modernisierung.' in, Lutz
Niethammer und Bernd Weisbrod (Hg.) 'Hans Mommsen: Der Nationalsozialismus und die
deutsche Gesellschaft. Ausgewahlte Aufsatze, Zum 60. Geburtstag.' Rowohlt. Reinbek bei
Hamburg. 1991. pp. 408-9.
60 Mommsen. 1995. op. cit. p. 397.
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policies in the Third Reich. It is not possible to free social policy from the broader
context of racial-hygienist ideas which informed NS Bevolkerungspolitik in the manner
attempted by New Right thinkers. Although the conditions for the genocide did not
unfold until the outbreak of the war against the Soviet Union, on the level of racial
ideology, these ideas exist in a continuity which links seemingly innocuous initiatives
such as the Winter Aid scheme and welfare groups through to the state policy of
genocide which unfolded in the context of the military campaign in the East. 62 In the
perspective offered by New Right thinkers, however, whilst NS social policy testified to
the modernity of the Third Reich and its intentional plans of social modernisation, bio-
racism was rather more a phenomenon of totalitarian belief in "utopia" upon which
basis Zitelmann and others have suggested a parallel to the "class utopia" aspired to by
the Communist movement.
The modernisation theory of New Right thinkers is predicated upon a separation of the
process of social modernisation from all accompanying ethical and political norms and
invokes a notion of value-free modernisation. Mommsen has criticised the claims made
in support of the modernisation thesis and concluded that no convincing evidence can be
found to support the argument that the NS state acted as a catalyst for social
modernisation. For Mommsen, such developments must be viewed within a much
longer historical time frame and he concludes that only when one investigates changes
between 1918-1945 and after can one speak of social modernisation proper."
Furthermore, Mommsen and others have pointed out the crass provocation of adding the
label "modernisation" to a regime which systematically destroyed democratic rights,
imprisoned and murdered significant sections of the indigenous and neighbouring
populations, advanced racial theory as a cohesive social value and, in the course of the
imperialist conquest of its neighbours, initiated the unique crime of state-led genocide."
Whilst this aspect of the New Right's concept of modernity has been seriously
challenged by respected experts in the field, we now need to address the second aspect
61 Michael Burleigh, Wolfgang Wippermann, 'The Racial State. Germany 1933-1945.' CUP.
Cambridge. 1996. esp. pp. 75-197.
62 Burleigh, Wippermann. ibid. Also cf Gotz Aly's analysis of the "Final Solution" which
highlights the role of demographic and economic bureacrats in generating the extermination
programme in the East. Aly, '''Final Solution". Nazi Population Policy and the Murder of the
European Jews.' Arnold. London. 1999.
63 Mommsen. 1995. op. cit. pp. 393.
64 Mommsen. ibid. p. 399, 1991. op. cit. p. 423. Frei. 1993. op. cit.
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of this approach which considers the role of ideology in National Socialism. Whilst New
Right thinkers do not deny the Holocaust and indeed condemn the racial theory which
inspired the programme of genocide, racial ideology is presented, by these thinkers, as a
variety of twentieth century political modernism and the "extremism" of the mass age.
In this sense, they pursue Nolte's relativisation enterprise of the 1980s and not only
refute the notion of uniqueness of the Holocaust but further more suggest an innate,
extremist relatedness between the "totalitarian" dictatorships of the twentieth century
which is intellectually cohered by recourse to an older critique of modernism and mass
society.
5.3. Race, Class and Mass
For Zitelmann, in an article which addresses Nolte's theory of the Weltbiirgerkrieg, the
fundamental error of communist anti-fascism was the belief that the NSDAP came to
power in order to avert the danger of proletarian revolution." The falseness of this
approach is not founded for Zitelmann in the recognition of the unlikelihood of a
communist overthrow in the late 1920s-30s but rather more from the neglect of the
revolutionary essence of National Socialism itself. Zitelmann recognises the superficial
congruence between communist theory of fascism and Nolte's understanding of the
NSDAP as the historical "answer" to the Bolshevik revolution of 1917. The essential
difference between the two positions is, of course, the fact that Nolte perceives the
reaction of the bourgeoisie as understandable and to a point justifiable." It was this
aspect which drew the fire of critical intellectuals during the Historikerstreit who,
according to Zitelmann, however, responded with moral indignation rather than
academic critique. Zitelmann concurs with Nolte that the Soviet Union represented both
Vorbild and Schreckbild for German fascism and states that the "fanaticism" of the KPD
and CPSU in fact drew much admiration from Hitler. Zitelmann differs from Nolte in
asserting parallels between fascism and communism in terms of their common
ideological vigour which corresponded to Hitler's intent on creating a right wing
fanatical elite (or "historical minority") which could impose its will upon society.
65 Rainer Zitelmann, 'Aus AniaB der Thesen von Ernst Nolte.' in Backes, Jesse, Zitelmann .. 1992.
op. cit. p. 221.
66 ibid. pg 224.
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Zitelmann makes this the basis of the following distinction between fascist and
conventional bourgeois anticommunism
Jene Merkmale der kommunistischen Bewegung, die vom Standpunkt des burgerlichen
Liberalismus aus als besonders verwerflich galten und den burgerlichen Antikommunismus zu
einem wesentlichen Teil motivierten, notigten Hitler hochste Bewunderung ab: der totalitare
Charakter der Ideologie, der unumschrankte Machtwille und die klar formulierte Zielsetzung, aile
politischen Gegner nicht nur "fanatisch" zu bekampfen, sondern letzlich vollig "auszuschalten"."
In the above, Zitelmann ignores the widespread support within "respectable" German
society for the right's brutal attacks upon the left which may well have aroused distaste
for the SA's "vulgar" tactics but found resonance with regard to its social content. This
is a position which also blurs the distinction between the "Red Terror" which was a
response to genuine social confrontation in the context of a civil war and the Nazi
persecution of the Jews which was a wholly ideological construction." This also
contrasts with the relative leniency with which fascist terror was treated by the
authorities in comparison to the draconian measures imposed upon the left." The above
reveals more about Zitelmann's own "totalitarian" approach to the relatedness of the
"fanatical" parties of left and right than it does historical events. Hitler's speech before
the members of the Diisseldorfer Herrenklub in January 1932 in which he spoke of the
remilitarisation of Germany, the crushing of the left and the expansion of Lebensraum
are taken by Zitelmann to have represented Hitler's tactic of appeasing bourgeois unease
towards the NSDAP rather than representing an expression of his genuine
anticommunism and pro-capitalist approach. The fact that within the first few years of
the erection of the NS dictatorship the regime set about implementing all of the above is
remarkably ignored by Zitelmann. Zitelmann's divergence with Nolte results from his
perception of the parallels between communism and fascism which ran deeper than a
mere reflection of each others' radicality
Wenn Nolte pauschal die Furcht vor dem Bolschevismus als das Motiv der Nationalsozialisten
begeift, dann schlie13t er damit von vornherein eine wichtige Stromung in der NSDAP aus,
namlich die sogenannte NS-Linke.70
67 ibid. p. 227.
68 This was a criticism which Mommsen levelled against Nolte during the Historikerstreit and
which he has subsequently argued against New Right "modernisation" advocates. cf Mommsen.
in 'Historikerstreit.' 1987. op. cit. 174-188
69 One significant example of this was the comparitvely lenient treatment of the Putschists of
1923 and the anti-republican state of Bavaria in contrast to the emergency ruled decreed in
Saxony and Thuringia in the same year after the entrance of KPD members into regional
parliaments. cfMommsen. 1989. op. cit. pp. 163-171, p. 180
70 Zitelmann. ibid. p. 231.
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Thus in contrast to Nolte, Zitelmann is concerned with drawing attention to the apparent
similarities between NSDAP and KPD on the basis of their apparent relatedness as
"fanatical ideologues" and he supports this via reference to the "left wing" elements
within the NS movement which we encountered in the Historisierung project. This is a
perspective which is often complimented with the identification of nationalist currents
in the KPD's politics. The reference to the KPD's adoption of nationalist themes is
indeed accurate and evidence of this may be found in the 1923 Ruhr campaign against
occupation by Belgian and French troops 71 as well as the 1930 programme of the party
which argued for the nationale und soziale Befreiung vom deutschen Volk and attacked
the Versa iller Raubfrieden." The KPD adopted a distinctly nationalist tone in the
engagement in the Ruhr, as opposed to its earlier policy of proletarian solidarity
between French and German workers against the bourgeoisie who, as Taylor noted,
despite the official "passive resistance" continued to sell coal to the French at inflated
prices." Fischer has also noted the accommodation of the KPD to anti-Semitic prejudice
in its condemnation of "Jewish" capitalists before audiences of "gentlemen of the
volkisch persuasion". 74 Such policy moves on the part of the KPD reflected a concession
to a nationalist and chauvinist political climate which reflected on the one level political
opportunism and on a more fundamental level this reflected the Stalinisation of the party
and the adoption Stalin's concept of the "national road to socialism". Whilst this may
well have represented an opportunistic concession to nationalism this must be
distinguished from the assertion implied by Fischer that this indicated an innate
relatedness between the two extremist mass parties of Weimar.
For Zitelmann such evidence testifies not to the political opportunism of the KPD under
the growing influence of Stalinism but rather more indicates a congruence between the
two extremes of the political spectrum which sought to mobilise the "masses". Far more
important a motivation for NS leading figures for Zitelmann was the dream of a system
which would unite socialist and nationalist aims in one movement. Whilst he concedes
71 cf Conan Fischer, 'The German Communists and the Rise of Nazism.' Macmillan. London.
1991. 45, 113-14. Although Fischer appears to conclude from such evidence testimony of grass-
roots level informal cooperation between NSDAP and KPD - a position which he has developed
since 1991 particular in his research into the working class composition of the SA.
12 cfthe apologetic formulation in Wolfgang Ruge, 'Deutschland 1917 - 1933. Von der Groden
Sozialistischen Oktoberrevolution bis zum Ende der Weimarer Republik.' VEB Deutscher Verlag
der Wissenschaften. Berlin (Ost) 1982. p. 373-4.
73 Taylor. 1965. op. cit. p. 229.
74 Fischer. 1991. op. cit. p. 59.
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that anti-communism and anti-Semitism played an important role in the NSDAP, they
did not constitute its basic social mission
Antisemitische Vorureile spielten - allerdings in recht unterschiedlicher Auspragung - eine Rolle,
aber gewichtiger noch scheint fur viele der Traum einer Vermahlung des Nationalismus mit dem
Sozialismus gewesen zu sein."
For Zitelmann, Hitler's primary motivation was not anticommunism but the
development of a revolutionary new elite which synthesised elements of nationalism
with socialism. How is it possible for Zitelmann to argue an affinity between a
movement which set at the front of its programme anti-communism, imperialist
conquest and bio-racism and a movement formally committed to the destruction of
capitalism as the womb of social deprivation and international conflict and to the
realisation of social equality? Zitelmann takes points of apparent congruence - the
revolutionary rhetoric, belief in an ideology and the vision of a future "utopia" and
extracts these from their specific social and political context and rationality in order to
construct an artificial relationship between radical left and right. From this perspective,
the fact that when in power the national socialists set about implementing their aims of
destroying the organised working class movement, re-militarising German society and
constructing the racially exclusive Volksgemeinschaft appear as secondary, or even
inconsequential particularly when this is coupled with the argument of a "welfarist"
policy direction of the NSDAP and NS state.
Zitelmann's contention that the NSDAP sought to synthesise the currents of nationalism
and socialism is worth considering further as it provides the key to the New Right's
approach to the legacy of German fascism. In general, New Right thinkers have
identified the mass and seemingly anti-elitist aspects of National Socialism in the
context of its right wing conservative peers such as the DNVP. For thinkers such as
Zitelmann and WeiBmann the superficial "egalitarianism" of National Socialism
indicated not only the "modernising" effects of the regime but also testify to the fact that
National Socialism represented something quite distinct from traditional right wing
parties and interests despite its clear antecedents in the conservative spectrum. Both Mai
and WeiBmann trace the political antecedents of National Socialism to late nineteenth
century attempts to found a mass party from the right in order to address the
transformation of society and the political entrance of the social democratic mass
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population in particular." Mai likewise emphasises the attempts of late nineteenth and
early twentieth century conservatives to formulate a right wing "version" of socialism
which primarily understood socialism however as an effective means of social
organisation in the modem mass age."
In a manner similar to that by which Zitelmann, Backes and Jesse formally adopt
Broszat's plea for a critical Historisierung of National Socialism, WeiBmann invokes
the work of the Anglo-American historian Geoff Eley into the reconfiguration of the
German right between the late nineteenth and early twentieth century." Again, similar
to the invocation of Broszat, WeiBmann conveniently ignores the underlying premise of
Eley's work that this reconfiguration was essentially one of an elite-level
reconfiguration of the relationship between industry, state and political right in the
objective interests of stabilising capitalist social relations. For WeiBmann, however,
these developments describe rather more problems of modem mass society and the
political weakness of liberalism in particular." For New Right thinkers, National
Socialism represented a phenomenon distinct from the conventional political right -
they thus decontextualise National Socialism from the longer term reconfiguration of
the right and create a false dichotomy between a supposedly homogenous "traditional"
conservatism and the new form of "revolutionary" conservatism during the 1920s-30s.
Whilst it is of course legitimate to indicate the distinctions between National Socialism
and "traditional" conservative nationalists such as those attracted to the DNVP, it is
disingenuous to ignore the widespread rejection of republican democracy by the
political right and important groups in influential positions of social power in state,
military and bureaucracy. The fundamental distinction between left and right which is
not considered in this New Right reading is that whilst National Socialism was in many
respects "anti-bourgeois" in terms of its radical claim to absolute political power, it did
not, in stark contrast to the radical left, seek to transcend the basis of bourgeois politics
in the social relations of capitalism. In terms of the fundamental political and economic
organisation of society National Socialism represented a radical political "revolution" in
an attempt to stabilise a profoundly shaken system whereas communism sought a post-
7S Zitelmann. ibid. p. 233.
76 WeiBmann. 1995. op. cit. pp. 14-34.
77 Mai. in Backes, Jesse, Zitelmann. 1992. op. cit. pp. 196-99.
78 WeiBmann. 1995. op. cit. p. 16.
79 WeiBmann. 1995.
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capitalist solution to contemporary crisis through a social revolution. Zitelmann seeks to
evade this factor by arguing for a (different) concept of "revolution" in order to be able
to classify National Socialism as a revolutionary phenomenon. This revolutionary
quality is then highlighted as evidence of a "totalitarian" or "fanatical" relatedness of
the extremes of left and right. for New Right thinkers the "revolutionary" element of
National Socialism was contained in the political and physical destruction of liberal
democracy which, significantly, is often portrayed in New Right readings as having
practically invited its own destruction. For New Right thinkers, the characteristic feature
of revolution is not primarily the socio-economic organisation of society but rather more
the destruction of a core of "traditional" political values. National Socialism is above all
condemned by these thinkers for its "usurpation" and subsequent destruction of
conventional values of patriotism and nationalism. In this manner a political defence of
"national tradition" forms the link between past and present in New Right thought:
whilst the destruction of tradition under National Socialism in the past resulted from its
"revolutionary" self conception it is imperative in the present that "traditions" are
observed and defended against "totalitarian" threats in the form of either fascism,
communism or even "democratism", "PC" culture or VerJassungspatriotismus in the
present. We shall return to critique of contemporary West German liberal democracy in
the following section. Before examining the contemporary defence of "national
tradition" against universalising and "moralising" political trends in present German
political culture, let us consider the notion of an "ideological" congruence between
fascism and communism in the context of the more conventional antimodernist
argumentation of neoconservative thought.
In an article which returns to theory of the Weltbiirgerkrieg, Nolte offered an
interpretation of the intellectual-historical antecedents to the "global civil war "
inaugurated by the Russian Revolution of 1917. For Nolte the Weltbiirgerkireg of 1917 -
1989 was a modem version and development of an older constellation of modem civil
war derived from revolutionary upheaval of 1789. Citing the English conservative
Edmund Burke's observations of the French Revolution, Nolte understands the French
Revolution as a seizure of power by a party of armed, fanatical ideologues of "moneyed
interest" over "landed interest" who, furthermore, sought and attained international
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resonance and influence between 1789 and 1815.80 The crucial moment for Nolte in the
eruption of this first Weltburgerkrieg was the toppling of the old monarchical semi-
absolutist order and the destruction of "tradition" in the name of progress and under the
influence of mass social action. Whilst by 1900 it appeared as if a repetition of the
Weltbiirgerkrieg would be highly unlikely, opportunity for precisely such a renaissance
was provided by the four years of industrial warfare between 1914-18 and, of course,
more importantly the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. A fundamental distinction between
these two Weltbiirgerkriege was the fact that whilst 1789 heralded the political entrance
of the "masses", the global civil war this unleashed was primarily fought between states.
The Russian Revolution of October 1917 is perceived in many respects as a product of
the development of modem mass society during the nineteenth century with its formal
claims to equality and democracy." As the Russian Revolution occurred in the age of
mass political parties resulting from mass political participation it thus, for Nolte,
produced the mass party of post 1918 radical fascism." We have examined Nolte's
thesis of the relationship between Communism and fascism elsewhere. What is of
interest here is the manner in which Nolte seeks to link the two epochs of global civil
war via the revolutions of 1789 and 1917. Whilst the former introduced the "masses"
and concepts of equality and democratic rights opposed to the old absolutist regimes at
the birth of modem capitalism, 1917 sought the emancipation of the working class from
the "highest stage" of capitalism." Both 1789 and 1917 staked claims to progression
beyond the confines of the present and an emancipation from particularist tradition
under the principle of equality.
For Lubbe too, the essence of modernist political ideologies is the emancipation from
tradition and the present into an imagined future utopia. Lubbe describes that whilst
during the renaissance, the concept of utopia was associated with spatial categories,
after the conquering of the earth this utopian desire was projected into the temporal
category which cast the future as the arbiter of utopia." Such temporal utopian visions
were articulated in the modem age of mass society in the insistence that the chosen
"party" represents the vanguard of humanity in the cause of emancipation from the
80 Nolte. in Jesse. op. cit. p. 357.
81 A similar argument that in the post-1789 epoch despotic regimes were compelled to adopt a
mass character is advanced by Backes in, Jesse. 1996. op. cit. p. 310.
82 Nolte. ibid. p. 362.
83 Lenin. 'Imperialism The Highest Stage of Capitalism.' Progressive Publishers, 1974.
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present." Whilst Lubbe perceives that racial theory does not touch Marxism in terms of
its intellectual niveau, he contends that both perceive history as a series of successive
historical epochs based upon class or racial struggle which privileges the "party" to
totalitarian self-empowerment. This forms the basis of the inherent relatedness between
NS racial ideology and Marxist-Leninist class ideology, both of which are based upon
mass terror." Not only does this ideological perspective offer justification for the
confrontation with the present society but it also provides a higher moral rationality for
the parties of "armed fanatics" to implement their programme with little regard for the
human consequences. It is upon this basis that Lubbe understands the capacity of both
Communism and National Socialism to perpetrate the mass murders of the distinctly
"modem" twentieth century and its concern to emancipate humanity from the
traditionalism of "common sense". For Lubbe the temporal location of the mass murders
of the last century was not incidental and rather more he perceives them as a
consequence of political characteristics of the modem age
Dieser Terror war vielmehr ein politisches Phanomen, das einzig im Kontext der modem en
Zivilisation verstandlich gemacht werden kann, namlich als politische Konsequenz des Versuchs,
den Desorientierungsfolgen des eigenen Gescheitertseins an den Herausforderungen der ohnehin
desorientierungstrachtigen Moderne in die Gewif3heiten einer Geschichtsideologie zu
entkommen, die einen in die Rolle des Endsiegers einsetzt."
For Lubbe it is thus inaccurate to describe the mass killings of the twentieth century as a
lapse into "barbarism" as they were wholly products of the dynamic of modem
civilisation which provided the technical precondition for the Holocaust or Stalin's mass
purges." Significant in Liibbe's approach is the lacking differentiation between Stalinist
purges and the genocide against Europe's Jewish population - whilst these events are
not explicitly denied their historical specificity this is essentially abolished in the
contention that they were related through the mediation of a fanatical belief in an
ideology of future utopia. This explains the ability of the fanatical parties to perpetrate
mass crimes and Lubbe refutes the notion forwarded by Horkheimer and Adorno that
the Holocaust represented the fruits of a morally indifferent "instrumental reason?" and
84 Lubbe, 1992. op. cit. p. 148-9.
85 Lubbe, 1992. ibid. p. 149.
86 Lubbe. 1992. p. 151.
87 Hermann Lubbe, 'Rationalitat und Irrationalitat des Volkermords. Ernst Nolte zum 70.
Geburtstag.' in, Hanno Loewy (Hg.) 'Holocaust: Die Grenzen des Verstehens. Eine Debatte tiber
die Besetzung der Geschichte.' Rowohlt. Reinbek bei Hamburg. 1992. p. 90.
88 cf Lubbe. 1992. op. cit. p. 137.
89 ibid.
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rather more suggest that the reason appealed to was understood as a higher moral
category. This higher moral status of the reason invoked by Nazis and Class Warriors
alike explains their ability to perpetrate morally repugnant crimes
Ohne die Wahrheitsuberzeugungen, wie sie sich bei den totalitaren Parteien im Medium der
Grollideologien unseres Jahrhunderts gebildet haben, blieben die totalitaren Massentotungen
unverstandlich, ja, sie hatten sieh gar nieht ereignen konnen."
Whilst in terms of the execution of genocide, the perpetrators responded to questions of
instrumental reason this does not explain the motivation for such crimes which Lubbe
perceives in the hohere ideologische Rationalitdt offered by both categories of "class"
and "race"." For Lubbe the mass killings perpetrated by communism and fascism are
the central definitory phenomena of the twentieth century to the extent that future
generations will look back upon the twentieth century as the epoch of ideologically
justified mass murders
Wir durfen sieher sein, daf aus dem Bliekpunkt des nachsten Jarhtausends, von dem uns ja nur
noeh wenige Jahre trennen, generell die Massentotungen aus ideologiseher Rationalitat mehr als
alles andere die historisehe Einzigartigkeit unseres Jahrhunderts ausmaehen werden. Millionen
Opfer nationalsozialistiseher Herrsehaft und Millionen Opfer intemationalsozialistiseher
Herrsehaft dazu - das wird sieh im Gedachtnis der kunftigen Generationen nieht als
unvergleiehlieh auseinander dividieren lassen."
It is upon the basis of this insight that Lubbe defends the comparative approach
advanced by Nolte during the Historikerstreit and contends that only via such
comparison can one ascertain the uniqueness of both Stalin's and Hitler's crimes."
Liibbe's thesis suggests a generic relatedness between communism and fascism which
was grounded in their apparent faith in a tradition-consuming philosophy of history in
the quest for a future utopia. Once this point has been accepted, questions of the
historical specificity of the crimes perpetrated by Stalinists or fascists assume a
necessary technical nature of when, how many and where etc. The notion that fascist
bio-racism represented a form of "inverted Marxism?" which supplanted the theory of
class struggle with that of race struggle serves not only to relative the historical
specificity of National Socialism but by blurring the distinction between the two
primarily serves to discredit conventional radical approaches to society and history.
90 Lubbe. 1992. in Loewy. op. cit. p. 85.
91 Lubbe. ibid. p. 84, pp. 86-7.
92 Lubbe, 1992. in Loewy. p. 90. also cfLiibbe. 1992. p. 137.
93 Lubbe. 1992. in Loewy. ibid. and Lubbe, 1992. p. 152-3.
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Whilst this approach was cohered by recourse to Cold War anticommunism during the
period of division, in unified Germany this approach appears intellectually cohered by
recourse to a more traditional neoconservative critique of modernist political culture and
mass society. The fact that this apparent congruence is expressed in such varied
concepts as Labbe's notion of "philosophy of history", or "idealism", Mai' s concept of
their related "materialism" or Zitelmann's understanding of their "fanaticism" indicates
that the perception of congruence is not derived from a study of the characteristics of
historical materialism or racial social Darwinism as even the most perfunctory of
glances reveals the incomparable nature of these currents. The basis of comparison
which remains constant is the perception of these ideologies which were capable of
politically mobilising the "masses" in the application of their ideas. Thus for one of the
co-authors of the SelbstbewuJ3te Nation, Ulrich Schacht, the actual political-
philosophical position assumed by communism or fascism regarded such concepts of
progress or reason is rendered a secondary value in the face of their common capacity to
unfold mass terror in the name of a future utopia of either class or racial provenance. In
tum, and in congruence with Nolte's appreciation the key event in this geneaology of
ideologically founded mass political terror is the French Revolution
Der macht-politisch wirksame Effekt derartig kurzschlieBender Tugend-und Heils-Systeme, wie
sie sich seit 1789 national und international entwerfen, urn international und national unterwerfen
zu konnen, heiBt: Klassen- oder Rassen-, in jedem Fall aber Massen- Terror. Er geschieht, seit
dieser Zeit, auf moderne Weise, also systematisch: Zunachst im Kopf, dann - als Kopf-ab-Ritual -
auf dem Marktplatz oder aber hinter den Bergen bei den Sieben Zwergen, in jenem sagenhaften
Gelande aller Ismen, die uns vor und nach den Zasuren als entweder helle oder dunkle Marchen
erzahlt werden, in deren Licht und Schatten wir uns sonnen durfen oder frieren solIen oder
umgekehrt. Nationalsozialismus, Kommunismus, Ignorantismus und vice versa."
The association made here between "race" or "class" terror rests upon the causal agency
of the a concept of the "masses" in translating a philosophy of history into political
reality. These are historical interpretation which of course have contemporary political
significance and are particularly related to the desire of conservative thinkers to
rehabilitate a more conventional form of nationalism post-unification Germany. Above
all this form of "totalitarian" interpretation of National Socialism is an attempt to
overcome the strictures of, in Schacht's words, the contemporary postdeutsche national
94 Thus Gunter Mai. in Backes, Jesse, Zitelmann. 1992. op. cit. p. 251.
95 Ulrich Schacht, 'Stigma und Sorge. Ober deutsche Identitat nach Auschwitz.' in Schacht,
Schwilk. 1994. op. cit. p. 58.
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suizidale Geschichtsschreibung which employs the NS experience in order to discredit
conventional forms of national identity." For Schacht, the benefits of an interpretation
of National Socialism as a product of "totalitarian modernism" is that it relieves
concepts of German nationalism and "traditional" values from the association with the
destruction of Weimar democracy and the construction of the "total state" for which
many of the Weimar right argued during the inter-war period. For Schacht the reference
to the "modernist" context of National Socialism implies that it is illegitimate to
stigmatise the Germans with Auschwitz for contemporary political-pedagogic purpose.
Schacht maintains that the Germans certainly have an obligation to know about
Auschwitz yet this is a form of remembrance which has abandoned a critical
perspective on German nationalism, the role of social elites or the crisis of inter-war
capitalism. This is a form of remembrance which decontextualises Auschwitz and is
above all shaped by the belief that the Holocaust testifies to the cosmic ability of man to
perpetrate inhuman actions against fellow humans
Dieses Wissen der Deutschen ist allerdings ein Privileg: Das Privileg zu wissen, daB Auschwitz
moglich ist, weil es geschah. Was aber rnoglich ist, weil es geschah, ist nicht einmalig, sondem
menschenmoglich."
What remains in this perspective is an interpretation of National Socialism which is
stripped of all historical contingency and context and which presents the Holocaust as a
consequence of the mass inspired ideologies of the modem age and the inherent
inhumanity of humanity. As such this is a form of "remembrance" which fails to
distinguish the specific socio-historical context of German fascism and the roots of
racial-hygienist notions in the political elite of the West since the late nineteenth century
and as such can be invoked in the neoconservative arguments in favour of a defence of
"tradition" and conventional national identity after the moral and political discrediting
of the concept of social emancipation and grand scale political action. If the destruction
of tradition appears to open the door to mass terror then it appears only fitting that
Tradition is defended in the present against a critical perspective. It is the context of
these considerations that neoconservatives perceives in 1989 a unique historical
opportunity to both revise post-war critical perceptions of national identity and to
relocate National Socialism and the Holocaust as a problem of "emancipatory" politics
96 Schacht. ibid. p. 62.
97 Schacht. ibid. p. 66.
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in the first instance. Let us now consider some of the contemporary formulations of
"tradition" against "emancipation" in New Right discourse.
5.4. The End Of Emancipation
Although the thesis of the relatedness of communism and fascism remains contentious,
the post-cold War climate is conducive to this basic approach which is characterised by
its anti-modernist thrust. From this perspective, both communism and fascism
represented modernist deviations from the "norms" of tradition and the nation which
they sought to transcend by revolutionary intervention. At the end of the twentieth
century, neoconservatives such as Zitelmann perceives an opportune constellation after
the discrediting of the concept of emancipation and faith in a future "utopia" (or more
commonly progress) for rehabilitating a more traditional perspective in political culture.
Whilst the right has always rejected such an approach, the engagement with the history
of communism within the totalitarian frame reference has apparently given a fillip to
this older antimodernist critique of the right. Not only has the collapse of the Eastern
Bloc discredited traditional left wing political approach as a non-viable option, but
further more it is revealed as a criminal political direction which was responsible for a
multitude of mass killings which cast the Holocaust of National Socialism in the
shadows. This insight at the "End of History" has been perceived as offering a unique
opportunity to counter the traditional deficit of the right - that of not being in possession
of a "utopia". As "utopia" is associated not only with naive attempt to overcome
anthropologically grounded concept of "human nature" in the more traditional style of
conservative argument but also with the mass crimes stretching from the eradication of
the Kulaks to the killing fields of Cambodia, the end of the twentieth century appears to
conservatives to represent a fortuitous constellation. Thus Zitelmann draws the
following optimistic conclusion for the New Right
Nur wenn es der demokratischen Rechten gelingt, dieses vermeintliche Utopie Defizit als
wirklichen Vorzug zu vermitteln, wird sie den Nachteil, nicht im Besitze von
allesversprechenden Utopien zu sein, zum Teil kompensieren konnen, Am Ende eines
Jahrhunderts, das uns vor allern lehrt, wie leicht schone Utopien in schone neue Welten, Diktatur
und Vemichtung umschlagen, gibt es vielleicht eine Chance, dies zu vermitteln."
98 Zitelmann in Schacht, Schwilk. ibid.p. 181.
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Zitelmann draws out the benefits of the present ideological climate for a conservative
outlook. By associating "utopian" conceptions with totalitarian dictatorship and
genocide he seeks to gain political capital for the right from the discrediting of the idea
of social alternative. The problem is contained in the fact that a conservative programme
which basis itself around the insight that "utopia" is a redundant term is a project which
can at best stabilise but never inspire. Whilst for postmodernists the experiences of the
twentieth century prove the illegitimacy of the grand narrative and reason, thus
concluding that ideas are essentially relative and never absolute, for conservatives
values can never be relative. The postmodernist fetishisation of the relative is matched
by the conservative search for the absolute. Only an absolute value contains the
potential to cohere and command authority which, for conservative thought, is the
primary social function of national identity.
It is this antimodernist perspective which has been retained from the older totalitarian
approach and been developed by the New Right. For the New Right, the end of the
"modernist project" signals not only the end of the Grand Utopia of social
transformation but equally discredits the Kleinutopie of bourgeois civil society
championed by thinkers such as Wehler and Habermas in the concept of republican
Verfassungspatriotismus. In this vein, Karlheinz Weiflmann contended
Die civil society als Klein-Utopie uberfordert und unterfordert den Menschen gleicherrnaBen, der
kein durchgangig rationales, aber ein in der geschichtlichen Tradition gebundenes Lebewesen ist.
Eine absolute Emanzipation aus diesen Bindungen bleibt unmoglich, solange die Individuen
schon durch ihre Sprache und all kulturellen Selbstverstandlichkeiten so wesentlich entlastet
werden."
Thus Weillmann repeats the common conservative anti-modernist critique that the
modernist project of emancipation through the medium of human reason is an
essentially "unnatural" mission which ignores the anthropological condition of
humanity. Here "culture" and "tradition" are counterpoised to reason and emancipation.
This is an insight which has profited from the collapse of the alternative socialist society
of the East which confirms for right wing thinkers the futility of emancipation. For
Wei13mann this also testifies to the failure of universal values which, once more, appear
to ignore the constraints of the "human condition" which is always contextualised by a
particularist culture which cannot be transcended
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Die in den vergangenen beiden Jahrhunderten untemommenen Versuche, diese Einsicht zu
uberspringen, urn vom einzelnen direkt zur Menschheit zu gelangen, waren jedenfalls zum
Scheitem verurteilt. Von der "Situation" kann sich der Mensch nur bedingt emanzipieren, sie
umgibt ihn immer schon als kulturelle Sphare.'?"
Thus for Weif3mann, the particularist differences between cultures assume absolute
status and form a kind of "second nature" of humanity which can not be transcended.
From this perspective, the revolutionary upheavals of 1789 and 1917 which both drew
upon universal values, the faculty of reason and a humanist approach were doomed to
failure from the outset. this approach ignores, of course, the profound changes wrought
by the revolutions of 1789 and 1917 in world history which, despite the evident failure
of their historical projects, nevertheless represented a great shift forward in human
social relations and not least in the sphere of culture. Weif3mann's static conception of
culture appears to be in fact a plea for particularism and a defence of "tradition" against
the project of human social emancipation. As such this forms a succinct articulation of
the conservative optimism that the collapse of the Cold War would herald a return to the
certainties and absolutes of culture and tradition after the collapse of the revolutionary
tradition and the discrediting of the concept of progress. Hartmut Lange expresses a
similar view of the significance of the changes of 1989 for conservatism commenting
Bertrand Russell iiuf3erte nach dem Kriegsverbrechertribunal in NUrnberg: Der europaische
Nihilismus harte in Nietzsche und Hitler seine historische Chance erhalten und ein fur allemal
verspielt, mit ebensoJchem Recht konnte man aber heute behaupten: Auch der rigorose
Rationalismus hatte in diesem Jahrhundert seine historische Chance und hat die aus den Fugen
geratene Welt keineswegs bessern konnen.!"
Lange sees the claim of Russell that "European nihilism" had lost its world historical
chance as justified. This was indeed a widely expressed sentiment in the direct post-war
years and reflected the mood that the "old world" was gone forever. National Socialism
discredited the traditional values of imperialism and racial superiority which had also
been a central tenet of the Anglo-American national identity before the war. In Germany
this was obviously particularly sharpened and led to the total discrediting of the political
elite and its traditional ideology. It is this background which formed the conceptions in
the 60s that the FRG had superseded the nation state in its decisive rejection of the
Sonderbewuj3tsein and the general suspicion towards more nationalist conceptions of
99 Karlheinz Weif3mann. 'Herausforderung und Entscheidung. Uber einen politischen Verismus
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statehood. This period is over and Lange concludes that the social discrediting of
traditional conservative ideology in the post-war phase has returned to haunt its
successor. After agreeing with Russell's conclusion on European nihilism, however, in
the light of the defeat of rationalism, Lange then falls back upon that very tradition in
order to comprehend the problems of the present. It would appear that Russell's verdict
enjoyed validity only for the post-war period as he claims
Die Welt zeigt sich heute deutlicher denn je nicht als Gelegenheit zur Vemunft, sondem als
"Wille und Vorstellung", die bis zur todlichen Erschopfung aneinandergeraten sind: Eindringlich
erfilllt sich auch die Behauptung Nietzsches, daJ3 der Mensch ohne Instnktschiene ein nicht
festgesetztes Tier sei und daJ3der Intellekt diesen Sachverhalt nicht bessert, sondem lediglich bis
in den Willen zur Bosheit hinein pervertiert. Und auch die Sorge Kierkegaards, wie man den
Menschen, der sich dem regellosen Risiko uberlalst, doch noch sicher in die Zucht und damit in
die Obhut eines allmachtigen, gerechten und liebenden Gottes zuruckgewinnen kann, ist als
Transendenzbegehren wieder aktuell.!"
The exhaustion of the idea of rational progress in human affairs has led to a renaissance
of interest in anti-enlightenment thinkers of which nineteenth century Germany can
boast the most rigorous of intellectual role models. The above quotation brings together
central aspects of conservative anti-modernist thinking of the nineteenth and early
twentieth century which was regarded as discredited by the experience of German
fascism and as anachronistic in the enlightened and "post-national" West German
society after 1945. As Lange notes, it appears that the social climate at the End of
History has created a constellation in which such intellectual tradition may once more
flourish after the discrediting of the classic modernist concepts of reason, universalism
and faith in the capacity of humanity to meaningful purpose in social affairs
traditionally associated with left wing and radical approaches to society and history.
This mood not only effects the formulation of traditional radical critiques of modern
society but also weakens the principles of Western liberalism which itself formally
based upon principles of democratic equality and universal values. Whilst Western
liberalism in the end proved more robust than either radical fascism or communism, it is
itself a potentially destructive form of political organisation precisely due to this
intellectual principle. This is a point addressed by Nolte. Whilst the fascist response was
ultimately incapable of defeating the socialist alternative during the period of the
European civil war, final victory of capitalism over the "last faith" of communism was
achieved by the pluralist system of liberal capitalism, thus
185
Mit negativer Wertung mochte man behaupten, die mit okonomischer Effizienz gepaarte Faulnis
des hedonistischen Individualismus habe den Sieg tiber den letzten Glauben errungen, welchen
der letzte Gegenglaube nicht zu erringen vermochte.!"
Nolte's aversion to liberalism, the weakness of which he considers a la Carl Schmitt, a
major reason for the emergence of the total state in the inter-war period, does not
prevent him from recognising its victory over the "last faith" of communism. This
appears, however, as a victory which was not driven by ideology but rather more by the
power of the "hedonistic individualism" of Western society. Does then, for Nolte, the
end of the Weltbiirgerkrieg signify an "End of History" in the sense implied by
Fukuyama? We can deduce the answer to this question from Nolte's negativer Wertung.
Whilst the end of the "last faith" is cause for celebration, he does not wish to terminate
history in the system of hedonistic individualism which itself is perceived as a threat to
the coherence of capitalist society. In this sense, one may perceive that the role formerly
played by communism in the conservative world view has been, to limited extent, been
supplanted by the older conservative critique of liberalism. Whilst Nolte supports the
economic liberalism of Western society, he perceives the greatest danger in the present
as deriving from the ascendancy of political liberalism. This critique of political
liberalism is employed to understand both past and present political developments. For
Nolte, arguing in the tradition of inter-war, pre-fascist, Conservative Revolutionaries,
the roots of the collapse of the post-First World War period lay in the traditions of self-
criticism of Western liberalism. Here he draws a clear parallel between the left of the
Weimar Republic and contemporary critical and left-liberal historians who reject the
thesis of the Weltbiirgerkrieg
Aber im Kern war der Boischevismus nichts anderes als die schon im Marxismus dogmatisierte,
dann verselbstandigte und mit einer sehr partiukularen Realitat verknupfte Selbstkritik der
"westlichen" Gesellschaft, die eben dadurch zur schrankenlosen Selbstgewil3heit und
Selbstpreisung wurde. Daher darf man sagen, dal3 die verstehende Affirmation den Vorwurf,
"konservativ" zu sein, nicht zu scheuen braucht: ohne Bewahrung gibt es kein Leben und die
Erhaltung des Lebens selbst in seiner Vielfalt und Gegensatzlichkeit ist die wichtigste von
allen.!"
Thus for Nolte, the emergence of bolshevism in the First World War was intimately
related to the critical tendencies which flourish in liberally constituted societies. The
partisan approach of the left wing intellectuals during the Historikerstreit, who through
102 ibid.p. 440-1.
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their positive concept of emancipation and normative concept of revolution exist in a
dangerous continuity with past movements. This appears as the crux of the matter for
Nolte, who rejects both the revolutionaries of 1789 and 1917 and assigns to this coterie
of "armed fanatics" the NS counter-revolutionaries of 1933. All three movements
destroyed tradition, the defence of which is associated with the defence of life itself and
appears as the historical mission of conservatism. The diversity of life which Nolte
identifies is not associated with the political current of pluralism (which he perceives as
a weakness of liberal society) but is rather more a coded plea for the cultivation of the
national particularism which he perceives as endangered by the universalist tendencies
of the critical left which, in tum, exists in a longer term continuity with previous
utopian, tradition-consuming, fanatical movements of modem history. This perspective
relates to the second function of post-communist "totalitarian" theory - that of
underwriting the conservative critique of emancipation and the plea for a return to
traditional values and the anthropologically essential community of the nation. This is a
perspective contained in the controversial article anschwellender Bocksgesang by the
playwright Botho StrauB originally published in Der Spiegel and reproduced as the
central text of the Selbstbewuftte Nation. In the figure of StrauB the New Right
perceived a paradigmatic character of the broader socio-political shift from the new Left
radicals of 1968 to the New Right radicals of 1989. StrauB offers the following
interpretation of his concept of the "right" which is worth repeating
Rechts zu sein, nicht aus billiger Uberzeugung, aus gemeinen Absichten, sondem von ganzem
Wesen, das ist, die Ubermacht einer Erinnerung zu erleben; die den Menschen ergreift, weniger
den Staatsbiirger, die ibn vereinsamt und erschuttert inmitten der modemen, aufgeklarten
Verhalmisse, in denen er sein gewohnliches Leben fuhrt, Diese Durchdrungenheit bedarf nicht
der abscheulichen und lacherlichen Maskerade einer hundischen Nachahmung, des Griffs in den
Secondhandshop der Unheilsgeschichte. Es handelt sich urn einen anderen Akt der Auflehnung:
gegen die Totalherrschaft der Gegenwart, die dem Individuum jede Anwesenheit von
unaufgeklarter Vergangenheit, von geschichtlichen Gewordensein, von mythischer Zeit rauben
und ausmerzen will. Anders als die linke, Heilsgeschichte parodierende Phantasie malt sich die
rechte kein kiinftiges Weltreich aus, bedarf keiner Utopie, sondem sucht den WiederanschluB an
die lange Zeit, die unbewegte, ist ihrem Wesen nach Tiefenerinnerung und insofem eine religiose
oder protopolitische Initiation. Sie ist immer und existentiell eine Phantasie des Verlustes und
nicht der (irdischen) Verheifsung.!'"
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In the above we may glean a paradigmatic appreciation of the essence of conservatism
promoted by right wing thinkers which is, for Straub, above all a political position
which is grounded in anthropological insights into the "essence" of human existence and
the need for tradition and a sense of myth mediated through history in order to counter
the (totalitarian) temptations of the promise of future utopia. The above represents a
critique of the form of Verfassungspatriotismus argued by left wing republicans and
who, or New Right thinkers, instrumentalise the Unheilsgeschichte of Auschwitz in
order to legitimise the Heilsgeschichte of civil society which itself represents a form of
"totalitarianism" intent on converting the "human" into the citoyen in the service of a
system of belief predicated upon universal values and orientated towards a progressive
emancipation from tradition and myth. For Straub, the phenomenon of "emancipatory"
educational ism plays a key role in producing a cultural of youthful indifference and also
for the emergence of Far Right rebellion against the political-cultural taboos of the
"'68" generation. Strauf indirectly acknowledges the proximity between the form of
nationalism represented in criminal form by radical right wing extremists and the form
of "traditional" nationalism and mysticism propagated by the New Right in contending
Der Rechte in solchem Sinn ist vom Neonazi so weit entfemt wie der FuBballfreund vom
Hooligan, ja mehr noch: Die Zerstorung innerhalb seiner Interessensphare wird ihm zum argsten,
erbittertsten Feind. (Freilich: durfen von uns verwahrloste Kinder zu unseren Feinden
werdenrj.!"
Whilst Strauf is concerned to distance Neonazi sentiment from the traditionalist
nationalism desired by the right his contention that the Far Right exists within the
right's own "sphere of interest" and thus requires particular sharp condemnation of the
right reveals an innate relatedness of nationalism propagated by both. Whilst New Right
intellectuals of course must be distinguished from the racist Far Right, their polemics
against immigration and desire for a "purer" form of patriotism derive from related
sentiment. In a sense one may perceive parallels here with conservative condemnations
of National Socialism contained in the writings of thinkers such as Nolte who on the one
hand perceive an element of historical justification for the emergence of fascism within
the context of the Russian Revolution and the breakdown of inter-war liberalism and yet
understand that National Socialism's "usurpation" of conventional conservative values
acted to discredit this intellectual political heritage. In this sense too, one may perceive
the New Right's intellectual antecedents in the pre-fascism Weimar Right who
106 ibid.
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exercised a sharp polemic against republican democracy and yet remained suspicious of
the mass movement of National Socialism and afterwards bemoaned the discrediting of
conservatism through the experience of the Third Reich.
In contrast to both the inter-war Conservative Revolutionary critique of universal
humanist values via recourse to the discourse race, or of post-war anticommunism,
Nolte's critique of universalist tendencies identified with the left assumes the form of a
defence of the concept of "difference" most commonly associated with the left'"
Diejenige Differenz und Partikularitat namlich, welche von den Postmodernen Linken verteidigt
wird, ist fur die heutige gemaliigte Rechte, die der Nation. Damit setzt diese freilich von seiten
der ganzen Linken dem Vorwurf des "Nationalismus" aus, und sie mag als obsolete Spatform
eines Phanomens des 19. Jahrhunderts oder gar des Faschismus erscheinen. J08
Such accusations are, of course, refuted and Nolte contends that the contemporary right
is less concerned with the cultivation of "nationalism" in the style of nineteenth century
and rather more with the cultivation of "national consciousness" i.e. the consciousness
of national particularism and difference. Thus the rehabilitation of the discourse of
particularist values of national culture, although it assumes the "PC" style of a defence
of cultural "difference" in fact relates to a much older concern of conservatism - the
critique of political liberalism and formally "universal" values. In this manner, Nolte
adopts the left motif of "cultural difference" in order to undermine the presumed
hegemony of left-liberal culture in contemporary Germany. Thomas Meyer has
identified this connection on the level of "culture" and speaks of the process of
"retorsion" whereby the left-wing, "multicultural" position is employed to argue the
particularism of German culture.!" For Nolte, whilst the contemporary right apparently
supports the greater union of Europe, its primary concern is that this will not lead to the
subsumation of the nation under a form of supra-state or even "world government".
These are trends which Nolte identifies with the political liberalism of the left and the
universalising principles of "civil society"
107 cf Jan MUlier, 'From National Identity to National Interest: The Rise (and Fall) of Germany's
New Right.' in German Politics. Vo1.8. Nr. 3. December 1999. Frank Casso Essex. p. 3.
108 Nolte. in Schacht. Schwilk. 1994. op. cit. p. 160.
109 Thomas Meyer, 'Identitlltswahn. Die Politisierung des kulturellen Unterschieds.' Autbau.
Berlin. 1997. p. 45-52.
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Es ist sehleehterdings nieht mehr zu iibersehen, daB der Liberalismus, sofem er sieh zum
Liberismus fortentwiekelt oder von diesem abgelost wird, die Nationen totet und nach dem Ende
einer gigatischen Bevolkerungsverschiebung auch die Menschheit toten konnte."?
Thus Nolte returns to the traditions of the Conservative revolutionaries and the anti-
liberal discourse which played an important role in cultivating the intellectual-political
atmosphere which, in combination with other factors, led to the overthrow of the
Weimar republic. III As Conservative Revolutionaries railed against Weimar democracy,
so the New Right challenges the "liberal" foundations of German political culture which
are understood as "Western" values. The New Right sought political influence in the
new Germany and attempted a paradigm shift to the right which was derived from older,
pre-1945 antidemocratic and anti-Western political traditions. Yet the influence of this
marginal group in terms of political efficacy is minimal. The failure of the right to
organise a coup in the Berlin FDP around ex Attorney General Alexander von Stahl
displayed there was little resonance for the ideas of this coterie of right wing
conservatives. The most provocative act of this group was the declaration of an Aufruf
gegen das Vergessen on 8 May 1995 which contested the reading of the end of the war
as a liberation for the Germans. Whilst this perspective may have been more consensual
among the right in the 1980s, the response to the Aufruf was largely negative even
within the conservative camp. New Right thinkers were essentially mistaken in
presuming that the exhaustion of emancipatory aspirations and politics would lead to a
revitalisation of the traditions of German nationalism. Whilst these thinkers do not
appear to hold much sway in political culture and their attempts to offer a reading of the
national socialist state as a modernising regime appear rather more compromising than
legitimising, the underlying motif of their understanding of the roots of National
Socialism does appear congruent with liberal conservative readings of the National
Socialist regime. The notion that the enlightenment and "modernism" are ultimately to
be blamed for the Holocaust is a theme which resonates with thinkers who could never
be described a recidivist nationalists. Thus Zygmunt Baumann has argued, in similar
fashion to the notions underpinning Adorno and Horkheimer's Dialektik that the
scientific rationality of the modern age led to the barbaric catastrophe of Nazi racial
ideology.'" In this sense, although these thinkers exercise no influence at the level of
110 ibid. pp. 160-1.
III ef Herbert Marcuse's 1934 article, 'Der Kampf gegen den Liberalismus in der totalitaren
Staatsauffassung.' in Abendroth. 1972. op. cit. pp. 42-74.
112 Zygmunt Baumann, 'Das Jahrhundert der Lager.' Frankfurter Hefte (1) 1994. pp. 32-33.
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political culture, their underlying hostility to humanist and universal values describes a
more consensual mood. Before examining contemporary political readings of the
national socialist past, it is necessary to consider the development of the left-liberal
discourse of identity in post-unification society to which the thinkers of the New Right
take such exception.
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6. The "Westernisation" of the German Nation
In the following chapter I wish to examine the development of the "post-national" left in
the context of unified nation. I first wish to consider perceptions among left-liberal
thinkers that unification represented a threat to the Western political culture of the
Federal Republic. I then wish to examine the emergence of a discourse of national
identity which synthesises a progressive model of "Western" political culture with the
"German nation" in a democratic-nationalist identity. Finally I wish to examine the
post-unification position of Jurgen Habermas as one of the few thinkers who remains
formally committed to enlightenment values and the continuation of the "modernist
project" of emancipation in a "post-national constellation".
6.1. The Endangered Republic?
An initial response of left thinkers in both East and West to the unification question
assumed the form of a plea for a form of confederation between the FRG and a reformed
GDR. For Habermas, this position was linked to his preference for a solution based
upon Article 146 of the Basic Law which foresaw a plebiscitary redrafting of the
constitution rather than the accession route codified in Article 23. This preference rested
upon his long held orientation towards a republican model of social organisation. For
Habermas it appeared ironic that precisely those conservatives who, during the period of
division, had pleaded for reunification were now formulating their justification for state
unity via recourse to article 23. For Habermas this testified to revanchist sentiments on
the right as it evoked the impression that the conditions for article 146 remained
unfulfilled thus implying an attachment to the former Reich territories of East Prussia
and Silesia.' For Habermas article 146 contained the potential to direct future
developments between the two states in a republican manner
Nur der Volksentschied iiber einen Verfassungsvorschlag, und zwar zu der Alternative zwischen
einem gesamtdeutschen Bundesstaat und einer Foderation, die der Bundesrepublik das
Grundgesetzt beizubehalten erlaubt, raumt allen Biirgem die Chance ein, nein zu sagen. Er macht
ein qualifiziertes Minderheitstum moglich; damit wird die Entscheidung der Mehrheit erst zu
I Jiirgen Habermas, 'Der DM-Nationalismus.' in Die Zeit 30.03.1990. Reproduced in, Volker
Gransow und Konrad Jarausch. (Hrsg) 'Die deutsche Vereinigung. Dokumente zu
Biirgerbewegung, Annaherung und Beitritt.' Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, Berend von
Nottbeck. Koln.199I.p. 150.
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einem bewuBt vollzogenen Akt, urn den sich das republikanische Selbstverstandnis kunftiger
Generationen wird kristallisieren konnen. Erst angesichts einer frei zu entscheidenden Alternative
kann zu BewuBtsein kommen, was unter den Jungeren ohnehin ein weitverbreitetes Gefiihl ist:
daB die Konstituierung einer einzigen Staatsburgernation auf den bisherigen Territorien der
Bundesrepublik und der DDR keineswegs durch vorpolitische Gegebenheiten der
Sprachgemeinschaft, der Kultur oder der Geschichte priijudizert ist. Deshalb mochte man
wenigstens gefragt werden.'
We may recognise some of the themes familiar to Habermas political theory which, in
the tum of 1989-90, he sought to bring into the discussion over the practical question of
German unification. As the above excerpt makes clear, Habermas was an opponent of
unification and not merely because of the eventual decision to unify in accordance with
article 23. More important for Habermas is the danger of a return to the pre-political,
anti-Western tenets of national conceptions expressed in the community oflanguage and
common culture of the Volksnation advocated by new right intellectuals in opposition to
a republican model comprised of politically conscious, free and equal citoyen. From this
perspective even an undesirable "yes" to unification of the two states would have
represented a conscious political decision rather than mere West German arrogance
underwritten by the economic muscle of the DM, a decision of the political elite or a
metapyhsically conceived idea of a "return to normality".
Habermas scepticism towards the concept of the "German nation" is shaped by a critical
reflection of the National Socialist experience. For Habermas, the experience of the
Third Reich serves as an eternal warning of the dangers inherant in traditional
formulations of German nationalism and national identity. In political terms, this epoch
underwrites the obligation of contemporary Germany to orientate itself towards
universal, republican values.' In place of the "return" to a primordial, naturalised nation
state which exists above society, critical commentators emphasised the importance of
the break with national traditions and continuities in 1945 and promoted varying forms
of Constitutional Patriotism as a means of regulating the sovereign will of both the
Western and Eastern German citizens. The act of determining a new consensus over the
norms of post-unification society, to be codified by the drafting of a new constitution,
was also intended to finally give the East German public sphere a political voice after
more than 40 years of enforced silence and to break with the tradition of voting with the
2 Habermas. ibid. p. 151.
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political elite. In this sense, reunification was regarded as an opportunity to articulate a
republican, "enlightened" political consciousness in German society as a counter to the
traditionalist and regressive national concepts of the right.
Similar arguments were forwarded by thinkers in both East and West as wtinessed in the
declaration of notable East German writers and artists Fur unser Land which foresaw a
reform of the GDR under retention of the antifascist and humanist principles, which the
East German regime formally referred to if never substantially realised, as a
sozialistische Alternative zur Bundesrepublik:' The dramaturgist and playwright Heiner
MUller, who also undersigned the declaration, argued for a reform of the GDR and
perceived the possibility of wresting the concept of utopia from the terrorism of Stalinist
rule.' Likewise, GUnter Grass argued for a confederation and, similar to Habennas,
supported his rejection of the realisation of a unified, sovereign German nation state
with recourse to a critical reading of German national history. For Grass, the crimes of
the last unitary German nation state eternally discredited the development of German
hegemony in Europe and also the instrumentalisation of "the nation" as a political tool
of social mobilisation
Die Wortblase "Wiedervereinigung" platzte, weil niemand, der bei Verstand und geschlagen mit
Gedachtnis ist, zulassen kann, daB es abermals zu einer Machtballung in der Mitte Euopas
kommt: Die Groflmachte, nun wieder betont als Siegermachte, gewiB nicht, nicht die Hollander,
nicht die Darien. Aber auch wir Deutsche nicht, denn jener Einheitstaat, denen wechselnde
Vollstrecker wahrend nur knapp fiinfundsiebzig Jahren anderen und uns Leid, Triimmer,
Niederlagen, Millionen Fluchtlinge, Millionen Tote und die Last nicht zu bewaltigender
Verbrechen ins Geschichtsbuch geschrieben haben, verlangt nach keiner Neuautlage und sollte -
so gutwillig wir uns mittlerweile zu geben verstehen - nie wieder politischen Willen entzunden."
Grass also feared that the emerging diffuse national feeling would suffocate "rational
'national consciousness" and denigrate the value of the successful East German
revolution as an instance of republican self-determination.' Western anti-national critics
3 ibid. 151-2.
4 'Eine sozialistische Alternative. Appel von Schriftstellern und Kuntlern der DDR am 26. II.
1989.' cited in Herman Glaser, 'Die Mauer tiel, die Mauer steht. Ein deutsches Lesebuch 1989-
1999.' DTV.Milnchen. 1999. pp. 59-60.
S 'Dem Terrorismus die Utopie entreiBen. Alternative DDR.' in Heiner MUlier, 'Zur Lage dec
Nation.' Rotbuch Taschenbuch. Berlin. pp.9-24.
6 Gunter Grass, 'Deutscher Lastenausgleich. Wider das dumpfe Einheitsgebot. Reden und
Gesprache.' Luchterhand Literaturverlag GmbH, Frankfurt am Main.1990. p. 8.
7 Gunter Grass. ibid. p.7. Thus noting the change in the democratic content of the chant Wir sind
das Volk implying an identity as "the people" in opposition to the political elite in comparison to
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of the unification process were disturbed by the arrogant overtones implied in the
"annexation" of the GDR facilitated by the victory of the West. During a parliamentary
discussion on the eve of reunification, the Green politician Antje Vollmer perceived ein
bundesdeutscher Nationalismus, ein bundesdeutscher Wohlstandschauvinismus in the
contributions of politicians from the ruling coalition. Vollmer emphasised that whereas
democracy had been a "gift" of the Allies to the FRG in 1949, the contemporary events
in the GDR represented the first instance in history where Germans had themselves
consciously fought for and attained democracy." She thus felt compelled to condemn the
demand for reunification as misplaced and offer support for the reform process in the
GDR as an act of democratic self-determination.
Left wing arguments for a German-German confederation, reform of the GDR, a
plebiscite in accordance with article 146 or a rejection of unification via recourse to
memory of Auschwitz found little popular resonance during the period of unification
which was fulfilled via the accession of the restored Lander of the former GDR into the
FRG. The appeal of a materially prosperous FRG held greater sway than an appeal for
the retention of socialist principles or antifascism and criticisms of the mass
population's desire for material improvement sharpened the divide between
intellectuals, many of whom had enjoyed a privileged status in the GDR, and the people
evoking images of high minded figures peeping from the ivory tower and condemning
the vulgarity of those intent on bettering their material lot. The republican reading of the
events which led to the implosion of the GDR regime was suppressed in favour of a
reading which interpreted the collapse of the Berlin Wall as a victory of the anti-
Communist Westbindung of the FRG and as a historical vindication of capitalism over
the socialist alternative. Similarly, in the decision to publicly celebrate the bureaucratic
codification of unity on the 3. October rather than the act of self assertion of the people
on the 9. November, some also perceived a missed opportunity to anchor a sense of
republican Verfassungspatriotismus in contemporary historical consciousness.
Commentating on the events of the 9. November, the liberal historian Christian Graf
von Krockow explained
the adopted slogan of Wir sind ein Volk implying an identity as the "German" people thus
legitimising reunification.
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Dieses Ereignis war die direkte Folge der standig anschwellenden Demonstrationen, die in den
Wochen zuvor in der DDR stattgefunden hatten; dieser Tag harte zum Zeichen dafur getaugt, wie
fur die Franzosen der Sturm auf die Bastille, daB etwas Neues begann und daB ein
Mundigwerden zur Freiheit die Einheit begrundete."
Thus, for Krockow, 1989 is a date which could have been interpreted as existing in a
historical continuity with the democratic-nationalist and republican traditions of the
spirit of 1789 and the progressive legacy of Western political culture. Essential to this
appreciation is the emphasis upon the conscious "coming of age" of the collective
citoyen as opposed to the pre-political "belonging" of an ethnic Volk. The course of
unity, however, failed to support this enlightened reading of reunification as
representing a form of "German Bastille" and is therefore criticised by von Krockow.
For von Krockow, the collapse of the GDR represented the collapse of an
Obrigkeitsstaat. Herein he perceives the possible historical-political foundations of a
concept of identity which was grounded m a republican form of
Verfassungspatriotismus and which eschewed the "German" traditions of identity
creation upon the basis of Feindbilder." Krockow employs this concept in order to
found a republican concept of identity based upon a positive celebration of the
Miindigkeit, or political assertion and "coming of age" of the East German citizenry.
For critical and left-liberal thinkers attached to Habermas concept of post-national,
Western identity, German unification, predicated upon the political and intellectual
exhaustion of the socialist alternative society, represented a profound challenge and
awakened fears of a return to pre-1945 traditions of German nationalism. The essential
fear of liberal sceptics of the German nation state is that 1989 had acted to erase the
progressive, pedagogic-political value of the year 1945 as marking the beginning of a
konstruktiver Lernprozefi" or process of politischer Zivilisierung", Left-liberals
perceived the unification of the German nation as a potential threat to this progressive
political re-education process and as having reopened the lines of historical continuity
with older national traditions which had both shaped and then been discredited by the
8 'Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestags.' Stenographische Berichte. 11. Wahlperiode
1731178. Band.151. 1989. 'Bericht zur Lage der Nation im geteilten Deutschland.' 173 Sitzung.
Mittwoch den 8. November. 1989. p. 13031.
9 Christian Grafvon Krockow, 'Die Deutschen vor ihrer Zukunft.' Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag
GmbH, Reinbek bei Hamburg. 1995.p. 124-5.
10 ibid. p. 122.
II Wehler 1995. op. cit. p.311.
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National Socialist expenence. Left-liberal anxiety over a potential "return of the
Sonderweg" stems from a fear that 1989 may come to displace the centrality of 1945 in
the political culture of the new republic. Essentially this perspective operates from the
perception of a historic dichotomy between the nation and democracy in German
history. From this perspective, the danger becomes that it is no longer the liberation
from National Socialism which acts as the anchor point of the political culture of
German society but the "liberation" from the dual hegemony of the superpowers and the
"return" to the naturalised continuities of the nation state. J3 Thus the critical aversion to
interpretations of a "renormalisation" of German social conditions is grounded in fears
for the future of German democracy. In a speech in the Frankfurt Paulskirche to mark
the fiftieth anniversary of the 8. May, Jiirgen Habermas delivered the following
criticism of conservative celebrations of the "return to normality"
Aus der Perspektive der Wiederherstellung des Nationalstaats rucken die Kontinuitaten der
Entwicklung seit der Grundung des Bismarck-Reiches in den Vordergrund. Die 1945 geteilte
Nation hat erst nach 1989 ihre nonnale Form zuriickgewonnen. Deshalb erscheinen die
vergangenen 50 Jahre als Peri ode eines Sonderwegs, wahrend dessen die Bundesrepublik eine
mehr oder minder liebenswerte, aber nicht ganz ernst zu nehmende Rheinbundexistenz im
Schatten der Weltgeschichte gefristet hat. 14
From this critical perspective, interpretations of reunification which imply a return to
the "normality" of the nation state denigrate the value of the enforced departure from
German national traditions in 1945 and attempt to develop a normative social status for
the national idiom. The apparent renaissance of conventional formulations of national
identity appear to such commentators as a retardation of the political culture of the
Federal Republic which brings with it the older dangers of German national
hypertrophy. Thus in an interview in 1993, Habermas voiced concern over the danger of
a reconstitution of the historic German Sonderbewufitsein stemming from the new found
confidence ofneo-conservative intellectuals and politicians which he believes endangers
the republican principles of post war West Germany
12 Habennas. 1996. op cit. p. 275.
13 cffhomas Assheuer, 'Das Deutschlandspiel.' in Die Zeit.Nr.37, 03.09.1998.
"Jurgen Habennas, 'Die Normalitat einer Berliner Republik. Kleine Politische Schriften VIII.'
Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main.1995.p.I72.
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Das deutsche Sonderbewul3tsein regeniert sich von Stunde zu Stunde. Der ganze intellektuelle
Mull, den wir uns vom Hals geschafft hatten, wird wieder autbereitet, und das mit dem
avantgardistischen Gestus, fur das Neue Deutschland die neuen Antworten parat zu haben."
Here Habermas touches upon an important aspect of the self identity of the new right.
Due to the taboo over the nation during the period of division it is possible for neo-
conservative national thinkers or the "Generation Berlin"16 to present themselves as
radical questioners of the intellectual status quo and to cast the post-war critical "'68"
generation of thinkers as the staid defenders of an essentially indefensible historical
status-quo. Habermas perceives the renaissance of neo-conservative positions as a
retrograde development which challenges the progressive political education process
into the norms of Western political culture embarked upon in the post war FRG. Gunter
Grass offered a similarly pessimistic survey
Es gibt die demokratische Linke nur noch als beschworenes Gespenst oder allenfalls in Gestalt
einiger zum Foil degradierter Einzelganger. Eines dieser restliehen Exemplare sprieht heute zu
Ihnen. Ieh habe mieh umgesehen, Auschau gehalten: Die Linke ist zermurbt, Der Dritte Weg ist
vemagelt. Die letzten Verfassungspatrioten sind demnachst im Zoo zu bestaunen. 17
Grass articulated a distinct air of fatalism resulting from the implosion of established
left wing social and political approaches after the collapse of the East and the clear lack
of resonance for a "Third Way" between capitalism and bureaucratic socialism and the
perceived waning of the concept of Verfassungspatriotismus after the erosion of the
post-national basis of both German states. although critical of concepts of "utopia"
associated with socialism, Heiner MUller also perceived the outbreak of ethnic and
nationalist conflict in regions of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc as resulting
for the search for values after the death of the twentieth century "God" of communism. IS
Whilst such sentiment, on the German left, reflected a certain feeling of mourning at the
passing of the constellation of post-war liberal certainties, left-liberal constitutional
patriots did not simply abandoned the ideas and principles of the republican civil society
after unification. Krockow expressed what appears a more typical perception when he
criticises Grass for his fatalism and suggests that such sentiment may well play into the
15 Jurgen Habermas, 'Das deutsehe Sonderbewul3tsein regeneriert sich von Stunde zu Stunde.
Interview mit Wolfram Schutte und Thomas Assheuer.' in Frankfurter Rundsehau vom 12.Juni
1993. in Habermas. 1995.p.86.
16 Thus Assheuer in Die Zeit. op. cit.
J7 cited in Christian Grafvon Krockow. 1995. op. cit. p. 120.
18 Heiner Muller, 'Jenseits der Nation.' Rotbuch. Berlin. 1990. p. 17-18.
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hands of precisely those national thinkers viewed with suspicion by the left." Whilst
few, Habermas most notably, continued the post-national identity discourse, many more
left liberals sought a form of rapprochement between the "post-national" tenets of
Constitutional Patriotism and the returned national idiom. In the following two sections
I wish to examine national and post-national answers to the question of identity from the
left-liberal milieu.
6.2 Transcending the Dichotomy between Nation and Republic
In his survey of German national and nationalist thought and practice since the late
eighteenth century, the left-liberal social historian Otto Dann refused to cast the future
national-political direction of unified Germany as a fait accompli. Dann suggested that
the left would do well to internalise the lessons of the first nation state after the purging
of liberals during the "reconfiguration" of the Reich at the end of l870s and challenge
the conservative right in defining the national-political culture of the new Germany
Offen und fUr die Zukunft der Bundesrepublik als Nationalstaat entscheidend ist vor allern die Frage, ob es
den demokratischen Kraften gelingen wird, die nationalpolitischen Institutionen, Symbole, Ideen und
GefUhle in ihrem Sinne zu pragen. 1m Deutschen Reich war die nationale Parole bald nach seiner Griindung
vom konservativ-antidemokratischen Lager okkupiert worden"
For Dann, Krockow and others, as we shall see, whilst the altered circumstances of
unified Germany eroded the post-national basis of their traditional political outlook, the
republican project of Verfassungspatriotismus had to be reformulated rather than
abandoned. In the context of the racist attacks and murders of the early years of unified
Germany, this project of democratisation and the construction of a political culture
based upon principles of civil society attained an extremely sharp focus which suggested
that older, traditional forms of "ethnic-nationalism" were in danger of resurfacing.
Whilst this discourse latched onto more established themes of left liberal discourse such
as a republican social model orientated towards the "Western" enlightenment political
culture championed as the core of the post-national identity developed in West
Germany, it represents a qualitatively new stream in a fundamental respect: In post-
unification Germany the democratic, "Western" and enlightened political legacy which
was once perceived as existing in a historically dichotomous relationship to traditional
19 Krockow. ibid.
20 Otto Dann, 'Nation und Nationalismus in Deutschland 1770 - 1990.' Verlag C.H Beck.
Munchen, 1993.p. 325.
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national concepts has been synthesised with the contemporary nation. This results in an
uneven, reciprocal, process whereby the concept of the German nation is "Westernised"
and the notion of Constitutional Patriotism is "nationalised".
Early on in the unification discussion a current of left-liberal thought emerged which
distinguished itself from the principled anti-national stance of Habermas which yet,
nonetheless, invoked the progressive, enlightened, Western political culture championed
by him. In this reading, the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and the return to the social form
of the nation state did not represent a defeat of progressive ideas but rather more their
fulfilment. The historian Jiirgen Kocka offered an interpretation of the revolutions of the
East which suggested that 1989-90 represented the historical victory of the "Western"
enlightened political culture championed by progressives during the historical debates
of the 1980s. Thus whilst Kocka formally shares the progressive, republican political
values of Habermas, he diverges in the assessment of the role played by these values
during the process of unification. Whilst Habermas perceived unification through article
23 as a defeat of republican conceptions of social organisation, Kocka perceives
precisely in this route an affirmation of Western republican democratic traditions
developed in the FRG and now extended to the former GDR. As such this is a reading
which counterpoises and yet parallels liberal conservative interpretations of the
"Westernisation" of the former GDR - in this reading the Westernisation of the GDR
does not only assume the form of an expansion of the Free Market and West German
institutions but rather more an extension of progressive Western political culture. Kocka
accurately observed of the revolutions of 1989-90 that they were distinguished from
previous models of revolution in that they were not characterised by the development of
new ideas or utopias or even by a merging of alternative ideas such as the "Third Way"
between capitalism and communism. Whilst the revolutions of 1989 did not espouse
new ideals, they were, for Kocka, driven by the desire to retrospectively join the form of
Western political culture advocated by liberal thinkers during the period of division
Die Revolutionen von 1989 wurden von demokratischen und freiheitlichen Ideen geleitet, die auf
die Durchsetzung der Grundprinzipien der burgerlichen Gesellschaft (civil society) und
reprasentativer, pluralistischer, rechts- und verfassungsstaatlicher Regierungsformen zielen und
Teil der Tradition westlichen politischen Denkens zumindest seit der Aufklarung sind. In diesem
Sinne waren die Revolutionen von 1989 Aufhol-Revolutionen, In diesem Sinn hat das Jahr 1989
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wirklich gezeigt, daB die franzosichen Revolution die Zukunft der Russischen war und nicht
umgekehrt."
One can perceive in this reading a left-liberal interpretation of 1989-90 as a "victory of
the West" which, however, is neither based in anticommunism, a sense of Free Market
superiority nor indeed conventional nationalism but rather more in terms familiar to the
classic post-national argument of the progressive left. Yet unlike previous positions,
Kocka perceived in 1989 a rapprochement between the formally antagonistic concepts
of nation and democracy which had been intermeshed by the association made between
national unification and integration into the West." In this sense Kocka has argued that
unification in accordance with article 23 was paradigmatic of the transformation of the
Eastern social model in that it did not represent something new but rather more an
extension of the FRG.23
Since unification this period has been historicised and transformed into a positive
historical legacy for the contemporary nation. From this perspective one may suggest
that the waning of emancipatory or alternative political models has led to a rethinking of
the tenets of FRG society. In this sense, Joschka Fischer concluded that after 1989 the
choices facing humanity could be reduced to the formula Kapitalismus oder
Kapitalismus and argued for the retention of the consensus model of the Federal
Republic as the model of a progressive compromise between capitalism and
democracy." Whilst liberal conservatives perceive the continuation of the technocratic
form of Western orientation particularly in terms of foreign policy, so left liberals argue
for a continuation of the FRG model in terms of the progressive Westbindung. The
primary distinction between liberal conservative and left liberal readings of the positive
legacy of the Westbindung is apparent over reception of the historical and contemporary
nation. Liberal conservatives remain attached to the historical concept of the German
nation and attempt to synthesise the period of West German division with particular
21 Jilrgen Kocka, 'Umbruche - aber ohne neue utopische Ideen. Die Sogkraft des Nationalen und
der Beitrag der Bundesrepublik zur Revolution in der DDR.' in, 'Historiker betrachten
Deutschland.' op. cit. 1992. p. 99.
22 Kocka. ibid. p. 98. and Kocka, 'Vereinigungskrise. Zur Geschichte der Gegenwart.'
Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht. Gottingen. 1995. p. 20.
23 Jilrgen Kocka, 'Crisis of Unification: How Germany Changes.' in Michael Mertes, Steven
Muller, Heinrich August Winkler. (eds.) 1996. op. cit. p. 196.
24 Joschka Fischer, 'Kapitalisrnus oder Kapitalisrnus. Frontverlaufe in der Auseinandersetzung urn
Republik, Sozialstaat und okologischen Urnbau.' in 'Blauer fur deutsche und intemationale
Politk.' 3. '96. (Marz) p. 284.
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transhistorical continuities of the German nation. Left-liberal constructs of a modem,
Western concept of the nation in post-unification soceity are, in contrast, predicated
upon the intellectual internalisation of the break with national traditions in 1945.25 Thus
whilst for conservatives 1989 appears as the most important historical-political marker,
for left liberals the primary historical date remains 1945 as this heralded the caesura
necessary for the gradual political-moral inclusion of West Germany into broader
Western enlightenment culture. This is the underlying assumption which led Habermas
to contend that 1989 will only ever remain a cause for celebration as long as 1945 is
remembered as the central historical-political caesura in German history." In this sense,
Kocka makes a plea for the retention of the "enlightened" political culture which the
FRG integrated itself into in the post-war period which is reminiscent of Habermas plea
for a selective appropriation of tradition
Wir konnen uns die Erbschaften auch keineswegs aussuchen. Aber man muf3 fur die Zukunft sich
entschieden in die eine oder andere Kontinuitatslinie stell en und gegenuber den ubrigen auf
Distanz gehen, ohne sie zu verleugnen oder zu verges sen. Ich pladiere daflir, das vereinigte
Deutschland konsequent in der Kontinuitat der Bundesrepublik zu verankem. Der tiefe Umbruch
von 1989/90 darf die Zasur der Jahre urn 1945 nicht relativieren. Vielmehr sollte und kann er sie
besiege In.27
Thus whilst Kocka understands the new Germany as existing in several lines of
historical continuity: the GDR, National Socialism and Western Europe he opts,
understandably, for the post-war Federal Republic as a past which should guide the
present. Yet whilst the celebration of 1945 over 1989 indicates the importance of the
break with the historical German nation and its anti-Western, anti-democratic political
and intellectual traditions, this does not indicate a continuation of the anti-national
discourse of the divided years. Far more, the retention of 1945 as the central historical-
political caesurae of modem German history forms the basis for a reconfiguration of the
German concept of nation in tune with the values incorporated by Western political
culture during the post-war period. This represents a celebration of the end of the
Sonderweg in 1945 which had steered the nation in an anti-Western course and
ultimately led to the horrors of the National Socialist regime." The only continuity
25 cfThomas Assheuer, 'Das Deutschlandspiel.' Die Zeit. Nr. 37 vom 3.9. 1998.
26 cfHabermas, '1989 im Schatten von 1945. Zur Normalitat einer kiinftigen Berliner Republik. '
in Habermas. 1995. op. cit. pp. 167-88.
27 Jurgen Kocka, 'Nur keinen neuen Sonderweg. Jedes Stuck Entwestlichung ware als Preis fur
die deutsche Einheit zu hoch.' in 'Historiker betrachten Deutschland.' 1992. op. cit. p. 184.
28 ibid. p. 185.
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which should be salvaged in the new national context of post-unification society is the
progressive democratic culture of the FRG rather than the compromised national
traditions which led to the collapse of 1945. For this reason, it was not only justified but
also politically astute to pursue unification as the integration of the former GDR into the
FRG rather than an attempted "middle way" between the two systems." This implies for
Kocka, the relinquishing of a specific "German" national identity in the traditional sense
and rather more the open acknowledgement of the Western roots of the FRG, and new
Germany, in Western political culture
Nicht das Zusammenwachsen zu irgendeiner neuen national-deutschen Identitat mit
uberraschenden Inhalten und neuen Strukturen ist die Aufgabe der nachsten Zukunft, sondem die
moglichst taktvolle Ubertragung des - entwicklungsbediirftigen - bundesrepublikansichen
Modells auf den Bereich der ehemaligen DDR. Die Vereinigung als Mittel zur Demokratisierung
und Verwestlichung der DDR - das ergibt einen Sinn und definiert eine Aufgabe, die uns lange
noch beschaftigen wird."
Thus for Kocka, the political cultural attachment towards the West which emerged in
(West) Germany only after the horrific apogee and collapse of the Sonderweg in the
National Socialist regime, must be retained and developed in the new German nation to
ensure that this remains a historical continuity which remains politically discredited if
not forgotten. Whilst Kocka perceives the form of nation state and nationalism which
ended in the National Socialist regime as definitively over, this does not signify for him
the end of the nation state which remains the normal form of political organisation of
European societies into which the "post-national" societies of both FRG and GDR have
been integrated. Although the nation of the present is characterised by supra- and sub-
national levels of organisation and interests, he does not perceive a development of
society beyond the nation state." Whilst Kocka does not underestimate the problems of
unified Germany resulting from the socially dislocative effects of the transfer of the
Free Market onto the East and the obstacles to innere Einigung presented by the
different social and cultural experiences in East and West,32 his understanding of the
political culture of the new Germany remains defined by the attachment to the post-
national, Western principles developed in the FRG which, however, now need to be
synthesised with the nation state. As such his interpretation is indicative of the
29 ibid. p. 190.
30 ibid. pp. 191-2.
31 Kocka. 1995. op. cit. p. 30.
32 ctKocka. in Mertes, Muller, Winkler. 1996. op. cit. pp. 198-205.
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transcendence (in the sense of a simultaneous process of negation and continuation on a
higher plane) of the "post-national" left-liberal discourse of the FRG in post-unification
society. These are ideas which have been developed most clearly in the 1990s by the
historian Heinrich August Winkler.
The events of 1989-90 clearly exercised a corrosive effect upon such positions and
Winkler was one of the first to reassess his position of the 1980s. Writing in 1990,
shortly before the bureaucratic codification of unification, Winkler repeated the earlier
critical perception of a historical dichotomy between the concepts of nation and
democracy in the German nation state between 1871 and 1945 and perceived in the
retarded democratisation of Germany the essence of the Sonderweg," For this reason,
Winkler rejected the conservative interpretation of 1989-90 as a "return to normality". A
return to the classic German nation state was not on the agenda for Winkler and he
contended that the world and European powers would not countenance German unity if
it were to assume the form of a return to the traditional German sovereign nation state."
Despite this, Winkler perceived continuities between 1871 and 1989 above all in the
confirmation of the kleindeutsch solution to the German question and with the creation
of the first "national democracy" of the Weimar Republic. Writing three years after
unification in a study of the Weimar Republic, Winkler perceived the following
parallels between the first national republic and the second
Das seit 1990 vereinigte Deutschland ist wieder, was bis dahin nur die Weimarer Republik war
oder zumindest nach dem Willen ihrer Grunder sein sollte: ein demokratischer deutscher
Nationalstaat. Zweifel, ob in Deutschland be ides zusammenpaf3t, die Demokratie und ein
Nationalstaat, sind drinnen und drauf3en zu vernehmen."
Thus Winkler touched upon a problem for those left-liberal thinkers who seek to
synthesise the concepts of "German nation" and "Western democracy" in that German
history displays the largely antagonistic relationship between the concepts of nation and
democracy which, in the case of Weimar, was catastrophically resolved by the
destruction of the latter. Whilst this reading formed a central legitimatory tenet of post-
war, post-national formulations of West German democracy during the period of
33 Heinrich August Winkler, 'Der unverhoffie Nationalstaat. Deutsche Einheit: Die Vorzeichen
sind gunstiger als 1871.' in 'Historiker betrachten Deutschland.' 1992. op. cit. pp. 164-5.
34 ibid. 168.
B Heinrich August Winkler, 'Weimar 1918-1933. Die Geschichte der ersten deutschen
Demokratie.' Verlag C.H. Beck. Munchen, 1993. pp. 11-12.
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division and could be invoked in the critique of "national" thinkers during the 1980s, it
does not readily lend itself to a legitimisation of post-unification Germany. The solution
to this problem is perceived in the task of redefining the contemporary concept of
German nation along the "post-national" lines of Western political culture which
developed in the post-war FRG after the historical collapse of the political and
intellectual traditions of the Sonderweg. For Winkler, the historical conflict between
democracy and the nation will not reassert itself in post-unification Germany if
Habermas maxim of the unreserved opening to the West as the achievement of the FRG
is internalised in contemporary political culture." Thus Winkler perceives the
contemporary definition of post-unification political culture as predicated upon the
adoption of the Habermassian concept of the progressive Westbindung and its
transference from the post-national society of the FRG onto the unified nation state of
the 1990s. Unlike the Weimar Republic, contemporary Germany is not an "uneducated"
democracy and possesses the 40 year democratic experience of the FRG. Thus both
Bonn and Weimar are understood by Winkler as foundational historical experiences
upon which contemporary German democracy can build."
In contrast to his position in the 1980s, Winkler has developed a line of argument in the
1990s which reflects the shift from a post-national to a national orientation among
liberal-left thinkers. Winkler's tendency during the 1980s to ascribe normative political
and historical value to the facticity of present social arrangements remains an aspect of
his thought on identity during the 1990s in his perception of the "normality" of the
present German nation state. Unlike liberal conservative readings of "normality" this is
not predicated upon a relativising appreciation of German national traditions and thus
does not seek to underline the "normality" of the historic German nation but is rather
more founded in the observation that in the present all Western societies are constituted
as democratic nations. This perspective brings Winkler to perceive in the post-national
past which, during the 1980's testified for him to a state of historical "normality", an
aberration from normality. Indeed, in a peculiar echo, albeit for different reasons, of a
popular contention of the New Right, Winkler has argued that the "post-national" period
36 Winkler. ibid. p. 12.
37 Winkler. ibid. p. 16.
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of division itself constituted a Sonderweg of German history." This does not, however,
imply for Winkler, an explicit relativisation of the Sonderweg of the German nation
between 1871 and 1945 which he continues to regard as evidence of the prolonged
influence of an atavistic Obrigkeit and as sealing the retardation of democracy in
modem Germany up until the post-war period. In contrast to the argument of the right,
Winkler's contention of national "normality" is based upon the perception of modem
Germany (in tandem with the rest of the West) as a "post-classical" nation state. It is
thus, in distinction to conservative readings, a formulation of "normality" which does
not reflect any affiliation to the historical German nation but is rather more founded in
the observation that modem Germany is as Western, democratic and pluralist as any
other Western European nation or the United States
Das vereinte Deutschland ist wieder ein Nationalstaat, wenn auch keiner der alten Art, wie das
deutsche Reich von der Bismarckschen Reichsgriindung im Jahre 1871 bis zum Zusammenbruch
des "Dritten Reiches" im Mai 1945 einer war. Europaisch und atlantisch eingebunden, ist die
Berliner Republik ein postklassischer, demokratischer Nationalstaat wie die anderen
Mitgliedsstaaten der Europaischen Union auch. Die Deutschen sind wieder, was sie zwischen
1945 und 1990 nicht waren, eine staatlich verfaf3te Nation."
Thus in 1990, all the Sonderwege of the Germans from the nation state of 1871 - 1945
through to the period of GDR and FRG had been overcome. The contemporary nation
state does exist, for Winkler, in particular lines of continuity with moments of previous
historical state forms such as the development of the social state, Rechtsstaat and the
expansion of the franchise in Bismarckian and Weimar Germany. Notably, the GDR
offers little for the new Germany and Winkler expresses a common perception of
Western intellectuals in contending that the East Germans remain considerably more
"German" in their value orientation than their Western counterparts." The observation
that in terms of political and cultural values, the former East German retained elements
of the historic Prussian Sonderbewuj3tsein concentrating on duty, obedience, submission
to the state and a Protestant confessional orientation forms an interesting counterpart to
conservative perceptions of enduring "collective" mentalities in the former East. Both of
these interpretations seek to explain the endurance of inequality of social experience in
the new Germany on the level of "values" which appear as stubborn left-overs from the
38 cfWinkler in Mertes, Muller, Winkler. 1996. op. cit. pp. 72, 76 also cf Winkler, 'Seperatismus
auf Filzlatschen. Der Marxismus-Lenninismus ist tot, und der Weg nach Europa fiihrt tiber
Berlin.' in Die Zeit. Nr. 43. 15. Oktober. 1998.
39 Winkler. in Die Zeit. 15. 10. 1998. ibid.
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past either the collective mentality of bureaucratic socialism or the older "German"
traditions derived from the period of the Sonderweg. Left liberal reformulations of the
concept of national identity seek to address these problems of inequality and the
concomitant trends to social heterogeneity in contemporary Germany via recourse to an
appeal to national loyalties which, however, have been purged of their traditionally anti-
democratic overtones.
A similar line of argument is pursued by Konrad larausch. larausch also considers
different formulations of the "normality" of the contemporary German nation and warns
against the dangers of a relapse into traditional national sentiment and tendencies of
reinterpreting the Bismarckreich as the historical "norm" of the German nation."
Against such readings larausch emphasises the important of an orientation towards
democratic Verfassungspatriotismus as a counter to the relapse into the conventional
nationalism argued by the right. Yet at the same time Jarausch perceives the necessity of
incorporating this liberal tradition with a contemporary concept of the nation which
could provide an effective basis for the cultivation of a democratic national political
culture. larausch describes the contemporary flux in established concepts of identity on
left and right which have stimulated a rethinking of the conventional approaches of both
left and right to the normative political and historical values associated with
contemporary concepts of "normality" and the nation
Die Beantwortung der Frage der Norrnalisierung hangt weitgehend von der Definition der
"Normalitat" ab. Da sich die Schatten der Vergangenheit kaum bannen lassen, muf der
neokonservative Versuch aggressiver Renationalisierung vehementen Widerspruch auslosen,
Nach der Wiederherstellung des Nationalstaates erscheint jedoch auch die Haltung des Post-
Nationalismus als unzureichend, denn eine perrnanente Besonderheit der Deutschen schafft
Unsicherheit, die weder der europaischen Integration noch der intemationalen Kooperation dient.
Ein Ausweg aus diesem Dilemma konnte eine partielle Norrnalisierung sein, welche die
schuldbeladene Kategorie Nation zu demokratisieren versucht. Als Wahrer der kollektiven
Erinnerung haben deutsche Historikeer in Ost und West, im Inland und Ausland, eine hohe
Verantwortung, allen nationalistischen Tendenzen zu widerstehen. Jedoch stehen sie gleichzeitig
40 Winkler,also cfMichael Mertes
41 Konrad Jarausch, 'Normalisierung oder Re-Nationalisierung? Zur Umdeutung der deutschen
Vergangenheit.' in Geschichte und Gesellschaft 21. Heft 4. Oktober-Dezember 1995.
Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht. Gottingen. p. 577.
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vor der Herausforderung, demokratische Perspektiven fur den Umgang mit dem
wiedererstandenen Nationalstaat in einem sich vereinenden Europa zu entwickeln."
Jarausch thus reconstructs the basis of the compromise between "national" and
"democratic" readings of past and present: whilst the enduring stigma of National
Socialism continues to hinder the project of "renationalising" German political culture
in conventional terms of neoconservatism, the unification of Germany has likewise
eclipsed the "post-national" formulation of democratic political culture argued by left-
liberals. Similar to Dann, Jarausch perceives the dangers of leaving the national idiom to
the right and stakes a claim for the retention of a critical perspective on the national past
which, however, in the context of post-unification Germany should also emphasise a
historical solidarity with the minority democratic-national traditions embodied in
moments such as the attempted revolution of 1848, the history of Social Democracy and
the construction of the Weimar republic." It is clear that for Jarausch this is a case of
articulating the established "western" democratic political culture previously associated
with post- or anti-national arguments within the altered constellation of post-unification
society. Whilst Jarausch criticises the conservative reception of unification and project
of reconstructing conventional national identity as attempts to rehabilitate discredited
national traditions and values, he omits an extremely important development in liberal-
conservative formulations of national identity which provides an important parallel to
left-liberal rapprochement with the national concept.
The form of liberal-conservative rapprochement with progressive discourse has been
represented most clearly in the writings and speeches of former Federal President
Roman Herzog. Herzog assumed the position of Federal President in 1994 after the
withdrawal of the controversial CDU-CSU candidate Stefan Heitmann who provoked
his withdrawal by his plea for the geschichtliche Einordnung des Holocausts and thus
argued along deutsch-national lines of relativising the past in the reconstruction of a
more traditional sense of German nationalism." Whilst some observers perceived in the
conservative current represented by Heitmann an indication of the likely development of
German conservatism in the 1990s,45this has been challenged by the development of an
42 ibid. p. 584.
43 Jarausch. ibid. p. 583.
44 cfFAZ 1993
45 ctstefan Berger, 'Nationalism and the Left in Germany'. New Left Review 'Barbarism and
Enlightenment'. 206/1994. p. 65.
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influential liberal conservative strand which continues to prioritise the German nation
and yet seeks a more "progressive" articulation of the terms of its identity. Herzog
proved himself to represent a more liberal conservative stance and as such continued in
a similar vein to Richard von Weizsacker who, in 1985, had caused much controversy
for his indirect criticism of Kohl's relativisation of the 8 May during the Bitburg fiasco.
Unlike Heitmann and many other in the CDU-CSU, Herzog has been concerned to
develop a more liberal version of national identity and has displayed a much more
flexible attitude towards dealing with the negative legacy of the historic German nation.
Rather than confronting this legacy by the aggressive relativisation pursued by New
Right thinkers, Herzog readily admits the disastrous consequences of traditional
nationalism in German history. Yet he clearly remains attached to the concept of the
nation in the present which he perceives as a necessary focus of social identity which
also requires the legitimacy cultivated from history. Herzog overcomes these problems
by creating a distinction between the "nation state" and the "nation". In a speech
delivered before the 41st. Historians' Conference in 1996 Herzog offered the following
understanding of this distinction
Das Prinzip der Abgrenzung, aus dem im 19. Jahrhundert die Nationalstaaten enstanden, taugt
heute ebensowenig mehr wie das der Expansion, das ja aueh mit dem Nationalstaat verbunden
war. Wir sind am Ende dieses Jahrhunderts dabei, die nationalstaatliehe Form zu uberwinden, die
in ihrer ideologisehen Ubersteigerung den Kontinent in den Abgrund gezogen hat. Ich sage
bewul3t, der Nationalstaat ist dabei, sieh zu verabsehieden, nieht die Nation. . .Der
"National staat" mit den dazugehorigen Souveranitatsvorstellungen hat sich (jedoch) iiberlebt. Im
19. Jahrhundert gab es zwei Kriterien filr diese Nationalstaatlichkeit: Zum einen das militarische
Potential - das sowohl zur Verteidigung des eigenen als aueh zur Eroberung anderen Territoriums
dienen sollte - und zum anderen das wirtschaftliche Potential. Beides gilt Hingst nieht mehr ... Der
Weg in die Zukunft kann filr uns nur lauten: Europa.I"
Thus for Herzog, the division between the nation state and nation is founded in two
primary trends: the discrediting of the traditional ideological-political concept of the
nation state and the trends towards economic and political de-nationalisation associated
with the process of "globalisation". Herzog avoids these problems by evoking a
separation between the historical nation state in its structural and ideological form and
the concept of the "German nation" as a focus of expressing a notion of cultural
particularism and collective identity in the present. This release from the stigma of an
46 'Rede von Bundesprasident Roman Herzog vor dem 41. Deutschen Historikertag am 17.
September 1996 in Munchen.' from, hrrp.z/www.bundesprasident.de.
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anti-democratic national past is conceptually enabled by German unification in 1989
which introduced a new, current, reality to the national idiom and offered an
opportunity for reconfiguring the concept of "nation" in the present against the negative
national legacy of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. For Herzog, the
exhaustion of the "nation state" at the end of the twentieth century is founded in two
phenomena: firstly the experience globalisation and the waning importance of national
boundaries and institutions and secondly in terms of the conventional ideological
political concepts of nationalism. Herzog appears to avoid the problems of conventional
nationalism for the expression of patriotic sentiment by associating this form with the
traditional "nation state" which has now been transcended leaving, however, the concept
of nation as an expression of collective cultural particularism. This is rather more an
attempt to reconfigure national patriotism and to shed the discrediting legacy of
National Socialism from the concept of nation. Unlike previous conservative attempts to
deal with the problems of the National Socialist past, however, for liberal conservatives
this no longer implies a relativising approach to the past but rather more an open
admission of this period of German national history. We shall return to this aspect in
more detail in the following chapter. At the moment we need to consider some of the
ways in which this more liberal, democratic expression of national identity and
patriotism is being articulated in post-unification society. The approach of separating
nation state from nation does not imply a departure from the project of constructing
identity from an instrumentalisation of history. In this context it is interesting to observe
how, in his first address as Federal President, Herzog attempts to create a "republican"
reading of 1989 and implies therein a continuity which is both democratic and national
and stretches back to the early nineteenth century emancipation movements of the
liberal bourgeoisie. In this reading, the successful democratic and peaceful revolution of
1989 becomes the basis for a reconfigurated articulation of national pride
Denn diese Freiheit, die Freiheit von 1989, ist durch das Yolk selbst erkampft worden. Die
Westdeutschen haben beim Aufbau ihrer Demokratie bestimmt viel geleistet, aber viele haben es
zunachst auf Grund einer totalen Niederlage und unter dem Drangen der Siegermachte getan. Die
Ostdeutschen haben ihre Demokratie selbst erkampft ... Das ist mehr als Hambacher Fest und
Paulskirche zusammen; denn sie sind, so bedauerlich das ist, letzten Endes gescheitert. 1989 ist
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gelungen. Darauf kann man doch stolz sein. "Stolz" ist ein Wort, das ich ganz ungem in den
Mund nehmne, das heir aber wirklich enigma berechtigt ist."
Thus Herzog articulates a concept of national pride which is conventionally associated
with a traditional conservative outlook via reference to a republican motif which appears
more at home in left-liberal discourse. The republican shading which Herzog casts upon
the unification of the two German states via reference to both the self-assertion of the
people in October-November 1989 and also the longer historical legacy of democratic-
national movements in the early part of the nineteenth century is of particular interest.
Herzog makes a claim for a democratic-national continuity which has been successfully
fulfilled in contemporary Germany. During 1989-90 conservatives cast the project of
unification primarily in terms of the successful economic model of the Federal Republic
and employed this argument in justifying unification in accordance with article 23 thus
shutting out any public-political consideration of new developments in a republican
sense as argued by Habermas. Whilst Habermas, Grass or politicians such as Lafontaine
were condemned as socialist dinosaurs for their defence of a republican and European
over a national orientation, in the course of the 1990s such readings have assumed a
prominent role in official commemorations of German unification. This testifies less to
the transformation of conservatives into liberal republicans but rather more to the de-
facto practice of liberal conservatives given the intractable problems of traditional
romantic nationalism which is motivated by the search for a positive or at least more
consensual articulation of patriotism.
A similar process of realignment is evident - from a liberal standpoint - in the post-
unification work of Wolfgang Mommsen. During the 1980s, similar to Winkler,
Mommsen perceived the post-national circumstances of the Federal Republic as the
historical "norm" of German statehood and the unitary nation state of 1871-1933 as a
mere "episode"." This contrasts with the position which he has developed in post-
unification society. Writing in the early 1990s, Mommsen contends that the Kaiserreich
not only forms the fulcrum of national identity in the present," but also laid the
47 cf' Ansprache von Bundesprasident Roman Herzog zu seinem Amtantritt am 1. Juli 1994.'
from: www.bundesprasident.de.
48 cfMommsen. 1983. op. cit. p. 76. (p. 110 in thesis)
49 cfWolfgang Mornmsen, 'Der autoritare Nationalstaat. Verfassung, Gesellschaft und Kultur im
deutschen Kaiserreich.' Fischer. F.lMain. 1992. p. 7. also cf'Mommsen, 'Das Ringen urn den
nationalen Staat. Die Griindung und der innere Ausbau des Deutschen Reiches unter Otto von
Bismarck 1850 bis 1890.' Propylaen Verlag. Berlin. 1993. p. 17.
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foundations for important social and cultural traditions which continue to shape the
Germans." Mommsen remains critical of the Kaiserreich as an authoritarian-
conservative state and acknowledges the contribution played by a positively endowed
SonderbewuJ3tsein in destroying the Weimar republic and enabling the accession of
National Socialism in 1933.51 Mommsen also, however, is keen to stress the positive
elements of the Second Empire such as the extension of welfare provision and the early
expansion of the franchise in 1867.52 Similar to Winkler, Mommsen remains committed
to a perception of the underlying "normality" of present arrangements which has
developed from a "post-national" to a "national" historical orientation. During the
1980s, conceptions of a German Sonderweg were firmly focused upon the German
nation between 1871 and 1945. During the 1990s, this focus has shifted for some
important left-liberals who remain critical of the Kaiserreich and yet consider the nation
state as a "normal" form of social order and imply that the period of division
represented a Sonderweg of historical development.
In this context it is interesting to compare such reflections of the Kaiserreich with the
post-unification world of perhaps the historian most associated with the Sonderweg
thesis - Hans-Ulrich Wehler. Wehler remains highly critical of conventional national
identity and the attempts of neoconservatives of both liberal conservative and "new
right" provenance who attempt to rehabilitate a concept of the compelling German
Mittellage" With respect to the Sonderweg thesis, however, Wehler has subjected his
earlier theories to a critical revision." Wehler no longer considers Bismarck's regime as
a "bonapartiste dictatorship" but rather more in terms of a "charismatic leadership" of
the type described by Weber. 55 Wehler also concedes that whilst earlier formulation of a
German Sonderweg were justified in examining the longer-term conditions of fascism in
German history, they operated from an idealised perception of "normal" Western
development" and were also of political use in morally legitimising the new post-war
50 ibid. p. 12.
51 Mommsen. 1992. op. cit. p. 421.
52 Mommsen. 1993. op. cit. p. 25.
53 cfWehler, 'Angst vor der Macht?' 1995. op. cit. and Wehler, 'Willkommen im Kreis der
Neorankianer.' 1994. op. cit.
54 cf, Hans-Ulrich Wehler, 'Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte. Dritter Band. Von der "Deutschen
Doppelrevolution" bis zum Beginn des Ersten Weltkrieges. 1849-1914.' C.H Beck. Munchen,
1995.
55 ibid. p. 373.
56 ibid. p. 464-5.
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direction of West Germany." Wehler, also concedes that it is no longer tenable to speak
of a "deficit" of bourgeois culture in the Second Empire and that it is more accurate to
speak of bourgeois imitation of the aristocracy rather than the feudalisation of the
middle-classes. 58 At the same time as he has rejected the Sonderweg thesis and now
speaks of the Sonderbedingungen of German modem development, Wehler, also
continues to defend the study of the particular and specific aspects of Germany's
development into a modem industrial state. Wehler continued to question the reform
potential of Imperial Germany given that the modernisation processes tend to engender
democratic and parliamentary development and he also stresses the importance of the
Sonderbewujitsein particularly in notions of the relationship between the state and civil
society." For Wehler today, the Revolution von oben in 1871 did not represent a
continuity of the Sonderweg, but rather more created the conditions within which the
Sonderbedingungen of German history could unfold destructive potential." It was thus
Bismarck who destroyed the German liberalism and not the experience of the failure of
the 1848 revolution." Thus whilst Wehler has revised the concept of a Sonderweg to
modernity, he remains highly critical of Imperial Germany which, in fact, he
understands as marking the beginning of many of the later problems of German history.
Wehler thus remains committed to a perspective which attempts to understand National
Socialism within longer-term historical, social and political developmental trends of the
modern German state. Mommsen's notion of the "centrality" of the Kaiserreich to
present society and concepts of identity remains anathema to Wehler. Yet also with this
critical historian, one can discern a changed attitude towards the project of the historical
construction of national identity from positive historical experience. Wehler remains
critical of the historic German nation and can perceive no potential for a positive
national identity in the present emanating from Imperial Germany. Yet Wehler is not
immune to facing the "challenge" described by Henry Ashby Turner Jr. of "identifying
the antecedents of a durable, democratic, peaceable German republic." One important
aspect of this process has been a reassessment of the legacy of 1848 for contemporary
expressions of post-unification national identity and this involves a reconsideration and
S7 ibid. p. 467.
S8 ibid. p. 474.
S9 ibid. p. 479.
60 ibid. pp. 480-1.
61 ibid. p. 480.
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reconfiguration of perceptions of national continuity in German history for both right
and left.
At this point we may observe the congruence between liberal-left intellectuals who seek
to democratise and "Westernise" the concept of German nation and liberal conservatives
who seek a form of national argumentation which is not compromised by the association
with National Socialism. Due to the historically conflictual nature of the concepts of
nation and democracy the search for positive national-historical antecedents remains
rather problematic. As Winkler's example of the Weimar Republic displays this period
in German history in which a synthesis between national and democratic concepts was
attempted contains little positive as it was the abject failure of this project which
eventually resulted in the destruction of the republic and the erection of the National
Socialist dictatorship. For this reason, the period of the Weimar Republic appears too
close to the National Socialist period in order to serve as a possible positive historical
precedent for the contemporary project of synthesising the concepts of democracy and
the nation. Due to this general problem of German national history, it appears, and not
without a considerable element of irony, that the pre-national period remains the only
epoch which could potentially serve as a historical precedent for a synthesis between the
German nation and Western political culture.
In this sense the liberal historian Lothar Gall took the 150 anniversary of the revolution
of 1848 as an opportunity to cultivate a sense of historical-political continuity between
the democratic-nationalist movement of the Paulskirche in Frankfurt and the Berliner
Republik to contend that the foundations of the Federal Republic emerged in 1848.63 In
a similar vein at the beginning of 1998 Wehler noted the increase in historical studies of
1848 in the world of academia and yet complained bitterly about the apparent lack of
interest in this heritage in the public-political realm. Wehler appears particularly
concerned that among the "inheritors" of this progressive tradition in the Trade Unions
and Social Democracy, 1848 appears to hold little interest
62 Henry Ashby Turner Jr, 'Germany's Past Viewed after Fifty Years of Democracy. ' in Merkl.
(ed.) 1999. op. cit.p. 31.
63 cf 'Das Fundament der Bundesrepublik entand 1848. Interview mit dem Historiker Lothar
Gall.' in Mainz Echo.15.10.1998. Also cfthe interview with the same in 'Der Spiegel' Nr.7.
09.02.1998.pp.54-5. Gall herelikewise stresses that the foundations of the Federal Republic can
be found in the national movement of 1848.
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1948 war nur ein schwaches Echo moglich, 1998 sollte die Bundesrepublik, sollten ihre Parteien
und gesellschaftlichen Kraft nicht nur imstande, sondem dezidierten Willens sein, sich zu 1848
und nob len Traditionen zu bekennen. . . DaB sich die Koalition mit der Ehrung auch dieser
Revolution schwertun mag, wird manchen kaum iiberraschen. Aber muB auch diese Stunde der
Opposition wieder ungenutzt vorubergehen''."
Here Wehler quite clearly stakes a claim for the public-political cultivation of a
democratic consciousness which relies upon an interpretation of the democratic-
nationalist traditions of pre-national German history. This approach reflects a shift in
attitudes towards the national past among left-liberal thinkers since unification in 1989.
The attempt to establish historical antecedants for 1989 in the democratic national
movement of 1848 signifies a subtle change in reflection of the past. Wehler's
observation that the then ruling coalition experiences difficulties with the legacy of
1848 was, however, refuted by the events of the year. Wehler's premise that
conservative leaning politicians and thinkers in general share few sympathies with the
traditions of the liberal national movement is founded upon an accurate assessment of
the conservative receptions of this period since the nineteenth century which has
certainly been characterised by a critical attitude. From this perspective, Wehler appears
to orientate himself upon the conventional dichotomy between left and right over
interpretations of the relationship between the forces of the nation and of republican
democracy throughout German history. 1998 witnessed, however, an official
engagement with the legacy of the liberal-nationalists on the part of conservative
politicians including Chancellor Kohl who asserted a line of historical continuity
existing between the reunified Germany of the Berliner Republik and the democratic
nationalist movements and ideas of the Frankfurt National Assembly of 1848.65 In a
similar vein, Roman Herzog, offered an interpretation of German historical continuity
between 1848 and 1989 which traces the development of the concepts of unity and
freedom from their genesis in Vormdrz to their fulfilment in the collapse of the GDR in
1989.66 For Herzog, the republican, democratic-nationalist principles of 1848 form the
64 Hans-Ulrich Wehler, 'Nicht der Rede wert? Der Politik fallt zu dieser Revolution nichts ein.' in
Die Zeit. Nr.5. 22.01.1998.
65 cf 'Rede vom Bundeskanzler Dr. Helmut Kohl zur Eroffnung des 30. Deutschen Tumfestes am
31. Mai 1998 in Munchen.' Pressemitteilung vom 31.05.98, Website source,
http://www.bundesregierung.de.
66 This point is also made by Winkler who perceives the demands of 1848 for unity and freedom
as having been finally fulfilled through the reunification of Germany in 1989-90. cf Winkler, 'Die
sperrige Revolution.' in Die Zeit. Nr.5. 22.01.1998.
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key historical orientation of a positive democratic-nationalist national identity for
reunified Germany
Und doeh wies das Jahr 1848 weit in die Zukunft. Die "Paulskirche" ist das eine grol3e Symbol
fur das Streben der Deutsehen nach Einigkeit und Recht und Freiheit, und erst heute konnen wir
hinzufiigen: der Fall der Berliner Mauer 1989 ist das andere. Beides sind Stemstunde deutseher
Gesehichte, mit denen wir sorgfaltig ungehen mussen; sie durfen nieht in der Routine
verordneten Gedenkens versinken. Das Zusammentreten des ersten, freigewahlten deutschen
ParI aments vor 150 Jahren ist ein Moment in unserer oft so schwierigen Geschichte, auf den wir
uns ohne Einschranken berufen konnen, auch wenn wir heute uber die Zukunft von Staat und
Demokratie nachdenken. . . 1848 gibt uns das Recht, mit Selbstbewul3tsein zu sagen: Die
demokratisehe Idee, die Ideen der Freiheit, der Menschen - und Biirgerreehte sind auch ein Teil
der deutsehen Tradition - aueh wenn sie sieh erst sparer wirklieh durchgesetzt haben."
Thus for Herzog, the democratic-nationalist legacy of 1848 forms a central aspect of
German historical continuity and also provides a contemporary and future orientation
for reunified Germany. Perhaps the most interesting and revealing aspect of Herzog's
appreciation of the significance of 1848 is that it is presented as displaying the supra-
historical, German antecedents of democracy, freedom, human and civil rights which
form an integral part of the legacy of "Western political culture" previously perceived as
the historical enemy of traditional German national traditions. Thus Herzog appears to
stake a claim for a German tradition of enlightened political culture which predates the
western integration of 1945. In this sense, Herzog's prioritisation of 1989 over 1945
reveals an important point of contradiction between liberal-left and liberal conservatives
readings of democratic patriotism and this is clearly not a complete convergence. Yet
the search for democratic national traditions provides a basis upon which left-liberal and
liberal conservative perceptions converge. The historical-political climate of reunified
Germany in the 1990's appears to find itself in a curious process of transformation in
which a conservative patriot such as Kohl can invoke the legacy of the liberal nationalist
movement of the 1832 Hambacher Fest and the revolutionary Vormlirz68 and the SPD
Minister for Culture, Michael Neumann, could suggest dropping the Holocaust-
Mahnmal project in the capital and support the reconstruction of the old Prussian
Berliner Stadtschlofs'" This situation would appear to reflect the common desire across
67 'Rede von Bundespriisident Roman Herzog anlalllich der Veranstaltung "150 Jahre Revolution
von 1848/49" am 18. Mai 1998 in der Paulskirche zu Frankfurt am Main.' http:/www.
bundesprasident. de
68 cf Kohl. 1996. op. cit. p.12.
69 cf 'Interview mit dem designierten Kulturminister Michael Neumann. Die Piekelhaube steht
mir nieht.' in Die Zeit.Nr. 32. 30.07.1998.
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the broad left-liberal - liberal conservative political spectrum for a democratic and pro-
Western articulation of national patriotism. In this manner a synthesis is achieved
between the desire to cultivate positive German national traditions which can act as a
source of contemporary social orientation and yet, however, do not conflict with the
tenets of Western political culture. In this representation, pride in German history is
fused with a commitment to "Western" democratic political culture.
As the foundations of the traditional conservative conception of the nation state crumble
and the reputation of the "classic" nation state across the Western world appears fatally
compromised then so it appears that resistance to historical movements such as German
liberal nationalism in the first half of the nineteenth century weakens. In this situation,
the inherent contradiction contained in the fact that such an attested admirer of
Bismarck as Kohl can simultaneously invoke the legacy of those liberal forces who
Bismarck placed himself in consistent and irreconcilable opposition to from the
revolution of 1848 to the "refounding" of the Reich in 1878 does not appear to be
problematic. In this interpretation of continuity in German history, the distinctive link
between historical and political perspective appears transcended in the common search
for a democratic national past. In this context it appears that the intense political
polarisation between left and right as witnessed in the historical arguments of the 1980s
has been replaced by the common spurious assertion of a vague historical continuity of
the "democratic German nation". The other essential aspect of this broader, and uneven,
reconfiguration of perceptions of historical continuity is the reassessment of the
"utopian project" in the light of the "End of History". It thus appears as somewhat ironic
that liberal thinkers in particular seek to present the "velvet revolutions" of 1989 as
existing in a continuity with the traditions of enlightenment thought and the genesis of
modem "civil society" in 1789 at a time when, not least amongst the left, the collapse of
the Cold War has been widely received as heralding the death of such "utopian" projects
which espoused the potential of historical progress through the agency of social
transformation. Yet without faith in the progressive potential of social transformation,
the political movements and ideas which are today lauded as key components of
superior "Western political culture" would never have emerged and succeeded in the
first place. Invocations of "Western political culture" conflate the West with progress
and "Western political culture" with the post-war FRG. Yet without the commitment to
universalism and historical progress these legacies tum into their opposite and appear
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as an enlightened foil for the articulation of essentially particularist values. Internally
this process is sealed in the creation of positive national identities which aim to cohere
and legitimise contemporary society and outwardly they further the division of
humanity through reference to the difference, and implied superiority, of "Western"
political culture in the world at large. The most obvious problem for attempts to
construct a sense of national identity from an instrumentalisation of "positive" national
history is of course that such readings are compelled to confront the period of National
Socialism which under no circumstances can serve as "positive" historical continuity.
These developments are reflected in changed attitudes towards the public-political
reflection of the National Socialist period and one may trace a similar process of
congruence between conventional concepts of history as "compensation" and
"emancipation" to that observed between concepts of "German nation" and "Western
democracy". This historical aspect forms the core of the final and following chapter.
Before examining the developments in "critical history" and the formation of identity it
is necessary to consider the arguments of perhaps the most notable left-liberal
intellectual Jurgen Habermas. Habermas more than most formulated his concept of post-
national, post-traditional identity during the FRG as a counter to the dangers of a relapse
into conventional national identity. In contrast to many left-liberal thinkers who
formally adopt his concept of Western enlightenment political culture, Habermas has
continued to argue for a post-national form of identity which is based upon the universal
principles of republican Verfassungspatriotismus. Let us now tum to Habermas concept
of the emancipatory project and its relationship to "post-national" formulations of social
solidarity.
6.3. "Emancipation" and Post-National Social Solidarity.
We should be wary of ignoring the distinctions between left-liberal and liberal
conservative concepts of "democratic patriotism" and the underlying political motives
which motivate the cultivation of a discourse of patriotism which fuses the national idea
with the idea of democracy. Whilst left-liberals stress the centrality of the historical and
political caesura of 1945 and seek to develop the post-war, "post-national" discourse of
Verfassungspatriotismus upon the national level, liberal conservatives emphasise the
importance of 1989 and seek a reconfiguration of nationalism into a more democratic
and "Western" form. Posed in its broadest terms one may perhaps speak of a left-liberal
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project of "nationalising" the concept of Verjassungspatriotismus which is paralleled by
a liberal conservative "democratisation" of nationalism. The point of congruence for
these two streams is formed by the common acceptance of the need to harness the nation
as a focus of collective social loyalty and solidarity.
Similar to left-liberals, Habermas too perceives parallels between the contemporary
constellation in the West and the bourgeois emancipation movements of the early
nineteenth century. Unlike many left-liberal or liberal conservative thinkers, however,
Habermas does not perceive this as a means of constructing a historical basis for
contemporary democratic national identity. Rather more, Habermas compares the ideas
of German nationalists during the 1840s in order to emphasise the fundamentally novel
circumstances of contemporary existence. Citing the 1846 Germanistenversammlung in
Frankfurt, Habermas contrasts the debates over the civic structuring of the nation and
the demarkation of its boundaries to other nation states with contemporary political
discussion in the West which is characterised by reflections of the demise of this
republican core and the blurring of established national borders." Habermas attempts to
draw political conclusions on the state of the national concept in the present by
reconstructing its genesis and development since the late eighteenth century. For
Habermas then, as now, the national concept is intellectually founded upon two
potentially conflictual ideas: firstly the republican, universal values enshrined in the
legally mediated order of a willed community of free and equals and secondly the
romantic, particularist values embodied by a pre-political community of fate
Die Nation hat zwei Gesichter. Wahrend die gewollte Nation der Staatsbiirger die Quelle fur
demokratische Legitimation ist, sorgt die geborene Nation der Volksgenossen fur soziale
Integration. Staatsburger konstituieren aus eigener Kraft die politische Assoziation von Freien
und Gleichen; Volksgenossen finden sich in einer durch gemeinsame Sprache und Geschichte
gepragten Gemeinschaft vor. In die Begrifflichkeit des Nationalstaats ist die Spannung zwischen
dem Universalismus einer egalitaren Rechtsgemeinschaft und dem Partikularismus einer
historischen Schicksalsgemeinschaft eingelassen."
Habermas thus appreciates the role played by both "civic-republican" and "cultural-
romantic" ideas in the evolution of the national concept in the West. For Habermas this
dichotomy remains harmless as long as the cosmopolitan concept of the nation of
70 Habermas. 1998. op. cit. p. 7.
71 Habermas, 'Die Einbeziehung des Anderen. Studien zur politischen Theorie.' Suhrkamp
Verlag. FrankfurtlM. 1996. p. 139.
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citoyen prevails over the ethno-centric interpretation of the Volksgenosse. Only the non-
naturalistic concept of nation is compatible with the universal conceptualisation of the
democratic constitutional state which allows the republican idea to ascend and, most
importantly for Habermas, to structure the instances of social integration. For Habermas
the greatest measure of success of the historic nation state was its ability to substitute
the decaying, particularist solidaristic bonds of late absolutist society towards family,
region, dynastic ruler, the village community etc. with a new, higher, more abstract and
universal level of social solidarity between free and equal national citizens who has
hitherto been strangers for one another." Yet, given the "Janus-face" of the nation," this
republican concept of social solidarity enabled by the national concept is endangered by
the organic, pre-political concept of the nation which claims a "higher" level of
authority than the rational will-formation process of the modem citizenry. The tum to
such ethno-cultural national concepts is explained by Habermas with regards to the
"conceptual" need to explain the basic totality of social relations. Habermas recognises
that the legalist-constitutional concept of the state leaves the question of defining the
boundaries of a political community open. For Habermas it is a "legalist-rational myth"
that the concept of Free Will determines the practical definition of such boundaries
which, in the "real world" are more likely the result of conflicts, wars and civil wars.
Nationalism resolves these problems by a definition of the national political community
as an organic, naturalistic phenomenon which is self evident in contrast to the supposed
artificial order of positive law thus
Der Ruckgriff auf die "organische" Nation kann deshalb den historisch mehr oder weniger
zuflilligen Grenzen der politischen Gemeinschaft das bloB Kontingente abstreifen, sie mit der
Aura einer nachgeahmten Substantialitat versehen und durch "Herkunft" legitimieren."
In the above we may recognise the form of national identity argued by New Right
conservatives in the continuity of "integrative nationalism" throughout the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century which prioritised the "organic" over the
republican nation. Similarly the above dichotomy is evident in conservative attempts to
construct a conflict between "national interests" and the constitutional court in the
debates over the defamation of the Bundeswehr, the Crucifix Judgement and the
arguments over the Reichstagverhullung considered in chapter four. As Habermas
n ibid. and also c:f, Habermas, 'National Unification and Popular Sovereignty.' in 'New Left
Review.' 219. Sept/Oct. 1996. p. 9.
73 ibid. p. ID.
74 Habermas. 1996. op. cit. p. 140.
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observes, the history of the early twentieth century displays the national idea has been
most frequently employed to legitimise foreign political adventure, war and the negative
integration of society and the Third Reich clearly exists in this continuity of the ethnic,
organic nation." Despite this, Habermas recognises the progressive origins of the nation
state in the dissolution of the old absolutist order and the introduction of the concept of
legally mediated social equality and universal values. The lesson which Habermas
concludes from the history of the nation state is that it must lose its ambivalent character
and, in the present constellation which displays the limitations of the traditional nation
state, he perceives just such an opportunity.
The primary service of the nation and "national consciousness" was the ability to create
a new context of social communication within which answers could be sought to the
questions arising from the rapid process of social and industrial modernisation and
which could reintegrate a population torn from the older corporatist bonds of late
feudalism." Habermas thus appears to prioritise the integrative function of the nation
and it is with this question of social integration that he is primarily concerned in the
present, unique constellation after the end of the Cold War. Whilst the early nation state
developed its most effective integrative potential via the fusion of the concept of the
Rechtsstaat with that of cultural membership of the nation, in the present we are faced
with the dissolution of these factors
Oer nationalstaatliche Rahmen fur die Implementierung von Menschenrechten und Demokratie
hat, tiber die Grenzen von Stammen und Oialekten hinweg, eine neue, abstraktere Form der
sozialen Integration moglich gemacht. Wir stehen heute vor der Aufgabe, diesen Prozef mit
einem weiteren Abstraktionsschritt fortzusetzen."
Thus the central question for Habermas is formed by the ability of the nation state to
serve this integrative function in a period in which its internal cultural homogeneity is
eroded by the process of multiculturalism and externally throughout the force of
globalisation which restricts the capacity of national government to purposefully
intervene in economic arrangements." It is within this context that Habermas has
developed his concept of the post-national constellation with which he seeks to provide
some answers to these newer problems of social integration during a period of profound
75 ibid.
76 ibid.
77 Habermas. 1998. op. cit. p. 36.
78 Habennas 1996. op. cit. p. 141.
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change. The "post-national" concept is one which Habermas has developed over the
past couple of decades and during the pre-unification period served to underwrite the
concept of Verfassungspatriotismus. The "post-national" concept clearly obtained a
particular relevance in the post-war context of divided Germany. Yet for Habermas,
despite obvious German peculiarities, this represented a much broader change
throughout the Western hemisphere represented in the breaking of the prioritisation of
national interests during the period of bipolar hegemony. 79 This external paradigm shift
corresponded to changes in domestic politics and most particularly in the pacification of
the class conflict which had destabilised inter-war society. For Habermas the classic
nation state allowed for an expanded and superior form of intersubjective
communication to that which developed under the regional dynastic arrangements of
late feudal society. The nation state thus created a new, abstract, level of social
solidarity between strangers. This form was discredited through the internal cohesion of
society via ethnic nationalism and the external policy and ideology of imperialism. The
post-war period fundamentally altered this now discredited constellation and offered
new forms of domestic and international regulation through the experiences of the Cold
War, the process of de-colonisation and the creation of the welfare, social state. Whilst
the Cold War overrode the narrow prioritisation of national interests and decolonisation
formally offered equality among nations, the social state offered a new level of domestic
social integration along democratic lines reminiscent of the earlier republican impetus of
the classic nation state
In der Gestalt sozialstaatlicher Massendemokratie ist hier die hochproduktive Wirtschaftsform
des Kapitalismus zum ersten Mal sozial gebandigt und mit dem normativen Selbstverstandnis
demokratischer Verfassungsstaaten mehr oder weniger in Einklang gebracht worden."
The creation of the social state introduced a period of unprecedented improvements
among the broadest section of the population and more importantly for Habermas
sensitised the post-war citizenry to the priority of claiming and realising basic rights.
Yet this project too became problematic due to the bureaucratising tendencies of social
democratic welfarism which appeared to bolster the power of the state and which was
led by a social democratic concept of bureaucratically administering emancipation
Allerdings ist die Sozialdemokratie uberrascht worden vom systemischen Eigensinn der
staatlichen Macht, der sie sich wie eines neutral en Instrumentes glaubte bedienen zu konnen, urn
79 Habermas. 1996. ibid. p. 144.
80 Habermas. 1998. op. cit. p. 78.
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eine sozialstaatliche Universalisierung der Burgerrechte durchzusetzen. Nicht der Sozialstaat hat
sich als eine Illusion erwiesen, sondem die Erwartung, mit administrativen Mitteln emanzipierte
Lebensformen zuwege bringen zu konnen."
Already during the mid-1980s Habermas has described the need to transcend the social
state into a higher level which could reflect the social change from work to
communication society and steer such forces in an emancipatory direction. Despite
obvious problems, Habermas considers the development of the social state as the
highest level of reflection in modern capitalist society and which offered the best
possible solution to the problem of capitalist economics and the iniquitous distribution
of material prosperity. The interventionist state regulated the economy and thereby
assured not only favourable conditions for the accumulation of capital but also allowed
for a more equitable distribution of the fruits of capitalist productivity as well as
providing a framework for the securing of the basic rights of as broad as possible layer
of the population. It is in this moment which Habermas perceives a continuity of the
older republican inspired concept of the Rechtsstaat which constitutes the "real nation"
of citoyen against the "imagined nation" of the Volksgenosse" The question which
Habermas poses is thus whether or not this project can be retained in the face of the
forces of globalisation which effectively de-nationalise the economic arrangements
which the interventionist state previously sought to tame and whether the republican
core of this project can be developed after the "End of History"." Habermas perceives
in the subsequent "unfreezing" of history post-Cold War the return of a problem as old
as capitalism itself and which had appeared to have been resolved during the post-war
period
Wie I!iBt sich die Allokations- und Entdeckungsfunktion selbstregulierender Markte effektiver
nutzen, ohne dabei Ungleichverteilungen und soziale Kosten in Kauf nehmen zu mussen, die mit
den Integrationsbedingungen demokratisch verfaBter liberaler Gesellschaften unvereinbar sind ?84
This is a process which Habermas traces since the 1980s and his primary concern is the
social costs engendered by the break up of the post-war social consensus under the aegis
of a socially ruthless neo-liberalism. Habermas is particularly concerned with effects
which such developments have upon the potential of liberal democratic societies to
absorb socio-political deregulation
81 Habermas, 'Die nachholende Revolution. Kleine Politische Schriften VII.' Suhrkamp.
Frankfurt. 1M. 1990. p. 192.
82 1996. op. cit.. ibid.
83 cfibid. pp. 146-8 and Habermas. 1998. op. cit. pp. 78-84.
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Eine solche Desolidarisierung muB jedoeh auf langere Sieht eine liberale politisehe Kultur
zerstoren, auf deren universalistisehes Selbstverstandnis demokratiseh verfal3te Gesellsehaften
angewiesen sind.85
Globalisation and the structural changes of the world economic system create problems
for the rich, welfare democracies of the first world and restrict the room for manoeuvre
of traditional nation states which are no longer in a position to ameliorate the social
consequences of the transnational movement of markets and investment. The older
solution along the lines of "Keynesianism in one country" is simply no longer a viable
option
Wie man es dreht und wendet, die Globalisierung der Wirtsehaft zerstort eine historisehe
Konstellation, die den sozialstaatIiehen Kompromil3 vorubergehend ermoglicht hat. Aueh wenn
dieser keineswegs die ideale Losung eines dem Kapitalismus innewohnenden Problems darsteIIt,
so hat er doch die enstandenen sozialen Kosten in akzeptierten Grenzen gehalten."
Thus the constellation at the end of the Cold War has introduced a new stage of
regulation in relationship between state and civil society which has developed since the
seventeenth century from souveriine HerrschaJt, the Verwaltungsstaat, to the
Steuerstaat and in the modem age from Nationalstaat to the post-war Sozialstaat" For
Habermas, the next stage of development must proceed on a supra-national level and in
this sense he urges that politics imitate economics and reorganise the principles of the
social state on the supra-national level of Europe." This is a move which demands a
reconfiguration of solidarity whose primary purpose is the securing of social integration
in modem societies and in this context Habermas stakes a claim for the substitution of a
now outdated, and indeed discredited nationalism, by the concept of
Verfassungspatriotismus" The "post-national" constellation represents a transcendence
rather than abolition of the nation state whereby the republican, universal core of the
classic national idea is retained and the ethno-cultural, particularist element left behind.
The current global constellation appears to demand precisely such a universal form of
identification which is no longer confined by the political, geographic and economic
boundaries of the nation state
Die Weltbevclkerung ist objektiv Hingst zu einer unfreiwilligen Risikogemeinsehaft
zusammengeschlossen worden. Nieht ganz unplausibel ist deshalb die Erwartung, dal3 sieh unter
84 Habermas. 1998. ibid. p. 80.
8S ibid. p. 81.
86 ibid. p. 83.
87 ibid. p. 84.
88 ibid. p. 85 and 1996. op. cit. p. 149.
224
dies em Druck jener groBe, historisch folgenreiche Abstraktionsschub vom lokalen und
dynastischen zum nationalen und demokratischen BewuBtsein fortsetzt. 90
This describes most clearly Habermas concept of the progressive potential of European
integration which he argues must not be left at the (present) technocratic level of market
regulation but rather more must include the domestic political democratisation processes
associated with the post-war social state." As economics have developed beyond the
control of national government so must any social policy which hopes for success also
be organised upon this supra-national level. Yet, as the above suggests, the European
level of social integration represents a stage in a much more ambitious project which
seeks to realise these progressive social developments on a global level leading
Habermas to contend that what is required is the cultivation of a Weltinnenpolitik."
Now that we have considered Habermas reconstruction of the "Janus face" of the nation
and his appreciation of the contemporary post-national constellation we are in a position
to consider his concept of identity and legitimacy creation. Whilst the formal adherence
to a universal concept of Verfassungspatriotismus appears familiar to both left-liberal
and even some liberal conservative readings of the identity question, Habermas concept
differs from the discourses previously considered in his interpretation of the
transcendence of the nation. Whilst left-liberals thinkers appear to share a similar
political perspective to Habennas and adopt concepts developed by Habennas since the
1960s, they reign in the formally universal aspirations of Constitutional Patriotism by
conceding the necessity of its basis in the cultural particularism represented by the
nation. This may be a democratic form of patriotism but it nevertheless remains
grounded in cultural particularism. Habennas development of a concept of anti- or post-
national patriotism is based upon two essential observations: firstly the experience of
the nation state in the West generally and in Germany in particular throughout the age of
imperialism wholly discredited the organic-national concept as a focus of both internal
social integration and international regulation of the legitimacy of the state. Secondly,
Habennas considers the development of socio-economic arrangements in the globalised
age as having effectively rendered the nation state an anachronism and the successful
89 Habermas. 1996. ibid. p. 143.
90 Habermas. 1998. op. cit. p. 89.
91 ibid. p. 80.
92 ibid. pp.167 -8.
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regulation of economic affairs through the medium of the nation an unrealistic
aspiration.
Habennas also appears to differ from his liberal colleagues in another, fundamental
aspect: in contrast to the left-liberal notion that in order to constitute itself
democratically contemporary society requires a sense of progressive identity anchored
in history, Habennas appears to argue for a much more "hands on" form of democratic
discourse which draws legitimacy not necessarily from a sense of identity but from the
procedural functioning of republican social organisation which is codified in law.
Habennas recognises that the best form of social integration and cohesion is derived
from the experience of an intersubjective relationship between the citizenry and state in
the formation of law and particularly of rights mediated through law. This is the sense
of Habennas claim to retain the republican origins of the nation state and the principle
and practice of the post-war social state. For Habennas, social integration can only truly
be achieved through the widest possible participation of the population or, in the
classical terms upon which Habennas basis this concept, civil society which, in contrast
to the naturalistic concept of nation is not a pre-political ethnic community but rather
more a direct product of the social contract
Ein vorgangiger, durch kulturelle Homogenitat gesicherter Hintergrundkonsens ist nicht notig,
weil die demokratisch strukturierte Meinungs- und Willensbildung ein vernunftiges normatives
Einverstandnis auch unter Fremden ermoglicht, Weil der demokratische Prozell dank seiner
Verfahrenseigenschaften Legitimitat verburgt, kann er, wenn notig, in die LOkken sozialer
Integration einspringen. In dem Malle, wie er den Gebrauchswert subjektiver Feiheiten
gleichmallig sichert, sorgt er dafur, dall das Netz staatsburgerlicher Solidaritat nicht reiBt.93
This is the practical republican core of Habennas concept of Verfassungspatriotismus
which not primarily based in the identification with a democratic history or traditions
and rather more is derived from the practical experience of the political inclusion of as
wide a sweep of the citizenry as possible. This is not an identity which flows from "top-
down" but is rather more a reciprocal process based on the intersubjective principle of
republican democracy which posts the citizenry as both the creators of law and the
subjects of such commonly constructed regulations and rules of social interaction." This
is the sense behind Habennas understanding of the "procedural legitimacy" contained in
93 Habermas, 'Inklusion versus Unabhangigkeit, Zum Verhaltnis von Nation, Rechtsstaat und
Demokratie.' in Hettling, Nolte (Hrsg.) 1996. op. cit. p. 119.
94 Habermas. 1996. op. cit. p. 391.
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the republican social model - we are the authors of the laws which bind US.95 Habermas
is keen to state that the project of constructing a "European Public" on the historical
model of civil society is not one which can be achieved by political elites but rather
more from the forces of "solidarity" as a force of social integration against the instances
of state power and moneyed interest." This is a project of "radical reformism" which
does not aim to dismantle established power structures and replace them with new ones
but rather more to shore-up existing structures against the threat from the right."
Ein radikaler Reformismus ist nicht mehr an konkreten Schliisselfordeungen zu erkennen,
sondem an der auf Verfahren gerichteten Intentionen, eine neue Gewaltenteilung zu fordern: die
sozialintegrative Gewalt der Solidaritat soli sich iiber weit ausgefacherte demokrarische
Offentlichkeiten und Intitutionen gegen die beiden anderen Gewalten, Geld und administrative
Macht, behaupten konnen. Das "Sozialistische" daran ist die Erwartung, daB sich die
anspruchsvollen Strukturen gegenseitiger Anerkennung, die wir aus konkreten
Lebenserhaltnissen kennen, tiber die Kommunikationsvoraussetzungen inklusiver Meinungs- und
demokratischer Willensbildungsprozesse auf die rechtlich und administrativ vermittelten sozialen
Beziehungen ubertragen."
In this manner Habermas seeks to continue the emancipatory project which is to be
carried by radical, autonomous public and channelled through legal institutions in an
attempt to restructure social and legal relations. Thus the law offers the only remaining
channel through which emancipatory impulses can be articulated. As Habermas himself
states, this is far from a revolutionary approach to emancipation and his approach
essentially represents the plea for an altered legal paradigm which could tame and direct
the forces of state power and capitalist interest into more emancipatory forms." Thus
Habermas project essentially attempts to cultivate a reinvigorated legitimacy for the law
and this project is lent a radical edge by his contention that non-governmental agencies
and the "autonomous" public must be the agents of this legitimacy creation rather than
political elites. This project has a particularly urgent nature given the discrediting of
established political parties and the notion of an end of "party democracy". Habermas
perceives herein the potential for cultivating new forms of political participation
external to the established party structures which could exercise emancipatory impact
upon the structures of established law
9S Habermas. 1996. op. cit.
96 Habermas. 1998. op. cit. p. 90. also cf Habermas. 1996. op. cit. p. 278.
97 ibid. p. 386.
98 Haberrnas. 1990. op. cit. p. 199.
99 Haberrnas. 1996. op. cit. p. 389.
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Wenn sich die Fonnen der politischen Beteiligung andern, muB das nicht schon per se ein
Schaden sein. Wenn sich die politischen Parteien immer weiter verstaatlichen und ihre Arbeit
gleichzeitig immer starker vennarkten, konnen in der Zivilgesellschaft Gegenbewegungen
einsetzen. Die Grunen haben noch einmal den klassischen Weg von der sozialen Bewegung zur
Partei zuruckgelegt, Das muf nicht so bleiben. Andere Initiativen verharren im Stadium der
Gegenorganisation und erobem sich manchmal, wie Greenpeace, weltweiten Einflull.'?"
In such protest movements and 'Non-Governmental Organisations' (NGOs) Habermas
perceives an example of the form of "autonomous public" which influences the
institutions of state and capital in an emancipatory direction which he has argued since
the 1970s.101 In essence, such organisations and public represents a modern form of
"civil society" which acts as the agency of the leap required from national to supra-
national and global level of reflection and socio-political reorganisation. Habermas
concept of Verfassungspatriotismus must thus be distinguished from conventional left-
liberal versions in several important respects:
(1) Habermas notion of Verfassungspatriotismus has retained its anti or post-national
orientation in post-unification Germany. Whilst conservatives celebrate the "return" of
the nation in 1989 and left-liberals have been compelled to supplement a form of
Constitutional Patriotism with the national concept, Habermas perceives in 1989 more
an opportunity to progress to a European and ultimately global level of socio-political
organisation. Thus, for Habermas, the universal core of Verfassungspatriotismus
matches the socio-economic transformation from the confines of the nation to the
extended parameters of the global society.
(2) Habermas concept of Verfassungspatriotismus offers more than the securities of a
flattering positive identity and is founded in his republican model of social organisation.
In this sense, Constitutional Patriotism is an expression of the "procedural legitimacy"
inherent in a republican model which strives for the widest possible inclusion of the
citizenry in the processes and structures of political will formation and decision making
- the legitimacy of the law is based upon the republican principle of intersubjectivity
which renders the citizen simultaneously subject and object of the collectively
conceived legal codex.
100 Habennas, 'Es gibt doch Altemativen!' in, 'Die Zeit.' Nr. 42. 8.10.1998.
101 cfChapter 3. pp. 92-101
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(3) Habermas retains the aspiration to social emancipation in the post-socialist world. In
contrast to the emancipatory moment achieved by the classic nation state which was
driven by the liberal bourgeoisie and the emancipatory form of work society driven by
the working class, the present constellation must be steered in an emancipatory direction
by the modem civil society constituted by the "autonomous public" represented in non-
governmental protest organisations which operate across a global web of intersubjective
communication. In the mobilisation of these instances of "cultural solidarity" against the
moments of state and capital Habermas perceives the potential to continue the radical-
democratic, modernist project into the 21. century.
Habermas has been criticised by liberal thinkers for developing a form of Constitutional
Patriotism which not only transcends conventional nationalism but which also
transcends "patriotism" itself leaving an ephemeral "moral-universal" stance.!" For
Leist, Habermas is the chief representative of a radical modernist approach which exists
at the opposite end of the political spectrum to the "national conservative" approach
represented in New Right thought. Whilst national conservatives operate from the a
priori of a cultural-ontological concept of national identity which demands piety from
contemporaries towards national values and past traditions. The "radical modernist", on
the other hand, abstains completely from the concept of identity and national
consciousness which is rejected as "ideology" and substitutes these with a concept of
timeless and unhistorical "modernity". Between these two "extremes" lies the genuine
patriot who rejects both national conservative and radical modernist approaches
Er (der Patriot) ist der national en Geschichte verbunden, ohne dabei vergangenheitsfixiert zu
sein; er weiB, daB die Nation als imaginierte Gemeinschaft je neu interpretiert und ihre
Geschichte in der Gegenwart fortgeschrieben werden muB. AuBerdem ist er davon uberzeugt, daB
eine Nationalkultur rational nicht einfach "zersetzt" werden kann, so daB ihre Kritik mit Tabus
und Verboten zu verhindem unnotig ist. Tradition und Moderne sind fur ihn keine Gegensatze.l'"
The distinction between these three positions becomes apparent with regards to their
assessment of the normative content of tradition. Whilst conservatives ascribe national
traditions normative power per se and radical modernists reject such an approach as
102 ef Anton Leist, 'Nation und Patriotismus in Zeiten der Globalisierung.' in, Christine
Chwaszcza, Wolfgang Kersting (Hrsg.) 'Politisehe Philosophie der internationalen Beziehungen.'
Suhrkamp. Frankfurt. 1M. 1998. p. 394.
103 ibid. p. 402.
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anachronistic mysticism, the genuine patriot attempts to balance the value of particular
traditions within the context of contemporary national community and thus
Einzig der Patriot kann damit eine unter aktuellen Bedingungen glaubhafte nationale Identitat
vertreten, wahrend der Konservative durch seine Aufklarungsfeindlichkeit das nationale Erbe
ebenso verspielt wie es der Modernist strikt verweigert.'?'
Thus Leist argues for a dynamic discourse of national identity which attempts to salvage
what remains credible from past traditions in order to lend contemporary, modem
society a sense of collective coherence and stability. This approach corresponds to the
form of democratic nationalism argued by left-liberal thinkers considered previously.
How does this interpretation of the patriot stand up against Habermas concept of
Verfassungspatriotismus? Leist criticises Habermas primarily because he supposedly
rejects not only the "national conservative" form of identity but an orientation towards
the nation and tradition full stop in favour of a "moral-universal stance". Upon first
glance this appears to describe the form of identity argued by Habermas. Yet upon
closer examination this is not the case. Leist accurately perceives the centre point of
Habermas concept of Constitutional Patriotism as an expression of solidarity with the
democratic process of political will formation which in and of itself fosters legitimacy
though its procedural practice of political inclusion and empowerment. Also correct is
the observation that Habermas rejects the particularist values embodied in national
culture in favour of a universal orientation derived from both the republican practice of
political inclusion of both indigenous and immigrant population and the commitment to
human rights. Leist, however, appears to miss the most fundamental point in that whilst
Habermas is an astute and sharp critic of the traditional, uncritical appropriation of the
past in the project of national identity construction this does not mean that he disdains
from relying upon an interpretation of history in order to lend his theory of identity
social authority. In fact, the perspective of the past could be seen as the most important
aspect of Habermas approach identity full stop. The essential difference, however, is
that in contrast to the national conservative uncritical fetishisation of national tradition
and left-liberal attempts to construct a positive past from the experience of the
democratic and emancipation movements of the nineteenth century, Habermas concept
of identity is based upon a wholly negative experience of history - the National Socialist
experience. It is in this context that Habermas does rely upon an appreciation of history
in order to lend his radical democratic vision moral-political authority.
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Whilst formulations of national, and indeed, "post-national" identity have undergone
radical change since German unification, the problem of the National Socialist past for
identity constructs predicated upon an appropriate of "positive" continuities of national
history remains. In this sense, both liberal conservative and left-liberal concepts of
"positive" national historical continuities remain porous. Whilst critical historians are
intellectually and politically better equipped than conservatives to engage with the
National Socialist past, this still remains the largest obstacle to the cultivation of a sense
of national identity based upon positive historical continuities of the German nation.
Similarly, the clear eclipse of the social, political and economic arrangements which
characterised the post-war period also renders an association with the FRG highly
problematic. The key to unlocking the problem of the NS past in the construction of
contemporary identity lies in Habermas theory of critical history. The novel aspect of
this discourse is that in contrast to both liberal conservative and left liberal formulations
of identity, Habermas has developed a construct of progressive, positive identity in the
present which is predicated upon the critical reflection of the wholly negative national
past of National Socialism. It is to this feature that we must now tum in the final chapter
which will attempt to draw together the main currents of the thesis.
104 ibid. p. 403.
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7. The Culture of Contrition and the Reconfiguration of National Identity
In the following chapter I wish to examine the reconfiguration of concepts of
national identity in post-unification Germany with reference to the critical
reflection of the National Socialist past. I first wish to consider the concept of
history as Dementi as elucidated by Habermas which perceives pedagogic
potential from the disasters of history. I then wish to examine how the medium
of contrition is employed to both address the National Socialist past and to
reformulate the need for an engagement with history and the need for identity. I
then proceed to consider Habermas "post-national" concept of "broken identity"
as a medium of articulating the "normality" of the contemporary German nation.
7.1. History as Dementi
Habermas concept of the "post-national constellation" and the need for a
transferral of fundamental executive and legislative powers of the nation state to
the supra-national level of a European federation found little resonance in
Chancellor Schroder's SPD.I Yet, in terms of identity creation in the Berliner
Republik it appears that Habermas concept of "post-national" identity has
acquired patronage at the highest level of contemporary political culture. In the
following I wish to elaborate Habermas concept of "post-national" identity and
to examine the manner in which this concept of radical identity has become
politically consensual in the new Germany.
During the 1980s, Habermas argued for a form of "post-traditional" patriotism as
a means of enlightened self regulation and critical defence against the
neoconservative discourse of conventional national identity. This is a theme
which he has developed in post-unification Germany. Habermas concept of
critical history is based upon a critical examination of conservative
"Historicism" and modernist "philosophy of history".' A primary concern of
Habermas is that unification heralded not only a "return" to the nation state but
I ef
2 ef Habermas, Aus der Geschichte lernen ? in Habermas. 1995. op. eit . pp. 9-18.
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also signalled a rehabilitation of traditional forms of national identity creation in
the manner of historicism. Habermas cites the following quotation taken from an
editorial penned by the veteran of the Historikerstreit Michael Sturmer,
published in the FAZ in 1993, which reproduces a long held concern of this
conservative historian
In zunehmenden Begrundungsnoten aber erhebt sich die Frage, wie lange es dem
steinernen Gast aus der Vergangenheit noch gestattet sein soli, fur aile Zukunft und aile
Vergangenheit fiber Burgertugend und Vaterlandsliebe sein Veto zu werfen.'
The above position holds that in order for the new Germany to constitute itself as
"normal" nation state, the critical memory of Auschwitz must be erased from
public consciousness." This appreciation corresponds to a school of
historiography which perceives in history not only a source of social knowledge
of the past but rather more a source of political orientation in the sense of
Historia Magistra Vitae. From this standpoint, present generations seek not only
knowledge about the past from history but rather more seek a form of
contemporary orientation based upon the perception that history constitutes a
cycle of development which enables the present to anticipate the future from a
reading of the past. 5
We may recognise in this a dominant motif of the conservative engagement with
identity considered in chapter one of this work. This form of historicism was
challenged at the end of the eighteenth century in the form of the "historical
thinking" which characterised the breakthrough of modernist society and which
emphasised the transient nature of historical form and developed a historical
sense of the unique and politically malleable nature of contemporary society.
This form of awareness of the transient nature of historical form constitutes a
central moment of the modernist consciousness for Habermas which enables the
human, subjective agents of history to contemplate the contingency of historical
form and, when wielded with the culture of reason to take history into our own
hands free from either divine or monarchical authority." Whilst Habermas
considers this new form of historical thinking a progression over the naive faith




in history as a "school-mistress", he is also critical of the "philosophy of history"
associated with Hegel and later Marx
Wahrend Hegel aus dieser Geschichtsschreibung die fatalistische Lehre zog, daf fur die
Handelnden aile Lehren zu spat kommen, wollte Marx, daB die Geschichtsphilosophie
selbst den kunftigen Generationen zur Lehre dient. Ihnen sollte die Erkenntnis des
naturwuchsigen Verlaufs der bisherigen Geschichte zu der Einsicht verhelfen, daB sie
sieh in Zukunft zu Subjekten ihrer eigenen Gesehichte emanzipieren konnen - also zu
Autoren machen konnen, die ihre Geschichte, wenn auch nicht unter selbstgewahlten
Umstanden, mit Willen und BewuBtsein produzieren. Hier verschmilzt das historische
mit einem utopischen BewuBtsein, das die Grenzen der Machbarkeit der Geschichte
iiberdehnt. 7
Habermas thus repeats Marx's criticism of Hegel's philosophy of history due to
its innate tendency to ascribe historical understanding an invariably post-festum
character." He then applies a similar criticism to Marx on the basis that he too
propagated a "philosophy of history" based upon a reading of the "natural
progression" of history which attributed too much potential to the human subject
and the possibility of conscious action upon history. As such Habermas repeats a
common conservative criticism of Marx and accuses Marx of a trait to which he
himself responded during his lifetime. Both Marx and Engels contested the
interpretation of historical materialism as a "philosophy of history" and stressed
the importance of the particular and historically specific elements of social
development over crude "models" of historical development of the kind which
Habermas clearly finds them guilty of" Interestingly, the element of this which
Habermas objects to is that it ascribes too much potential to the human subject to
take history in its hands and consciously direct historical development. This
appears somewhat contradictory for a thinker who has invested much time and
energy in defending the potential of reason and progress and the "modernist
project" against attacks from both neoconservative and "postmodern" quarters."
This is, however, consistent within the context of Habermas theoretical position
6 cfHaberrnas, Die Modeme. 1990. in Haberrnas. 1992. op. cit.
7 Haberrnas. 1995. op. cit. p. 185.
8 Marx,. 'Die FrOhschriften', Hrsg. von Siegfried Landshut. Stuttgart: Kroner Verlag, 1968. p.
522
9 cfChapter3, p. 85
10 ef Haberrnas defence of reason and universal values against the "radical contextual ism" of
postmodemists and the metaphysical ontology of neoconservatism in Die Einheit der Vemunft in
der Vielheit ihrer Stimmen. in Merkur. Heft 1. Januar 1988. 42. Jahrgang. pp. 1-14.
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which, on the one hand formally defends a culture of emancipation and
revolutionary consciousness whilst, on the other, negating the possibility of
social revolution thus failing to attain the unity of revolutionary consciousness
and practice characteristic of historical materialism. For Habennas, whilst
historicism perceives too little reason in history, models of a "philosophy of
history" read too much reason into historical development. II
Against this intellectual background Habennas stakes a claim for an
emancipatory approach which is based in a "critical" concept of history which
appears tailor made to the conditions of post-war Germany. What Habennas
finds curious, and objectionable, in both historicism which fetes tradition and a
"philosophy of history" which asserts a progression from past to future according
to human will is that they both operate from a positive reading of history. Whilst
conservatives perceive in history the validity of particularist, unreflected and
hence naively assimilated traditions and progressives the faculty of human
reason to shape the world, both operate from a positive appreciation of history
and suggest that elements are worthy of repetition
Das ist merkwurdig, weil wir normalerweise aus negativen Erfahrungen, eben aus
Enttiiuschungen, lemen. Enttauschungen sind es, die wir in Zukunft zu vermeiden
suchen."
Habennas does perceive the endurance of traditions through history and he
ascribes to them a political-pedagogic potential for the present. Yet this
understanding differs fundamentally from both conventional conservative and
left-liberal versions in that Habermas perceives the progressive potential of
tradition not in a positive perspective of the past but rather more in reflection of
history's negative experiences. For Habennas we do learn from history and
tradition exercises the power to shape the present but, however, not in the form
of a simple "handing down" of classic canons or ideas but rather more as part of
a progressive Lernprozefi which issues from critical reflection of problems and
failures in indigenous history
Ich meine enttauschende Situationen, wo Erwartungshorizonte - und damit die
erwartungsstabilisierenden Uberlieferungen selbst in eine Krise geraten. Wenn die
II Habermas. 1995. op. cit. p. 13.
12ibid.p. 14.
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Geschichte uberhaupt zur Lehrrneisterin taugt, dann als eine kritische Instanz, an der,
was wir im Lichte unseres kulturellen Erbes bislang fur richtig gehaJten haben, scheitert.
Dann fungiert die Geschichte als eine Instanz, die uns nicht zu Nachahmungen, sondem
zu Revisionen herausfordert."
Applying this model to the German context, we may perceive that 1945 provides
precisely just such an instance of critical self-reflection in the light of the utter
moral and political collapse of indigenous national traditions." This corresponds
to Habermas belief that the defeat of German fascism represents the most
significant event of the twentieth century which provides the foundations of his
concept of "post-traditional" patriotism. History and tradition thus playa central
role in Habermas concept of identity. In contrast to the conventional
conservative naive assimilation of national traditions, or indeed left-liberal
attempts to construct positive national-democratic traditions, this is a form of
identity cultivated from reflection of a profoundly compromised and negative
national past. It is only upon this basis of history as Dementi that the present can
hope to learn from the past."
It is interesting to compare this concept of history and identity with formulations
of Federal President Herzog since his assumption of office. As we noted in the
previous chapter the process of a "Westernisation" of the concept of the German
nation, this rapprochement between left and right is reproduced on the level of
history as Dementi. In an address to the 4l. Historians' Conference on 17
September 1996 in Munich, Herzog articulated an interesting perspective on the
relationship between historiography and contemporary political orientation.
Herzog begins with an interesting appreciation of the relationship between the
reflection of the past and contemporary socio-political context
Ais ich das Motto Ihres diesjahrigen Historikerstages las: - "Geschichte als Argument" -,
da wurde mir doch ein biBchen schwummerig. Naturlich wird, nicht zuletzt in der
Politik, immer wieder einmal mit der Geschichte argumentiert - ob mit mehr oder
weniger Gluck will ich hier ganz offen lassen. Und gefahrlich wird die Sache dadurch,
daB der Ruckgriff auf die Geschichte meist in solchen Momenten geschieht, in denen es
urn eine grundsatzliche Neuorientierung der Politk geht, in denen also das Bedurfnis
nach Orientierung besonders groB und die Berechenbarkeit der Zukunft besonders klein
IJ ibid. p. 15.
14 ibid. p. pp. 15-16.
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ist. Die Geschichte wird meist dann zum Argument, wenn man in einer Gegenwart nicht
mehr so recht weiter weiB. 16
Upon first glance this appears as a conventional conservative appreciation of the
role of history in shaping contemporary society. Herzog acknowledges that
history - or to be more precise the political engagement with the past - assumes a
particularly attractive character in times of uncertainty. The search for
orientation in times of profound flux often stimulates a search for potentially
cohesive values from a reading of the past. Unusual about the above
appreciation, however, is the sense of unease articulated by Herzog towards this
approach and his perception that this is even a potentially "dangerous" enterprise
in times of high uncertainty about the present and anticipated future. This
apprehension, however, appears to derive less from the practice of gaining
contemporary orientation from a reading of the past (as we shall see this is an
approach fundamentally supported by Herzog) but rather more from an
appreciation that this has become a problematic enterprise. For Herzog, it is no
longer possible to contend long with Leopold von Ranke that history is defined
by the concern to reveal wie es gewesen ist," Herzog appreciates that such a
claim for an absolutely "objective" history is not possible and that the concerns
of the present always act as a filter through which the work of the historian
inevitably passes. IS Indeed, Herzog appears to concede ground to a relativist
perspective in suggesting that history fragments into the myriad perspectives,
individuals and mentalities and social structures which comprise the past
producing a plethora of historical perspectives." This leaves us, for Herzog, with
the fundamental question ob man aus der Geschichte lernen kann" This old
question is lent a unique context in the present given the departure from the
nation state form which has dominated world history since the late eighteenth
century.
ISibid.pp.17-18.
16 Rede von Bundesprasident Roman Herzog vor dem 41. Deutschen Historikertag am 17.






The unique constellation on the threshold to the next millennium necessitates a
rethinking of the relationship between past and present, the tradition of
historicism and the model of the nation state. Whilst the changes in
contemporary socio-political constellation of the West necessitates a change in
our appreciation of the relationship between past and present this does not imply
a departure from the practice of deriving contemporary orientation from an
engagement with the past as, Geschichtliches Wissen ist stets die Quelle jener
Gelassenheit, die die erste Voraussetzung for wirklich rationale politische
Analysen und for rationales politisches Handeln sein sollte," Such rational
political action is characterised also by the "lesson" of history that one must
perform "better" in present and future. The third "lesson" which Herzog draws
from history is that one must always bear in mind the contingency of
contemporary constellation. Whilst he may be content with the relative
democracy and prosperity of contemporary Germany, the historical and global
perspectives teaches us that this is rather less the "normal case" and perhaps
even the exception of history. We thus need to develop a familiarity with history
in order to be aware that history may well repeat itself and thus gain awareness
of the treasure which we posses in the present. 22
Returning to his opening conjecture that history attains a particular relevance in
times of flux, Herzog contends that 1989 heralded precisely the form of caesura
in history which brings relations into flux. what, then, does 1989 signify for not
only German history but rather more for global history? 1989 clearly represented
the end of the Cold War and the ascension of the Free Market, democratic model
to a global model. 23 Yet Herzog is not concerned to repeat the platitudes of
common garden political science and is more interested in investigating the
possible consequences of 1989 for our appreciation of history after the demise of
the East West conflict
1989 bedeutet hier, daJ3 geschlossene Geschichtsbilder wider1egt worden sind, wie sie
der historische Materialismus im Osten, aber auch westliche Varianten des Historzismus
und des okonomischen Determinismus anboten. 1989 ist der beste Beleg fur die
21 ibid. p. 2.
22 ibid.
23 ibid. p. 3.
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Offenheit der Geschichte, dafiir, daB es keine gesetzmalligen Notwendigkeiten gibt,
sondem daB Gegenwart und Zukunft zunachst einmal von den Menschen selbst
abhangen."
More surprising, perhaps, than Herzog's condemnation of the "closed"
historiographical approach of historical materialism which is contlated with the
vulgar Marxism of Eastern bureaucratic socialism is the admission of the closed
nature of traditional historicism of the West. The objection raised against both is
that such closed historical models deny the subjective element of history any
chance of conscious, positive action upon history. This objection is also raised
against Fukuyama's "utopia" of the "End of History". As such it would appear
that Herzog offers a more positive evaluation of the human potential than the
radical philosopher Habermas. Both traditional left- and right-wing historical
approaches are rejected by Herzog due to their tendency to project transcendental
"laws" of historical development which he recognises as not only metaphysics
but as a restriction on the subjective human potential to rational action. As such
this appears a refreshingly open appreciation of the contingency of historical
development and of the potential of humanity to take history in its own hands.
Such a subject orientated perception of history must be welcomed over the
determinist variants of either traditional Western historicism and the vulgar
Marxism of state socialism of the former East.
Yet this is a perception with limitations. Herzog is not against the engagement
with history in order to provide orientation in the present per se. Herzog's
approach could be more accurately described as an articulation of the desire to
reformulate more conventional notions of the social use of history in the
construction of national identity. Commenting on the effects of National
Socialism in post-war (West) German society, Herzog observes the following
Seit 1945 gab es fur die Deutschen - und zwar weder im Osten noch im Westen - keine
Daten, die zu "historischen Festpunkten" geworden waren. Aber auch eine Gesellschaft
mit gebrochener Geschichte braucht "positive Orientierungspunkte". Sonst besteht die
Gefahr fUr sie, in Geschichtslosigkeit oder gar Geschichtsfeindlichkeit zu verfallen."
This is an interesting admission of the problems created for post-war Germany
by the National Socialist experience. More characteristic of right wing thinkers,
24 ibid.
239
and indeed politicians, during the post-war period was the tendency to contest
the disruption of the "organic" continuity of German national history via
recourse to a mixture of romantic projections of "German identity" and a
relativisation of the National Socialist past via Cold War anticommunism.
Herzog clearly remains faithful to the perception that a people needs a positive
sense of history. Yet the frank admission that this was far from possible during
the post-war period represents a remarkable openness towards the problems
presented by the National Socialist past for traditional conservative perceptions
of an orientation towards history. Whilst West German conservatives orientated
themselves on historical events such as the founding of the Second Empire,
Bismarck's birthday, the founding of the FRG, the uprising of the 17 June and
other, in the East a similar role was performed by celebrations of Marx' birth and
death anniversaries, similar for Luther and during the 1980s even Bismarck and
Friedrich the Great and the founding of the GDR constitution. Clear from
Herzog's reading is that, in the West at least, these were understood as
substitutes for a more open celebration of national traditions. Why does Herzog
feel it necessary or even possible to retrospectively admit to the problems
experienced in the post-war period in such an open manner? The answer would
appear to be that he considers such problems as now consigned to the past. 1989
has opened up the possibility of national celebration and the cultivation of a
more positive relationship to national history which proved so problematic
during the post-war period: Das Jahr 1989 konnte, wenn ich recht sehe, erstmals
zu einem so/chen positiven Orientierungspunkt werden" This 1989 represented
not only the fortieth anniversary of the successful West German state, but also,
of course, the democratic revolution in the former GDR and the events which
opened the possibility of the unification of the two German states. Not only does
this appear to represent a positive instance of national history which can form the
basis of identification but also, it is understood as a date which relativises the
negative caesura of 1945
Die Deutschen haben 1989 auch einen Anfangspunkt fur eine positive
Geschichtsaneignung gesetzt. Nach 1945 waren es die negativen Lektionen des Dritten
Reiches, die die Generationen darauf verpflichteten, es "besser zu machen". Mit 1989 ist
2S ibid. p. 4.
26 ibid.
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diese Verptliehtung zwar keineswegs erlosehen, es ist aber eine weitere dazu
gekommen: Der Wille Opfer zu bringen, die Bereitsehaft etwas zu riskieren, die
Motivation, etwas Neues aufzubauen, der Mut, sieh von Gewohntem zu verabschieden
in der Hoffnung, etwas Besseres zu sehaffen. Das sind die positiven Lektionen von
1989. Oder sie konnten es zumindest sein, wenn wir nur zu klagen aufharten, und es nur
wollen."
In this context, we can perceive the basis upon which Herzog feels confident in
admitting the problems of historically founded identity creation in the post-war
period. This also demonstrates the distinction between Habermas concept of
critical history which is centred upon reflection of the Third Reich and this
version which is centred upon 1989. Thus whilst Herzog declares the departure
from the "nation state?", he also perceives 1989 as representing a new, positive
basis for the cultivation of a sense of national identity. An additional point of
celebration for Herzog is the fact that post-1989 Germany has neither reverted to
traditional nationalism nor has it acted to relativise the commitment of Germany
to the Western alliance." Thus whilst reflection of the break of 1945 is not
contested by Herzog, its significance for the national concept has been
fundamentally altered by the positive national historical experience of 1989. Yet
whilst Herzog clearly seeks a positive basis for defining contemporary national
identity this is a problematic enterprise. Whilst it no longer appears that German
unification could offer a point of common consensus and pride in united
Germany, the construction of a "positive" German nation form history is limited
by the experience of National Socialism. In order for a coherent and potentially
authoritative concept of national identity to be constructed, the National Socialist
past must be addressed. It is to this problem that I shall now tum.
7.2 Learning the "Lessons" of the Past
The occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the Second World War
offered an instance whereby the transformation in official commemoration of the
National Socialist past could be measured. The 8 May in 1995 aroused concern
over the manner in which this date would be commemorated by the conservative
27 ibid.
28 ef: p. 217
29 Herzog. op. cit. pp. 4-5
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coalition government and whether this would lead to a repeat of the crass
Vergangenheitspolitik of Kohl's commemoration in Bitburg." Such fears were
fuelled by the aggressive media-campaign of right wing conservatives combining
figures from both the old deutsch-national right such as Alfred Dregger and New
Right figures such as Zitelmann in an Aufruf gegen das Vergessen," The culture
of amnesia criticised by these thinkers did not relate to the National Socialist
past but rather more to the invasion and occupation of Germany by the Red
Army in 1945 thus rendering any celebration of "liberation" on the 8 May both
historically and politically illegitimate. If the culture of relativised memory of
the National Socialist past were to become, as many critical thinkers feared, the
paradigm of national identity in the new Germany, then the Aufruf represented a
potential rallying call for right wing Vergangenheitspolitik. The Aufruf and the
political sentiment which underlay its proclamation, however, experienced a
strong rebuttal. Whilst one might well have anticipated such a reaction from left
and liberal figures, particularly interesting was the negative reception of the
Aufruf among conservative politicians. In this context Edmund Stoiber declared
Kein Vergessen, kein Verfiilschen, kein Schlufistrich, keine Wiederholung! Wer
sich nicht erinnert, hat keine ZUkUnJt!.32Federal President Herzog in particular
appeared to continue the enlightened path forged by von Weizsacker a decade
previous and stated in no uncertain terms that modem Germany required a
vigilant and "living" memory of the National Socialist past emphasising Wir
wollen unser Entsetzen nicht konservieren" Herzog had set the tone of
remembrance several weeks before the anniversary of the end of the War in
Europe in a speech delivered before the gates of Bergen-Belsen to commemorate
the liberation of the camp on 27 April. In this speech Herzog expressed the
priority of open contrition for the past in contrast to the tactic of suppressing
memory of German crimes
30 ef Norbert Seitz, Die kalte Revision. Zur Aktualitat der 8.- Mai-Rede Weizsackers. in
Frankfurter Hefte. Mai. 1995. (5). pp ..389-392.
31 cfDer Tagesspiegel. 8. 5. 1995.
32 ef Rede des Bayerisehen Ministerprasienten Dr. Edmund Stoiber bei der Feierstunde anlafllich
des 50. Jahrestages des Kriegsendes vom 8. Mai 1945 in Aehaffenburg. at: http://www.bayem.de
33 ef Herzog, Wir wollen unser entsetzen nieht konservieren, Der Tagesspiegel. 08. 05. 1995. also
cf. Ansprache von Bundesprasident Roman Herzog zum Gedenktag fur die Opfer des
Nationalsozialismus am 19. Januar 1996 im Deutschen Bundestag. at
http://www.bundesprlisident.de.
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An diesen Sunden tragen wir Deutschen schwer. Nichts darf verdrangt werden, nichts
darf vergessen werden. Wir tragen Verantwortung dafiir, daB sich sowas nie
wiederholt. 34
This is an expression of contrition which involves an open admission of German
guilt and culpability which is combined with a responsibility that the like may
never reoccur again. Herzog is adamant that the form of amnesia demanded by
right wing conservatives must not take hold in post-unification Germany
Noch einmal zusammengefaBt: Der Ablauf von fiinfzig Jahren seit dem Ende des NS-
Regimes kann nicht Ende des Erinnems heiBen. Was wir jetzt brauchen, ist eine Form
des Gedenkens, die zuverlassig in die Zukunft wirkt."
Thus for Herzog, the elapse of half a century should In no manner act to
relativise or suppress memory of the National Socialist past. Interesting in the
above statement is the concept that "memory" and "commemoration" play an
important role in cultivating future orientation. This underlies the concept of a
German responsibility and "learning the lessons" of the past. The primary
"lesson" which Herzog has elucidated throughout his tenure as Federal President
is derived from the more familiar conservative critique of "totalitarianism"
Wenn wir aus der Geschichte lernen wollen, rnussen wir erkennen, daB die Gefahr des
Totalitarismus immer noch im Prasens steht und nicht nur in Deutschland - sondem der
ganzen Welt - und daB sie uns auch im Futur wieder begegnen karin."
Thus it would seem, the celebrated collapse of the "totalitarian" regimes in the
East has not banished the dangers of "totalitarianism" in Germany or elsewhere
around the globe and in this, Herzog perceives the connection between memory
of the German past and contemporary political action. Whilst Herzog clearly
expresses remorse in the name of Germany for the atrocities committed at
Bergen-Belsen and other former camps, National Socialism is primarily regarded
as an example of "totalitarian" politics. In this sense, Herzog's approach is to be
distinguished from both conventional left-and right wing readings of the
National Socialist past: this is a discourse of the German past which appears to
fuse both "critical" and "totalitarian" approaches. The collapse of the Soviet
Union and the GDR in particular appears to have strengthened the totalitarian
34 "Die Wurde des Menschen ist unantastbar". Ansprache in Bergen-Belsen am 27 April 1995. in,
Michael Rutz (Hrsg.) Roman Herzog. Die Zukunft der Erinneung. Wegmarken deutscher
Geschichte. Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart. 1999. p. 134.
3S ibid. p. 136.
36 ibid. p. 138.
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reflex associated with the political right. Thus Herzog has often spoke of the
need of contemporary Germany to come to terms with the "two" German
dictatorships of the twentieth century in a manner which associates the "brown"
and "red" dictatorships via their status as "totalitarian" regimes." Yet whilst this
approach continues to effect a relativisation of the National Socialist experience,
it no longer appears to imply a policy of selective amnesia towards the German
past.
Herzog frequently invokes the concept of "totalitarianism" to explain both
National Socialism and the post-war GDR. Yet Herzog's understanding of
"totalitarianism" must also be distinguished from the neoconservative arguments
of the 1980s in another respect. The brand of totalitarianism argued by Nolte
during the 1980s was imbued with an innate sense of superiority over the current
alternative society of the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc. It is upon this basis that
Nolte felt confident enough to argue that anyone who considers the post-war
Western social system superior and more desirable than the Communist societies
of the Eastern Bloc must be forced to concede at least an element of
"justification" for the emergence of fascist movements in Europe during the
1930s.38 Whilst during the 1980s right wing conservatives sought to explain
National Socialism via recourse to an a priori fear of "asiatic" barbarism," New
Right thinkers have expanded this concept in the 1990s to an understanding of
the barbarism inherent in all "mass -isms" of the twentieth century." This
perception is also coupled with an attempt to cast the National Socialist
Holocaust as testimony to "man's inhumanity to man" and thus relativise its
specific social, political and historical genesis in the breakdown of inter-war
German democracy." Whilst Herzog is strictly against a relativisation of the
past, the terms in which the National Socialist regime are understood appear
congruent with the anti-humanist tone of New Right readings. Thus Herzog
argued at the declaration of the 27 January as a day of national remembrance
37 efWege ins Offene: Lehren aus zwei deutsehen Diktaturen. Rede vor der Enquete-Kommission
"SED-Diktatur" am 26. Mlirz 1996 in Berlin. in. ibid. pp. 171-184. also ef Umgang mit der
Schuld. Politisehe Meinung.
38 efp. 63
39 efChapter Two. p. 62.
40 efChapter Five. p. 187
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Was Menschen anderen Menschen an Leid und Grausamkeit zufugen konnen, ist tief in
das individuelle wie in das gemeinschaftliche Gedachtnis der Deutschen eingebrannt.
Der heutige Tag, der auf die Befreiung von Auschwitz hinweist, ist bleibende
Erinnerung daran."
In this reception, Auschwitz primarily stands as a symbol of the cosmic
propensity of humanity to inhuman action. This perception is, however, not
exhausted in the rather banal observation that the Holocaust serves as evidence
of the depths of human depravity. In order for such "memory" to acquire the
political function desired of identity, it needs to be related to the mantra of
"learning the lessons of history". What possible lessons can this perspective on
the past impart upon present and future generations? Herzog attempts to link this
rather anti-humanist perception with contemporary obligations
Eines ist klar: Auschwitz hat unser Bild vom Menschen verfinstert. Was einmal
historische Wirklichkeit war, gehort fur immer zu den furchtbaren Moglichkeiten des
Menschen, dcren Wiederholung in welcher Form auch immer, nicht ausgeschlossen
werden kann. Die Damme und Sicherungen miissen also immer wieder aufs neue gebaut
werden."
Thus the possibility of repetition of the atrocities of the past lies not primarily
within particular political and social values, beliefs and practice but appears as
grounded in "human nature" itself. If this is the case then not only is the
possibility of "repetition" ever present but the chances of eradicating this
inhuman tendency of humanity are faced with an absolute barrier shaped by the
conditio humanum. It is within this context that the relationship between memory
of the past and the contemporary state's internalisation of the "lessons" of
history is developed. The role of the state consists, in this reading, in securing
contemporary society from the dangers of a relapse into the barbarism which
appears innate to humanity. This appears to be the underlying content of
contentions that the dangers of totalitarianism remain ever present and, m
particular, a dangerous temptation for young generations who have no
experience of dictatorship. Numerous contributions from all shades of political
affiliation to debates on the National Socialist past remark that we currently
stand at a period generational change and that this necessitates pedagogic-
41 Schacht in Schacht, Schwilk. 1994. op. cit. p. 66.
42 ibid. p. 147.
43 ibid. p. 157.
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political activity on behalf of the state, teachers, politicians and parents. This
combines with a perception of "totalitarianism" as a phenomenon which
surreptitiously creeps up upon a society from innocuous beginnings
Und wir durfen keinen Augenblick vergessen, daB die Generationen unserer Kinder und
Kindeskinder keine Anschauung mehr davon hat, was Willkiirstaat, Entwiirdigung und
Massenvemichtung wirklich bedeuten, wie aile diese Scheuf31ichkeiten nicht auf einmal,
sondem Schritt fur Schritt, zum Teil in ganz kleinen Schritten, tiber ein Yolk
hereinbrechen und wie notwendig es daher ist, auf die kleinen Zeichen am Anfang zu
achten."
This appears a manner whereby the state and established politics can build a
bridge with the young in a society characterised by ever declining participation
in party politics and elections particularly among younger generations.
Interesting here also is the perception that "totalitarianism" "happens" to a
society from seemingly innocent beginnings. This interpretation relativises the
specific historical context within which German fascism developed and
underplays the popularity of replacing Weimar democracy with a form of
authoritarian state within establishment and conservative social circles. Whereas
the state and its representatives were instrumental in strengthening the power of
the executive over legislative and in removing the former from democratic
accountability during the late 1920s - early 1930s,45 Herzog presents this as a
phenomenon which creeps up upon society from the "outside". Whilst a common
perception of the left engagement with the National Socialist past during the
period of division was of the role of the state and old bureaucracy in destroying
Weimar democracy, in contemporary Germany the state appears as the last
bastion of democratic civilisation. In the context of a latent, innate human
preponderance towards barbarism, the state appears as a regulatory instance
which lends the process of contrition and moral engagement with the past a
necessary anchor of social authority
Die Geschichte der Zivilisation lehrt uns, wie lange es gedauert hat, bis die Menschen
lemten, sich zu disziplinieren, ihre Konflikte in geregelten Bahnen auszutragen, ihre
latente Gewaltbereitschaft zu Uberwinden. Die deutsche Gesschichte dieses Jahrhunderts
_ aber beileibe nicht nur sie - lehrt auch, in weIch erschreckend kurzer Zeit alles an
Zivilisation, Humanitat und Selbstdisziplin wieder verspielt werden kann. Das
44 ibid. p. 141.
4S cfHans Mommsen. 1989. op. cit. esp. pp. 275-489.
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"moralische Gesetz in uns", von dem Kant und die Aufklarung so emphatisch
gesprochen haben, ist so stark nicht, wie man es glauben mochte, es verlangt daher
funktionierende und durch Glaubwiirdigkeit kraftvolle Institutionen."
In this context the transmission of "memory" across the generations assumes the
form of a moral obligation of established politics and the state to inculcate in the
youth, in particular, a sense for the dangers of totalitarianism and, ultimately, of
the latent bestiality of the human condition. This represents an interesting
reversal from perceptions of youth and the fascist legacy since the APO period:
during the 1960s, the critical engagement with the National Socialist past formed
the moral-political core of radical youthful opposition to a social and political
establishment implicated in the National Socialist regime. During the 1990s, the
critical engagement with the National Socialist past appears rather more as a
moral-political-historical obligation of the state to educate the young of the
dangers of the totalitarian "temptation"." On the surface level this would appear
to match the political ascension of the "'68" generation in contemporary
Germany.
Whilst this appears the case, it must also be noted that this is a motif of critical
self-reflection which is shared by mainstream conservatives and which predates
the Red-Green coalition. What is equally interesting and important is the manner
in which conservatives during the 1990s have been able to relate the older
concern for a cultivation of historical-moral responsibility to the critical dealing
with the past. Whilst it no longer appears possible to inculcate in the young a
sense of national continuity and pride in traditions, what remains is a moral
compunction to develop an emotional engagement with national history founded
upon the obligations which issue from a horrific past. This formulation of the
contemporary social use of "historical consciousness" combines a traditional
conservative concept of Historie in a form more traditionally associated with
radical and critical positions." Yet in the reading of Auschwitz as testimony to
innate human barbarity, National Socialism is detached from the specific socio-
46 cfHerzog, in Rutz (Hrsg.) op. cit. p. 145.
47 Herzog. in Rutz ibid. p. 151.
48 also cf, Die EntwOrdigten wieder ins Recht setzen.Rede bei der Gedenkveranstaltung aus AnlaB
des 60. Jahrestages der Synagogenzerstorung 1938 ("Reichskristallnacht") am 9. November 1998
in Berlin. in Rutz (Hrsg.) op. cit. pp. 139-140.
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political context which has conventionally compromised traditional conservative
Geschichtspolitik. This aspect of developing a sense of historical consciousness
was also emphasised by the CDU member and former executive member of the
Zentralrat der Juden in Deutschland Michael Friedmann in a contribution to the
debate over the planned national Holocaustmahnmal in Berlin. Friedmann
declared that he does not require the monument primarily as a Jew but rather
more as a German citizen." For Friedmann, remembrance of the National
Socialist past and the cultivation of a historically founded sense of national
identity in the present are mutually enhancing projects thus
Geschichtslosigkeit ist Geschichtslosigkeit. 50 Jahre nach der Befreiung vom
Nationalsozialismus stellen sich wichtige Fragen, deren Beantwortung auch fur die
Zukunft ethische, politische und gesamtgesellschaftliche Konsequenzen haben werden.
Die wichtigste Frage, die uns gerade im Kontext dieser gesschichtlichen Erinnerung fur
die Zukunft beschaftigen wird, heil3t: Wie Erinnerungsarbeit offensiv, institutionell
organisiert, einer breiten Bevolkerung zuganglich gemacht wird."
Thus Friedmann's prime concern is how Erinnerungspolitik can be organised
and institutionalised so that it may penetrate broad sections of the population.
The ethical, political and social values which Friedmann seeks to cultivate
authority for in contemporary society derive their legitimacy from a reflection of
the National Socialist past. Not only does remembrance of the Holocaust
describe a moral obligation of successors of the perpetrator generation but this
provides an opportunity to cultivate historical legitimacy for specific social and
political values in contemporary society thus
DaB Erinnerung und die Auseinandersetzung mit Geschichte, auch mit dem
Nationalsozialismus, Herausforderung und Chance und nicht Bedrohung ist, rnuf von
uns allen vermittelt werden. Annahme von Geschichte ist identitaatsstiftend. Sie hilft
dabei auch Begriffe, wie Frieden, Freiheit und Menschenwiirde, nicht als
Selbstverstandliches, sondem als Ausnahme zu verstehen."
Thus, for this sensitive conservative, reflection of the National Socialist period
can perform a highly useful and compelling role in fostering a sense of national
identity and in lending contemporary social values a powerful source of moral-
49 cf Michael Friedmann Geleitwort in Lea Rosh (Hrsg.) "Die Juden, das sind die doch die
anderen". Der Streit urn ein deutsches Denkmal. Philo. BerlinlWien. 1999. p.8.
so cf Michael Friedmann, Das Drama, die Unlust und die Unverschamten. Streitpuntk Holocaust-
Mahnmal: Zur Annahme der Geschiche. in Der Tagesepiegel. 18 Januar 1995. in Michael
Jeismann. (Hrsg.) Mahnmal Mitte. Eine Kontroverse. DuMont Buchverlag. Koln. 1999. p. 90.
SI ibid. p. 91-2.
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political authority. As the case of Friedmann exemplifies, this does not
necessarily testify to a machiavellian instrumentalisation of the NS past for
contemporary political ends but rather more describes the coincidence of two
perceived fundamental needs: firstly the need to cultivate a more open
relationship to the National Socialist past in post-unification Germany and
secondly the need to foster collective, authoritative values at a time of socio-
political flux. Upon the basis of contrition, a new authority and legitimacy can be
cultivated by the critical engagement with national history. In contrast to
historicist traditions, the national past no longer appears as an instance of
imitation but rather more as a negative counter-foil to the present which
illuminates the exceptional and therefore contingent nature of contemporary
democracy and peace. This appears the true sense of the monument as a
Mahnmal - as a symbolic historical warning to successive generations. In this
context, the monument offers not only a site of collective memory but also a
potential affirmation of the present. 52 This constellation offers the possibility of a
reconfiguration of national "normality" in the new Germany which is curiously
predicated upon the admission of former "abnormality". In the following I wish
to examine this reconfiguration of concepts of national "normality" and identity
by examining contemporary discussion of the Holocaustmahnmal, the reception
of Daniel Jonah Goldhagen's Hitler's Willing Executioners and the German
contribution to the NATO intervention in Kosovo.
7.3. The Holocaustmahnmal and "Broken Identity"
The debates which have accompanied the plans for the construction of a national,
central memorial of the Jewish victims of National Socialism have been shaped
by conflicting approaches to the symbolic, public representation of the negative
German past in contemporary society. The period spanning the founding of the
Biirgerinitiative PERSPEKTIVE BERLIN e. V in 1988 to the acceptance in
parliament of the Eisenmann 2 model of the Holocaustmahnmal in Berlin in June
1999 provides a useful context for assessing the changes in national identity
since unification. A central point of controversy centres upon the question of
52 Friedmann. in Rosh. 1999. op. cit. p. 9.
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precisely whom the Mahnmal should provide a memorial for. The founding
representatives of the Initiative, the journalist Lea Rosh and the historian
Eberhard Jackel, have consistently and adamantly argued that the monument
should solely commemorate the Jewish victims of National Socialism. The first
Aufruf of the Biirgerinitiative on 29-30 January 1989 demanded the construction
of a memorial in memory of the Jewish victims of the Holocaust as an obligation
of Germans in both East and West." For Jackel, who adopts an "intentionalist"
approach, the Nazi Holocaust perpetrated against the Jews represented both the
central motive of the regime and also the culmination of a thousand years old
European anti-Semitism."
These factors which distinguish the singularity of the Holocaust also legitimise
the particularist remembrance of Jewish victims distinct from other groups. This
drew criticism from some who accused the PERSPEKTIVE group of attempting
to monopolise the former Reich Security HQ in the Prinz Albrecht Geliinde and
undermine the Topographie des Terrors museum" Others, such as the president
of the German Romanis, Romani Rose, accused Jackel and Rosh of
marginalising the extermination of Romani and Sinti" and creating a hierarchy
of victims. 57 The exchange, like much of the subsequent debate, was marked
with personal as well as critical objections. Rudolf Augstein accused Lea Rosh
of being a Wiinschjtidin, referring to the journalist's decision as a young woman
to affirm her Jewish ancestry and change her name." Jackel accused those who
argue for a universal memory of the victims of essentially siding with the
relativist argument of Nolte during the Historikerstreit" Romani Rose in tum,
53 cf Lea Rosh (Hrsg.) "Die Juden, das sind die doch die anderen". Der Streit urn ein deutsches
Denkmal. Philo. BerlinlWien. 1999. p. 20.
54 cf Eberhard Jackel, Ann aile und jeden erinnem? Der Plan fur ein Berliner Mahnmal zum
Gesenken an den Judenmord darf nicht zerredet werden .. (Die Zeit. 7. April 1989, in Jeissmann.
1999. op. cit. p. 58-9. also cfLea Rosh's defence of Jackel against critics in Rosh. 1999. op. cit.
p.34.
55 cf Gerhard Schoenberger. in Die Zeit Nr.15 in Rosh. ibid. p. 33.
56Cf Romani Rose, Ein Mahnmal fUr aile Opfer. Irn NS Regime gab es keine Verfolgung erster
oder zweiter Klasse. Die Zeit. 28. April. 1989, in Jeissmann. 1999. op. cit.
57 Rose. ibid. p. 62. and Reinhard Kosellek, Wer darf vergessen werden? Das Holocaust-
Mahnmal hierarchisiert die Opfer. in Die Zeit. Nr. 13. 19. Marz 1998.
58 Rudolf Augstein,
59 Jackel. in Jeismann. ibid. p. 60.
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accused Jackel of "betraying" the historical and political obligation to remember
the victims of National Socialism."
During the 1980s politics organised at party and governmental level displayed
little interest in the Holocaustmahnmal project which appeared to contain little
political capital for any of the parties." During the 1990s this process has been
reversed and the planned monument made a central focus of public-political
debate not only at the level of the feuilleton but in the public selection of a model
design and financial aid at both regional and federal level. In tum this reflects a
change in perceptions of the relationship between concepts of national identity
and the National Socialist past. Roman Herzog believed that modem Germany
needed to construct the Mahnmal unserer selbst willen" Parliament President
Wolfgang Thierse also emphasised the particular German context of the
monument in his defence of the Eisenmann 2 model in parliament
denn nicht fur die Juden - ob deutsche oder andere - bauen wir dieses Denkmal, sondem
fur uns, als unser ureugenes Bekenntnis zu einem politischen Selbstverstandnis."
From this, it is clear that the debate over the target group of the monument is is
expanded by a third, and perhaps most important group, the successor
generations of the perpetrators. The major division within this group lies
between those who perceive in open contrition for the Holocaust a potential basis
for reconfiguring a new concept of "post-national" national identity and those
who, as before, perceive in the focus upon the National Socialist past the greatest
barrier to contemporary "normality".
Perhaps the most controversial critique of the Holocaustmahnmal was contained
in Martin Walser's acceptance speech for the 1998 Friedenspreis. Walser
criticised the Dauerprlisentation unserer Schande in German political and media
culture and warned that Auschwitz was ill-served as a form of Moralkeule to be
applied to the Germans at will." As Gyorgy Konradi abserved, Walser's
60 Rose. ibid. p. 64.
61 cf Jeissmann. op. cit. p. 25. also cfRosh. 1999. p.
62 Herzog. 27 January 1999. in Rutz. 1999. op. cit. p.
63 in Rosh. ibid. p. 133.
64 Walser, at http:lbrandstetter.de
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observations brought this "moral cosh" crashing down on his head 65 President of
the Jewish Central Council Ignatz Bubis perceived in Walser's intervention signs
of a renaissance of nationalist sentiment which was not altogether free from anti-
Semitic prejudice." For Bubis and left wing critics of Walser he has essentially
provided a legitimacy for the more undiplomatic demand from the Far Right
quarter and figures such as the sponsor of the D VU Gerhard Frey for finally
drawing a line under the German past. Walser's critical observations on the
instrumentalisation of the Holocaust provoked controversy also because this was
coupled with a concept of "normality" characterised by a "privatisation" of the
memory of National Socialism." Walser's comments thus aroused suspicion that
his concept of "normality" was founded in rather more traditional notions of the
value of national consciousness unimpinged by recollection of the National
Socialist past." In the construction of a Holocaustmahnmal opponents such as
Walser and Augstein perceived the monumentalisation of the National Socialist
past as a moral-political restriction of the sovereignty of newly unified
Germany. Writing in Der Spiegel Augstein expressed this sentiment thus
Nun soli in der Mitte der wiedergewonnenen Hauptstandt Berlin ein Mahnmal an unsere
fortwahrende Schande erinnem. Anderen Nationen ware ein solcher Umgang mit ihrer
Vergangenheit fremd. Man ahnt, daB dieses Schandmal gegen die Hauptstadt und das in
Berlin sich neu formierende Deutschland gerichtet ist.69
Thus Augstein perceived in the monument an attack upon the newly won
sovereignty of the Berlin Republic and perceives "outside" forces (primarily
from the US) attempting to lecture the Germans on how to deal with their past. 70
Whilst both Walser's and Augstein's criticisms contain insight into the manner
in which the Holocaust is being subjected to a process of instrumentalisation
which itself is of dubious moral probity, both of these contributors continue to
perceive a dichotomy between concepts of German "normality" and sovereignty
6S Gyorgy Konradi, Die Zeit, Nr. 53. 1. 22 Dec 1998.
66 cf Ignatz Bubis antwortet Martin Walser - Unterschwelling antisentitisch. Auszuge aus Rede
zum 60. Jahrestag der Pogromnacht, in Suddeutsche Zeitung. Nr. 259. 10. II. 19998. and Spiegel
Gesprach - "Moral verjahrt nicht", Ignatz Bubis iiber die Auschwitz-Debatte und seine
Auseinandersetzung mit Martin Walser und Klaus von Dohnanyi. in Der Spiegel. Nr. 49. 30. II.
1998
67 Thus Robert Leicht, Warum Walser irrt. Auch die Nachgeborenen haften fur das Erbe von
Aschwitz. Die Zeit. Nr. 50. 3. December 1998.
68 cfWalser's 1993 contribution in Der Spiegel. re Far Right
69 Der Spiegel. Nr. 49. 1998. op. cit. p. 32.
70 ibid. p. 33.
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at home and abroad and the critical reflection of the past. Far more important a
development over the 1990s has been the reconfiguring of the moral-political
sovereignty of the German nation which is articulated precisely through this
process of critical self-reflection. In this context, Augstein appears correct in
perceiving a tendency towards instrumentalisation of the Holocaust and yet
wrong in associating this with a loss of moral-political credibility associated with
the concept of national "normality". In an article considering the development
of the neue Linke, Richard Herzinger observed the longevity of this disparate
group in determining the political culture of the Federal Republic since the
1960s.71 Herzinger perceives two main successors of the neue Linke of the 1960s
in thinkers such as Walser, Botho StrauB, Hans-Magnus Enzensberger and
Rudiger Safranski who have turned towards traditional neo-conservative
ontology and those, such as Peter Schneider and Daniel Cohn-Bendit who have
transformed into adamant defenders of Western parliamentary democracy and
the Westbindung," In some important respects we might view the argument over
the Holocaustmahnmal as a debate between these siblings of the New Left. What
is most interesting in this relationship is not primarily the conventional
conservative ontology of the right but rather more the manner in which
progressive arguments are employed to reconfigure a new concept of national
normality.
Writing before the parliamentary decision to construct the Eisenmann II model,
Habermas emphasised the symbolic importance of constructing the monument in
the new Germany
Tauschen wir uns nicht. In der funfzigjahrigen Geschichte der Bundesrepublik ist dies
der erste Zeitpunkt, an dem ein parlamentarisches Votum fur ein solches uniibersehbar
in die Zukunft hineinragendes Zeichen einer gelauterten kollektiven Identitat der
deutschen iiberhaupt in den Bereich des Moglichen riickt. Es scheint auch der letzte
Zeitpunkt zu sein, an dem das noch moglich ist. Eine Berliner Republik, die der
falschen, der monumental en Vergangenheit gewidmet werden soli, wirft ihre Schatten
voraus."
71 Richard Herzinger, Left is Right and Right is Left. Ober die Transformation ideeller
Paradigmen in den national en Intellektuellendebatten. in Langguth. 1997. op. cit. p. 300-301.
72 ibid. p. 30 I.
73 Habermas, Der Zeigefinger. Die Deutschen. in Die Zeit. Nr. 14.31. Marz 1999.
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For Habennas, the Mahnmal clearly offers a unique historical opportunity to
lend symbolic meaning to the notion of a gelauterte or "purified" form of
collective identity. Habennas also perceives that time is running out for this
important political-cultural departure from conventional expressions of
patriotism. Habennas rejects both the national conservative approach of a Baring
as well as the left-wing nationalism of a Willy Brandt as dangerous
developments. Equally, Habermas observes a new mutation of left-wing, social-
democratic nationalism in the "telegenic" form of Chancellor Schroder who is
pursuing a "normalisation" of the past undreamt of by Kohl. 74 Against such
approaches, Habennas understands the Holocaustmahnmal as a unique
opportunity to break out of traditional forms of national representation and to
symbolically internalise the concept of history as Dementi. This necessitates
placing the memory of Auschwitz at the heart of contemporary identity as he
asks
Machen wir die selbstkritische erinnerung an "Auschwitz" - die wachgehaltene
Reflexion auf das mit diesem Namen verbundene Gesschehen - explizit zum Bestandteil
unseres politischen Selbtverstandnisses?"
This forms the basic question which the Germans today have to ask themselves
in accepting responsibility conferred upon later generations as an element of
"broken" identity. Habermas then proceeds to explain the concept of "broken"
identity
"Gebrochen" insofem, als diese Verantworung den Willen zur Diskontinuieung
irrefilhrender Denkweisen in der Kontinuitat eigener Uberlieferungen bedeutet. Als
mithaftende Nachfahren sagen wir das "Nie Wieder" zu uns selbst. Der Bruch an der
Fortsetzung unserer tragenden Traditionen ist die Bedingung wiedererlangter
Selbstachtung."
Thus Habennas perceives in the internalisation of the National Socialist past in
contemporary collective consciousness an instrument of critical self-regulation
of indigenous traditions. In so far we can perceive a congruity with his earlier
arguments from the 1980s. Yet in the contemporary context this concept of
critical history centred upon reflection of the National Socialist past is invoked
not to refute the legitimacy of "national identity" but rather more as a
74 ibid.
"Habermas. Die Zeit. 31.03.1999. ibid.
76 ibid.
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precondition of its reconfiguration. Thus the concept of "broken" identity
strengthened by critical memory of the National Socialist past forms the basis of
a new reconfiguration of identity and indeed the precondition of regaining a
sense of self respect. In the objections of Walser, Lubbe, Augstein and others
Habermas perceives a desire to return to old heroic, representations of the past
which characterised the age of European nationalism." For Habermas, however,
despite the radical shift in content nach wie vor geht es urn die
Selbstverstiindigung der Deutschen." The redirection of perspective to the
victims of the Holocaust represents, for Habermas, an opportunity to lend his
project of the "post-national" constellation a legitimacy cultivated in history
Die Zumutung besteht also darin, moralische Gesichtsounkte, die in den burgerlichen
Gleichheitsnormen des Binnenverkehrs westlicher Gesellschaften langst rechtlich
verankert sind, nicht nach Kriterien der Zugehorigeit selektiv anzuwenden. Der
Holocaust fordert die Deutschen zu einer raumlichen und zeitlichen Entgrenzung der
moralischen Verantwortung der demokratischen Burgergesellschaft auf, die mit dem
konventionellen Formen nationaler Totenkultue unvereinbar ist. 79
in the critical reflection of the Holocaust as a component of collective identity
Habermas perceives a possibility of historically legitimising the universalisation
of the "moral principles" contained in his understanding of the bourgeois concept
of civic equality. Thus the shift in emphasise from a celebration of indigenous
traditions to a form of solidarity with the victims of those traditions provides the
moral-political context within which a shift from particularist, national values to
a universal, "post-national" orientation is enacted. Herein, perhaps, Habermas
perceives a retort to conservative accusations of the emotional barrenness of
Verfassungspatriotismus and a necessary source of historical legitimacy to
supplement the "procedural legitimacy" of intersubjective mutual regulation.
Whilst this is clearly a centrally important development in the German context,
Habermas situates this within a broader trend throughout the West to a critical
engagement with indigenous national history citing Helmut Dubiel's suggestion
that throughout the West in the post-Cold War period the national past has
ceased to be an unquestioned source of orientation and affirmation in the
77 ibid.
78 Habermas, Die Zeit. op. cit.
79 Habermas. ibid.
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present." In this context West Germany appears, due to the specificity of its
modern history, to have been at the vanguard of a much broader, "post-national"
development throughout the West which, since the collapse of the Cold War
framework has taken root. Habennas acknowledges this is suggesting that
contemporary debates over the national past in Western nations reflects in
structure, if not theme, the course of the West German Historikerstreit of the
1980s. This distancing from the indigenous, national past and the "solidarity"
with the victims ultimately provides the opportunity, for Habennas, of breaking
the universalist core of democratic civil society from the particularism of
national consciousness
Mit diesem Wandel im kollektiven Selbstverstandnis holt der Universalismus des
demokratischen Verfassungsstaates den Partikularismus des mit ihm verschwisterten
NationalbewuBtseins ein, indem er dieses gleichsam von innen umstrukturiert. Die
Nationen bekommen die postnationale Konstellation auch auf diese Weise zu spuren."
Habennas thus perceives in the "post-national" constellation not only a force
from "outside" in the form of increasing internationalisation of markets,
investments and production but equally one which operates from "within" as
witnessed in the growing popular alienation from established national narratives
in all Western nations since the end of the Cold War. This interpretation of
history as Dementi finds symbolic expression in the Holocaustmahnmal. On the
one hand, the monument symbolises the break with national traditions after the
experience of National Socialism and, on the other, the monument urges a break
with national particularist loyalties in favour of solidarity with the victims of the
indigenous past. Habermas interprets the weakening of conventional national
consciousness as leading to the development of a universal outlook. Yet this
model does not shed its particularist groundings. Habermas falls back upon an
inherently particularist concept of German identity in order to support the
development of a "post-national" orientation. Whilst Habennas appreciates the
exhaustion of conventional left and right wing approaches to society and history
his concept of history as Dementi denotes an attempt to cultivate historically
legitimacy for contemporary identity based upon a reconfiguration of the
relationship with the national past. Habermas concept of universalism is not
80 Habermas. ibid. Dubiel. 1999. op. cit. p. 292.
81 Habermas. ibid.
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based on the traditional left-wing concept of internationalism nor indeed
primarily on the principle of common human equality but rather more in
generating moral solidarity on the historical experience of victimhood par
example.
Despite the universal aspirations of Habermas concept of identity it remams
conceptually focused upon a particularist German historical experience. This
may well be formed by a wholly negative past which urges the break with
national traditions but this does not indicate the departure from national identity
per se. Rather more this appears as a progressive reconfiguration of national
identity. This sense of departure and reconfiguration is succinctly expressed in
the concept of "broken identity" which signals the admission of a wholly
compromising national past as a means whereby a credible concept of "post-
national" national identity can be reconstructed. The cultural historian Aleida
Assmann has also considered the changes in identity politics in post-unification
Germany. Like Habermas, Assmann comes from a critical perspective and also
understands the emergence of "post-national" traditions over the 1990s as
indicative of the need to reconfigure concepts of nation and national identity.
This process has served to reactualise the nineteenth century practice of "nation
building" via recourse to the construction of monuments and museums
Die Einrichtung und staatliche Forderung histoischer Musseen zeigt eben so wie die
Debatte urn zentrale Denkmaler, daB der gesarntdeutsche Nationalstaat emeut irn Begriff
ist, sich ein Gedachtnis zu schaff en. 82
Thus Assmann, like Habermas, understands the interest in history as a result of
the value flux generated by the profound changes in the German context over the
past decade. Assmann notes that the concept of national identity has long been a
left wing taboo after the collapse of the last German nation state. Assmann stakes
a claim for a "national feeling" which is neither "positive" nor "negative" but
rather more is based upon the recognition of "historical truth" as a part of "self-
definition"." Again, like Habermas, Assmann perceives in the Holocaust an
aspect of German history which touches all successor generations of Germans
82 Aleida Assmann, Zwischen Ptlicht und Alibi. Wozu nationales Gedenken? Die Debatte urn das
Holocaustmahnrnal zeigt die Deutschen auf der Suche nach einem neuen Gedachtnis. in Die
Tageszeitung. 20. Marz. 1996. in Jeissrnann. 1999. op. cit. p. 160.
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urging the cultivation of a reflexive concept of national consciousness based in
the self critical acceptance of the nazi past In contemporary national
consciousness. In this model, the credibility of contemporary national
consciousness achieves definition to the extent that memory of the crimes of the
indigenous national past is highlighted. Assmann is clear that collective memory
is a constantly changing and dynamic social process. Whilst collective memory
is thus constantly reconstructed, it does lay claim to authoritative values which
can claim validity into the future. In this context, this concept of critical history
appears as a suitable means of cultivating authority for socially normative values
in the digital, "information-age"
Anders aber auch als der grol3e digitale Zeichenflul3, der im World-WideWeb-Wissen
permanent transformiert, konturiert das bewertende Erinnern nach wie vor
Selbstverpflichtung, Orientierung und Identitaten."
Thus the plea for a culture of reflexive, critical memory is understood as a means
of reconfiguring "national consciousness" the authority of the value therein
enshrined in the age of mass communication and permanently changing
information. It thus reproduces a claim traditionally associated with romantic
concepts of identity which seek in the engagement with history absolute values
and points of orientation in periods of contemporary flux. Whilst Habermas
speaks of a "broken identity" Aleida Assmann, together with her husband Jan
Assmann have spoken in favourable terms of the concept of "negative
nationalism". When combined with a dynamic culture of self critical reflection,
this concept of "negative nationalism" appears as a positive instance of self-
regulation which simultaneously describes a particular German phenomenon
Nirgendwo auf der Welt wird wie bei uns eine die eigene Identitdt untergrabende
Erinnerung festgeschrieben. 85 Yet at the same time this is a form of self-critical
reflection which provides the foundations for a reconstructed concept of
contemporary national "normality" measured in the degree to which this
negative past is acknowledged and accepted in the new Germany."
83 ibid. pp. 160-1.
84 ibid. p. 165.
85 cfInterview with Aleida and Jann Assmann. Die Zeit. Nr. 50. 1999. op. cit.
86 Jan Assmann. ibid.
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In this context, Thierse cited Habermas support for the Eisenmann model as
encapsulating the Pathos des Negativen" and likewise considered the importance
of cultivating contemporary moral responsibility from a critical reflection of the
German past
Das Denkmal, iiber das wir heute entscheiden, richtet sich an die zukiinftigen
Generationen mit der Botschaft: Scham ist ein Moment unserer menschlichen Wiirde.
Aus dem politisch-praktischen Gedenken unserer mit unfa13barem Unrecht verkniipften
Geschichte erwachst auch moralische Gegenwartsverpflichtung und Zukunftsfahigkeit. 88
It is interesting to note how Thierse clearly perceives no contradiction between
invoking the National Socialist past in contemporary identity creation whilst
condemning the instrumentalised, "ritualised antifascism" of the GDR which, he
and others have suggested, contributed to the later growth of the Far Right in the
former East. 89 Such critiques suggest the impression that whilst the former SED
regime shamelessly instrumentalised the National Socialist past for
contemporary political aims, contemporary, unified Germany is engaged in a
neutral, honest confrontation with its past. Yet, as Jan and Aleida Assmann
suggest, such "neutral" collective memory is a fiction as the "remembered past"
always serves to either legitimise or de-legitimise the present and reflects
contemporary concerns." The clearest expression of this relationship between
engaging with the past and articulating contemporary interests was offered by
Chancellor Schroder. Schroder was initially clearly ill-disposed towards the
Holocaustmahnmal and only changed his attitude when it became apparent, in
the wake of the reaction to Walser's comments, that it was no longer possible to
oppose the monument. Schroder's engagement with the National Socialist past
represents a more "pragmatic" version of the subtler formulations of
reconfiguring "normality" evident in the writings of Habermas and the
Assmann's. Schroder's understanding of the altered status of the National
Socialist past in reunified Germany IS strongly motivated by the
acknowledgement that the end of the Cold War has also loosened the shackles on
the concept of German sovereignty and the posing of questions of national
87 Habermas,. Die Zeit. op. cit. .
88 Thierse in Rosh. ibid. p. 136.
89 Thierse.in Rosh. ibid. Herzog.
90 cf Aleida and Jan Assmann. Die Zeit. Nr 50. 1998. op. cit.
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interests. Explaining his understanding of the "normality" of contemporary
Germany Schroder elaborated
Ein Yolk kann aus seiner ganzen Geschichte nicht heraus. Ohne Yergewisserung uber
die Historie gibt es weder Gegenwart noch Zukunft. Nur ist eben die Frage, was
uberwiegen soll. Schafft die Bereitschaft, einer neuen Generation, sich
auseinanderzusetzen, nicht zu vergessen, nicht auch die Chance, unbefangener die
eigenen Interessen zu vertreten? Ich glaube bislang uberwog die Befangemheit. Das
hangt auch mit der Frage zusammen, warum wir Europaer sind. Die Generation vor
meiner hat gesagt: Wir sind es, weil das die richtige Antwort auf die deutsche
Geschichte ist. Und wenn die Deutschen es nicht sind, werden bei den anderen die
Angste vor dem Furor teutonicus ubergrols. Jetzt muf man hinzukommen, daf wir
sagen: Die Deutschen sind nicht nur Europaer, wei! sie mussen, sondern mindestens
auch, weil sie wollen und es dazu gar keine Alternative gibt."
Schroder clearly understands the value of contrition for the past as a means of
asserting the legitimacy of national interests in the present. Furthermore,
Schroder perceives a change in sovereignty perceptions between his generation
and the one previous whose option for Europe was shaped by the recent, and
frequently personal, experience of National Socialism. For Schroder's generation
it no longer appears as primarily a matter of "historical responsibility" whether
the Germans are European orientated but rather more a matter of subjective
political choice. One might infer from Schroder's statement that this shift from a
primacy of "historical responsibility" to pragmatic political choice could also be
applied to the articulation of contrition for the National Socialist past. This
concept of "normality" has been criticised and commentators have remarked on
the curious phenomenon of the present establishment personnel who cut their
political teeth during the counter-cultural rebellion of '''68'' and who now assert
national interests to an extent unimaginable under previous administrations.
Writing in Die Zeit Klaus Hartung perceived a Schluj3strich under the German
past in Schroder's rigorous assertion of national normality at the Party
Conference in Leipzig in April 1998.92Speaking before the September elections
Schroder criticised Kohl's European policy for casting integration and the Euro
as the "price of German history" and argued for a more assertive articulation of
91 Schilder. Die Zeit. Nr. 6 1999. op. cit.
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national interests. Hartung notes that Schroder's "normality" rhetoric is unlikely
to explode a new Historikerstreit as it is driven by pragmatic political concerns
of a generation untouched by the war experience for whom the Gnade der spiiten
Geburt has become a matter of fact." Writing in Der Spiegel, Reinhard Mohr
also noted the national tone in Schroder's governmental declaration in which the
chancellor spoke of the Selbstbewufusein einer erwachsenen Nation, die sich
niemandem iiber-, aber auch niemandem unterlegen fiihlen muJ3.94Mohr
imagines the outrage among liberals and the left such comments would have
provoked if Kohl had attempted such a "normalisation". Mohr notes the strange
combination of a political class shaped to a large extent by the '68 experience
employing a political vocabulary most traditionally associated with right-wing
conservative nationalists such as Dregger or intellectuals of the New Right. 95 Yet
this form of national normality is not accompanied by a plea for drawing an
overt line under the National Socialist past in the manner implied in Walser's
controversial speech. Mohr perceives the framework of German identity on the
threshold to the new century as cast between the dispute over Walser's speech
and Schroder's rhetoric of normality. Mohr perceives this new discourse of
normality as a consequence of the broader ascension of a new power-generation
born around the mid- to late 1940s
Und dennoch - es gibt so etwas wie eine langsam wachsende Normalitat in Deutschland,
auch im Verhaltnis zu seiner Vergangenheit. Eine neue Generation der 40- bis 50
jahrigen reprasentiert sie bereits. Sie stellt die Bundesregierung, sitzt in den
Chefredaktionen der groJ3enMedien, leitet Theater, Universitaten, Weltkonzerne."
This is clearly the generation of the New Left and former '68 milieu which has
successfully completed its Marsch durch die Institutionen in the 1990s. Mohr
comments that the essential difference with this generation is that it did engage
with the National Socialist past and hence is bound to adopt a more sovereign air
in dealing with the German past than its predecessors. This is a point positively
picked up in a contribution for the 'PERSPEKTIVE Berlin Burgerinitiative' by
92 Klaus Hartung .Schroders SchluBstrich Die SPD sonnt sich in der Gnade der spaten Geburt.
Die Zeit. Nr. 18. 23. April. 1998.
93 ibid.
94 Reinhard Mohr, Total normal? in Der Spiegel. 49/1998. p. 41.
95 ibid.
96 ibid. p. 48.
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the director of the SPO's party school Tilman Fichter." Fichter, a former SOS
member, draws a continuity between the critical student engagement with the
National Socialist past during the 1960s and the support for the construction of a
monument to commemorate the Holocaust during the 1990s.98 Fichter suggests
that between 1945 and 1968 three main generations determined political culture
in West Germany comprising the Weimar, Front and HJ/Flak-auxiliary
generations all of which failed to engage successfully with the National Socialist
past." For Fichter only the successive generations of war- and post-war children
born after 1935 and 1945 respectively have developed a civilised and reflective
relationship with the National Socialist past. This generation, which corresponds
to Mohr's new elite, were shaped by the post-war experiences of economic
reconstruction and Adenauer, the anti-authoritarian revolt of the 1960s, the
social-liberal coalition, the Kohl era and the collapse of "poststalinism" in the
East.1oo
It is primarily this generation which Fichter considers the prime supporters of the
Holocaustmahnmal project.'?' For Fichter, the symbolic reflection of the
National Socialist past could provide a point of social and political consensus in
German society. Fichter suggests that the parliament, Berlin Senate and the
group of sponsors of the monument could invite disparate representatives of
youth comprising a rather motley congregation of Sports, Catholic and
Evangelical and socialist youth groups, anarchist Autonomen from community
groups together with young recruits of all three armed forces.t'" This appears as
an exercise in rapprochement with the German past, particularly on behalf of the
military, in which the articulation of contrition simultaneously offers a point of
collective consensus for contemporary pluralist society in which the '68
generation have attained political hegemony. This is a theme which was also a
dominant undertone in the public-political discourse of the so-called
Goldhagenkontroverse.
97 Tilman Fichter, Zur Vorgeschichte des Denkmals: Fiinf Generationen nach Auschwitz. in
Rosh. 1999. op. cit. pp. 173-201.
98 ibid. p. 181, 197-200.
99 ibid. p. 186.
lOO ibid. p. 197.
101 ibid. p. 199.
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7.4 "Ordinary Germans" - Then and Now. The "Goldhagen Controversy".
The publication in 1996 of the US political scientist Daniel Jonah Goldhagen's
doctoral thesis 103 provoked unprecedented academic, media and public interests
in the US, Israel and above all Germany. Goldhagen's Hitler's Willing
Executioners was published in the US in Spring 1996 and later in the year
translated and published into (the more ambiguous title) Hitlers willige
Vollstrecker in Germany. The German publication in August 1996 was followed
by a discussion tour of five major cities in September that year which attracted
mass audiences and were broadcast live on national television and radio. The
combination of intense academic, public and media interest in Goldhagen's
thesis indicated that the discussion over Hitler's Willing Executioners expanded
beyond an academic exchange of interpretations of the genesis of the Holocaust
and provided insight into the reflections of contemporary Germans on
contemporary German political culture. Through the tumult which emerged
around the publication and promotion of the book one might perceive that, as in
the case of the Holocaustmahnmal, the German past was being employed as a
filter through which contemporary political culture could be observed. This
perception could only be strengthened by the extremely problematic historical
explanation of the Holocaust advanced in the thesis.
Goldhagen's central thesis is that the Holocaust was less a product of Nazi racial
biology and rather more the most obscene manifestation of an inherently anti-
Semitic German culture. For Goldhagen, the perpetrators were "Germans" first
and only SS men, NSDAP, SD or Police Battalion members etc. second, Their
chief common denominator was that they were all Germans pursuing German
national political goalsI" Distinctive of Goldhagen's thesis, however, is that
this "perpetrator mind set" is considered paradigmatic of the collective mind set
102 ibid. p. 193.
103 Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, Hitler's Willing Executioners. Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust.
Abacus. London. 1997.
104 Goldhagen. ibid. p. 7.
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of the vast majority of Germans. lOS Goldhagen argues that a historical
perspective is imperative in order to understand the evolution of the genocide.
This appears a reasonable claim yet in Goldhagen this historical explanation
assumes the teleological form of reading backwards into German history from
the Holocaust in order find spurious evidence of a centuries-old "eliminatory
anti-Semitism" which was transhistorically ingrained into German culture.!"
Goldhagen asserts that during the nineteenth century not only did the
conservatives and viilkisch nationalists form the "vast majority of the
population"!" but also that liberal emancipationists and assimilationists were in
fact wolves in sheep's clothing representing a brand of "philo-antisemitism't.!"
From this perspective, distinct phenomena such as assimilation, the repeal of
emancipation, expulsion through to annihilation were all variations, enormously
different as they may be, on the eliminationist mind set. 109
For this reason the Nazis did not have to "remake" the Germans after 1933 as the
vast majority of them subscribed to the underlying Nazi model of Jews and in
this sense (as the Nazis themselves understood) were "Nazified" in their views of
Jews .110 Upon this basis Goldhagen asserts that the "Nazi German Revolution"
was "on the whole, consensual"."! This notion that Nazi, exterminatory anti-
Semitism reflected a central theme of "the cultural cognitive model of German
society"!" provides the substance of Goldhagen's cultural-anthropological
approach to the genesis of the Holocaust. Goldhagen's new and substantially
different view of essential aspects of the period'? comprises the notion that
previous non-German scholars were fundamentally mistaken in assuming that
the Germans "were more or less like US"."4 Goldhagen suggests that we should
approach German history somewhat as an "anthropologist" does when
10' ibid. pp. 4, 9, 44, 78-9
106 ibid. pp. 31-2, 74, 399.
107 ibid. p. 56.
108 ibid. p. 59.
109 ibid. p. 70.
110 ibid. pp. 87. Also cfpp, 85, 103,116, 443.
III ibid. p. 456.
112 ibid. p. 74.
113 ibid. p.
114 ibid. p. 27.
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investigating the world of a people about whom little is known. us Rather than
representing children of the Enlightenment and rational occidental culture,
Goldhagen considers the Germans almost as a species apart which, despite
superficial congruence with Western societies, were in essence dominated by a
cultural cognitive model which was founded in the "magical thinking" of
exterminatory anti-Semitism. In the light of this dominant anti-Semitic cognitive
model of German culture we are, according to Goldhagen, compelled to revise
our assumption that the Germans were essentially "like us". This is driven home
in the final page of the book in which Goldhagen summarises the general
underlying tenet of his thesis in which he contends that the concentration and
death camps exposed not just Nazism's but also Germany's "true face" and that
to a great extent "Himmler's Kultur" had already beome the "Kultur of
Germany't.!" Clearly aware of the implications of his thesis for perceptions of
contemporary Germany, Goldhagen states, buried away in the endnotes of the
book, that he does not believe in the existence of a "timeless German
character"."? Goldhagen maintains that the "common cognitive models" of
German history have changed and evolved particularly since 1945. This caveat is
undermined, however, by the whole argument of the book which understands the
Holocaust not only as the culmination of miIIennial European anti-Semitism but
as the reactionary apogee of an already "Nazified" German culture.
Academic responses to Goldhagen were overwhelmingly critical. Hans-Ulrich
Wehler noted the unintentional proximity of Goldhagen's cultural cognitive
model with the cultural categories of bio-racism.!" Goldhagen's monocausal
explanation of the genesis of the Holocaust attracted criticism from both
"intentionalists" such as Eberhard Jackel'" and Yehuda Bauer!" and
liS ibid. p. 28.
116 ibid. p. 460.
117 Goldhagen. 1997. op. cit. p. 594. Footnote 38.
118 Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Wie ein Stachel im Fleisch. in Die Zeit. Nr. 22.24. Mai 1996.
119 For Jackel, Goldhagen' s work is simply a "bad book" and has reduced the niveau of research
to the level of the 1950s. cfEberhard Jackel, Simply Put: A Bad Book in Franklin H. Littel (ed.)
Hyping the Holocaust: Scholars Answer Goldhagen. Merion Westfield Press. Pennsylvania.
1997.pp. 159-164. also cfthe same accusation in Wehler. 1996. op. cit. and Wolfgang Scheffler,
Ein Ruckschritt in der Holocaustforschung. in Der Tagesspiegel. 03. 09. 1996.
120 Yehuda Bauer, Daniel J. Goldhagen's View of the Holocaust. in Littel. ibid. pp. 59-72.
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"functionalists" such as Hans Mommsen!" and Gotz Alyl22. Goldhagen's
cavalier treatment of the sources has also been subjected to surgical scrutiny and
the illogic which underpins his argument that the Germans murdered Jews
because they were anti-Semitic and that they were anti-Semitic because they
were Germans has been critically exposed.!" Goldhagen's response to the critics
has varied between arguing the same in more diplomatic language.!" personally
abusing his critics.!" to threats of libel action in the British courts against his
detractors.!" Whilst historians and experts on the genesis of the Holocaust
subjected Goldhagen' work to a rigorous critique, other intellectuals have
defended the work. The most important intellectual to defend Goldhagen was
Habennas. Habennas defence of Goldhagen is not primarily motivated by
intellectual agreement with his thesis but rather more by an appreciation of its
provocative impact upon German political culture. In this context, Habennas
perceives in the controversy surrounding the work an opportunity to develop the
concept of "broken identity".
In 1997 Goldhagen was awarded the Friedenspreis of the Federal Republic by a
public forum in recognition of his academic achievements in Hitler's Willing
Executioners. In the laudatio for Goldhagen at the award of the prize, Jurgen
Habennas explained his defence of Goldhagen's work in terms of its
121 Hans Mommsen., The Conditions for Carrying Out the Holocaust: Comments on Daniel
Goldhagen's Book. in Litte!. ibid. pp. 29-43. Also, Mommsen, Die diinne Patina der Zivilisation.
Der Antisemitismus war eine notwendige, aber keineswegs hinreichende Bedingung fur den
Holocaust. Die Zeit. Nr. 36. 30 August. 1996 in which Mommsen repeats his argument that the
Holocaust must be viewed within the context of the "cumulative radicalisation" process which
accelerated in the context of the war against the Soviet Union. Also cf Hans Mommsen, Die
Realisierung des Utopischen: Die Endlosung der Judenfrage" im "Dritten Reich" in Geschichte
und Gesellschaft. 9 (1983) pp. 381-420. Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht. 1983.
122 Although Aly welcomes Goldhagen's concentration upon the subjective motivation of the
perpetrators he criticises the "super-intentionalism" of the thesis which substitutes Hitler for "the
Germans". cf Aly 1997. op. cit. p. 202.
123 Norman G. Finkelstein and Ruth Bettina Bim, A Nation on Trial. The Goldhagen Thesis and
Historical Truth. Henry Holt. New York. 1998.
124 cfDaniel Goldhagen, Das Versagen der Kritiker. in Die Zeit. Nr. 32. 2. August. 1996.
125 cf A Comment by Daniel Jonah Goldhagen on: A Nation on Trial: The Goldhagen Thesis and
Historical Truth. at, http://www.goldhagen.comIn this "review" of Finkelstein and Bims's
critique Goldhagen fails to justify his claim that their work represents a "tendentious series of
inventions" by failing to address a single one of the numerous points raised by Finkelstein and
Bim.
126 cf Michael Jeismann, Der Schutz des allmachtigen Autors. Rechsanwalte lesen lassen: Wie
Daniel Goldhagen mit seinen Kritikem verflihrt. in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. Nr. 256. 4.
November. 1997. p. 41.
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contribution to fostering debate on the theme of the social use of history.!" For
Habermas, Goldhagen's study has provided a public forum in which the citizenry
of contemporary Germany can continue the social discussion over what form of
political coexistence is desirable and which values should attain normative
status. Such discussion reflects both Germans' perceptions of one another as
citizens and also how they wish to be regarded by others
Dafiir bildet die nationale Geschichte einen wichtigen Hintergrund. Nationale
Uberlieferungen und Mentalitaten, die Teil unserer Person geworden sind, reichen
namlich weit hinter die Anfange dieser Republik zuruck, Diese Verbindung aus
politischem Selbstverstandnis und historischem Bewul3tsein bestimmt auch die
Perspektive, aus der Goldhagens Buch fur uns relevant wird. 128
Thus for Habermas, the national past forms a useful background against which
contemporary society is cast into relief. It is thus a perfectly natural, automatic
reflex for the Germans to ask questions about the Holocaust when attempting to
understand their contemporary political existence. In this reading, contemporary
political identity is lent substantial definition by the concept of historical
consciousness. Furthermore, the present is connected with the past not only
through this process of political self-reflection but by the same "cultural threads"
which linked the then generation of perpetrators to past generations as suggested
by Goldhagen. This link between past and present German culture shatters the
naive suspension of belief of contemporary generations towards their own
traditions and implicates present generation in a process of moral-political self
reflection.!" Whereas Goldhagen posits an anti-Semitic German cultural
cognitive mind set which continued from the middle ages to 1945, before
vanishing into the ether, Habermas maintains the continuity into the present in
the form of national traditions and mentalities which define a specific German
culture. In this context, Habermas perceives in the public discourse over
Goldhagen's study an opportunity to promote his concept of history as a critical,
127 ibid. p. 48-9.
128 ibid. p. 49.
129 This argument also dveloped in Birgit Rommelspacher, Anklage und EntJastung.
Sozialpsychologische Aspekte der Goldhagen-Debatte. in, Jurgen Elsasser, Andrei S. Markowitz
(Hrsg.) Die Fratze der eigenen Geschichte. Von der Goldhagen-Debatte zum Jugoslawien-Krieg.
Elefanten Press. Berlin. 1999. p. 34. Rommelsspacher main critique of Goldhagen is that he
terminates his thesis in 1945 thus letting contemporary generations "off the hook".
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negative pedagogic-political instance as Diese kritische Einstellung gegeniiber
Eigenem ist es, was Goldhagens Studie fordert - und was die Besorgnis mancher
Konservativer auf den Plan ruft.130
Thus in Goldhagen's thesis Habennas appears to perceive a public discourse
which is particularly suited to his project of critical self-reflection. In reading
one cannot help but feel that Habennas suspends his critical faculties with
respect to the intellectual and political character of Goldhagen's study in favour
utilising the public controversy it created to promote the concept of "broken
identity". The quality of insight offered by Goldhagen, his contribution to our
understanding of the genesis of the Holocaust and the inner logic of his argument
are all left untouched by Habennas. Clearly of more importance for Habennas, is
the potential of the book to weaken the naive faith in indigenous traditions
championed by conservatives with renewed vigour since 1989.131For Habennas
the conservative alliance of historicism and nationalism collapses the necessary
distinction between history as a tool of social analysis and history as a source of
identity creation and degenerates to GeschtchtspolitikI" Habennas argues for a
differentiation of the distinct roles played by the historian in legal, moral and
political discourse of the past. Whilst historians serve as experts in establishing
causality in legal trials and historical knowledge of past deeds plays a central
role in the moral dialogue between members of the personally effected
generation, history serves a different purpose for successor generations. For
successor generations of Germans, historical knowledge of the Holocaust and
National Socialist past forms an important moment in their process of ethical-
political self-definition. In this context, history serves as a source of normative
values in the present and historians participate in its discourse no longer as
experts but as "intellectuals't.!" Present German generations thus engage with
this atrocious period of national history with regards to their own political
identity
Sie wollen sich fiber die kulturelle Matrix eines belastenden Erbes Klarheit verschaffen,
urn zu erkennen, wofiir sie gerneinsarn haften und was gegebenfalls von den
no ibid. p. 50.
131 ibid.
132 ibid. p. 52.
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Traditionen, die damals einen verhangnisvollen Motivationshintergrund gebildet haben,
noch fortwirkt und der Revision bedarf.!"
Thus for Habermas whilst it is a nonsense to speak of "collective guilt" it is
possible to speak of a widespread individual guilt in the past from which a
consciousness of "collective responsibility" emerges in the present. 135 Thus
although Habermas is critical of the alliance between historicism and
nationalism, his own perspective of the role of history in shaping contemporary
political culture is also firmly welded to the past. Habermas conception differs
from conservative ideas of Geschichtspolitik in that he avoids the metaphysical
associations of conventional, transhistorical "identity" in favour of a process of
rational, conscious political reflection of discredited traditions. Thus for
Habermas, the bond with the past is not founded upon an innate "need" of
contemporary Germans to assure themselves of their identity via the assimilation
of particularist, cultural traditions, but rather more from the political need to
critically revise such traditions in the light of the catastrophe of National
Socialism.
Despite this distinction, or rationalisation of the need to cultivate historical
consciousness, however, this is a model which continues to cultivate authority
for contemporary values with reference to the past. In the form of critical self-
reflection, the past no longer demands the attention of contemporaries in terms
of its status as a positive role model, but rather more derives moral-political
authority from the experience of utter disaster and unimaginable inhumanity. For
conservatives such as Sturmer or Hildebrand, the past in the form of the
Bismarckreich or the history of the German Mittel/age offers the present an
affirmatory sense of historical precedent. For Habermas, the past offers the
present a source of value orientation primarily in terms of its own moral and
political bankruptcy. Thus, in the discussion over the Holocaust, the present
generation finds the negative counterfoil par example against which
contemporary value creation proceeds. Goldhagen's greatest service, for
Habermas, was in provoking a public discussion over the negative national past.
133 ibid. p. 61.
134 ibid. p. 54.
135 ibid.
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Yet more than its provocative impact as a catalyst of reflection, Habermas also
appears to implicitly sanction Goldhagen's central, and most contentious
assertion that the perpetrators committed atrocities because of the normative
status of anti-Semitism in German culture.!" It is this aspect which interests
Habermas in particular and although he concedes that Goldhagen's model of a
"straight road" to Auschwitz is problematic, he welcomes the emphasis upon the
perpetrators motivation and mentality which mirrored the cultural norms of
German society. The reason for this is that it provides a forum within which
contemporary moral and political social norms can gain definition. Habermas
suggests that the degree to which we ascribe culpability to individuals or
circumstances and where we draw the line between free will and compulsion,
guilt and innocence depends not only on our knowledge of the historical facts but
upon our perception of the facts. These social preconceptions (Vorverstandnisi
thus shade our perspective of the past
Die hermeneutische Bereitschaft, den wahren Umfang von Verantwortung und
Mitwissen anzuerkennen, variiert mit unserem Verstandnis von Freiheit - wie wir uns als
verantwortliche Personen einschatzen und wieviel wir uns selbst als politisch
Handelnden zumuten. Mit Fragen der ethisch-politischen Selbstverstandigung steht
dieses Vorverstandnis selbst zur Diskussion. Wie wir Schuld und Unschuld im
historischen Ruckblick verteilt sehen, spiegelt auch die Normen, nach denen wir uns
gegenseitig als BUrger dieser Republik zu achten willens sind. An diesem Diskurs
nehmen ubrigens die Historiker nicht mehr als Experten, sondem wie wir anderen in der
Rolle von Intellektuellen teil.137
This is an interesting perception of the dialectical relationship between historical
consciousness and political identity. On the one hand, contemporary social and
cultural norms and values provide a filter through which we view the past. Yet,
on the other hand, these norms and values are susceptible to transformation from
the reflection of history. Habermas himself has played a key role in this
mediation between National Socialist past and Federal Republican present
throughout his academic career and experienced at first hand the power of the
National Socialist past to influence contemporary political culture since the
1960s. Whilst it appears that Habermas acknowledges the dialectical relationship
between our perception of present and past, in the context of the project of
136 ibid. pp. 56-7.
137 ibid. p. 6 J.
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cultivating a sense of "broken identity" Habennas appears to commit a similar
confusion to that which he criticises in the conservative union of historicism and
nationalism. This appears to be the only possible explanation of his defence of
Goldhagen despite the serious problems with his perspective of German history,
culture and the genesis of the Holocaust. In the context of the Goldhagen
controversy Habermas appears to prioritise the contemporary process of value
creation from the self-critical reflection of the National Socialist past above the
clearly distorted "historical consciousness" represented in the book. In other
words, the fact that Goldhagen has offered a seriously flawed explanation of the
Holocaust which distorts rather than elucidates our understanding of the
phenomenon appears less important than his ability to provoke critique of
indigenous national traditions and culture. Thus for Habermas, Goldhagen's real
contribution to the ongoing discourse of ethical-political value creation is his
concentration upon specific customs, traditions, mentalities and perceptions in a
particular cultural context.!" Rejecting the critique of Goldhagen's rigid cultural
model, Habennas states that anthropological pessimism, which enjoys strong
German intellectual traditions, represents rather more the problem which he
seeks to address in the book."?
Habermas conception of the need of contemporary Germans to reflect their own
political and social norms in discourse of the National Socialist past is predicated
upon a sense of continuity between the generations which lends this process
moral authority. For Habermas this bond between past and present is formed by
the continuity of cultural traditions and mentalities which, however, are subject
to transformation.!" They are also subject to reactivation and it is clearly this
fear which motivates Habennas critique of right wing attempts to rehabilitate
more conventional forms of nationalism which were given a fillip in unification
of the two German states. The concept of "broken identity" draws upon concept
of historical legacy in order to cultivate the social authority to which it clearly
aspires. Unlike conventional discourses of "historical consciousness", this is





provides a foundation upon which a more positive sense of self in the present can
be reconfigured. The historian Lutz Niethammer, who by no stretch of the
imagination could be described as a friend of traditional German nationalism,
articulated this peculiar reconfiguration of national pride as follows with
reference to the government's regulation of compensation for former slave
labourers and victims of the National Socialist regime
Dal3 100 Milliarden und mehr in die Wiedergutmachung geflossen sind, die
hauptsachlich bei judischen Opfern angekommen sind, war berechtigt. Darauf sollten
wir durchaus in einem national en Sinne stolz sein.!"
Thus, in this reading, contrition and atonement for the past not only serves to
underline the "normality" of the German nation but also transforms into a
collective act which can be unreservedly viewed as a source of national pride and
by implication patriotism. In the following, final, section of this chapter I wish to
examine the manner in which this model of critical self-reflection as a means of
articulating a more authoritative sense of national normality and pride was
developed over the Kosovo intervention in 1999.
7.5. Power Politics between Sonderbewufusein and Sundenbewufltsein ?
Perhaps more than any other event, the military intervention in Kosovo displays
with startling candour the degree to which reflections of the National Socialist
past and German present have undergone radical transformation since
unification. The military intervention and specifically its German component
was overwhelmingly justified with recourse to the National Socialist past and the
contemporary moral-political obligations imposed upon the Germans. In this
manner the Kosovo intervention can be regarded as an example of the foreign-
political dimensions of "broken identity". Editor of the Frankfurter Allgemeine
Frank Schirrmacher commented Dieser Krieg wird in Deutschland, anders als in
anderen Liindern. fast ausschliej3lich mit Auschwitz begriindet referring to the
constant use of Holocaust vocabulary and imagery from Foreign Minister
Fischer who compared Milosevic with Hitler and Defence Minister Scharping
141 Spiegel Gesprach mit Lutz Niethammer, Wir wollen mit uns ins Reine kommen. Der Spiegel.
Nr. 8.22 Feb. 1999.
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who "consciously" employed the word KZ to describe prison camps in Serbia.'?
This use of the imagery and vocabulary of the Holocaust and Third Reich in
Western perceptions and presentations of the war in Kosovo was clearly not
limited to Germany and formed the historical paradigm through which the
"humanitarian intervention" was lent moral-political authority. Yet this clearly
attains a particular importance in the German context.
In an article originally published in the British Guardian newspaper and
subsequently published in the Siiddeutsche Zeitung, Goldhagen elaborated his
concept of a "German solution" for the conflict in the Balkans.'? In Goldhagen's
commentary, the experience of the Second World War assumes not only
metaphorical value but rather more the status of a practical historical lesson for
the present and future. For Goldhagen, whilst during the early 1940s Japan and
Germany persecuted brutal wars of conquest in which mass murder was inherent,
during the 1990s this role is performed by the state of Serbia. Not only are the
Serbs driven by the desire to conquer territory but also their "eliminatory
project" against the Albanian Diaspora differs only from the "German" atrocities
in terms of number. 144 As the "Germans" were consumed with anti-Semitism, so
the Serbs today are "obsessed" with the gliihender HajJ ihres ethnischen
Nationalismus.r" In contrast to "Germans" during the Second World War,
Goldhagen perceives that the Serbs themselves suffered from "ethnic conflict" at
the hands of Croatians, Bosnians and even Kosovo Albanians. Yet despite this
implicit recognition that the conflicts in the Balkans have more to do with civil
wars than state projects of racial extermination, Goldhagen states Doch haben
die Serben alles in ihren Kriiften getan, urn die Welt an den Holocaust zu
erinnem:" In this, Goldhagen most certainly reflects the dominant historical-
political filter through which the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo have been
viewed in Germany and the West. Goldhagen escalates the comparison with the
142cited in, Matthias Kuntzel, Milosevics willige Vollstrecker? Goldhagen, Deutschland und der
Kosovo-Krieg. in, ibid. p. 174.
143 Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, Eine "deutsche Losung" fur den Balkan. Urn das Volkermord zu
beenden, muG die Nato Serbien besiegen, besetzen und umerziehen. in Sudeutsche Zeitung. Nr.





Second World War further and perceives in the post-war occupation and "re-
education" of Germany and Japan a successful model for the present conflict in
Serbia and potentially a model for the whole of the Balkans.
In this, Goldhagen is at least consistent in his historical observation. Goldhagen
disregards the historically specific context of the Second World War in which
Germany and Japan emerged as serious rivals for world power with Britain and
the US, in order to make the somewhat farcical comparison with the bankrupt
Serbian state. Goldhagen holds an uncritical perception of US international
influence. Although he speaks of the necessity of a NATO engagement in the
Balkans, he rather undermines this sense of collective response by stating that if
the nineteen member states could not make a decision the US, and any others,
should simply go it alone."? He thus essentially argues that the Allies and-or the
US should repeat the experience of 1945 and militarily defeat the ruling regime
in Serbia, occupy the country and initiate a process of political and social re-
education. For Goldhagen this is not only a moral but also, in the long-term, a
"practical" necessity.!" As in the post-war period not only Germany and Japan
but the whole of the Western hemisphere was included into the hegemony of the
US, in the 1990s Goldhagen escalates the "German solution" to the entire region
Die Besetzung Serbiens ware die Voraussetzung fur einen umfassenden
DemokratisierungsprozeB - nicht nur in Serbien, sondem im gesamten ehemaligen
Jugoslawien. Denn es gibt keinen AnlaB zu glauben, daB die Nachbam der Serben lauter
Engel sind."?
Goldhagen supports this with the observation that "history" has proved that
foreign powers are capable of progressively intervening in other powers to
achieve peace and democratisation. Goldhagen also suggests that mass-murder
and wars of conquest deny the perpetrator nations any "moral right" to
sovereignty or self-determination.!" This appears as a "moral right" which
clearly aspires to global validity and yet remains the exclusive property of the
Western allies or more precisely, as he implies, of the US. Indeed, he perceives






cost" of this enterprise for the Allies. Goldhagen concludes by posing the
"simple" question of whether it would be better for the Serbs to be ruled by a
Konrad Adenauer or a Saddam Hussein. Either way, the primary factory appears,
as with the case of these two rulers, is that they are placed in power and
sponsored by the US. This is a form of "democratisation" which operates above
the heads of the supposed beneficiaries who would presumably oppose such a
move to their peril. in Goldhagen's contribution we may perceive a continuity of
the "cultural-anthropological" model of analysis which substitutes "the
Germans" with "the Serbs" who appear equally in need of a moral-political re-
education programme facilitated by the US military.
It is interesting to compare Goldhagen's US proscription for the Balkans with the
position developed by Habermas. As Habermas perceived in the debates over
Hitler's Willing Executioners an opportunity to promote the domestic project of
"broken" or "post-national" identity, in the NATO intervention in Serbia he
perceived the chance of expanding this concept into the realm of foreign policy.
During the early 1990s, Habermas warned of the dangers of a concept of
"normality" orientated towards the Mittellage and Bismarckreich'" and feared a
regeneration of the Sonderbewujitseinl" In an article written dealing with the
NATO intervention and specifically with its German military component,
Habermas developed the concept of the "post-national" constellation and posed
the possibility for realising the cosmopolitan order to which his concept of civil
society aspires.!" Habermas title Bestialitdt und Humanitiit recollects Carl
Schmitt's dictum wer Humanitdt sagt, meint Bestialitiit, Schmitt objected to the
use of such phrases in order to justify the pursuit of national interests under the
name of universalism and democracy. Schmitt's objections were not primarily
directed towards the instrumentalisation of this legacy for national interests but
rather more stemmed from his principled objection to humanism and a universal
outlook in general.!" Habermas takes this point to argue against Schmitt and his
lSI Habennas. 1995. op. cit. p. 172.
IS2 ibid. p. 86.
IS) JOrgen Habennas, Bestialitat und Hurnanitat. Ein Krieg an der Grenze zwischen Recht und
Moral. Die Zeit. NT. 29. April 1999.
1S4 cf Habennas. 1996. op. cit. pp.
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contemporary neoconservative acolytes such as Mechtersheimer and Nolte!" and
for a realisation of a cosmopolitan order. For Habermas, the potential for the
realisation of this order is heightened by the weakening of the nation state's
sovereignty in both domestic and international affairs. Thus the "natural
struggle" between nations identified by Schmitt or the principles of national
sovereignty defended by conservatives in the present is no longer tenable
Oagegen erheben sich trifftige Einwande. Es ist ja nicht so, als ob in der postnationalen
Konstellation kraftstrotzende Nationalstaaten von Regeln der Volkergemeinschaft
gegangelt wiirden. Vielmehr ist es die Erosion der staatlichen Autoritat, sind es
Bi.irgerkriege und ethnische Konflikte innerhalb zerfallender oder autoritar
zusammengehaltener Staaten, die Interventionen auf den Plan rufen.!"
As instances of this constellation of decomposition Habermas cites the cases of
Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia and now Kosovo. Habermas rejects the idea that
interventions are an attempt to compensate for the loss of power in the globalised
world and argues that they represent a just answer to the experiences of the
Holocaust and totalitarianism."? The problem of a "moralisation" of the situation
to meet particularist political ends is acknowledged by Habermas and he
perceives the answer to this problem in the institutionalisation of moral values in
a legal codex which aspires to universal application. In this sense, the borders
between law and morality can be relativised and reconfigured on the road to the
realisation of cosmopolitan world order which, however, is not predicated upon a
"world governrnent'V" Despite the universalist aspiration of this project, there
is a discernible air of particularism under the surface of his argument. In the first
instance this is represented in the belief that in fact only the states of the first
world are in a position to realise this cosmopolitan order.!" This prioritises the
West as arbiter of universal values. Thus far this appears congruent with older
arguments of the "enlightened political culture" of the "West". Yet this older
position is supplemented by a newer turn in which Europe and indeed Germany
appear as the genuine representatives of the modernised Kantian project of
realising "eternal peace". Habermas suggests that for the first time this
progressive tradition has been taken seriously by a German government. In





contrast to his earlier fears of a normalisation of the German nation and a
regeneration of the Sonderbewujitsein, Habermas notes that the discussion over
the war against Serbia progresses along similar lines to other Western states and
that no trace of the Sonderweg or Sonderbewujitsein can be detected.!"
Interestingly, Habermas perceives a division in the alliance between Anglo-
Saxons and Continental Europeans, between those who invited the General
Secretary of the UN to their meetings and who strive for agreement with Russia
and those who trust only in their weapons arguing
Ein interessanter Unterschied im Verstandnis der Menschenrechtspolitik zeichnet sich
ab. Die USA betreiben die globale Durchsetzung der Menschenrechte als die nationale
Mission einer Weltmacht, die dieses Ziel unter Prarnissen der Machtpolitik verfolgt. Die
meisten Regierungen der EU verstehen unter einer Politik der Menschenrechte eher ein
Projekt der durchgreifenden Verrechtlichung intemationaler Beziehungen, das die
Parameter der Machtpolitik schon heute verandert.!"
In this context Habermas perceives that the US employs the moral vocabulary of
human rights in order to legitimise distinctly political aims and relates this to the
Wilsonian tradition of fusing national interests with humanitarian aims. He poses
the legitimate question of how the West would react to Chinese intervention in
Asia justified by the rhetoric of human rights. Curiously, for this advocate of
"self-critical reflection" this is not an accusation levelled against Germany and
the Europeans who he clearly perceives as the more progressive of the Allies
who have internalised the cosmopolitan aspirations he describes. For Habermas
the problem of morality as a vague, relative concept can be addressed by its
codification in law. In this sense, this mirrors the project of republican
democracy which underpins his concept of Verfassungspatriotismus
Erst wenn die Meschenrechte in einer weltweiten demokratischen Rechtsordnung in
ahnlicher Weise ihren "Sitz" gefunden haben wie die Grundrechte in unseren national en
Verfassungsen, werden wir auch auf globaler Ebene davon ausgehen durfen, dal3 sich
die Addressaten dieser Rechte zugleich als deren Autoren verstehen konnen.l"
Thus Habermas seeks to realise the republican democratic core of civil society in
the international context as a collective Lernprozefi. The motif of the Lernprozej3
is interesting and is a term which has been employed by critical thinkers to





describe the post-war inclusion of the FRG into the enlightened political
community of the West. In the post-unification, post-national constellation, it
would appear, and this is the implication of Habermas argument, that Germany is
no longer in need of instruction but rather more is itself in a position to promote
this culture around the globe. For Habermas, of course, this testifies to a
commitment to cosmopolitan values. Yet his older theme of "Westernisation" as
only possible in Germany after the experience of Auschwitz can be employed to
legitimise a particularist German responsibility. In this sense, Chancellor
Schroder argued for a possible German military contribution to NATO's
intervention prior to the outbreak of conflict
Uns steht das Argument "Wegen der deutschen Geschichte geht es nicht" nicht mehr zur
Verfiigung. Bis hin zu denen, die im Kosovo geschutzt werden mussen, besteht doch die
Einsicht: Weil wir dort solche vielfliltigen Verwiistungen angerichtet haben, sind wir
besonders gefordert, Mord, ja vielleicht sogar Volkermord zu verhindern.!"
Thus the German past, in this reading, represents not merely a moment of shame
and dignified contrition but rather more appears as a historically founded, moral-
political obligation to engage in world politics even via recourse to military
intervention. This of course remains a highly problematic past and the signs of
splits in the coalition and the refusal to countenance the deployment of ground
troops are clear signs that the National Socialist past remains a problematic past.
Despite this, it must be noted that the theme of the National Socialist past has
undergone perhaps its most radical transformation in the German context in
terms of reformulating a progressive international mission of the new state which
claims the moral high ground. This appears a dangerous and inherently
escalatory model of action whether it is codified in law or not. This clearly
represents a qualitative departure from the heilsamer Primat der Innenpolitik of
the Bonn republic. The shift in left-liberal intellectuals from a critique of the
missioneering Weltpolitik of the Wilhelmine era to a legally codifed
Weltinnenpolitik is, perhaps, a marginal distinction for those effected who appear
to disqualify themselves from participation in the herrschaftsfreier Diskurs of
the new cosmopolitan order. It is now time to draw some concluding remarks on
the culture of contrition and the reconfiguration of national identity.
163 cf Interview with Chancellor Schroder in Die Zeit. Nr. 6. 4. Februar. 1999. op. cit.
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8. Concluding Remarks:
National Identity: Compensation, Emancipation or Contrition?
Manche lfiBt sich verfuhren durch sein augenblickliches Daseinsinteresse. Es scheint ihm
vorteilhaft, die Schuld zu bekennen. Der Entriistung der Welt tiber das moralisch verworfene
Deutschland entspricht seine Bereitwilligkeit zum Schuldbekenntnis ... Dazu kommt die fatale
Neigung, durch Schuldbekenntnis sich besser zu dunken als andere. In der Demut ist verborgen
der bose Stolz auf sich seiber. 1m SichbloBstellen liegt ein Angriff auf die anderen, die es nicht
tun.'
As Jaspers penned his treatise on the question of guilt over half a century ago, Europe
and Germany lay in rubble. For Jaspers, the responsibility to admit culpability for the
recent past derived from the rootedness of the National Socialist regime in broader
trends of German history and political culture. This was a form of contrition for the
recent past which issued from the criminal, political, moral and metaphysical
responsibility to the victims and, ultimately, God. As the above indicates, Jaspers was
clearly aware of the potential abuse of contrition for self serving ends. Jaspers returned
to the question of guilt twenty years later and, on the occasion of the 1965
Verjiihrungsdebatte, argued that an honest, self-critical reflection of the crimes of
National Socialism could facilitate the still absent sittlich-politische Revolution
incumbent on West German society.' Upon first glance, this may appear to contradict
the sense of Die Schuldfrage which rejected any instrumentalisation of the National
Socialist past for contemporary interests. Yet, during the 1960s this discussion
proceeded against the background of perceptions of social and political continuities,
particularly at an elite level, between National Socialist and West German state. The
ethical and moral questions arising from the engagement with the National Socialist past
during this period issued from the perception of social and political continuities of older,
authoritarian elites and political mentalities which continued to influence the present.
It is a CUrIOUS phenomenon to observe that the willingness of political culture to
internalise the discourse of contrition for the past appears to have developed in inverse
proportion to the perception of social , personal and political continuity between
National Socialist and West German society. From this perspective, the willingness to
IKarl Jaspers, Die Schuldfrage. Ein Beitrag zur deutschen Frage.Artemis Verlag. ZUrich. 1946.
p.82.
2 Jaspers, Gesprdch mit Rudolf Augstein: "Far Volkermord gibt es keine Verjiihrung", in Jaspers.
1966. op. cit. p. 20.
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express contrition for the National Socialist past must be viewed within its specific
historical context. In this vein, one critic of the Holocaustmahnmal project justified his
opposition in terms of the rather "safe" form of "self-criticism" expressed in this
symbolic representation of the past.' Broder highlights that thirty years ago such a
project would have been genuinely radical and politically useful in the context of the
endurance of former elites in West German society. In the present, such "secondary"
solidarity with the victims is infused with the experience of a contemporary society free
from any significant personal or political continuity.
This contrasts starkly with the context within which SPD politician Arndt made his
passionate and genuinely self-critical declaration Ich weiJ3 mich mit in der Schuld.'
Unlike many of his parliamentary colleagues, Arndt had actively supported individuals
persecuted by the Nazi authorities. Yet he still considered himself partially responsible
as he had not, like the majority, rushed out into the streets to attempt to publicly hinder
the persecution of the Jews. On the opposite side of the debate, arguments for the
abolition of the statute were equally related to genuine social and political interests and
forces as Barzel's defence of the honour of the Wehrmacht displayed.' This contrasts
with contemporary dealings with the past and Lea Rosh noted, with disappointment, that
in contrast to the passionate debates of the 1960s, the parliamentary debate of the
planned Holocaustmahnmal in June 1999 was conducted in a rather bureaucratic
manner and the speakers put her more in mind of accountants than statesmen." Whilst
the limitations of the Verjiihrungsdebatten should not be underestimated,' she articulates
an interesting point regarding the altered social context within which contrition for the
past is expressed.
The expression of contrition for the National Socialist past in contemporary society
clearly attains a different political significance than during the 1960s and is informed
3 Henryk M. Broder, Abgesturzte Flugzeuge. Streitpunkt Holocaustmahnmal: Das wohlige
Gefiihl, etwas Gules zu tun. Der Tagesspiegel, 17. Januar 1995. in Jeismann. (Hg.) 1999. op. cit.
p.88.
4 c:f Arndt in, Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages. 4. Wahlperiode. Stenographische
Berichte. Band 57.170. Sitzung. Bonn. Mittwoch, den 10. Marz 1965. p. 8552.
s Barzel, ibid. pp. 8530.
6 Rosh. 1999. op. cit. p. 142.
7 Jaspers criticised the Verjahrungsdebatten (with the exception of Arndt and Jahn's
contributions) as a self-serving PR exercise for the "party oligarchy". c:f Jaspers. 1966. op. cit. p.
115.
280
with the underlying impression of a "historicised" National Socialist regime. This does
not imply a relativisation of the moral-political significance of the National Socialist
past as argued by New Right revisionist historians in an attempt to salvage the reputation
of traditional nationalism. Rather more this reflects the fact that contemporary Germany
is clearly a fundamentally different society than the Third Reich or the early post-war
republic which was marked by elements of personal and political continuity. In this
context, there is the danger that contrition becomes subjected to a process of
instrumentalisation for contemporary political interests in the form warned of by Jaspers
in 1946. The thesis has attempted to examine the tendencies contained within a
reconfiguration of national identity towards such an instrumentalisation.
This is a problem which reflects perceptions of history as a medium of understanding
human social development and as a source of authority for particular values in the
present. 8 In turn, this reflects attitudes towards the concept of progress in human affairs.
E.H Carr distinguished the "barren" understanding of progress as an automatic or
inevitable progression to a clearly defined "goal" of history from "progressive
development of human potentialities"." For Carr, history enabled us to appreciate the
present within a dynamic context of historical development. This sense of direction in
history, or the belief that we have come from somewhere is closely linked, for Carr,
with the belief that we are also going somewhere. Likewise, he states that a society
which has lost its capacity to progress in the future will quickly cease to concern itself
with its progress in the past. In this context, he stated that our view of history reflects
our view of society. 10 This is evident from the thinkers and positions considered in this
thesis and the reconfiguration of national identity which I have suggested.
In this context, it seems desirable to distinguish between approaching the past as a
source of contemporary value creation and as an investigation into human social
development. The discourses of national identity examined in this thesis look to the past
as a source of authority and legitimacy for contemporary political values. This appears
the case with both the right and left wing thinkers considered in this thesis. For right
wing thinkers such as Hermann LUbbe, history offers a source of "compensation" for the
8 c:f Filredi. op. cit. 1992. esp. pp 59-87.
9 E.H Carr, What is History? Penguin. London. 1987. p. 119.
10 ibid. p. 132.
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dynamism and perpetual technological-social change which is characteristic of modem
society. II Whilst technological-economic modernisation is welcomed by these thinkers
on the basis of their commitment to Free Market society, they react negatively to the
processes of social and political change which this generates. In the concept of "national
identity" right wing thinkers perceive a discourse which can both cultivate a sense of
continuity in the face of change and also foster a sense of common value consensus in
society mediated through the patriotism derived from a positive identification with the
national past. In the "schizophrenia" of the neoconservative attitude towards
modernism, critical historians perceived a rehabilitation of the ideological model of the
Sonderweg which promoted economic-technological modernisation and simultaneously
repressed emancipatory political currents.
In response to this, the discourse of Verfassungspatriotismus represented an attachment
to the civil society of the classic bourgeois age which was mediated by the self-critical
analysis of the Sonderweg and the reflection of the National Socialist past as a warning
of the dangers of German nationalism and "conventional" patriotism. In this sense, for
Habermas, West Germany only ever became a member of the progressive, Western,
enlightenment political culture after the discrediting of the Sonderweg through the
horrific experience of Auschwitz and the critical reflection of this in the 1960s.12 Critical
history and the practice of critical self-reflection of indigenous traditions through the
Sundenbewujstsein thus served to affirm West Germany's commitment to the
revolutionary critique of tradition and also performed an important self-regulatory
function in the critique of nationalism and unreflected patriotism.
Both "compensatory" and "emancipatory" approaches to the German past reflected
distinct perceptions of contemporary society and a desire to foster authority through
recourse to history. During the 1980s, the dichotomy between left and right was
reflected in perceptions of identity. Whilst conservatives perceived in "historical
consciousness" a medium of cultivating conventional national identity, left-liberal
opinion understood critical history as an underlying foundation of post-national
Constitutional Patriotism and a medium of social-political emancipation. In historical-
political terms, these approaches were broadly orientated towards the modernist culture
II Labbe. 1992. op. cit. pp. 281-304.
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of the enlightenment and republican popular sovereignty on the one hand and the
romantic reaction to the enlightenment and the nation state unified under Bismarck, on
the other.
Both conservative and left-liberal thinkers argued for the cultivation of nonnative social
values cultivated from an interpretation of history. Whilst conservatives perceived in
conventional national identity a source of compensation for the rigours of modem
society and social pluralism, left-liberals sought to cohere the emancipation from nation
state to post-national social state in 1945 and the 1960s via recourse to a critical reading
of national traditions. These positions reflected different political approaches to the
present. A society organised along the ideas of Lubbe or Nolte would assume a very
different form than one conceived by thinkers such as Habennas and Wehler. Whilst
this remains the case in the present, the dichotomy between "compensatory" and
"emancipatory" approaches to past and present has undergone significant change since
the emergence of the discourse of identity during the 1970s which was accelerated and
influenced by the events of 1989-90. Whilst the collapse of the post-war order and the
unification of the German states clearly exercised a profound effect upon political
culture, seeds of congruence between liberal conservative and left-liberal perspectives
were sown in the common orientation towards the status-quo which was remained
characteristic of both these approaches to West German society.
Taking a broader, macro-perspective, many commentators, from both left and right,
trace broader paradigm changes back to the 1970s and the gradual erosion of the post-
war consensus. For the left in particular, the 1960s represented the pinnacle of the post-
war "Golden Age,,13which, since the 1970s, has appeared in terminal decline. This is
expressed in the decline of the mass political parties, state regulation of the economy,
the terms of economic security and welfare of the population and relative increases in
poverty both within Western societies and between the "First" world and the rest of the
globe." This development also charts increasing scepticism in political culture towards
the concept of progression in human potentiality after the decline and discrediting of
both revolutionary and reformist currents of the twentieth century left. The
12 Habennas. 1992. op. cit. pp. 159-160.
IJ Hobsbawm. 1994. pp. 224-400.
14 Thus Hobsbawm. 1994. op. cit. pp. 403-585.
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neoconservative backlash of the 1970s saw Reagan and Thatcher in the US and Britain
champion a "radical" conservatism predicated on the dismantling of the post-war
consensus, the celebration of free-market economics which was ideologically cohered
by a distinctly nationalist political tone. In the West German context these broader
developments assumed, as they did everywhere, a specific form. Whilst the Kohl
government displayed less of the US and British conservative vigour in challenging the
post-war socio-economic consensus, in terms of political culture, the 1980s witnessed
an attempt by the right to rehabilitate conventional terms of patriotism. This was
predicated upon a relativisation or neutralisation of the political charge of the National
Socialist past.
The collapse of the Cold War appeared to confirm these longer trends and were
synthesised in perceptions of a victory of capitalism over the only social alternative of
the twentieth century and the discrediting of the left. In the German context, these
developments were a source of inspiration for conservative thinkers who quickly set
about translating the academic debates over national identity from the 1980s into the
political reality of unified Germany. Liberal, pro-Western conservatives celebrated the
victory of the anticommunist Westbindung and the return to a state of national
"normality". This project was based in the perception that reunification of East and
West German states during a period of anticipated "hard times" necessitated the
cultivation of a conventional form of patriotism based upon the positive traditions of the
nation. The return of Germany as a global player was perceived as existing in the
continuity of the Mittel/age and the historical Mittelmacht of Imperial Germany. New
Right conservatives eschewed the pro-Western approach of their liberal colleagues and
instead proclaimed the welcome return to more traditional forms of national autonomy
and German nationalism which pre-dated the "Westernisation" of one half of Germany
post 1945. The collapse of communism appeared to these thinkers to indicate the
bankruptcy of a "modernist" political orientation and to offer a basis for relativising the
moral-political charge of the National Socialist past.
Yet where conservative thinkers of both liberal and New Right variety appear mistaken
is the assumption that this signifies an unproblematic return to "traditional" forms of
national identity and patriotism based upon a positive reading of the national past. The
negative reception of the idea of "utopia" and "ideology" appears to have exercised a
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disintegrative impact upon all formulations of utopia or progress. Hobsbawm conceives
in the socio-economic disaster zone of a Russian society reorganised along the
principles of the Free Market the discrediting of this ideology and social practice."
Furthermore, in the weakening of the autonomy of national governments in the face of
the globalisation of productive forces, many commentators perceive in the 1990s a
waning of the integrative capacity of the nation state to foster both social prosperity and
social loyalty".
I would argue that in the second half of the 1990s a rather different configuration of
national identity has emerged which represents a qualitatively new departure from both
the conventions of traditional left and right wing discourse. Whilst the left may have lost
faith in the ability of human society to progress to an alternative and superior social
form, a section of the liberal conservative right has ditched its embarrassing
commitment to romantic concepts of nationhood which, in the context of German
division, played a necessary role in articulating the commitment to the "nation". During
the 1990s the most remarkable feature of liberal conservative approaches to the question
of the German nation has been the clear willingness of conservative politicians to
express unreserved contrition for the crimes of the past and to link this with the
articulation of national identity. Likewise, left wing discourse has been transformed and
many left-liberal thinkers have engaged with the project of constructing a "progressive"
identity for the new nation. In this sense, not only have various left-liberals attempted to
construct a progressive continuity for the German nation between 1848 and 1989 but
more importantly the critical reflection of the National Socialist past has assumed centre
role in the reformation of national identity.
It is with regards to this aspect of reflecting the National Socialist past that the
traditional discourse of conservative national identity has been most fundamentally
outflanked by left liberal constructions. Liberal conservatives arrive at the point of
contrition for different reasons than left-liberals. Traditionally, self-critical reflection of
the National Socialist past has been anathema to conservatives of both liberal and
deutsch-national provenance. This resulted primarily from the perception that critical
15 Hobsbawm. 2000. op. cit. p. 71.
16 William Wallace, Rescue or Retreat? The Nation State in Western Europe. 1945-93. in Dunn.
1995. op. cit. p. 75. Kennedy. 1992. op.cit. Habermas. 1998. op. cit. pp. 65-90.
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reflection of the National Socialist past and the articulation of "conventional" national
identity were mutually antagonistic. During the Cold War, anticommunism offered a
means of articulating a concept of Western democracy and also relativising the National
Socialist past. This function has been clearly eclipsed in the post-Cold War world. In
this context the anticommunist relativisation of the National Socialist past appears
reduced to its anti-modernist core which posits the horrors of the past as evidence of the
innate barbarism of humanity. The initial enthusiasm for the reconstruction of
conventional national identity was an important feature of the early 1990s. Yet at the
end of the 1990s there appeared little resonance for a return to "Prussian" virtues,
Bismarck's Imperial Germany, or indeed the ethnic concepts of nationality argued by
New Right thinkers. Romantic nationalism no longer appears a discourse which could
command social and moral authority in the domestic and international arena. In
particular, the ascent of an anti-humanist paradigm of explanation of the National
Socialist past no longer effects a relativisation or neutralisation of this past. It appears
rather more the case that not only in Germany but throughout the West, the engagement
with this period in history forms an important component of the rearticulation of social
values. In this vein it was interesting to read British Prime Minister Blair declare that in
remembrance of the Holocaust he perceived the basis of a "new form of patriotism" and
hoped to emulate the German decision of 1996 to declare the 27 January a "National
Day of Remembrance"." In the German context, however, these developments clearly
attain a specific importance.
It is within this context, of the exhaustion of conventional national compensatory and
post-national emancipatory approaches at a time of value flux that reflection of the
National Socialist past has assumed a new public-political role. This assumes the form
of a reflexive, constructed identity creation, which invokes a sense of "learning the
lessons" of the past in order to cultivate present and future social values and political
orientation. Yet unlike conservative concepts of conventional national identity or left-
liberal formulations of democratic-national traditions this is a form of national identity
based upon reflection of the wholly negative past of National Socialism. In this sense, I
speak of the ascendance of a "culture of contrition" which is defined by the acceptance
of guilt for past transgressions and the willingness to "learn the lessons" of the past.
17 c:f The Guardian. 27. January. 2000
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In the 1990s this self-critical reflection of the National Socialist past appears the
constitutive core of the reconfiguration of the concept of national identity based upon
the "critical ownership" of the indigenous past. 18 This also appears to be a discourse
which meets with a degree of popular resonance, Although the Goldhagen controversy,
Holocaustmahnmal, Wehrmachtaustellung all drew criticism from the right, it would
appear that in terms of broader political culture - and particularly the articulation of the
legitimacy of the state in domestic and international affairs - that this right wing critique
is in a position to mobilise backward prejudices and resentment but not society as a
whole. The self critical reflection of indigenous traditions appears a broader
phenomenon which has engulfed all Western states in the post-Cold War world. As
Helmut Dubiel argues, it no longer appears that traditional representations of a glorious
national past offer much of a positive orientation for the present." It is in this context
that Jurgen Habermas perceives the force of the "post-national constellation" which
could at last break the republican core of the classic nation state from its cultural-
particularist context. In this Habermas appears to pursue the "post-national" arguments
of the division years and offer a model of emancipatory alternative." In Habermas we
find the most sophisticated articulation of this critical reformulation of national identity.
Habermas reflects upon the republican origins of the nation state which he seeks to
continue at a supra-national level between nation states and a "post-national" level in
terms of national identity. The bearers of this radical democratic model are the
"autonomous public" of modem communication society comprised of the New Social
Movements and their derivatives. For Habermas, the bourgeois national citizens of the
late eighteenth and early nineteenth century attained an abstract level of solidarity in the
principle of equality of all before the commonly agreed law. Whilst this appears an
accurate observation it appears equally revealing that Habermas prioritises the
solidaristic virtues of this republican model over the aspiration to emancipation from
tradition and, more to the point, the present which fuelled the "Age of Revolution".
18 Thus the formulation of a collective national identity based upon critical analysis and reflection
in Barbara Heimannsberg, The Work of Remebering. A Psychodynamic View of the Nazi Past as
II Exists in Germany Today. in Barbara Heimannsberg and Christopher 1. Schmidt (ed.) The
Collective Silence. German Identity and the Legacy of Shame. Jossey-Bass. San Francisco. 1993.
pp. 163-170. here p. 164.
19 Dubiel. 1997. op. cit. p. 292.
20 Jurgen Habennas, Es gibt doch A/ternativen! Die Zeit. Nr. 42 vom 8. 10. 1998.
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Habennas traces this principle of democratisation and equality through the lean years of
the German Sonderweg through to the post-war period of the social state. The
breakdown of this highest regulation of the relationship between capitalism and
democracy is offset by Habennas in the emancipatory milieu of the "autonomous
public" of Greens, feminism, the NGOs and human rights groups. Habennas perceives
in a global autonomous public, which is held together by fear in an involuntary
RisikogesellschaJt, the radical inheritors of this defeated legacy and the bearers of
"cultural solidarity" in society which strives in an emancipatory direction unhindered by
the instances of Geld and Macht. The shift from "work" to "communication" society
and the eclipse of the classic form of the nation state necessitate the continuation of this
radical, modernist core to a higher level. Europe is the next logical stage of this post-
national progression towards an ultimately cosmopolitan order of world society.
Yet despite the radical pretensions of this model, it remain problematic in terms of its
own emancipatory aspirations. This is a model of regulating the relationship between
the areas of "cultural solidarity", the state and capitalist interest which, however, has
accepted the failure of state intervention to regulate the relationship between capitalism
and democracy. In this context, all that politics can do is as he suggests is "follow" the
market." Habermas remains critical of the social effects of a ruthless neo-liberalism and
growing inequality within the Western nations and between richer and poor nations
around the globe. Yet the only counter to this which he offers is a discourse of social
solidarity rather than one of social change. In a sense, this radical democratic model
repeats in different form, the dichotomy in neoconservatism between socio-economic
modernisation and political emancipation in inverted form. In this context, given the
prioritisation of solidarity over change, Habermas appears to offer a radical version of
the compensation sought after by the right in the certainties of a positive past.
Habermas in essence constructs a radical legitimacy for the law and identity by formally
removing it from the remit of political parties and "official" state instances (because
Sinn cannot be administratively cultivated) and its transference to the area of "cultural
solidarity" born by the "autonomous public". In this model, however, the tendency is
inherent for the arena of "cultural solidarity" itself to be "tamed" by state and capitalist
interest for which it provides a new, radical, legitimacy. In this context it appears rather
21 Habennas 1998. op. cit. p. 84.
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more the case that it is these groups whose emancipatory aspirations have been
"tamed"." Habermas' prime concern appears social regulation rather than social
emancipation. His radical formulation of legitimacy is based upon the insight that the
best form of legitimacy to which society can aspire is one based upon the principle of
self-regulation." In this sense, his plea that legitimacy must be legally mediated both in
terms of domestic solidarity and international law appears to contradict his critique of
social democracy during the 1970s and 1980s for attempting the bureacratic
administration of Sinn.
Habermas' claim to continue the modernist project appears undermined by his
scepticism towards the concept of historical progress. Whilst he perceives in this period
a positive legacy to be developed and continued in the present, Habermas' project of
emancipation is limited by his scepticism towards the ability of men and women to
rationally progress human society. Habermas thus falls back onto a concept of radical
identity which is centred upon the past in the form of the 1960s reconfiguration of West
Germany but more importantly in the collapse of the German nation in 1945. This is a
concept of "broken identity" which is historically focused upon the National Socialist
experience as the central event of the twentieth century.
This concept of history as Dementi appears to unite both the exhaustion of the
progressive faith in historical emancipation and also of the conservative faith in national
traditions. This is a reconfigured relationship to tradition which nevertheless demands
social authority and brooks little contradiction. This appears as a discourse of self-
critical reflection which not only reserves its critical faculties for the past rather than the
present, but which also appears immune to critique itself. As various commentators
noted during the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999, the claim to historical and
moral responsibility via remembrance of the Holocaust serves to suffocate or discredit
all critical faculties." Those who dare question this self-critique or suggest elements of
political instrumentalisation therein run the risk of being criticised as Holocaust deniers,
anti-Semites or neo-fascist hyper-nationalists. There appear clear tendencies of political
instrumentalisation of the National Socialist past both in terms of reconfiguring the
22 c:fChristopher Lash 1995. op. cit. p. 27. Hobsbawm. 2000. op. cit. p. 98.
23 Habermas. 1998. op. cit. pp. 226-30.
24 Thus Kuhnl, in Elsasser, Markowitz. 1999. op. cit. p. 178-9.
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legitimacy of the state domestically and internationally through the medium of national
identity. Despite the radical form which this identity assumes, its formulation of
political values as national identity inevitably prioritises the past over the future and
present and represents a formulation of particularist values. This matches well with
contemporary scepticism towards the possibility of progress either in the form of a
"return" to an ideal national community or of a departure into an alternative future - the
past is no longer positively endowed and this reflects the belief that a positive,
alternative future is either no longer tenable of indeed a criminal enterprise. All that
remains is the horror of the National Socialist past as a stimulus to engage in historical
consciousness and learn the lesson of the past.
In this context, I argue that the culture of contrition expresses both the perceived need to
address the National Socialist past and, at the same time, cultivate authority from history
for a concept of national identity. This is a discourse of identity which offers neither the
compensation cultivated from the certainties of a positive national past and nor does it
feature as a discourse of emancipation from the confines of the present into a potentially
better, alternative future. It both reflects the perception that the national past no longer
commands the authority to discipline society and also, in the National Socialist past,
offers an example of the dangers of "utopian" aspirations to change in the future. This
appears, in contrast to many conservative formulations, a discourse of collective
national identity which is aware of its historical contingency and indeed of its own
constructed character. Whilst this appears a more rational and open ended form of
identity, it nevertheless feels compelled to legitimise contemporary values in the form of
an obligating historical legacy.
Against this broader background of our age, contrition offers a medium of reconfiguring
a sense of national identity which can mediate both domestic solidarity and articulate
the moral-political authority of the nation on the international stage. In this, despite its
radical pretensions in thinkers like Habermas, it ultimately repeats the problems to
which he has spent his life criticising: the prioritisation of "tradition" as a source of
contemporary political and moral direction and the division of humanity into a hierarchy
of particularist units. Habermas is formally committed to universal values, radical
critique of tradition and political emancipation. This is formulated however as a
distinctly Western political culture and a progressive legacy which only the nations of
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the "first World" can truly represent." For Habermas, the post-national West German
republic joined this community in the I960s and this membership was predicated upon
the historical and political-intellectual departure from the nation state. The
contemporary German nation achieves rapprochement with this community through the
concept of "broken" identity which predicates contemporary national "normality" upon
the degree to which past "abnormality" is acknowledged and repented. Furthermore,
Germany is not only a member of this Western political community, but appears for
Habermas as a more faithful representative of progressive traditions than the US. Whilst
his critical faculties perceive power-political motives underlying the US invocation of
"morality", he does not countenance this as a feature of German and European policy.
It is in this sense that the thesis perceives a reconfiguration of national identity and a
culture of contrition which can be invoked to reformulate a more assertive sense of
national self and a sense of moral-political mission internationally. This appears an
"emancipatory" discourse of identity which seeks a more resonant form of social
regulation domestically and a more "progressive" basis for international activity. It is
these aspects of this discourse which appear to appeal to more sensitive liberal
conservatives, such as Herzog, who acknowledge the discrediting of conventional
patriotism and who seek a more positive and less compromised articulation of national
"normality".
The thesis perceives in contrition the potential basis for reconfiguring "compensation"
for contemporary social problems via an "emancipatory", "critical" discourse which
has, however, shed all pretensions to purposeful change in the present in the search for a
better, alternative future. As such, this is a discourse whose socially critical aspirations
are muted by its underlying pessimism towards progress in human affairs and its
reconfiguration of national particularism. It is out of this pessimism that the concept of
national identity emerges. The thesis suggests that the serious problems of the
contemporary world are not best met by the divisive concept of national identity -
whether in traditional or "broken" form. The realisation of human potentialities appears
better served by a non-dogmatic, positive attitude towards an open-ended future rather
than the final certainties of a horrific past.
25 Habennas. 1996. op. cit. p. 213.
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